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1. Rebalancing the Chinese 
Economy to Sustain Long-Term 
Growth 
Huw McKay and Ligang Song
Meeting the challenge of the domestic restructuring to sustain growth, 
asserting the right to develop and not to be penalized purely for being 
large, while taking on increased responsibility for global balance, 
stability, and governance and representing the interests of less-powerful 
developing countries are major new mountains to climb. China’s success 




The call to rebalance economic growth in China is primarily motivated by 
the structural problems within China as well as in its economic relations with 
the rest of the world. China’s international payments surpluses during the first 
decade of the twenty-first century have corresponded with deepening domestic 
structural risks to China’s economic growth and development. These structural 
challenges include the composition of growth resulting from China’s dynamic 
internal transformation, China’s trade orientation, the trajectory of resource use 
and carbon dioxide emissions, welfare problems of distribution and international 
constraints. It is thought to be necessary for China to confront these challenges 
now in order to put the growth path into a more sustainable trajectory in the 
future (Deer and Song 2012). The purpose of this year’s China Update book is to 
examine the challenges China faces in addressing its economic imbalances and 
sustaining growth against a backdrop of heightened domestic and international 
uncertainty. 
The transition from a traditional to a modern economic system entails major 
and often rapid structural change in economy-wide processes of industrialisation, 
urbanisation and agricultural transformation (Syrquin 1988). As a result of 
rapid structural change, transitional economic challenges arise, which can pose 
risks to future growth if not well managed. Rapid change can also create welfare 
challenges, as the institutional settings required for an equitable distribution 
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of income might not be present. As such, the pursuit of ‘balanced’ economic 
growth is best thought of as a broad policy objective that aims to limit risks to 
growth and to mitigate the negative impact on welfare. It should therefore not 
be expressed as a particular target, such as a reduction in the current account 
surplus or a rise in the labour share of income. The role of policy should be to 
design and implement a framework that reduces distortions, encourages and 
rewards innovation, equalises access to education, employment, a social safety 
net and capital for investment, while minimising rent-seeking opportunities. 
The desire to achieve such an environment will create demand for institutional 
reforms that can facilitate these processes of structural change in the least 
disruptive fashion.
The enormous scale of China’s aggregate imbalances—crudely summarised 
as the unbalanced nature of domestic expenditure—and its external payment 
surplus, which reflects a stark excess of saving over investment, are well known. 
Unbalanced domestic expenditure refers to China’s high, and until recently, 
growing share of investment relative to consumption in the expenditure 
measure of gross domestic product (GDP). The external payment imbalance 
refers to China’s current account, trade account and private financial account 
surpluses. While the list of Chinese economic characteristics that deserve the 
label ‘unbalanced’ is legion—including the level of the exchange rate, the 
urban–rural income divide, the coast–hinterland divide and asymmetries in the 
degree access to credit, education, social security and housing—at some level 
they all relate to and inform the basic macroeconomic structure and the external 
payments position.
Figure 1.1 China: Expenditure shares of GDP, 1978–2010 (per cent)
Source: CEIC data, available from <http://www.ceicdata.com/China.html> 
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Figure 1.1 shows the composition of China’s growth by broad expenditure 
measures of GDP from 1978 to 2010. Three broad trends are evident: from the 
late 1990s there was a sharp rise in the investment share of GDP and a sharp fall 
in the final and household consumption shares of GDP, while the share of net 
exports rose sharply from a modest base after 2002. China’s high investment share 
of GDP implies a very rapid rate of capital accumulation. China’s  investment 
share of expenditure in GDP (using gross capital formation—that is, including 
inventories) rose sharply from 35 to 48 per cent of GDP between 2000 and 
2010, equating to a 13 percentage point rise.1 A high investment share of 
expenditure in GDP is relatively common in industrialising economies, such as 
Japan in the 1960s and Korea in the 1970s, particularly in the early period of 
rapid (catch-up) economic growth (Fukumoto and Muto 2011; Knight and Wang 
2011; McKay and Song 2010:Table 1, p. 6). Catch-up growth driven by rapid 
capital accumulation can be sustained for decades in capital-poor transitional 
economies with an abundant supply of labour. China’s still relatively low level 
of income per capita and capital stock per worker, in addition to its relatively 
low (policy-suppressed) urbanisation rate and the relative backwardness of its 
central and interior provinces, argue that concentrated growth on the Chinese 
Mainland could potentially continue for longer than it did in its neighbours, 
including Chinese Taiwan and South Korea. 
Nevertheless, China’s investment-led growth model is coming under 
increasing scrutiny due to the increasingly unhelpful international environment 
in which it finds itself today, in addition to the sheer heft that China exercises as 
the world’s largest manufacturing exporter, emitter and commodity consumer. 
Furthermore, the costs of resource-intensive growth—via high pollution 
and energy intensity—are becoming increasingly apparent. The low share of 
household consumption in total expenditure is a result of both a high marginal 
propensity to save and the low wage share of income at the national level (and 
declining real rural incomes). China has avoided a major slowdown or recession 
to date, but cyclical overinvestment in certain sectors has been a feature of each 
successive boom, especially during the recent heavy-industry and stimulus-
infused housing and transport infrastructure booms of 2004–07 and 2009–10 
(McKay 2011) 
The sharp rise in the investment share of expenditure in China’s GDP has 
been mirrored by a fall in the share of final consumption expenditure. Figure 
1.2 shows the fall in final consumption expenditure has been led by a falling 
share of household consumption. Between 1979 and 2010 total household 
1  Note that gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) has risen by slightly less than gross capital formation (GCF) 
over the equivalent period, which reflects a cyclical rise in inventories at the end point. A longer sample, 
comparing 2010 with 1994, shows that GCF rose by 8 percentage points of GDP but GFCF rose by 12 
points. This reflects the fact that the increasing commercialisation and efficiency of the corporate sector 
have reduced the bloated inventory position that characterised the early transitional economy. 
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consumption expenditure fell by 13 percentage points. This fall in the share 
of household consumption expenditure has been led by a fall in the share of 
rural household consumption, which has not been offset by urban consumption 
growth. Across this period, the government share was low and declined from 
15 to 13 per cent of final expenditure.2 As a result, China’s share of consumption 
expenditure remains at a relatively low level.
Figure 1.2 Final Consumption Expenditure Shares of China’s GDP, 1978–2010 
(per cent)
Source: CEIC data, available from <http://www.ceicdata.com/China.html>
The sharp rise in China’s trade surplus between 2004 and 2008 was driven by 
a spectacular improvement in China’s heavy machinery and transport balance, 
as documented by McKay and Song (2010) and shown in Figure 1.3. This offsets 
a widening deficit on primary products. 
2  Note that the government share of income rose through this period, but the portion of public income 
allocated to capital formation rose, thus leaving public consumption at a low level. See the discussion 
of public savings in the chapter in this volume by Ma et al.
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Figure 1.3 China’s Trade Balance, Decomposed by Broad Sector, 1993–2009 
(per cent)
Note: Primary includes agriculture, fuel and other mineral resources. 
Sources: CEIC data, available from <http://www.ceicdata.com/China.html> Updated data based on 
original in McKay and Song (2010). 
China’s total manufacturing trade balance was in net surplus from as early 
as 1994 but this was concentrated in lower value-added manufactures, and 
was initially offset by a net deficit in heavier machinery and transport sectors; 
however, the machinery and transport equipment balance turned to surplus and 
rose sharply from 2004 to 2008. This turnaround in the machinery and transport 
equipment balance was the result of rising investment in heavy industry in the 
early 2000s (Anderson 2008), which led to a sharp rise in heavy manufactured 
goods output, an expanding market share abroad and import substitution at 
home when capacity came on stream from 2004. Yet this sharp rise in output 
was not matched by an equivalent rise in domestic or foreign demand and, thus, 
the rise in market share led to falling prices, a lower rate of profit and continual 
deterioration of China’s terms of trade (McKay and Song 2010). 
Many of the challenges arising from China’s structural imbalances are 
more or less common to transitional economies undergoing rapid growth and 
development. This is because the process of economic transition from a traditional 
to a modern economy entails a set of linked structural transformation processes 
such as industrialisation and urbanisation. This structural transformation is 
often marked by the concentrated growth of industry, a rising investment share, 
sharp rises in the energy intensity of production and demand for resources, and 
falling expenditure shares of consumption. 
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Nevertheless, in the case of China’s economy, the legacies of its pre-reform 
heavy industrial structure and its institutional and policy architecture have led 
to a pattern of growth marked by widening imbalances that are more pronounced 
than those seen in other industrialisation drives, and which were not present 
in the initial stages of China’s reform. Indeed, China’s pattern of growth during 
the 1980s was remarkably balanced by current standards as household incomes 
rose on the back of a rapid growth of labour-intensive production outside the 
traditional state-owned sector. China’s domestic expenditure and external 
imbalances, however, widened in the 2000s as a result of China’s stalled 
institutional reforms in the 1990s, and this has reinforced an investment-led 
industrial structure, especially in heavy industrial production and real estate 
development. The current growth pattern highlights the opportunity costs of 
stalled structural reform areas such as the migration and labour market systems, 
vertical fiscal relations, state-owned enterprises and the financial system. 
Tackling China’s economic imbalances requires economic policy reform to 
direct a new pattern of growth, which requires a major alteration of the current 
industrial structure and the institutional arrangements associated with it. 
The key is shifting the economic environment and incentive structure within 
which China’s economic entities operate. The rebalancing policy objectives are 
to raise the domestic absorptive capacity of China’s economy, through raising 
the relative share of consumption in final expenditure, rather than by seeking 
to reduce the net role of exports; and to direct resources further away from the 
relatively inefficient into the more productive sectors of the economy through 
an improved market mechanism. 
Three sets of market-enhancing institutional reforms are necessary: reform of 
the labour system, reform of the financial system and reform of the government 
system, particularly in regards to the local government and state-owned 
enterprise sectors. The interdependence of the Chinese economy with the 
world economy also suggests the significance of these channels for international 
rebalancing (Deer and Song 2012).
The effective (as opposed to spatial) urbanisation of China’s migrant workers 
is the most effective and realistic mid-term policy strategy for rebalancing 
China’s macroeconomy. Institutional reform can accelerate the long-run 
processes of migration and urbanisation in China, which would raise domestic 
demand and, thus, reduce both the internal and the external imbalances in 
China’s macroeconomy, and shift the current unbalanced industrial structure. 
A policy of urbanising rural migrant workers by removing threshold barriers 
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to urban residency and ensuring equal access to social housing, education, 
health and social protection3 is likely to raise consumption by migrant workers 
(Song et al. 2010). 
Moreover, the process of urbanisation requires investment in urban 
infrastructure (such as mass transit and utility provision) and in service 
industries. The effect, combined with higher domestic consumption by migrant 
workers, would be to raise growth and enhance structural change. Urbanising 
China’s rural migrant workers would also help to integrate China’s still segmented 
labour markets and provide a basis for long-term real wages to rise. Real wage 
gains can accelerate structural change by raising household consumption in 
domestic demand4 and by providing a basis for real currency appreciation. 
That can help shift China’s industrial structure towards the tertiary sectors, 
which would benefit from the broader and deeper consumption basket of the 
better remunerated household sector. This would have positive implications for 
employment and enhance many qualitative aspects of future growth.
Given the objective of rebalancing China’s industrial structure, capital market 
reforms are necessary for China to rebalance in three related areas: the allocation 
of capital, the cost of capital and the link between domestic financial reform and 
exchange arrangements. Although China’s bank-dominated financial system 
deepened its asset base considerably over the reform period, China’s system of 
formal credit allocation has remained narrow, and is mainly directed to the state 
sector as state-owned banks (SOBs) continue to dominate the sector. China’s 
state-owned commercial banking sector allocates capital at rates that are low 
relative to those prevailing in private markets or a broad indicator such as the 
growth rate of nominal GDP, which reinforces the wider structure of investment 
and expenditure imbalances. 
It will be difficult to develop domestic financial markets without further 
liberalisation of the foreign exchange system or of financial (capital) account 
controls. The two spheres are mutually reinforcing, even circular (McKay 2007). 
The exchange rate remains the anchor for China’s monetary policy and any move 
towards a flexible currency needs to be accompanied by a shift to a different 
anchor. Current efforts to build up the interbank lending market and thereby 
establish a benchmark short-term interest rate to serve as this anchor show 
3  Andrew Watson’s chapter in this volume advocates a centralisation of the retirement income 
system—a recommendation in harmony with our own thinking.
4  Another way of thinking about this relation is through unit labour costs and the wage–profit share. 
If workers are under-remunerated for their productivity, unit labour costs fall and profits rise. 
That summarises the events of the past decade. Changing the direction of these dynamics—fully 
remunerating (or even a period of catch-up over remuneration)—would lower profits, boost the wage 
share, raise consumption and possibly lower investment also, although the effect on investment is 
ambiguous due to differentiated sectoral effects and the altered relative price between capital and labour 
predicted by rising unit labour costs.
Rebalancing and Sustaining Growth in China
8
some promise. Speaking pragmatically, however, this market remains immature, 
liquidity remains variable and its ability to independently anchor monetary 
policy is a distant surmise. For now, all prescriptions for financial liberalisation 
must be offered within the context of the present regime apparatus.
A feasible reform would be to seek to incorporate China’s large informal 
financial sector into the official financial system, in tandem with a removal 
of administrative ceilings on bank deposit rates and floor lending rates. 
The objective would be to create a legal sector of smaller non-bank financial 
lending and deposit institutions.5 These firms would compete with the banking 
system to provide market-based contract terms for households and small and 
medium- enterprises (SMEs). Once this reform has been given some time to 
gain traction, targeted moves to liberalise private capital outflows could be 
introduced as a further market discipline on the banking system. This would 
have the additional benefit of increasing the loan to deposit ratios of the 
banks, which would increase their wholesale funding requirements, which 
would deepen the interbank funding market, which would increase the 
potency of interest rates as a monetary policy tool, and thus accommodate the 
required transition away from the exchange rate anchor, as ventured above; 
however, the circularity of the financial reform arguments again come into 
play. The possibility of a deterioration of bank asset quality at a time of weak 
asset prices and a substantial pool of legacy loans from the quasi-fiscal lending 
expansion of recent years argues for a prudent approach to avoid unnecessary 
instability. Regardless of the precise time frame, deepening the reform of the 
SOBs is a requisite achievement if capital allocation is to improve and contribute 
positively to the ultimate rebalancing goal. Recent official commentary6 and the 
incorporation of interest rate liberalisation into the Twelfth Five-Year Plan offer 
some grounds for hope.
The current pattern of local government investment, especially its role in 
real estate investment, is a key element, along with the high share of investment 
in heavy industry, of China’s cyclical macroeconomic imbalances, which have 
led to repeated overheating of China’s economy during each phase of the 
investment-led boom (McKay 2011). Since fiscal reforms in 1994, the majority 
of government revenues have been collected by the Central Government, while 
local governments have remained responsible for the majority of public and social 
expenditure, especially on health and education (Figure 1.4). As a consequence 
5  The recent rise of shadow banking in China indicates that this is not such a distant goal. Official 
data accessed via CEIC show that non-banks (and the off-balance-sheet activities of banks) made up 
44 per cent of ‘total social financing’ in 2010, which is material. Indeed, the subsequent slowdown in 
non-bank finance is a major factor in the deceleration in economic activity under way in the first half 
of 2012. 
6  Premier Wen Jiabao addressed the monopoly power of SOBs in a radio address in April, as reported in the 
Asian Wall Street Journal (2012). 
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of this fiscal and governmental system, not only do local governments have 
a powerful incentive to maximise growth, but they also have an overriding fiscal 
incentive to do so through driving new investments, such as in real estate, in 
which they have direct or indirect claims to income, rather than through raising 
consumption. 
Figure 1.4 Revenues and Outlays by Level of Government
Sources: CEIC data, available from <http://www.ceicdata.com/China.html>
The current pattern of local government investment—and outlays, more 
broadly—could be better directed to meeting the needs of China’s current 
urban and migrant populations by directing more expenditure to social 
housing and educational and social services (such as health, retirement income, 
transportation, unemployment insurance, public space and environmental 
amenity). There is much more to be done to reform the fiscal system at central 
and local government levels, including shifting the current land-transaction tax 
system to a property valuation and rates system. Reducing reliance on turnover 
and land sales would reduce two of the most egregious incentive distortions of 
the current system, while moving to a periodic valuation tax on housing would 
reduce investor willingness to leave property idle (untenanted), thus bringing 
about an effective increase in housing supply. Turning what is currently 
a heavily pro-cyclical revenue source (land sales) into something more closely 
resembling an annuity stream, would improve the sustainability of sub-national 
government finances in a material way. Recent moves to allow local governments 
to issue bonds, while cracking down on financing platforms, are useful policies 
but they do not attack the underlying issues. 
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Rebalancing China’s economy also requires reform of the state-owned 
enterprise (SOE) sector. There are immediate and long-term term reasons for 
this. Although China’s SOEs no longer account for the majority of output 
in all sectors, the SOEs remain dominant in strategic monopoly sectors 
(Xiao et al. 2009). State-owned enterprises have accounted for much of the sharp 
rise in heavy industrial profits and enterprise savings in the period since 2000. 
The monopoly position of China’s SOEs also poses a longer-term challenge to 
the reform of China’s industrial structure towards a more balanced trajectory. 
Although the non-state sector accounted for the majority of industrial output 
in 2007, the SOEs accounted for more than 53 per cent of non-agricultural fixed 
investment, while employing only 13 per cent of the total workforce (Brandt and 
Zhu 2010). These discrepancies reflect the capital-intensive heavy industries in 
which the SOEs operate. They also suggest, however, an inefficient allocation 
of capital across sectors, which also reflects the still large distortions in China’s 
factor markets, which cumulatively benefit the SOE sector disproportionately 
(Huang  and  Wang 2010). Rebalancing China’s economy towards domestic 
demand will therefore require better access to capital for the non-state 
enterprises, reduced barriers to entry in SOE-dominated sectors, a greater 
openness to foreign direct investment in those same areas, further privatisation 
and a greater insistence on shareholder rights regarding dividend payments. 
The overall opportunity costs can be further reduced or even minimised should 
more resources be allowed to flow into the more vibrant non-state sectors 
through improved factor markets. This goal cannot be achieved unless China 
deepens the reform of state-owned enterprises.
Investment in hard infrastructure, from telecommunications to transport, 
remains central to long-term growth, but there is also a clear tendency towards 
cyclical overinvestment in certain heavy industries, from cement and steel 
production to machinery and transport production. Competition and anti-trust 
policy is needed to more fully redistribute monopoly rents (Tyers and Lu 2008), 
especially in China’s strategic monopoly and pillar industries. Opening up share 
ownership and trading could potentially redistribute savings to a wider range 
of investors and allow new commercial entrants, while corporate tax reform 
through unifying the corporate tax rate for all firms including private and 
foreign firms could potentially redistribute more of these savings/profits to 
consumers. This suggests that the task of rebalancing will also hinge on how 
China reforms and strengthens its regulatory system especially with respect to 
competition, market entry and taxation. 
High rates of investment at early stages of development tend to gradually 
shift towards a moderately rising consumption share as the structural processes 
of urbanisation and industrialisation effectively mature. The familiar inverted-U 
shape (sometimes labelled a Kuznets curve, as in McKay 2008) present across a 
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number of development indicators when mapped in GDP per capita space attests 
to this. Therefore, it is entirely reasonable to expect China’s domestic absorptive 
capacity to rise over time; however, while a rise in China’s domestic absorptive 
capacity will, by definition, reduce China’s external surplus, this does not mean 
that China’s current account will move immediately into deficit; indeed, twin 
surpluses could remain for the time being. China’s current account surplus has 
moderated in recent years on: a) soft demand for its exports; b) rapid increases 
in the price of its import basket; and c) strong demand for imported resource 
volumes. While an element of this narrowing is evidently cyclical, and thus 
we should not use the absolute latest level as the ‘jumping off point’, it is most 
unlikely that the current account will ever again approach the level seen in 
2007. The rough estimate of Ma et al. (Chapter 4, this volume) that the average 
current account will move towards 1 per cent of GDP over the coming decade 
is a good starting point for discussion and debate.
In any case, the pressures that are currently building will ultimately 
convince China to accelerate the pace of structural adjustment including 
the pace of liberalising its capital account with the full convertibility and 
‘internationalisation’ of the renminbi (RMB). At the same time, China’s eventual 
success in achieving the objective of rebalancing will also depend on how 
China’s major trading partners seek to overcome their own structural problems. 
The experiences of the United States show that while a deep recession can 
narrow external imbalances, mitigating the fallout from a contraction in private 
demand via fiscal expansion can substantially reduce policy flexibility down 
the line. The experiences of Europe show that ageing, developed economies 
with inflexible labour markets and exchange rates and open capital accounts can 
find the task of adjusting imbalances comes with major questions of financial 
instability and rising sovereign risks. The Japanese story is a cautionary tale 
that shows that sometimes even a sharp decline in the investment share will 
not bring about external rebalancing. The global economy will be challenged to 
maintain the rate of expansion required to return balance sheets to health while 
demand centres and relative prices continue to shift. 
Tackling China’s economic imbalances necessitates economic policy reform 
to facilitate a more sustainable pattern of growth that will fundamentally alter 
China’s industrial structure and its trade orientation. Rebalancing requires 
a strategy for removing factor price and cost distortions that have arisen from 
the traditional state-owned heavy industrial and governmental structures and 
the macro-financial architecture that supports them. 
Market-enhancing institutional reforms will be central to the reduction of 
China’s macroeconomic imbalances. The next phase of transition must be built 
around a strategy of reforms in four key areas: the migration and labour market 
system, reform of the government system (particularly local government, with 
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an emphasis on a sustainable fiscal policy and better decision making regarding 
outlays), reform of the state-dominated non-financial sectors and reform of the 
overall financial system. Each of these strategic areas constitutes a key link in 
the overall path-dependent chain that constitutes China’s current and future 
structural trajectories. Reform in these segments will have strong positive 
multiplier and spillover effects in a range of sub-aggregate arenas relevant to 
achieving greater equity (contemporary and intergenerational), balance and 
sustainability. 
Structure of the Book
We began by stating that ‘the role of policy should be to design and 
implement a framework that reduces distortions, encourages and rewards 
innovation, equalises access to education, employment, a social safety net and 
capital for investment, while minimising rent-seeking opportunities’. Each of 
the chapters in this volume tackles the issue of rebalancing. Part one comprises 
those works that do so directly in a broad macroeconomic framework. Part two 
comprises those chapters that approach imbalance from a sectoral or sub-macro 
perspective. 
Part one begins with a chapter by Rod Tyers that styles the rebalancing 
imperative as the search for inward-looking growth. To frame the discussion, 
Tyers presents a menu of policy regimes that seems promising with regards to 
achieving this end. These regimes are then ‘tested’ via a model of the Chinese 
economy that emphasises the oligopoly power of large firms. 
Working from a sophisticated conception of the middle-income trap—‘the 
distinction is between the “natural” slowdown in the convergence process…
and premature stagnation due to powerful vested interests’—Tyers finds that a 
successful turn inwards should incorporate a ‘more ardent attack on oligopoly 
rent’. In what fashion? Tyers argues that policies of pure privatisation and 
industrial fragmentation offer less promise than either price regulation or 
foreign competition in services. 
The chapter by Anders C. Johansson puts a strong case that financial 
repression is a root cause of both domestic and external imbalances in the 
Chinese economy. He argues that comprehensive financial reforms should 
be central to any concerted attempt to address imbalances, although he is at 
pains to highlight that due respect for correct sequencing must be taken into 
account. By discussing the apparent international and local symptoms of China’s 
financially repressive policies in an integrated framework, Johansson builds up 
a convincing narrative that a multitude of superficially disparate issues can be 
fruitfully considered from this perspective. 
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In Chapter 4, Guonan Ma, Robert McCauley and Lillie Lam build on their 
impressive recent output on China’s savings rate. The focus of this effort is 
the current account surplus from a savings–investment perspective, with an 
exchange rate overlay. A masterful review of the state of play in these areas is 
followed by some educated prognostication on the future course of the savings 
and investment shares over the coming decade, in tandem with some observations 
on the historical trajectory of the real exchange rate compiled under various 
methodologies. The authors conclude that the current account surplus is likely 
to narrow further in coming years, with the savings shares declining by more 
than the investment share, and the quite considerable historical (and future) real 
appreciation of the RMB the authors envisage continuing to do its work. 
Chapters 5 and 6 can be considered together. Yue Que, Fang Cai and 
Xiaobo Zhang argue in Chapter 5 that the ‘flying geese’ are moving inland as 
rising cost pressures on the coast drive them out. In Chapter 6, Miaojie Yu and 
Wei Tian offer a rich and highly disaggregated view of the ‘DNA’ of China’s 
processing trade, where a great many of these ‘flying geese’ reside. Que et al. 
empirically demonstrate why the push away from the coast has occurred. They 
show that the proportion of manufacturing activity accounted for by the coastal 
provinces follows an inverted-U shape, with the benefits of agglomeration 
initially drawing capital out of the interior, before factor prices in these densely 
occupied regions reached a threshold level, which was the signal to go west. 
Yu and Tian offer an extremely comprehensive overview of the processing 
trade—who, what, where, how—mining a huge database the authors created 
through an innovative merger of transaction and firm-level trade information. 
They supplement the descriptive element of the chapter with an estimate of 
productivity growth in the processing sector, which they conclude is lower 
than that of firms conducting ordinary trade.
The final chapter in part one is by Bijun Wang. Wang poses the question 
of whether China’s outward direct investment (ODI) can contribute positively 
to the rebalancing issue through improving the quality of growth. She argues 
that this is an unanswerable question without more detailed knowledge of 
the motivation for and style of the ODI decision. To gain this insight, Wang 
presents granular data on approved transactions, suitably cleansed, arriving at a 
taxonomy suitable for addressing the rebalancing. To Wang, if ODI is undertaken 
from a resource security perspective, it removes a bottleneck in the economy as 
it is presently constructed, but it could reduce the incentive to alter the growth 
model in fundamental ways. If ODI is undertaken to acquire strategic assets, 
the implications for rebalancing are more promising, with both direct and tacit 
influences working to enhance the quality of growth. Efficiency-seeking ODI, 
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which has contributed very strongly to structural change over the course of 
Japan’s development drive, is not yet seen as a major factor driving the ODI 
decisions of Chinese firms.
The last two chapters of part one reflect one of the hallmarks of this volume: 
the recognition that disaggregated data—whether from the firm, the province, 
the county or the single industry—are of tremendous value in understanding 
macroeconomic trends in China and should not be the sole domain of sectoral 
experts. The chapters of part two continue in this vein, with some fascinating 
information presented on the spatial aspect of inequality, migration decisions, 
rural population and intergenerational mobility. Some of these data come from 
official sources; some have been created by painstaking survey work. 
The issue of income inequality has become a major focus of policymakers in 
recent times. This volume contributes to the debate from a number of angles. 
In addition to the studies in part one that touch on the inequality issue in a 
broad macroeconomic framework, our knowledge of the spatial aspect of income 
inequality in China—all the way down to county level—is greatly enhanced by 
the results detailed in Chapter 8 by Tsun Se Cheong and Yanrui Wu. Further, 
in Chapter 10, Jane Golley and Sherry Kong delve into The Australian National 
University’s Rural–Urban Migration in China and Indonesia (RUMiCI) survey 
database to broaden our understanding of educational access (a fundamental 
driver of inequality) across generations and locales. 
Cheong and Wu offer a comprehensive study of the spatial distribution of 
income inequality. Their work is distinctive as it estimates contributions to 
inequality across five spatial tiers, starting at the county level. They find that 
intra-provincial differences in output per head—that is, differential income 
levels across counties in the same province—are substantial contributors 
to overall inequality levels. They argue that this makes the case for policy 
formulation to have a strong local component. Further, they find that inequality 
has different spatial characteristics in the hinterland (where inter-county 
inequality dominates) and the coastal and north-eastern regions (where intercity 
inequality is an additional major factor).
Golley and Kong undertake a detailed study of intergenerational patterns 
of educational attainment across three population segments: urban residents, 
rural residents and rural-to-urban migrants. They begin with a multilayered 
question: ‘Does the persistence of educational attainment across generations 
reflect genetic factors, uneven opportunities or uneven returns?’ They approach 
the question by documenting evidence of the degree of persistence/mobility 
in intergenerational educational achievements in the above segments. They 
find that the uneven nature of returns to education in urban and rural areas, 
a lack of investment in rural education from early childhood onwards and 
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the segmented urban labour market skew the incentives to pursue education, 
particularly beyond junior high; urban residents have a strong incentive to move 
up the ladder, rural residents less so, with migrants somewhere in between. 
This reinforces and amplifies the urban–rural divide.
Chapters 9 and 11 offer new perspectives on China’s rural communities 
and the actual and potential internal migrants within them. In Chapter 9, 
Sylvie Démurger delivers some compelling insights into the complex economic 
and social calculus that goes into the migration decision: the decision to leave 
home, where (how far) one should go and for how long. Her framework, which 
owes much to the ‘new economics of labour migration’, takes the household as 
the basic decision-making unit and the household’s goal is to minimise income 
risk. The boundaries of the investigation are set beyond economic, landholding 
and geographic factors to incorporate the influence of social and family 
networks. Social networks are shown to be a significant influence on migration 
decisions that send the individual far afield, whereas it is only the presence of 
a family network that is significant for shorter haul migration. Chapter 11 gives 
an initial glimpse of a new demographic survey undertaken in a number of 
key migration source regions in rural China, with data collected in the winter 
of 2010–11. Funing Zhong and Jing Xiang offer a discussion of their sample 
relative to that of the official household survey, detail their methodology and 
collection method and give some preliminary conclusions on the basic contours 
of the data. Expect to hear a great deal more from this project as time goes by.
One cannot get too deep into an educated discussion of Chinese imbalances 
without making mention of the social safety net. Yet detailed work on this vital 
policy area is surprisingly scarce. Chapter 12 by Andrew Watson steps into 
the breach, focusing predominantly on the provision of retirement incomes 
in an ageing society. Watson highlights the fact that the current system is 
contradictory, with a geographically fluid labour market sitting uneasily 
alongside a geographically rigid social security infrastructure. Following 
a  magisterial account of historical developments and the current policy 
position, Watson recommends the adoption of an integrated, portable, centrally 
funded and administered system characterised by equal access for all citizens. 
This chapter is highly recommended to all those who have at some stage caught 
themselves vaguely recommending social security reform in China without any 
specific notion of exactly what that might entail.
The following chapter, by Zhiyun Zhao and Chaofeng Yang, looks at China’s 
efforts to move up the value chain and become an internationally competitive 
innovator, which is an important co-requisite of travelling the positive road 
to a more balanced economy. At the outset, the authors characterise China’s 
high-tech industry of today as being afflicted by weak innovation capacity, 
low technology intensity and poor economic efficiency. They posit that with 
Rebalancing and Sustaining Growth in China
16
developed countries pursuing a ‘technology blockade’ strategy, it is vital that 
China builds an indigenous innovation capability, with imported technology 
playing a complementary role. To them, this implies that a preferential 
industrial policy for firms with innovative potential should be put in place. 
They also offer a practical suggestion for policy design that will be swiftly 
recognised by those who stand by the maxim ‘what gets measured gets done’. 
They argue that quantitative targets for high-tech output at the local level 
should be replaced with qualitative ones that emphasise the desire for more 
sophisticated production. Further, they argue that competition policy should 
be used to reduce entry barriers (with a side note that large firms in China are 
less innovative than smaller ones), the Government should play a guiding role 
while market forces should be catalytic, while noting an inherent institutional 
weakness in the commercialisation of innovative ideas. 
The volume concludes with two chapters dealing with China’s resource 
endowment. Chapter 15 deals with its quest for security of energy supply while 
Chapter 14 looks at its struggles to maintain the quality and abundance of its 
water supply. In Chapter 14, Hong Yang, Zhuoying Zhang and Minjun Shi offer 
a timely reminder that the joint problems of water pollution and water scarcity 
together threaten to undermine economic growth. They highlight the fact that 
China’s industrial structure—which makes it a net exporter of virtual water 
(or embodied water)—is incompatible with its status as a water-poor country. 
They also go below the national level to highlight that the regional distribution 
of economic activity places water-intensive manufacturing in water-poor locales. 
The energy security issue remains an emotive one inside China and without. 
ZhongXiang Zhang’s chapter, which concludes the volume, aims to address what 
he feels are the ‘misconceptions and misunderstandings’ surrounding energy 
security in both China and internationally. Coincidentally, the East–West Centre 
in Hawaii, one of Zhang’s academic homes, seems an ideal place from which 
to intermediate the sometimes strident discourse. Zhang makes a number of 
important points. The first is that for China, energy security is really about oil 
security. The second is that the Strait of Malacca is the major point of strategic 
vulnerability for China, given it has little geopolitical leverage in the area and 
the disproportionate amount of its imports using this narrow body of water. 
He ties this reality to the Chinese perception that an ‘oil blockade’ of China 
by the West is a genuine threat; and then douses the flames by systematically 
dismantling this thesis. Three, he emphasises that the loans-for-oil deals between 
Chinese development banks, foreign oil concerns and China’s own national oil 
companies have not been successful in reducing energy insecurity, principally 
because the Chinese companies have shown no clear predilection to bring the 
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oil home for domestic consumption where prices are set below those prevailing 
in international markets. Further, he argues that Chinese investment is adding 
to global supply potential in a net sense, which benefits all consumers of oil. 
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2. Looking Inward for Growth
Rod Tyers1
Introduction
There is wide agreement outside China, and more recent concurrence 
inside, that China’s growth will, and should, be increasingly underpinned 
by rising home consumption rather than exports.2 The foreign viewpoint is 
notwithstanding the considerable contributions of China’s export-led growth 
to improvements in the foreign terms of trade and to cheaper financing of 
investment and government spending. The dominant political force behind this 
view seems to be concern over declining overall economic performance, at least 
compared with China, comparatively high unemployment and the very visible 
nature of manufacturing ‘offshoring’.3
Yet the global gains conferred by China’s growth are fragile and the Chinese 
regime that has produced them faces potentially destabilising threats from 
within and without. For this reason there looms the ‘middle income trap’ widely 
ascribed to other developing regions (World Bank 2010). The poor performance 
of trading-partner economies clearly weighs on China’s government, as does 
foreign political hostility to continued export-led growth. Internally, there has 
been a tightening of labour markets, foreshadowing a Lewis ‘turning point’ 
that would mark a natural end to export-led growth.4 In addition, there are 
reasons why increased public investment and the fostering of increased 
1  Funding for the research described in this chapter is from Australian Research Council Discovery Grant 
No. DP0557885. It was conducted in part during visits to the China Center for Economic Research (CCER) 
at Peking University. Special thanks are due to Feng Lu and Ling Huang at Peking University for many 
constructive conversations on the topic and to Peter Dixon, Yew-Kwang Ng, James Giesecke, Yuanfang 
Li, Miaojie Yu, Yongxiang Bu and to other participants at lively CCER and CoPS seminars. More recently, 
valuable comments on the latest draft have been received from Ligang Song, Huw McKay and Warwick 
McKibbin. Research assistance was provided by Pingkun Hsu at ANU, Liu Liu at the CCER and at the 
UWA Business School by Ying Zhang and Tsun Se Cheong.
2  For the foreign, and particularly the American, perspective, see Bergsten et al. (2008) and Lardy (2006, 
2012). For the official Chinese line on the ‘rebalancing’ of its economy, including its external accounts, 
see Wen (2007, 2011) and Yi (2011).
3  Foreign animus towards China’s economic policy regime has been further inflamed by the large current 
account surpluses of the past decade and the perspective of some in the West that China’s political 
system denies basic human rights or of others that its large government and defence forces represent a 
strategic threat. See Tyers (forthcoming).
4  The timing of China’s Lewis turning point is a subject of controversy, as suggested by the contrasts 
between the views expressed by Cai (2010), Garnaut (2010) and Golley and Meng (2011), which offer just 
a sampling of a substantial literature. There is, however, little doubt that the turning point is on its way, 
even if there is little agreement as to whether recent real wage rises suggest its presence.
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private consumption are of considerable political value at present. The high 
environmental costs of China’s manufacturing expansion have yet to be fully 
covered and there is increased income inequality associated with rents in the 
state-owned sector that will be politically difficult to unwind.5 This inequality 
coincides with socioeconomic stratification in China’s periphery, which has 
precipitated increased class, ethnic and regional conflicts.
Middle-income ‘slowdowns’ in developing countries that have heretofore 
grown strongly out of poverty are the subject of expanding interest 
(Easterly 2001; Eichengreen et al. 2011). The focus is the distinction between 
‘natural’ slowdown in the convergence process as poorer countries approach 
full industrialisation, which is due to diminishing returns to physical and 
human capital and diminished ‘catch-up’ investment incentives (Lucas 2009), 
and premature stagnation due to powerful vested interests that oppose 
economic policy reforms needed for the final catch-up phase (Haber et al. 2008; 
Riedel 2011).6 The sense in which the slowdown is considered a ‘trap’ derives 
from a divergence of collective interests from those of the leadership group, 
with the latter associated with rent extraction (corruption) that peaks at middle 
levels of real per capita income.
So, where are the rents and the vested interests that could retard China’s 
future growth and does ‘turning inward’ exacerbate the risk of an associated 
slowdown? The financial sector is one location. Very high saving challenges 
this sector to allocate efficiently across investment opportunities. The many 
weaknesses in this process, stemming in part from the protection of state-owned 
financial institutions, have already received considerable attention (Riedel 2007; 
Walter and Howie 2011). Yet the potential gains from further industrial reform 
that reduces rents in protected corners of the economy extend well beyond 
the financial sector to include comparatively protected and state-owned 
heavy manufacturing and services. Industrial reforms have penetrated these 
sectors less because of their political sensitivity. If such reforms are required 
for inward-focused growth then there will be political difficulty achieving it. 
Yet such reforms offer an effective replacement of export-led growth that is also 
transformative of China’s economic structure and its labour force.
Alternative approaches to inward-focused growth are numerous and they 
include, importantly, policies and institutional development to support domestic 
innovation and human capital accumulation. These are the engines of steady 
state growth, whereas in this chapter the focus is on alternatives that follow 
5  For a discussion of the institutional and industrial reform agenda and its difficulty, see, for example, 
Deer and Song (2012), Riedel (2011) and Tyers and Lu (2008). 
6  These issues parallel an established literature in political economy that originated with Mancur 
Olson (1965) and Gordon Tulloch (1967) and from which emerged the term ‘eurosclerosis’ to describe 
stagnation due to interest group conflict and rent seeking in Europe.
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on from the export-led era in that they could further transform the structure 
of China’s economy. They include expanded government and further industrial 
reforms, amongst which are pure privatisation, the fragmentation of state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs), price-cap regulation and foreign direct investment (FDI) in 
heavy manufacturing and services. The economic implications of  changes of 
these types are assessed using a mathematical model of the Chinese economy 
that captures the behaviour of state-owned oligopolies and the impacts of 
further industrial reform. The greatest potential for inwardly generated 
growth is shown to rest, as expected, with further industrial reform in heavy 
manufacturing and services. The simulation results suggest the best prospects 
for further growth are to attack rents with tighter price-cap regulation and 
to advance services productivity through foreign direct investment. The first 
of these will be resisted by those currently enjoying the rents and the second 
presses against the desire on the part of China’s government to protect services 
from foreign ownership.
The next section reviews the relative merits of export-led growth, develops 
the reasoning behind China’s choice to turn inward and discusses the sources 
of internally generated transformative growth. In section three, the particular 
structure of China’s economy is reviewed along with the associated sensitivity of 
its overall performance to its real exchange rate. Section four offers a description 
of the model used and the construction of its database. The fifth section compares 
inward-sourced growth scenarios and section six concludes.
The Turn Away from Export-Led Growth
Economic development is primarily about shifting the population from low 
labour productivity farming to urban employment where the availability of 
physical capital ensures higher income and more efficient access to essential 
services. This requires rural–urban migration and, at least initially, basic 
(mainly primary) education and training. These conditions supply a workforce 
suitable for light manufacturing. If the protection of property rights and the 
export infrastructure facilities are sufficient, the availability of adequately 
trained workers then attracts capital that is supplied from both domestic saving 
and foreign direct investment. In the ‘East Asian model’, much of the migration 
from rural areas goes into manufacturing, though some goes to construction and 
other services, which also expand.7 In a final phase, the transition from middle 
level to very high real per capita income requires further education and training 
suited to the growth of sophisticated services.
7  The Indian model differs from this in that the rural to urban migration goes primarily to services, with 
manufacturing limited by regulatory and infrastructural constraints. See Bardhan (2010).
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The Merits of Export-Led Growth
The growth in the local supply of light manufactures that occurs in the early 
stage in the East Asian model is more than can meet local demand. Comparative 
advantage in light manufacturing is realised via openness to trade, so the home 
labour force is transformed by exporting. As it turns out, this transformation 
is also beneficial to already industrialised trading partners. This is because the 
resulting change in the international terms of trade is positive for them: light 
manufactured imports are cheaper and skill-intensive durable (consumer and 
capital) goods, which they export, are in higher demand. Moreover, since the 
opening of such developing economies in this way supplies additional low-skill 
labour to the integrated global economy, FDI opportunities are abundant and 
savers in industrialised countries earn higher returns. Idiosyncratically, the 
East Asian model has also offered high saving households and firms that have 
supplied excess saving to the global economy. This has financed investment and 
government expenditures in the industrialised economies in ways that have 
enhanced their growth.8
The Choice to Look Inward
Variations on the East Asian model have been the dominant basis for catch-
up by poorer countries and regions for more than a century (Dooley et al. 2004). 
Why then should the Chinese choose to ‘look inward’ now? The reasons are 
manyfold. First, it is inevitable that China will cease to depend on labour-
intensive exports and move its production up the chain of sophistication in 
the manner of Japan, the Republic of Korea and its regions in Taiwan and 
Hong Kong before it. This generally coincides with a slowdown in the rate of 
rural to urban migration and some acceleration in the rate of rise in real wages—
the ‘turning point’ of Lewis (1955). The ardent debate over the proximity of this 
turning point notwithstanding, the most carefully considered evidence suggests 
it could still be some way off (Cai 2010; Golley and Meng 2011). It is nonetheless 
true that demographic changes associated with China’s One-Child Policy have 
accelerated it, and labour costs have indeed grown more sharply in recent years. 
Even though this pattern of labour-force tightening is smooth, the associated 
transition to slower growth can be abrupt and destructive, as in the case of 
Japan in the late 1980s,9 so it is possible the Chinese Government seeks to ensure 
a smooth transition.
8  While it is true that cheaper credit has not always led to growth-enhancing expenditures in these 
countries, their errors in public and private expenditure patterns have not been the fault of the 
Asian high savers.
9  The literature on Japan’s stagnation since the late 1980s is vast. See Hayashi and Prescott (2002) 
and Tyers (2011).
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A second important reason is that growth has slowed in the regions to which 
China’s exports are directed. This raises the prospect that the terms of trade might 
shift more rapidly against it if exports continue to be pushed out at the current 
rate, so a smaller proportion of the benefits from export-led growth would 
accrue to China.10 Third is political pressure from destination regions against 
China’s current account surpluses of the past decade, the perceived unfairness 
of Chinese policy and the loss of trading-partner employment in manufacturing. 
Political attacks on Chinese exports, and anti-Chinese xenophobia in general, 
are more likely when the movement of vast numbers of Chinese workers into 
the modern sector is perceived as being associated with the unemployment 
of one-tenth of those seeking work in Western Europe and the United States. 
This association has high-level backing in policy debates, particularly in the 
United States (Bernanke 2006; Krugman 2010).
The Western backlash is essentially mercantilist and much of it is directed 
at China’s exchange rate. The perception in the United States that countries 
like China use ‘exchange rate protection’ stems from the role of the US dollar 
as the reserve currency and the difficulty the United States faces when a lack 
of competitiveness would justify a depreciation against others. In the 1980s, 
this ire was directed against Japan, leading to the Plaza Accord and a large and 
destructive appreciation of the yen (Goyal and McKinnon 2003; Hamada and 
Okada 2009), and ultimately to the US Exchange Rates and International Economic 
Policy Coordination Act of 1988, which formalised the United States’ ‘defence’ 
against currency manipulators. Poverty and its associated low wages are seen 
in US policy debates as an unfair trade advantage rather than a problem that 
is solved by expanded trade. The fact that the underlying real exchange rate 
of China against the United States has appreciated substantially since 2004 and 
continues to appreciate seems to have been missed in the American literature 
(Tyers and Zhang 2011).11
Finally, China is constantly criticised for its lack of political rights and 
for its treatment of unhappy minorities such as the Tibetans and the Hui zu. 
This criticism is sometimes justified but often it stems from fear of China as a 
potential strategic opponent and a sense that the advocacy of additional political 
and religious rights might weaken it in such a competition. These  external 
criticisms of the Chinese state and its policies, while occasionally well intentioned, 
are too often xenophobic and made in ignorance or disregard of the considerable 
benefits of Chinese growth for the West. Within China, however, inequality 
10  This raises the prospect of ‘immiserising growth’, which is already hotly debated as a consequence 
of Chinese export expansion, at least for smaller, poorer exporters that compete with China 
(Bhagwati 1987).
11  While the American literature continues on this refrain, the Geithner-led US Treasury—the guardians of 
the ‘currency manipulator’ label—have increasingly tried to highlight the real exchange rate adjustment 
as one of the arguments behind their unwillingness to cite China. Thanks to Huw McKay for this note.
Rebalancing and Sustaining Growth in China
24
has become a major political issue and the ‘turn inward’, via expanded public 
investment, has also been justified as a means of redirecting the fruits of growth 
to lagging regions and to the rural sector in general (Wen 2011).
Inward Sources of Growth
Potential inward contributions to growth are numerous and they include 
improved policy implementation in the areas of innovation and human capital 
growth (Robertson 2011) as well as in the urbanisation of migrant workers 
(Song et al. 2010). In what follows the focus is on some particular sources of 
growth that are natural successors to export-led growth in that they could 
further transform the structure of China’s economy.
Given the apparent success of China’s surge in public investment during 
the global recession in 2008–09, the Government is surely tempted to think of 
expanded government activity as an inward source of future growth. And it is 
common for governments of developing countries to undersupply public goods 
that are foundations for growth. In China’s case these include the facilities and 
regulatory institutions to support basic and higher education, transport and 
telecommunications infrastructure, retirement insurance, health insurance and 
environmental protection. Compared with other developing countries, China 
is in the fortunate situation of having implemented a sensible tax law in 1994 
that is accessing an increasing share of all its economic activity. This means that 
Central Government tax revenue is rising faster than gross domestic product 
(GDP) and it was this that allowed the substantial increase in public investment 
in 2009 without a large increase in the fiscal deficit (Jia and Liu 2009).12 So, 
depending on the extent of crowding out and of Ricardian equivalence amongst 
savers, a rise in government activity could help expand China’s GDP by reducing 
the rate at which home income is spent on foreign assets and products and 
therefore bolstering aggregate demand abroad rather than at home. It is unclear, 
however, to what extent this expanded government activity can bring about 
anything but a comparatively short-term, one-off change in national output.
An important and yet untapped source of further growth is in the extension 
of industrial reforms to heavy manufacturing and services. State-owned 
firms in these sectors have been relatively protected and significant foreign 
ownership shares have been prevented. One consequence of this is that these 
firms—supplying as they do essential materials and services to an economy that 
12  A less well-publicised reason for the modest expansion in Beijing’s fiscal deficit is that the increased 
spending on provincial public projects was heavily financed by commercial banks and therefore 
associated with similarly rising deposit rates and at least implicit government guarantees. It was 
therefore ‘off balance sheet’ so far as the Federal Government was concerned. Thanks also to Huw McKay 
for this observation. The key implication is that private saving has financed public investment at the 
provincial level.
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is  expanding rapidly, courtesy of the more competitive light manufacturing 
export sector—have been extremely profitable (Lu et al. 2008). At the same 
time, these firms have returned little in the way of dividends to the Central 
Government, so their profits have not been distributed to their public owners. 
Instead, these profits have been reinvested. Consequently, the decision to save or 
consume from this component of national income has been denied households, 
contributing substantially to China’s extraordinary saving—amounting to more 
than half its GDP.13
Substantial potential future growth lies in the redistribution of these rents, 
which would make Chinese intermediate products cheaper and foster overall 
output growth while at the same time raising private consumption. A number 
of approaches are possible, some of which are already being tried.
1. Pure privatisation: this would return the profits of SOEs to private households 
and foster consumption, raising domestic demand for China’s goods and 
services.
2. SOE fragmentation: this would force more competition between firms 
and thus reduce mark-ups.
3. Tighter regulation of SOE pricing: this could, at least in theory, force firms 
to price at their average costs, eliminating rents altogether and reducing the 
price level.
These alternatives are examined in the analysis to be discussed 
in subsequent sections.
China’s Structure, Performance and its Real 
Exchange Rate
The implications of a turn inward ride rather importantly on consequent 
changes in China’s underlying real exchange rate, or its level of global 
competitiveness. This special sensitivity stems from its economic structure, 
as summarised in Table 2.1. Four patterns stand out
1. the majority of non-agricultural employment is in the export-oriented light 
manufacturing sector—indeed, employment in this sector exceeds that 
in agriculture
2. the light manufacturing sector dominates China’s exports
13  The contribution of corporate saving to China’s overall saving rate and to the current account surpluses 
of the past decade is examined by Kuijs (2006), Kuijs and He (2007) and Tyers and Lu (2008).
Rebalancing and Sustaining Growth in China
26
3. light manufacturing is relatively competitive—price mark-ups are low so 
pure or economic profits make up only a small share of total revenue
4. the SOE-dominated energy, metals and services sectors are less labour 
intensive and at the same time they are oligopolistic, generating substantial 
rents.




Share of total 
production 
employment
Share of total 
exports
Pure profit 
share of gross 
revenue
Agriculture 13 24 2 0
Petroleum, coal, metals 16 11 10 20
Light manufacturing 29 33 82 5
Services 42 32 6 20
Total 100 100 100 12
a Pure profits are calculated from national statistics estimates of accounting profits, deducting required 
returns to service industry specific prime rates. Here they are presented gross of tax and corporate saving 
and as shares of total revenue.
Source: Model database, derived from Dimaranan and McDougall (2002), and an updating of the national 
data to 2005.
Since exporting firms are highly competitive, generate little pure profit and 
carry most of the new or ‘modern sector’ employment, future employment 
performance is very sensitive to the relativities between home wages and export 
prices, and hence to China’s real exchange rate.
Yet the inward-looking policy changes that could contribute most to enlarging 
China’s economy all have implications for the real exchange rate. Consider, first, 
the case of government expansion. There are several mechanisms by which 
expanded government expenditure tends to appreciate the real exchange rate.
The Mundell–Fleming Effect
When financial capital is internationally mobile, even if imperfectly, 
increased government borrowing raises home yields and induces financial 
inflow (Fleming 1962; Mundell 1963). The net effect is to raise demand for home 
relative to (more elastically supplied) foreign products and services and hence 
to appreciate the real exchange rate.
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The Non–Traded-Good Demand Effect
This recognises that governments concentrate their spending on non-traded 
services, so their expansion changes the composition of aggregate demand 
towards more inelastically supplied home products, driving up their relative 
price and hence the real exchange rate.14
The Oligopoly Rent Effect
Increased government spending raises home demand for home products, 
reducing the exported share of the average firm’s output. Because foreign 
demand is the most elastic, this reduces the elasticity of demand faced by 
oligopoly firms, which then raise their mark-ups. And since these firms reside 
mainly in the protected heavy manufacturing and largely non-traded services 
sectors, such price rises appreciate the real exchange rate by raising the relative 
prices of non-traded services and by increasing costs faced by the competitive 
export sector (Tyers and Lu 2008). A way of thinking of this is that the excess 
profits are achieved by supplying less output so the oligopoly firms reduce 
productivity in the largely non-traded sectors of the economy.
In assessing fiscal expansions, the negative effect on the real exchange rate 
is commonly seen as being more than offset by the resulting expansion in 
aggregate demand. A key mechanism for this is that the increase in government 
dis-saving reduces the national saving rate, at least temporarily, requiring the 
failure of Ricardian equivalence. Because reduced national saving contracts 
the leakage of expenditure abroad, which in China takes the form of foreign 
reserve accumulation, the current account surplus is reduced and more Chinese 
expenditure falls on the home relative to the foreign economy. This has the 
effect of either inducing a home inflation or arresting a deflation. If the latter, 
it  stabilises the relationship between nominal wages and the price level and 
hence maintains the steady-state level of employment. Tyers and Huang (2009) 
take just such a short-run approach to government spending in China. In this 
study, the focus is on transformative sources of growth that operate in the 
long run so the expansion of government to be considered here is long run in 
orientation and therefore tax financed.
Returning to the oligopoly pricing effect on the real exchange rate, 
the alternative of further industrial reform is also considered here. To the extent 
that this reduces oligopoly mark-ups it will tend to depreciate the real exchange rate 
and thereby preserve the competitiveness of China’s export manufacturing sector. 
14  De Gregorio et al. (1994) and Froot and Rogoff (1995), and more recently Galstyan and Lane (2009), 
recognise that boosting government expenditure appreciates the real exchange rate by this mechanism, 
even in the case of public investment, at least in the short run.
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The further alternative of FDI in Chinese services offers increased services 
productivity. This also would depreciate the real exchange rate by reducing the 
relative price of non-traded products. To quantify the effects of these on China’s 
overall economic performance, a complete model of the Chinese economy 
is offered.
An Oligopoly Model of the Chinese Economy
To capture the behaviour of the oligopolistic SOEs, a comparative static 
macroeconomic model of the Chinese economy is used that embodies a multi-
industry structure in which all industries are treated as oligopolies, with firms 
in each industry supplying differentiated products and interacting on prices.15 
The model is described in detail by Tyers (2012) and in appendices to Tyers and 
Lu (2008). A short summary of the relevant elements is offered here.
Behavioural Underpinnings
The model has neoclassical foundations with final consumption, intermediate 
demand and the demands created by a capital goods sector treated as in most 
economy-wide models, with nested CES preferences.16 Government expenditure 
is an exogenous policy variable but it is subdivided across goods and services 
also via nested constant elasticity of substitution (CES) systems, and government 
revenue stems from a tax system that includes both direct (income) taxes levied 
separately on labour and capital income and indirect taxes including those 
on consumption, imports and exports.17 The level of total investment placing 
demands on the capital goods sector has Q-like behaviour, being influenced 
positively by home rates of return on installed capital and negatively by 
a financing rate obtainable from an open ‘bond market’ in which home and 
foreign bonds are differentiated to represent China’s capital controls. Savings are 
sourced from the collective household at a constant rate and from corporations 
at industry-specific rates on the assumption that corporate saving (retained 
earnings) in SOEs depends on the magnitudes of pure (economic) profits earned. 
Foreign direct investment and official foreign reserve accumulation are both 
represented, to complete China’s external financial accounts.18
15  It is a distant descendant of that by Harris (1984) and Gunasekera and Tyers (1990), though it is 
considerably generalised to include macroeconomic behaviour.
16  See, for example, Dixon et al. (1982).
17  Income taxes are approximated by flat rates deduced as the quotient of revenue and the tax base in 
each case.
18  Hereinafter the capital, financial and official sub-accounts of China’s balance of payments will be referred 
to as the ‘capital account’.
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The departure from convention arises with the way production is specified 
to account explicitly for oligopoly. Firms in each industry supply differentiated 
products. They carry product-variety-specific fixed costs and interact on prices. 
Cobb-Douglas production technology drives variable costs so that average 
variable costs are constant if factor and intermediate product prices do not 
change but average total cost declines with output.19 Firms charge a mark-up 
over average variable cost, which they choose strategically. Their capacity to 
push their price beyond their average variable costs without being undercut by 
existing competitors then determines the level of any pure profits and, in the 
long run, the potential for entry by new firms.
Thus, each firm in industry i is regarded as producing a unique variety of its 
product and it faces a downward-sloping demand curve with elasticity εi (< 0). 
The optimal mark-up is then as given in Equation 2.1.
Equation 2.1
In Equation 2.1, pi is the firm’s product price, vi is its average variable cost and 
ei is the elasticity of demand it faces. Firms choose their optimal price by taking 
account of the price-setting behaviour of other firms. A conjectural variations 
parameter in industry i is then defined as the influence of any individual 
firm, k, on the price of firm j. For this parameter the non-collusive (Nash) 
oligopoly implies a zero value, while for a perfect cartel, it has the value unity. 
Although the level of price collusion between firms is not readily estimated, it 
is calibrated for each industry in China from prior knowledge of mark-ups and 
elasticities of demand.
Critical to the model’s behaviour is that the product of each industry has 
exposure to five different sources of demand. The elasticity of demand faced 
by firms in industry i, εi, is therefore dependent on the elasticities of demand 
in these five markets, as well as the shares of the home product in each. 
They are final demand (F), investment demand (V), intermediate demand (I), 
export demand (X) and government demand (G). For industry i, the elasticity 
that applies to (19), above, is a composite of the elasticities of all five sources 
of demand (Equation 2.2).20
19  While firms are oligopolists in their product markets they have no oligopsony power as purchasers 
of primary factors or intermediate inputs.
20  The expressions for these elasticities are messy and voluminous. They are derived in appendices to Tyers 
and Lu (2008).
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Equation 2.2
In Equation 2.2, jis  denotes the volume share of the home product in market 
i for each source of demand j. These share parameters are fully endogenous in 
the model.
Thus, the strategic behaviour of firms, and hence the economic cost 
of  oligopolies, is affected by collusive behaviour on the one hand and the 
composition of the source of demands faced by firms on the other, both of which 
act through the average elasticity of varietal demand. Thus, when economic 
shocks change the composition of demand, they also change the average 
elasticity of demand faced by firms. When this falls, oligopoly firms raise their 
mark-ups and extract increased rents. Of course, rent extraction depends on 
costs, and importantly on fixed costs. If there is entry into an industry, fixed 
costs rise with the number of firms, raising average total costs and hence the 
mark-up required to break even.
Model Structure
The scope of the model is detailed in Table 2.2. Factor intensities by industry 
and initial demand shares, elasticities and mark-ups are reported in Tables 2.3 
and 2.4 respectively. The economy modelled is ‘almost small’, implying that 
it has no power to influence the border prices of its imports but its exports 
are differentiated from competing products abroad and hence face finite-elastic 
demand. The consumer price index (CPI) is constructed as a composite Cobb-
Douglas–CES index of post–consumption-tax home product and post-tariff 
import prices, derived from the aggregate household’s expenditure function. 
This formulation of the CPI aids in the analysis of welfare impacts. Because 
collective utility is also defined as a Cobb-Douglas combination of the volumes 
of consumption by generic product, proportional changes in overall economic 
welfare correspond with those in real gross national product (GNP).
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Industries Agriculture
Metals, including steel, minerals and (non-coal) mining
Coalmining and production




Chemical, rubber, plastic products
Textiles
Other manufactures
Electricity supply and distribution






Source: Aggregates of the 57-industry GTAP Version 6 database from Dimaranan and McDougall (2002).








Agriculture 11 59 0 30
Metals and minerals 66 27 5 2
Coal 28 30 3 39
Petroleum 86 5 1 7
Processed agriculture 38 54 7 0
Electronic equipment 66 26 8 0
Motor vehicles 59 35 6 0
Chemical products 62 32 6 0
Textiles 40 52 7 0
Other manufactures 68 27 5 0
Electricity 69 21 11 0
Gas manufacturing and distribution 49 37 14 0
Communications 92 5 3 0
Insurance and finance 80 12 8 0
Transport 78 18 4 0
Construction 56 37 7 0
Other services 54 27 19 0
a These are factor shares of total value added in each industry, calculated from the database. Capital shares 
include pure profits. Shares sum to 100 per cent horizontally.
Source: Model database (social accounting matrix), derived from Dimaranan and McDougall (2002).
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The quantity of domestically owned physical capital is fixed both in the 
short and the long runs, so that changes in the total capital stock affect the 
foreign ownership share and hence the level of income repatriated abroad. In the 
experiments to be presented, a long-run closure is used throughout.21 Physical 
capital is homogeneous and fully mobile between industries, though claims on 
home and foreign capital are differentiated, so there is a wedge between the 
home and domestic bond yields (interest rates) that stems the differentiation of 
these financial assets (due, say, to the retention of inward and outward capital 
controls) combined with endogenous reserve management policy. All real 
unit factor rewards are flexible and domestic factor supplies are fixed. A fixed 
oligopoly structure is retained, assuming SOEs are protected from competitive 
entry and are prevented from exiting if losses are incurred. Consistent with 
China’s heretofore fiscal conservatism, the base fiscal deficit is held constant with 
exogenous expenditure changes covered by endogenous changes in tax rates.
Comparing Alternative Regimes
To quantify the ‘natural’ slowdown story, the simulations commence 
with representations of continuing export-led growth and the Lewis turning 
point. Government expansion is then considered—first financed by a rise in 
consumption taxation and then financed by a rise in corporate taxation. Turning 
to industrial reform, three types are considered. First, a pure privatisation is 
simulated by allowing all profits of SOEs to accrue as income to the collective 
private household. Second, a threefold fragmentation of SOEs is tried in order 
to elicit more competitive pricing, and third, price-cap regulation is imposed to 
force mark-ups halfway to the level sufficient to cover average costs. Finally, the 
option of opening the services sector to additional FDI is considered and hence 
of fostering accelerated productivity growth in that sector. It is worth noting 
that, except for the last, all these scenarios ignore natural innovation and 
productivity improvements that would continue irrespective of the fiscal or 
industrial policy regime. As such, these simulations consider policy changes 
that could offer the major boost to China’s GDP that might replace that yielded 
by export-led growth.
Further Export-Led Growth
Continued export-led growth is illustrated in this simulation by some 
representative shocks to productivity and a closure that allows rising labour 
supply. There is a rise in labour productivity in agriculture, to represent its 
capacity to continue shedding workers, and a rise in total factor productivity in 
21  This contrasts with the results presented by Tyers and Huang (2009), which are short run in nature.
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the light manufacturing export sector, to represent the effects of continued FDI 
into that sector. There is also an arbitrarily low increase in the real production 
wage, which is made exogenous for this simulation so that the supply of workers 
to the modern sector can grow. Workers continue to be released by agriculture, 
foreign capital flows in and expansion is substantial as expected. The results are 
shown in the first column of Table 2.5.22

















up by 30%, 
company tax 
financedd
Real GDP 16.6 4.9 2.6 –1.7
Real GNP 9.3 3.9 –8.9 0.6
Real exchange rate 1.3 3.5 1.3 2.0
Exports/GDP 19.1 5.8 –7.9 –10.0
Consumption/GDP –8.7 –2.9 –2.1 0.8
CA surplus/GDP 17.0 –3.2 –4.4 –2.4
Production employment 17.7 0.0 0.0 0.0
Real production wage 2.0e 7.2 –3.5 –3.3
Real skilled wage 18.4 4.1 –1.5 –0.7
Physical capital stock 19.8 5.3 –1.4 –1.5
Real home capital incomef –3.8 –3.2 –13.6 –7.1
a These simulations are all made in long-run mode—endogenous capital stock with exogenous external 
rate of return on excess saving and perfect mobility of workers between agriculture and the other sectors. 
The number of oligopoly firms is fixed, however, so that pure profits are endogenous.
b This simulation retains the existing policy regime and applies 4 per cent labour productivity in agriculture, 
to continue to release workers, and 4 per cent productivity in light manufacturing (the export sector) 
due to continued FDI, combined with an exogenous rise in the real production wage of just 2 per cent. 
Modern sector labour supply therefore rises substantially.
c Here the agricultural productivity rise is not imposed and the supply of production workers is fixed.
d These simulations represent tax-financed fiscal expansions, which raise the government spending share 
of GDP by one-quarter in the case of consumption tax financing and one-third in the case of capital income 
tax financing.
e In the export-led growth case the real production wage increase is an arbitrary and exogenous 2 per cent.
f Real home capital income is the income accruing to domestically owned capital net of tax and depreciation.
Source: Simulations of the model described in the text.
22  Real net income to home capital owners actually falls slightly. This is because total saving continues to 
increase under this scenario and capital controls are retained. This excess supply of saving is transferred 
to foreign reserves only incompletely, leaving a decline in the home bond yield.
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Lewis Turning Point
Here, the same shocks are applied, except that there is no productivity gain 
in agriculture associated with departing workers and the closure is changed so 
that the supply of production labour is fixed and the real production wage is 
endogenous. The results are shown in the second column of Table 2.5. In this 
case, surplus workers are no longer available so that growth then stems from the 
productivity changes alone and is much reduced. The real production wage rises 
faster, however, and there is a reduction in the current account surplus due to a 
decline in pure profits in the protected sectors (in effect, a gain by workers at the 
expense of capital) and hence a decline in corporate saving. The current account 
balances because of the saving change and there is a ‘natural’ redistribution of 
the SOE rents in favour of working households. If the Government can maintain 
a steady policy hand during this shock, while growth will clearly slow, many of 
the other structural issues with the Chinese economy are corrected.
Consumption Tax-Financed Government Expansion
In the long run an expansion of government activity must be financed by 
taxation. Here the instrument of choice is the consumption tax. The experiment 
is an arbitrary increase in the government share of GDP by 25 per cent. 
It requires an increase in consumption tax revenue by 14 per cent of the tax 
base. This is a large negative shock that contracts real domestic factor income at 
new home prices. The results, shown in the third column of Table 2.5, confirm 
that home workers and home-owned capital are losers, so real GNP contracts; 
however, real GDP rises slightly. This is due to the retention of considerable 
foreign capital, the income from which is not subject to the consumption tax, 
and the fact that the real rate of return on capital rises in terms of foreign prices 
on the back of reduced real labour costs. The protected heavy manufacturing 
and services sectors expand in this scenario while private households and 
workers are worse off.
Corporate Tax-Financed Government Expansion
If the government expansion is financed from company, or capital income, 
tax the net effects are as shown in the final column of Table 2.5. The tax 
needed to expand the government share of GDP by 30 per cent turns out to be 
7.7 per cent of the capital income tax base. Because corporate saving depends 
on profits, it declines, also contracting the current account surplus. Apart from 
a substantial cut in real income to home capital owners, this policy has little 
effect on overall real economic activity. Enlarging government, at least via tax 
increases, therefore offers little real long-run expansion under the assumptions 
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of this model.23 A key to this is the turning inward of demand under the 
government expansion scenarios, which reduces the export share of production 
and therefore the elasticity of demand facing oligopoly firms. The result is a 
modest but influential real appreciation in each case that is larger than would 
arise were there to be no oligopoly behaviour.
Pure Privatisation
The first shock simply places the majority of SOE assets in private hands, 
so that profits are distributed to households. The rates of corporate saving 
across industries are reduced until total corporate saving falls to a more 
normal 5 per  cent of GDP.24 Most after-tax company income then accrues to 
households, so it can be allocated by them to saving or consumption.25 By itself, 
as indicated in the first column of Table 2.6, this reduces national saving and 
the current account surplus. Other than this, however, the simulation suggests 
that privatisation generates no substantial growth in and of itself so long as the 
competition facing SOEs is restricted.26
Fragmentation of SOEs
Here SOEs are subdivided within sectors and encouraged to compete on price. 
This has been a popular approach in some protected sectors, yet the simulation 
suggests the results are not attractive. A threefold increase in the number of 
oligopoly firms is imposed in the heavy manufacturing and services sectors, the 
effects of which are shown in the second column of Table 2.6. The problem with 
this approach is that, while it does induce more competitive pricing and hence 
lower mark-ups, each new firm carries fixed costs so the sectoral fixed-cost 
burden rises sufficiently for prices to rise, lower mark-ups notwithstanding. 
Because fixed capital is required, the capital stock increases substantially but 
capital returns are slashed. While production workers gain, domestic capital 
owners lose and no substantial growth is yielded.
23  A separate experiment to measure the effects of a similar expansion that is bond financed finds results 
that are contractionary of both GDP and GNP in real terms. This result is examined in short-run mode by 
Tyers and Huang (2009), who find that the usual Keynesian expansion is more than offset by oligopoly 
price increases and the associated real appreciation.
24  This is the scale of corporate saving in Taiwan. See Tyers and Lu (2008).
25  It is achieved by shocking down the corporate saving rate (retained earnings rate) so that discretionary 
corporate income accrues to households.
26  Had it been assumed that privatisation might eliminate x-inefficiency and hence raise productivity by 
making poor-performing firms takeover targets, a one-off growth surge might be expected from this 
change.
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Real GDP 0.6 –12.9 28.3 15.9
Real GNP 0.8 –13.8 13.0 6.5
Real exchange rate 1.2 2.9 –8.2 –6.6
Exports/GDP –10.6 –17.2 42.9 22.3
Consumption/GDP 13.2 17.6 –12.0 –7.0
CA surplus/GDP –61.9 –143.3 80.4 48.7
Real production wage –0.2 15.6 30.4 19.4
Real skilled wage 0.9 –1.6 42.1 21.8
Physical capital stock –0.4 26.4 28.3 16.9
Real home capital incomef –0.7 –50.0 4.4 3.2
a These simulations are all made in long-run mode—endogenous capital stock with exogenous external 
rate of return on excess saving and perfect mobility of workers between agriculture and the other sectors. 
The number of oligopoly firms is fixed, however, so that pure profits are endogenous.
b Pure privatisation requires that all corporate income after tax should accrue to the collective private 
household and be split between consumption and saving at private rates.
c The number of firms is enlarged threefold in heavy manufacturing and services.
d Price caps alter the pricing formulae of oligopolistic firms, forcing them to halve their mark-ups over 
their average costs.
f Real home capital income is the income accruing to domestically owned capital net of tax and depreciation.
Source: Simulations of the model described in the text.
Tighter Price-Cap Regulation of SOEs
The results for tighter price caps on SOEs are more positive. Indeed, they 
suggest that substantial new growth is available from this policy option. 
In oligopoly industries with fixed costs, mark-ups over average variable cost are 
required to break even. In the simulation, price caps are imposed that would 
force firms to reduce their mark-ups halfway towards the level that would cover 
average costs. Such price-cap regulation appears to have been successful in many 
industrial countries and the simulation suggests that the effect in China would 
be to reduce costs in industries whose products are used as intermediate inputs 
throughout the economy and hence economic activity would be expanded 
substantially. As indicated in the third column of Table 2.6, the lower costs help 
depreciate the real exchange rate, aiding the export sector and, aside from the 
overall expansion it offers, it unwinds much of the income inequality of recent 
decades by redistributing rents and raising wages.
Rebalancing and Sustaining Growth in China
38
FDI-Induced Productivity Growth in Services
The final simulation considers the effect of a productivity improvement in 
services of the type that could be delivered by additional foreign investment. 
The results are indicated in the final column of Table 2.6. The more efficient 
services sector depreciates the real exchange rate, boosting rather than impairing 
exports and fostering overall growth. The Balassa–Samuelson hypothesis 
notwithstanding, there is also structural convergence of the Chinese economy 
with the industrialised West. The simulation yields substantially higher real 
wages that benefit both skilled and production workers. These represent higher 
costs, however, so they cause a redistribution of industrial output and exports 
in favour of heavier manufacturing. The Chinese economy continues to open but 
it is much more reliant than before on intra-industry trade with the West, in the 
manner of the United States and Western Europe.
The Difficult Politics of Internally Generated Growth
While the results obtained here are dependent on some strong assumptions 
underlying the modelling,27 they are clear in suggesting that, for substantial 
further growth to be found from looking inward, China will need to combine 
other elements of industrial reform with a more ardent regulatory attack on 
oligopoly rents. This will be difficult politically, as will the other key element 
of further growth—namely, substantial productivity growth in the primarily 
state-owned services sector. Achieving this will require levels of FDI in services 
that parallel those in Chinese manufacturing. Heretofore, the Government has 
opposed foreign ownership in key services and heavy manufacturing industries, 
so allowing such FDI will also be very difficult politically.
Conclusion
With the impending end to export-led growth and conflicts due on the one 
hand to rising domestic inequality and, on the other, to recently high current 
account surpluses, China is in need of a further stage of transformative growth 
that will maintain the pace of its catch-up and address its internal and external 
27  One such assumption is that the private household saving rate from disposable income remains constant. 
Those policy changes that substantially increase household disposable income, such as privatisation, 
could see a change in this rate, though it is not clear in which direction. A permanent income story 
might suggest a rise but the focus here is on the long-run steady state and in that case it is possible that 
households expecting a continuation of higher incomes might choose a lower rate. A fully dynamic 
approach, along the lines of McKibbin and Woo (2004), would help address this, though even then, the 
results would rely on much debated assumptions about the formation of household expectations and it is 
unlikely that the direction or the relative scale of the projected changes in overall performance would be 
altered.
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conflicts. One inevitable transformation to come stems from the Lewis turning 
point. Its arrival will see accelerated real wage growth and hence the fruits of 
further growth will be less concentrated and, since this will raise the share 
of total income available to households, the corporate share of saving should 
fall. This in turn should reduce the overall saving rate and the current account 
surplus. It will, of course, bring with it the need for costly adjustments since, as 
shown in the previous section, growth will slow and the supply of new labour 
to the heretofore efficient and relatively competitive light manufacturing sector 
will gradually dry up. Moreover, the net benefits from China’s growth that 
accrue to the global economy will also decline. Yet if, as some believe (Garnaut 
2010), this transition is imminent, the silver lining it brings will be reduced 
political pressure from at home and abroad and hence less incentive to abandon 
the heretofore successful market-oriented policy regime.
But there remain the matters of sustaining the overall growth rate and of an 
orderly transition. As to the latter, both the Republic of Korea and Taiwan made 
orderly economic transitions away from dependence on the transformation 
of their labour forces via labour-intensive exports. Political transformations 
towards liberal democracy also occurred in both, commencing as their urban 
middle classes assumed numerical majorities. Of course, they were helped in 
this by the stimulus associated with China’s own growth surge. Japan’s initial 
transition was orderly, surviving the oil and commodity crises of the 1970s, 
but it was subsequently disrupted by policy errors during the 1980s and early 
1990s. Japan’s comparatively liberal democracy could not chart those waters 
effectively even with the growth of China on its doorstep. Now China must 
do so, but without the external stimulus associated with a growth surge in a 
large near neighbour.
As for moderating the growth slowdown, a further source of transformative 
growth is required to avoid a rapid and possibly disruptive slowdown. This issue 
is here addressed via simulations of a 17-sector model of the Chinese economy 
that takes explicit account of the oligopoly behaviour of SOEs and a database 
that captures essential economic structure—namely, a largely competitive 
light manufacturing export sector and oligopolistic heavy manufacturing and 
services sectors dominated by state-owned enterprises. The results suggest that 
further transformative sources of growth do exist but, to exploit them, China’s 
government must dig deep and produce industrial reforms that reduce the rents 
that currently concentrate economic gains while at the same time welcoming 
FDI into its hitherto protected service industries. The benefits available are 
considerable, including not only final steps towards real per capita income 
convergence with the West but also reduced inequality and stronger, more 
externally engaged heavy industry and services.
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While delivering this will be a tall order politically, China’s governments 
since the early 1980s have faced constant political and economic challenges and 
they have thus far been effective. The fundamentals behind Chinese growth to 
date seem sound and the obstacles to continued transformation are known to 
the Government and its branches (The Economist 2011). The continuing external 
clamour for greater consumption is essentially xenophobic—tantamount to 
demands that the Chinese should invest less and have their economy perform 
more poorly. A strong Chinese economy and a smooth economic transition are 
in the global collective interest and will require that Western political pressure 
is restrained. At the same time, the Chinese are in a better position to learn 
from the Japanese experience and resist external pressure for economic policy 
changes that are not beneficial domestically.
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China’s impressive growth over the past three decades has come under 
scrutiny from both domestic and international economists. Most observers as 
well as the Chinese leaders themselves now agree that the economy needs to 
rebalance in order to sustain high levels of growth in the long run.1 Economic 
imbalances such as high levels of investment and saving and low levels of 
consumption, external imbalances, high and increasing levels of inequality, and 
increasing environmental problems need to be addressed. This chapter argues 
that these imbalances and challenges, while pressing, are primarily symptoms 
rather than root causes. I propose that repressive financial policies constitute 
a central problem in the Chinese economic system and that comprehensive 
financial reforms should play an important part in any serious attempt to address 
current economic imbalances.
It is a well-known fact that the Chinese Government has applied severe 
policies of financial repression as part of its development strategy since the 
beginning of the reforms in the late 1970s (for example, Lardy 2008; Lu and 
Yao  2009). Financial repression is, however, relatively seldom tied to the 
increasing imbalances and challenges to continued economic development that 
the country is facing. One plausible reason for this is that research on financial 
repression has mainly focused on the direct relationship between repressive 
financial policies and economic development. A common finding in this research 
literature is that financial repression has a significant and negative effect on 
economic growth. To some extent, this relationship does not go hand-in-hand 
with the very repressive financial policies seen in China together with the strong 
and sustained level of China’s economic development. Recent research, however, 
sheds new light on the relationship between financial repression and economic 
growth, suggesting that the relationship is nonlinear. Furthermore, and more 
importantly, new research on financial repression and economic imbalances 
highlights the fact that repressive financial policies often lead to both domestic 
1  During a speech at the 2011 Boao Forum, President, Hu Jintao, stated that ‘population, resources and 
the environment have put great pressure on our economic and social development, and there is [a] lack 
of adequate balance, coordination or sustainability in our development’ (Hu 2011). Examples of scholars 
and policymakers stating the need for restructuring include Huang and Wang (2010), Lardy (2012), 
World Bank (2012) and Yao (2011).
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and external economic imbalances. Governments can use financial repression 
to allocate limited financial resources, skew relative prices and provide capital 
to preferred sectors. This is perhaps especially common in developing countries, 
where governments often want to attract foreign investment, increase the 
competitiveness of the traded sector and develop domestic industrial capability 
(Johansson and Wang 2011).
The connection between financial repression and economic imbalances 
in China and its importance for sustained economic development is seldom 
highlighted in the literature on China’s imbalances.2 The aim of this chapter is 
twofold. First, I want to shed light on the forms of repressive financial policies 
that have been used in China over the past three decades and provide an initial 
discussion on how reforms can be undertaken in order to address imbalances that 
are threatening the economy. Second, I highlight some of the specific imbalances 
that are likely to be at least partly due to repressive financial policies. To fulfil 
these two aims, I first introduce the concept of financial repression and briefly 
discuss individual repressive policies in China. I then draw on recent research 
that connects financial repression with economic imbalances to highlight the 
relationship between the two in the case of China. The main point of this chapter 
is not to argue that financial repression constitutes the single cause of China’s 
economic imbalances. These policies should instead be seen as part of a complex 
economic system that is marked by significant imbalances.
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. The section immediately 
following introduces the concept of financial repression. Section  three takes 
a closer look at repressive financial policies in China. The fourth section discusses 
the relationship between financial repression and economic imbalances and 
places this relationship in the Chinese context. Section five discusses potential 
financial reforms that are likely to have a positive impact on current imbalances 
and section six concludes the study.
Financial Repression
The term ‘financial repression’ was arguably first used about 40 years ago 
by McKinnon (1973). He defined financial repression as policies that regulate 
interest rates, set high reserve requirements on bank deposits and mandatorily 
allocate resources in the economy. Such policies are generally used more 
extensively in developing countries. It is often argued that repressive financial 
2  One important exception is Lardy (2012), who emphasises the need for the Chinese Government to 
undertake financial liberalisation in order for the economy to continue to grow at high levels during the 
next decade. The World Bank’s recent report on the Chinese economy that aims to bring forward a new 
development strategy for China also touches on the need for financial liberalisation (World Bank 2012).
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policies hinder financial development and lower the overall efficiency of the 
financial system. For example, Pagano (1993) finds that policies such as interest 
rate controls and reserve requirements limit the financial resources available 
for financial intermediation. A natural extension of this is the argument that 
financial repression holds back economic development (McKinnon 1973; 
Shaw  1973).3 This is because repressive financial policies discourage saving 
and investment due to lower returns than in a competitive market. In an often-
cited paper, Roubini and Sala-i-Martin (1992) present theoretical and empirical 
analyses of the negative relationship between repressive financial policies and 
long-term economic growth. In a related paper, King and Levine (1993) use 
an endogenous growth model to show that financial sector distortions reduce 
growth by way of limiting the rate of innovation in an economy.
It should be noted that even though there today exists a large number 
of theoretical and empirical studies that portray the negative link between 
repressive financial policies and economic growth, other studies have cast 
doubts on the relationship between the two. One proponent of this alternative 
view is Joseph Stiglitz, who argues that imperfect information might result in 
a need to impose financial restraints in order to uphold stability in the financial 
system. For example, Stiglitz (2000) attributes the increasing frequency of 
financial crises during the past decades to the process of financial liberalisation 
in developing countries. It can thus be argued that such countries are better able 
to manage their money supply and financial stability under policies that focus 
on financial restraints due to the existence of significant degrees of imperfect 
information (Hellmann et al. 1997, 2000; Stiglitz 1994; Stiglitz and Weiss 1981). 
These two seemingly opposite approaches to repressive financial policies do 
not, however, necessarily contradict each other. In a recent study, Huang and 
Wang  (2011) examine the impact of financial repression on economic growth 
in China during the past three decades. Their findings confirm that repressive 
financial policies have indeed helped economic growth in China. The authors link 
this positive relationship to a prudent and gradual approach to liberalisation; 
however—and what is more important for the analysis in this chapter—their 
results also indicate that the impact turned from positive during the first two 
decades of reform to negative in the 2000s. At least in the case of China, these 
findings indicate that the effect of repressive financial policies on growth and 
its composition are dependent on the general level of development as well as the 
institutional setting. How repressive financial policies affect economic activity 
is thus dependent on the net effect of the positive and negative influences 
discussed here.
3  For a detailed and interesting review of the topic of financial development and economic growth, 
see Levine (2005).
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Repressive Financial Policies in China
In this section, we discuss different forms of repressive financial policies in 
China. The repressive financial policies in China that are most often mentioned 
in the literature include interest rate controls, credit controls and reserve 
requirements; however, financial repression includes several additional policies 
that can be and often are used in countries around the world, including China. 
Here, the discussion is based on a list of different policies in an index of financial 
reforms developed by Abiad et al. (2008), who cover a range of potential ways 
to liberalise the financial sector: interest rate controls, credit controls and 
reserve requirements, barriers of entry and state ownership in the banking 
sector, capital account restrictions, regulations and supervision in the banking 
sector, and security market policies. The last two of these are usually not seen as 
typical repressive policies, but as they are directly connected to other policies of 
financial liberalisation or repression, we briefly discuss them as well.
Interest Rate Controls
Repressed interest rates constitute arguably the most-often cited repressive 
financial policy in China (for example, Lardy 2008; Lu and Yao 2009). During the 
period of the traditional planned economy, interest rates were deliberately kept 
low in order to stimulate the development of heavy industry in China. After 
economic reforms were initiated in 1978, artificially low interest rates remained. 
Basically, very low deposit rates and lending rates have resulted in an implicit 
tax on net lenders. As Lardy (2008) points out, since households are major net 
savers in China, the redistribution has to some extent been from households to 
corporations, but even more so to the state. Due to the fact that the state has full 
control over the domestic banking sector, the major beneficiaries of repressive 
interest rate policies have been the state-owned enterprises (SOEs); however, 
Chinese corporations are also large net savers. According to Lardy (2008), one 
of the most significant gains for the state has therefore been that the cost of 
sterilisation has been kept relatively low, thus allowing for a significantly 
undervalued renminbi during most of the past decade.
Figure 3.1 shows the real interest rate during the reform period. The very 
low general level of real rates of return to bank deposits is clearly visible. 
There  are even several prolonged periods with negative real interest rates 
during this period.
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Figure 3.1 Real Interest Rate, 1978–2011
Source: Data from National Bureau of Statistics of China.
Credit Controls and Reserve Requirements
It is still common for many countries to require that a minimum share of total 
bank lending be given to priority sectors or companies. This is especially so in 
the case of China, where the banking system is generally regarded as a channel 
for industrial policy. Research shows that state-owned banks in China tend to 
favour SOEs and generally do not focus primarily on enterprise profitability 
(for example, Podpiera 2006; Wei and Wang 1997). A typical example of credit 
control and direct lending in China is the difficulty faced by private enterprises 
looking to obtain credit.4 Walter and Howie (2011) argue that most of the bank 
lending in China goes to state-owned enterprises. Some observers are worried 
that this became worse during the global financial crisis, stating that much of 
the fiscal stimulus package introduced in 2008 resulted in an increase in directed 
lending. There are, however, those who take the opposite view. Lardy (2012) 
argues that the view that Chinese banks’ main purpose is to provide funding 
for the Government and SOEs is ‘outdated and wholly inaccurate’. Looking at 
lending during the global financial crisis, he shows that the growth of lending 
to small firms was more than twice the growth of lending to large firms and 
that the total amount of new lending to small firms actually surpassed that 
4  Some solutions to this and other forms of discrimination for such firms have included disguising 
themselves as a state-owned or collectively owned entity (‘wearing a red hat’) or developing strong ties 
to political leaders (for example, Feng et al. 2011).
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to large firms (Lardy 2012). While SOEs might be receiving less of the total 
lending than before, it is clear, however, that the banking system is still 
filled with preferential treatment to certain groups of enterprises. A growing 
literature on political connections shows that strong ties to leading politicians 
are very valuable for Chinese firms. One of the effects of political connections 
is preferential access to debt capital (Shih 2008). Supporting the view that the 
Government is still very much controlling credit, the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) recently published a report claiming that the Chinese Government’s 
role in credit allocation is partly responsible for causing a build-up of contingent 
liabilities and making the much needed reorientation of the financial system 
more difficult (IMF 2011).
Besides control over credit allocation, the Government can use reserve 
requirements to repress the financial system. Figure 3.2 shows the reserve 
requirements for Chinese banks imposed by the People’s Bank of China during 
the reform period. While the level of required reserves was very high during the 
initial stage, it then came down to the 5–15 per cent interval, only to return to 
about 20 per cent during the past two years. Abiad et al. (2008) use 20 per cent 
as a threshold when determining whether reserve requirements are to be seen 
as excessive, suggesting that China’s reserve requirement ratio is to be regarded 
as too high. Lardy (2012) also argues that China’s reserve requirements are ‘very 
high’ and that they should be addressed in future financial reforms.
Figure 3.2 Reserve Requirements, 1978–2011
Source: Data from National Bureau of Statistics of China.
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Entry Barriers and State Ownership in the Banking Sector
In China, most of the capital in the financial system is allocated through 
banks. As Walter and Howie (2011) point out, ‘[i]n China, the banks are the 
financial system’. Naturally, ownership of banks is the most direct way to 
control credit allocation in an economy. State ownership of banks is therefore 
an important indicator of how liberalised the financial system is. Here, it is clear 
that financial reforms in China have a long way to go. While China’s banking 
sector has undergone significant reforms during the past two decades, the state 
still controls all the major banks. Table 3.1 shows the different banks in 2009, 
classified by ownership structure according to the People’s Bank of China. Policy 
banks are fully owned by the state. The four major banks have all undergone 
initial public offerings, but still remain under majority state control.5 Of the 
other 13 major banks classified as joint-stock commercial banks, 11 are controlled 
by national or local government organs. This means that the state-controlled 
banks hold assets of close to RMB59 trillion, corresponding to approximately 
73 per cent of total bank assets in 2009.
Table 3.1 China’s Banking Institutions, 2009
Assets  
(RMB trillion)
Number Share (%) Amount Share (%)
Policy banks 3 0.05 6.95 8.63
State-owned commercial banks 4 0.07 39.04 48.47
Joint-stock commercial banks, 
state as largest shareholder
11 0.20 12.59 15.63
Others 2 0.04 2.01 2.50
Others
City commercial banks and credit 
unions
158 2.80 5.71 7.09
Rural commercial banks and credit 
unions
5241 93.02 8.64 10.73
Postal savings bank 1 0.02 2.70 3.35
Foreign banks 32 0.57 1.35 1.68
Non-bank institutions 182 3.23 1.55 1.92
Total 5634 100.00 80.53 100.00
Source: Data from Deng et al. (2011).
5  The four large commercial banks (commonly called the ‘Big Four’) are: Industrial and Commercial Bank 
of China, China Construction Bank, Agricultural Bank of China and Bank of China.
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Walter and Howie (2011) argue that banks are basically used as utilities 
providing unlimited capital, which is then mainly channelled to state-owned 
enterprises. In this sense, the Chinese economic model during the past three 
decades has been based on a developmental state that channels funds through 
the banking system. This has not been without cost. It has been argued that 
the financial system is quite fragile and that it will need to be recapitalised on 
a  regular basis based on current business practice (for example, Walter and 
Howie 2011). Reforming the banking sector in China probably constitutes one 
of the most difficult challenges in the effort to reform the financial sector, as it 
would result in a significant loss of control over capital allocation in the economy. 
Nevertheless, it should be seen as a key priority in the effort to secure long-term 
financial stability. Showing that China’s leadership is aware of this problem, 
Prime Minister, Wen Jiabao, recently stated that the large commercial banks 
are making profits far too easily due to their monopoly position (Barboza 2012).
Capital Account Restrictions
Capital account restrictions are imposed to obtain greater control over the 
exchange rate as well as domestic credit flows. A desire to limit competition 
for ‘captive’ bank deposits is a further motivation. Typical policies related to 
the capital account include restrictions or taxes on inflows or outflows as well 
as alternative exchange rates for different forms of transactions across country 
borders. Without tight capital account restrictions in place, repressive financial 
policies such as suppressed interest rates would be much less effective.
Ever since the beginning of the economic reforms in the late 1970s, 
the Chinese Government has taken gradual steps to liberalise the capital account 
in China. Foreign direct investment was allowed to flow in early and outward 
direct investment has been allowed for most of the past decade; however, besides 
small test cases (such as the qualified foreign institutional investor, QFII, and 
the qualified domestic institutional investor, QDII, schemes), private portfolio 
flows have been kept off limits. It is not unusual for developing countries to 
have relatively low levels of capital account convertibility. One could therefore 
argue that China’s policies follow those of other emerging economies. Figure 3.3 
shows Chinn and Ito’s (2006) index for capital account openness for the United 
States and a number of emerging economies. Naturally, the United States has a 
much higher level of capital account openness; however, even when compared 
with other, larger emerging economies, China exhibits a relatively low level 
of capital account convertibility. It is only India that shows signs of a similar 
low level of liberalised capital account. At the same time, there seems to be a 
growing consensus among Chinese policymakers that continued capital account 
liberalisation is desired. A recent report published by the survey and statistics 
department of the People’s Bank of China states that it is now time to open up 
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the capital account. The report even provides a three-step roadmap for such 
reform over the coming 10 years (China Securities Journal 2012). These signals 
are consistent with the trend towards internationalising the renminbi, which 
has gathered pace since 2010.
Figure 3.3 Capital Account Openness Index
Note: The Chinn–Ito index measures a country’s degree of capital account openness. The higher the index 
is, the higher is the degree of openness.
Source: Data from Chinn and Ito (2006); Ito and Chinn (2010). 
Regulations and Supervision in the Banking Sector
Prudential regulation and supervision of banks are important for financial 
reforms. Not only the formal regulative framework, but also, more importantly, 
the actual supervisory oversight is crucial in the development of a sound 
and stable banking system. In the case of China, significant steps have been 
taken to improve the regulatory framework and the supervision of the banks. 
Nevertheless, as pointed out in a recent assessment by the World Bank and 
the IMF, the autonomy of the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) 
is challenged due to the fact that the banking system is used so extensively by 
the Government to pursue its economic policy and to facilitate a high level of 
credit growth (World Bank 2011).
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Security Market Policy
The development of the securities market constitutes an important part 
of financial development. It allows for investors to further diversify their portfolio 
holdings and provides alternative channels for funding. The Government can 
carry out a range of different policies to facilitate the development of domestic 
securities markets, including the auctioning out of government securities, 
establishing debt as well as stock markets, making use of different forms 
of  encouragement such as tax incentives, and opening up domestic capital 
markets to foreign investors, albeit under a quota system (Abiad et al. 2008).
While China has taken steps to develop its securities markets, it is still far 
from having well-functioning capital markets. The bond market especially has 
yet to become an important part of the financial system. While the domestic 
stock market has grown significantly in size over the past decade, it is still far 
from developing into a mature and well-functioning market. Foreign investors’ 
access to the Chinese stock market is also still very limited; most are allowed 
to trade only in B-shares, which constitute a very limited share of the overall 
market, with a relatively small number of QFII firms able to fill an A-share quota. 
Most trading activities by foreign investors instead take place in Hong Kong 
(as well as other markets), where a large number of companies from the Mainland 
have listed, especially during the past decade. Furthermore, supervision of the 
stock market is generally considered weak and it is commonly argued that the 
supervisory body, the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), is in 
need of considerably more resources in order to function well. Even the recently 
appointed chairman of the CSRC, Guo Shuqing, has stated that ‘insider trading, 
market manipulation, fraudulent listings and other illegal activities have not 
only seriously distorted the normal path for investors seeking returns, but have 
also severely harmed investor confidence and critically affected normal market 
functions’ (Lu et al. 2012). According to a recent joint report by the World Bank 
and the IMF, the CSRC needs greater operational autonomy. The report also 
states that the commercial court, enforcement of illegal investment activities and 
the detection and deterrence of unfair trading practices need to be improved 
(World Bank 2011). There is thus still much work to be done to facilitate the 
development of more market-driven and market-based intermediation in China.
Financial Repression and China’s Imbalances
In this section, some of the imbalances in the Chinese economy are 
highlighted. Each of them is then discussed within the framework of repressive 
financial policies in an attempt to shed light on how such policies might have 
played a role in the emergence of such imbalances.
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Structural Imbalances
Recent research has shown that repressive financial policies are associated with 
structural imbalances. Typically, countries follow a similar pattern of structural 
change as their economy develops. Economic growth is accompanied by the 
gross domestic product (GDP) share of the agricultural sector falling as the GDP 
share of the industry sector increases. Later, the industry share of GDP decreases 
as the service sector expands. In countries that make use of strict, repressive 
financial policies, however, such policies will slow structural transformation. 
Johansson and Wang (2011) develop a model in which financial repression affects 
the balance between the industry and the service sectors. The main implication 
of their model of non-balanced growth is a repressed service sector relative to 
the industry sector. Their empirical findings on a large set of countries strongly 
support the theoretical framework, indicating that institutional distortions can 
have important consequences for a country’s economic structure.
This unbalanced pattern of development is quite apparent in the case of 
China. Figure 3.4 depicts structural change during the reform period. While the 
agricultural sector follows the typical pattern of structural change seen in many 
other countries, the industry sector’s share of GDP has remained at very high 
levels throughout the three decades. Given the strong focus on industry during 
the period before 1978, industry’s share of total GDP at the beginning of the 
reforms was at a very high level. The fact that it has remained at this level 
throughout such a long period of very high economic growth indicates that the 
economic structure has become heavily distorted.
Figure 3.4 Sectors’ Share of GDP, 1978–2008
Source: Data from National Bureau of Statistics of China.
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Structural imbalances similar to the ones found in China are arguably 
synonymous with the developmental state often found in East Asian countries. 
Strong state intervention combined with extensive planning and regulation 
in  countries that are late to industrialise mean that it is the state itself that 
takes on different developmental functions and thus leads the industrialisation 
process (Amsden 1989; Johnson 1982; Wade 1990). China, perhaps more than 
any other country, portrays this development model and also shows how the 
success of state intervention during one phase might be followed by the state 
acting as an interest group and thus serving as an obstruction to ongoing 
adaptation. The empirical evidence found in Johansson and Wang (2011) and 
the fact that the developmental state most often is tied to a heavy reliance on 
the development of industry support the argument that less repressive financial 
policies would most likely help mitigate the disparities in China’s economic 
structure. A rebalancing of the economic structure would in itself also have 
ramifications for a number of other areas of the Chinese economy, including its 
external balances, the labour market, and so on.
External Imbalances
China’s large external imbalances have been a sensitive and heavily debated 
topic, especially since the beginning of the global financial crisis. While China 
has maintained what many have argued is a significantly undervalued currency 
during most of the past decade (Frankel 2006; Goldstein and Lardy 2006), 
the Chinese current account surplus has been persistent during this period. 
Figure  3.5 shows the current account and the trade balance during the past 
three decades. The trade balance widened dramatically from 2003 to 2007 from 
an already high level. It is only during the later stages of the global financial 
crisis that the trade surplus has decreased.
There are a number of plausible reasons for China’s external imbalances. 
For  example, the exchange rate has often been singled out as a main reason 
behind China’s growing trade surplus. What has often been overlooked, 
however, is how repressive financial policies in general can affect a country’s 
external balances. In a recent study, Johansson and Wang (2012a) use a panel of 
countries to analyse the relationship between financial repression and external 
balances. They suggested two hypotheses for how repressive financial policies 
could affect the current account. First, they build on the model developed in their 
earlier work (Johansson and Wang 2011) and argue that financial repression can 
cause external imbalances due to the imbalance in the basic economic structure. 
As in the case of China, if repressive financial policies are used to develop 
the industry sector at the expense of other sectors, the result is most likely 
a strong increase in exports, as manufacturing makes up a significant part of 
the industry sector. Second, financial repression can have an effect on external 
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balances by way of hindering financial development. Financial development is 
associated with a lower level of the current account, since financially developed 
economies are less anxious about their international financial resilience. 
While  the empirical results in Johansson and Wang (2012a) mainly support 
the first of these hypotheses, the second one is plausible, perhaps especially 
in the case of China. Recent research thus highlights fundamental structural 
features in the financial sector as being at least partly responsible for external 
imbalances. In the case of China, a heavily repressed financial sector is likely to 
have helped the country’s external imbalance become even more severe during 
the past decade.
Figure 3.5 China’s Current Account and Trade Balance, 1981–2010
Note: The current account is on the left axis, the trade balance on the right.
Source: Data from National Bureau of Statistics of China. 
Inequality
Rising inequality is one of the primary concerns of the Chinese Government. 
It fears that the growing divergence between rural and urban incomes and the 
general income inequality in the country could result in an increasing level of 
social instability. Figure 3.6 shows just how severe the level of inequality has 
become during the reform period. The Gini coefficient shows a steady increase 
during the whole period. Starting from a relatively modest level of 0.29 in 
1978, it increased to close to 0.47 in 2005 (Fang and Yu 2012). The subject has 
become so sensitive that the Chinese Government will not even publish the 
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Gini coefficient and has not done so for the past decade.6 While the National 
Bureau of Statistics argues that this is due to the problem of incomplete data, 
the Government has been criticised for trying to downplay the large wealth gap 
in the country (Fang and Yu 2012). Figure 3.6 also shows the disparity between 
rural and urban incomes in China. The urban–rural income ratio follows the 
general inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient closely, indicating that 
the growing divide between rural and urban households makes up a significant 
part of the overall income inequality in the country.
Figure 3.6 Gini Coefficient and Urban–Rural Income Ratio, 1978–2005
Note: The urban–rural income ratio is on the left axis, the Gini coefficient on the right. 
Source: Data from National Bureau of Statistics of China.
Repressive financial policies can result in higher levels of income inequality. 
As Johansson and Wang (2012b) point out, repressed interest rates can lead 
to uneven returns to savings in countries with fragmented financial markets. 
One of the reasons for this is that affluent people might have better access to 
alternative investment instruments. For rural households in China, the number 
of alternatives for where to invest savings is limited and the most common 
form of savings is a typical bank account. For more affluent people, there are 
alternative investment opportunities, including a range of financial instruments 
and the investor housing market, which is unaffordable for ordinary Chinese. 
Furthermore, and as noted earlier, repressive financial policies can cause 
6  The Gini coefficient measures inequality on a scale from zero to one, where zero reflects complete 
equality and one represents complete inequality. It has been argued that, when taking hidden income 
into account, China’s Gini coefficient is most likely significantly higher than 0.5 (Wang and Woo 2011).
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severe disruptions to the process of financial development. Demirguc-Kunt and 
Levine (2009) note that, with large financial market imperfections, investment 
opportunities become a function of dynastic assets. This is because a producer’s 
wealth has a large effect on problems with moral hazard and adverse selection 
that put constraints on opportunities. Furthermore, financial development 
is linked to equality through other mechanisms. For instance, efficient 
credit markets allow for people with high ability to access quality schooling 
regardless of parental wealth, thus decreasing the potential for permanent, 
or intergenerational, inequality (Demirguc-Kunt and Levine 2009).
Given the potentially important effect that repressive financial policies can 
have on income inequality over time, such policies are working against what the 
Chinese Government is trying to achieve. Inequality is one of the imbalances 
emphasised in the Twelfth Five-Year Plan; however, policy discussions so far 
have not focused on the relationship between severe repressive financial policies 
and inequality. It is likely that the high level of financial repression in China, 
especially the excessive use of repressed interest rates, has added to the growing 
disparities in household income. Thus, if the Government were to ease up on 
such policies, it might prove productive in the battle against inequality.
Moving Forward with Financial Reforms
Financial liberalisation poses difficult challenges to any country. One of the 
fundamental lessons learned from failed liberalisation processes around the 
world is that sequencing is imperative. In the case of China, although capital 
account liberalisation is regarded as important and is even included in the 
Twelfth Five-Year Plan, a complete opening up of the capital account would 
preferably come after other financial reforms have taken place. The key role 
interest rate restrictions play in fuelling the banking system with cheap capital 
means that a sudden and comprehensive liberalisation of the capital account 
without taking the restrictive interest rate controls into account could generate 
a massive outflow of capital if Chinese households and companies were able to 
place their capital in investments in foreign markets and if expected returns 
abroad were to be much higher than those at home (net of foreign currency 
risk perceptions). Comparing interest rates in different countries, this would 
not constitute a significant problem at the moment as the Chinese interest rate 
is now significantly higher than interest rates in the United States and Europe. 
Nevertheless, the existing interest rate differences are a result of economic crises 
in both the United States and Europe and this could change as time passes. 
Similarly, if significant weaknesses are found in the domestic banking system, 
especially during a time of crisis, an open capital account would accelerate 
bank runs. Thus, supervision and regulatory practice in the banking system 
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need to be in place before there is a complete reform of the capital account. 
Lardy and Douglass (2011) note that for capital account liberalisation to work 
well, there is also a need for sufficiently developed domestic capital markets, as 
they provide incentives for further commercialisation of domestic banks, enable 
absorption of large capital inflows and reduce the risk of currency mismatches. 
Lardy and Douglass also argue that there is a need for exchange rate flexibility, 
since a significantly under or overvalued currency would result in large capital 
inflows or outflows if the capital account is opened. A recent report by the 
People’s Bank of China added macroeconomic stability and adequate foreign 
exchange reserves as important precursors for continued capital account reform 
(China Securities Journal 2012).
Besides interest rate liberalisation, continued efforts to strengthen the 
regulatory framework and supervision for both the banking sector and the 
securities markets are needed. The lack of independence for both the CBRC and 
the CSRC needs to be remedied so that both of these sectors will become more 
market driven.
Conclusions
Financial repression affects not only financial development and economic 
growth in general. It can also be the root cause of a number of different economic 
imbalances, some of which have been discussed in this chapter. Some of these 
economic imbalances have developed into difficult challenges for the Chinese 
Government. While the country’s current account seems to have moved closer 
to a reasonable level of late, it is still too early to tell if this is temporary and due 
only to a significant fall in demand from its main trading partners due to the 
global financial crisis or if it is more permanent in nature. In addition to external 
imbalances, structural imbalances at home and a severe level of inequality 
constitute some of the primary difficulties that China’s policymakers need to 
address. While financial repression is certainly not the only factor causing such 
imbalances in China, less repressive financial policies could help mitigate them. 
Financial liberalisation would decrease the heavy reliance on investment and 
heavy industrial development and free resources for the expansion of the service 
sector and consumption. Similarly, continued financial reforms would result in 
a significant increase in financial development, which would have multifarious 
benefits from higher returns to household savings and to better opportunities 
for individuals from less affluent households to access high-quality education. 
These potential changes are likely to help bring a stop to the negative trend of 
increasing inequality in China.
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As noted in this chapter, recent research has brought the formerly disparate 
fields of financial repression and economic imbalances together. Additional 
research along these lines is important to fully understand the many ways in 
which repressive financial policies can affect an economy. Such research is also 
likely to help shed light on issues that have been overlooked in the debate on 
the positive and negative effects of financial liberalisation.
Looking at each of the dimensions of financial reform discussed in this 
chapter, it is clear that continued reforms are needed for China to develop a well-
functioning financial system. It is also important, however, to identify a proper 
sequence for each of these reforms, as swift reforms in certain areas without 
taking related repressive policies into account could result in instability, which 
might discourage policymakers following through on the entire package, which 
would be a damaging outcome for both the Chinese and the global citizenry.
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4. Narrowing China’s Current 
Account Surplus: 
The role of saving, investment and the renminbi
Guonan Ma, Robert McCauley and Lillie Lam1
Introduction 
The widening of the Chinese current account surplus from the neighbourhood 
of 2 per cent of GDP about the turn of the century to as much as 10 per cent 
before the global financial crisis in 2008 led to calls for the renminbi (RMB) 
to be revalued. The rationale was that a stronger renminbi would make 
Chinese exports less competitive and imports cheaper for Chinese consumers. 
This rationale sees the external surplus as a function of relative prices so that 
exchange-rate appreciation can narrow the surplus to a desired level.2 
Another, and in many ways richer, conception of China’s external surplus 
is that it reflects a shortfall of the domestic absorption of output—whether 
consumption, investment or government spending—in relation to the economy’s 
productive capacity. Viewed from this perspective, the Chinese economy in this 
century showed a rise in investment in relation to output, but an even larger rise 
in savings. The gap between investment’s substantial rise and the stronger rise 
in savings widened the current account surplus. On this view, to understand 
the widening of China’s current account requires an answer to the question: 
what drove savings up?
Our examination of China’s savings rate emphasises the contribution of both 
corporate and government savings more than that of households. On this view, 
a popular account of the rise in Chinese savings—namely, higher household 
income insecurity—suffers from its silence on corporate and government 
savings, which rose more. Corporate savings rose in classical fashion as profits 
rose, and wages declined, in income. Government savings rose as the revenue 
dividend from higher growth was poured into public capital formation.
1  The views expressed in this chapter are not necessarily those of BIS. We would like to thank the participants 
of the SUERF Conference in Brussels in May 2011 and Stephen Cecchetti and Lu Feng for discussion. 
2  Along these lines, Cline (2012) argues that the renminbi appreciation explains the ‘lion’s share’ of the 
decline of the Chinese current account surplus of 7.4 per cent of GDP between 2007 and 2010, with 
help from higher oil prices and lower global interest rates. Moreover, he reports (p. 12) that ‘the policy 
experiment in which the real effective level of the renminbi continues to rise at 3 per cent annually 
shows that the result would be [to] shift China into approximate current account balance by 2017’. Cline 
is right to single out returns on China’s international assets as a determinant of the current account. 
He et al. (2012a) consider how these returns might be affected by increasing the proportion of China’s 
external assets held in private Chinese hands.
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When the global financial crisis hit, Chinese Government spending 
increased and agencies of sub-national governments borrowed from banks to 
boost infrastructure and other public investment. This response shrank the 
current account surplus substantially but only by raising investment to an 
unprecedented and unsustainable share of output. The scale and distribution 
of any credit losses from this investment boom remain a matter of keen debate. 
Looking forward, demography and domestic policies are working together to 
narrow China’s current account surplus, which indeed shrank in 2011 to below 
3 per cent of China’s GDP. As labour force growth slows, real wages are rising 
rapidly, making Chinese exports less competitive, allowing higher consumption 
and squeezing corporate profits and savings. For its part, the Government might 
shift its spending from building infrastructure to providing services. 
In this scenario of a Chinese economy rebalancing towards consumption and 
government services, the exchange rate can continue to play a complementary 
role. If the renminbi continues to appreciate in real terms, it would help to 
shift production from exports to goods and services for home use. In fact, after 
policymakers broke the peg to the dollar in 2005, the renminbi traded so as to 
appreciate gradually against a broad basket of trading partner currencies in 
2006–08. This experiment was interrupted by the global financial crisis, but 
appreciation resumed in some fashion from mid-2010. 
However one interprets the underlying policy, the nominal renminbi had 
by the end of 2011 appreciated by 21 per cent against its trading partners’ 
currencies since June 2005. China’s relatively high inflation pushed up the 
real effective appreciation to 30 per cent over the same period. And this real 
appreciation approaches 50 per cent, if one focuses on unit labour costs rather 
than consumer prices. More likely than not, such a scale of broad real exchange 
rate appreciation is narrowing China’s current account surpluses. 
This chapter first reviews Chinese savings and investment behaviour, noting 
their more separate evolution over time. Then we review the management of the 
renminbi. 
Saving–Investment Perspective 
China has run one of the largest surpluses in the world in recent years. 
Its  current account surplus widened from 5 per cent and 10 per cent of its 
own GDP between 2005 and 2007, before narrowing to less than 3 per cent by 
2011. In terms of global GDP, it ranged between 0.3 per cent and 0.7 per cent. 
As a result, within one decade, China swung from net international debtor of 
10 per cent of GDP to net international creditor of 30 per cent of GDP, despite 
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per capita GDP still well below US$5000 (Ma and Zhou 2009). In order to examine 
the sources of China’s current account surplus, we first focus on savings and 
investment, whose gap, by national income accounting identity, is the current 
account balance (Figure 4.1, top panel).
Figure 4.1 China’s Gross National Saving and Gross Capital Formation 
as a Percentage of GDP
Saving–Investment Balance and Current Account1
Gross National Saving and Capital Formation
1 Gross national saving is estimated using either expenditure-based GDP or production-based GDP. 
By definition, the current account balance equals expenditure-based gross national saving minus gross 
capital formation.
Sources: National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBS); authors’ own estimates.
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The Chinese economy both saves and invests a lot. In 2010, its gross national 
saving reached 53 per cent of GDP, and investment spending reached 48 per cent 
(Figure 4.1, bottom panel), leaving a current account surplus at 5 per cent of 
GDP. The contributions of such high saving and investment to global imbalances 
and financial crises have attracted much attention (ADB 2009; Bernanke 2005; 
Zhou 2009). 
A high and rising saving rate implies a low and falling consumption share. 
Private consumption as a share of China’s GDP declined from 50 per cent to 
33 per cent between 1990 and 2010. Contrary to common perceptions, however, 
China’s private consumption has grown at a strong pace of 8 per cent to 
9 per cent per annum over the past 20 years; the penetration of colour televisions, 
refrigerators, washing machines and airconditioners has increased tenfold. 
Yet, the overall Chinese economy grew even faster than consumer demand. 
GDP grew more than 10 per cent annually between 1990 and 2010, powered 
mainly by stronger investment demand. Gross capital formation increased at a 
breakneck speed of 15 per cent a year over these two decades, as its share in 
GDP rose from 36 per cent to a staggering 48 per cent by 2010. Remarkably, 
such rising investment has been more than fully financed by even faster rising 
saving since the early 2000s. China’s gross national saving rose from less than 
40 per cent of GDP in 1990 to 53 per cent in 2010. As noted, the current account 
surplus widened from 2 per cent of GDP in the early 2000s to 10 per cent in 
2007, before narrowing to less than 3 per cent in 2011. 
Thus, from the saving–investment perspective, not weak investment but 
extremely strong saving provides the key to understanding China’s recent large 
current account surpluses. Here we first take a closer look at the dynamics of 
the Chinese saving rate before examining the trends in its investment rate and 
drawing their joint implication for its current account balance. Admittedly, 
saving and investment interact with each other and are jointly determined. 
Indeed, as we argue below, strong profitability raised corporate savings and 
in turn provided incentives for investment, while high investment boosted 
growth, thus lifting savings. Still, it is possible to discuss savings and investment 
separately because the Chinese economy has become more open in recent years, 
despite binding capital controls. 
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Figure 4.2 Feldstein–Horioka Time-Series Regression: Annual data for China
Year-on-Year Change as a Percentage of Lagged GDP1
The Estimated Betas of Gross National Saving
1 (ΔIt)/GDPt-1 and (ΔSt)/GDPt-1, where I stands for gross capital formation and S is gross national saving.
2 The regression equation is (ΔIt)/GDPt-1 = α + ß (ΔSt)/GDPt-1. Recursive regressions, with 1984 as the 
starting year and the ending year corresponding with that indicated by the x-axis. Regressions of rolling 
10-year windows, with ending year corresponding with the x-axis. 
3 The F-statistics, log likelihood ratio and Wald statistics all confirm a break point of 2001 in the data 
sample. The nulls that ß equals unity for the sub-sample of 1984–2001 and zero for the sub-sample of 
2002–10 are both accepted. 
Sources: CEIC; authors’ own estimates.
In particular, a simple Feldstein–Horioka (1980) analysis shows that savings 
and investment no longer track each other as they used to (Figure 4.2, top panel). 
Whereas annual Chinese data indicate no significant difference from a one-to-one 
relationship between changes in investment and savings before 2000, subsequently 
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a smaller change in investment is associated with a given change in saving. The 
beta in a regression of changes in investment as a ratio to lagged GDP on changes 
in savings as a ratio to lagged GDP run over progressively longer periods starting 
in 1984 dips towards 0.9. More tellingly, the beta estimated over a rolling 10-year 
window drops to 0.5 for the sample ending in 2010.3 Given that the economy 
opened up with World Trade Organisation (WTO) accession in 2001, the Chow test 
rejects the identity of the estimated betas over the two sub-samples of 1984–2001 
and 2002–10. A coefficient of 0.5 is close to the 0.58 that Blanchard and Giavazzi 
(2002) report for the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) cross-section over 1975–2001, while it is above their estimates for the 
European Union in the 1990s. These regressions describe Chinese savings and 
investment that can to some extent be separately discussed.
China’s Exceptionally High Saving Rate and Factors 
Behind It
China’s aggregate saving rate has been exceptionally high relative to its 
own history, to the saving of its thrifty Asian peers or to any empirical model 
predictions. During the 2000s, China’s aggregate marginal propensity to save 
exceeded 60 per cent. Relative to GDP, China has edged out Singapore to become 
the highest saver in the world. China emerges as a big outlier in cross-sectional 
or panel regressions, with its actual saving rate typically 10 to 15 percentage 
points higher than predictions (Ma and Wang 2010).
Both the dynamics and the composition of China’s rising gross national 
saving defy simple interpretations. All three sectors in the Chinese economy—
household, corporate and government—have been high savers. Yet, taken 
individually, none is an exceptional saver by comparison with its global 
counterparts. Instead, high saving by all three sectors makes China’s aggregate 
saving rate exceptionally high. And contrary to conventional wisdom, the 
household sector accounted for less than one-sixth of the increase in China’s 
gross national saving in the 1990s and 2000s. The corporate and government 
sectors made bigger contributions to the rising Chinese aggregate saving 
(Figure 4.3, top panel). In particular, the saving of the government sector almost 
tripled—from 4.4 per cent of GDP in 1992 to 11 per cent by 2008—as most of 
the robust gains in government revenues during this period were invested in 
physical infrastructure rather than used to boost social services. The share of 
China’s government saving is also relatively high compared with other countries 
except Korea (Figure 4.3, bottom panel).
3  In statistical terms, a one-tailed test does not reject that the 2010 recursively estimated beta of 0.9 is 
equal to 1, while the betas estimated by the rolling 10-year regressions ending in each year 2007–10 are 
significantly smaller than unity at the 5 per cent level. 
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Figure 4.3 China’s Gross National Saving, by Institutional Sector, as a Percentage 
of GDP
China’s Gross National Saving1
2005–07 Average, by Market
1 Saving under flow-of-funds statistics.
Note: CN = China; DE = Germany; FR = France; IN = India; JP = Japan; KR = Korea; PH = Philippines; 
TW = Chinese Taipei; US = United States. 
Sources: Asian Development Bank (ADB); CEIC; NBS; OECD; authors’ own estimates.
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The factors behind China’s high and rising saving rate are multiple, leaving 
many puzzles to be resolved and suggesting that a cocktail of policies might be 
needed to rebalance the Chinese economy. At minimum, the principal causes for 
high Chinese saving in the 2000s include two sets of interacting forces (Ma and 
Wang 2010). 
The first set consists of powerful structural forces in the domestic Chinese 
economy. As described by Lewis (1954), surplus rural labour allowed rapid 
industrialisation paced by capital-widening investment and provided ready 
migrants willing to work at the going wage. The potential was heightened by 
the commune system having kept millions of surplus peasants down on the farm 
for decades and a very compressed demographic transition, featuring a rapidly 
falling ratio of child dependants to working-age adults. This transfer started 
as the communes collapsed under Deng Xiaoping. A central result of such a 
large-scale transfer of labour at a relatively stable wage is a falling labour share 
of output and rising profit and savings rate. High returns to capital stimulated 
investment, driving faster growth, which further lifted the saving rate. China’s 
WTO accession and the supportive global growth environment in the early 
2000s also accommodated this profound transition.
The other set of factors encompasses institutional changes during the 1990s 
and 2000s. These include labour downsizing at state-owned companies, reform 
of the pension system and the introduction of private home ownership. First, 
employment at state-owned companies, which had provided much social 
welfare and security, almost halved during 1995–2005. This restructuring 
enhanced efficiency and profit in firms while presenting workers with increased 
job insecurity and expenditure uncertainty. These added to private saving by 
both the corporate and the household sectors. Second, pension reforms reduced 
pensions and increased contributions to government pension schemes, thereby 
lifting both private and public saving. Finally, the introduction of private home 
ownership in the 1990s boosted household planning for home purchase and 
increased land revenues to the Government in a high-growth environment, 
again pushing up both private and public saving. 
In addition, other government policies might have played a role in lifting 
the Chinese saving rate. These include promoting officials who invest rather 
than provide social services, slow weaving of the new social safety net after 
the widespread layoffs by state-owned companies, retaining entry barriers to 
(and levying heavy taxes on) services and maintaining limits on credit access 
by small companies and households. Of these, the most important might be the 
promotion policy for officials. Since those presiding over rapid growth were 
rewarded, local government officials responded by investing additional public 
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revenues to boost local GDP growth in the short term and their odds of their 
promotion. China’s government consumption is 12 per cent of GDP—below the 
OECD average of 15 per cent. 
Other commonly cited policies are somewhat less convincing accounts of 
the path of Chinese savings. It is sometimes suggested that high Chinese saving 
mostly arises from government subsidies, price distortions and the market 
power of state firms in telecommunications and energy. While such frictions 
can help explain inefficiency, they do not offer useful insights into why China’s 
aggregate saving rate suddenly surged in the 2000s, after a period of significant 
economic liberalisation (Ma and Wang 2010). 
Two examples help make the case. First, indigenous private firms have done 
much of the higher corporate saving. Their uncertain and restricted access to 
credit could account for their reliance on retained earnings to fund expansion. 
On this view, not subsidies and monopolistic state firms but rather limited credit 
access of private firms makes sense of higher corporate savings; however, limited 
access by small firms to external financing is felt to be a problem globally, and 
it is not clear whether the Chinese situation is worse than that of its emerging-
market peers. Second, another frequently cited factor—the limited availability 
of consumer credit—could indeed force Chinese households to save more than 
otherwise. But in this century, household loans have expanded significantly 
relative to both the household income and the economy (see below), precisely at 
a time when both the gross national saving rate and the household saving rate 
rose markedly. 
Structural Factors Influencing the Prospective Saving Rate
The medium-term outlook for China’s saving rate matters not only for its 
future economic growth path but also for the rebalancing of the global economy. 
One key challenge for Chinese policymakers in the next decade, though, is to 
maintain robust internal demand while rebalancing the economy more towards 
consumption. Both domestic structural factors and policy measures could 
influence such a transition. Three structural factors stand out: state-enterprise 
restructuring, demographic change and continued urbanisation. 
First, large-scale labour retrenchment is now behind us. Going forward, the 
scope for big, one-off cost savings and efficiency gains in the corporate sector 
is limited, as will be the associated income and expenditure uncertainties 
for Chinese households. What is more, new restructuring would cause less 
insecurity since the social safety net is nowadays provided by the Central 
Government. Less restructuring and insecurity will dampen private saving by 
both firms and households. 
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Second, China can hardly avoid a rapidly ageing population and slower 
growth of its labour force in this decade. Indeed, China’s working-age population 
could stop growing in 2015 and thereafter shrink for 10 years or more. This 
could lead to a declining household saving rate and a slower pace of corporate 
investment spending, likely resulting in lower potential output growth unless 
productivity growth rises in an offsetting manner. 
Third, while the migration from agriculture to the cities is likely to continue 
in the years ahead, there are signs that (and considerable academic debate about 
whether) China has reached the ‘Lewis turning point’ at which the modern 
economy has absorbed the surplus farmers (Garnaut 2010). When pressure on 
labour supplies in agriculture reaches this point, industrial wages rise to attract 
further migrants into industry. Then, wages can rise faster than productivity, 
raising labour’s share of income and depressing corporate saving (while 
appreciating the renminbi in real terms), and personal consumption can displace 
investment. Recent reports of double-digit wage growth make this conjecture 
plausible.
Taken together, these medium-term structural forces suggest that China’s 
aggregate saving rate over the coming years could plateau and then ease off 
noticeably from its current half of output. During this process, government 
policy can play a role in assisting the desired transition to a more balanced 
growth model, including: 1) further deregulation to reduce entry barriers 
in labour-intensive services to create more jobs and thereby to support the 
demand for labour and wage growth; 2) a stronger but sustainable social safety 
net; and 3) improved incentives for government provision of services (Ma and 
McCauley 2012). 
China’s High Investment Rate and Factors Behind It
We next turn to China’s investment rate, highlighting its recent trends 
and reviewing its possible determinants. Over the past two decades, China’s 
gross capital formation, like its savings, has been high and rising in relation to 
output. Between 1990 and 2010, its investment–GDP ratio rose from 36 per cent 
to 48 per cent—an exceptionally high level for a big economy (Figure 4.1, top 
panel). Much of the marked rise in the Chinese investment rate took place in 
the decade following China’s 2001 WTO accession. It matches or exceeds peak 
investment rates reached during the high-growth phases of Korea and Singapore 
and on the eve of the Asian financial crisis by other Asian economies (Park and 
Shin 2009). Hence, the conventional wisdom is that China over invests. 
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Figure 4.4 China’s Investment and Household Loans, as a Percentage of GDP
Gross Capital Formation, by Sector
Real Estate Investment and Household Loans
1 Real estate investment includes land purchases and demolition expenses, which could exaggerate 
relative to gross capital formation. 
2 Household loans include mortgage loans, auto loans, credit card loans and others. 
Source: CEIC.
As with Chinese saving, a breakdown of Chinese investment for the period 
1992–2008 reveals that the three sectors all increased their investment, but 
not evenly. As of 2008, Chinese firms, households and government undertook 
70  per cent, 20 per cent and 10 per cent, respectively, of the overall gross 
capital formation—similar to the OECD averages of 60 per cent, 25 per cent 
and 15 per cent. This raises a question about the assertion that housing and 
infrastructure investments in China have recently been excessive, especially in a 
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decade when state-owned firms provided employees with fewer apartments. Over 
this period, all three sectors contributed to a rise in the aggregate investment 
rate (Figure 4.4, top panel). In particular, government investment relative to 
GDP more than doubled—from 2.2 per cent to 4.8 per cent. In contrast, firms 
and households each added less than 2 percentage points of GDP to investment. 
Finally, while government and household investment as a share of GDP rose 
steadily, corporate investment swung sharply, dropping by more than 3 per cent 
during 1992–99 and then surging by 5 per cent during 2000–08. 
Policymakers, academics and market participants disagree over whether 
China has invested excessively (Knight and Ding 2010; Park and Shin 2009). 
In light of the domestic demand composition, the Chinese investment rate is 
often regarded as too high—a sign of the so-called ‘internal imbalance’. But it 
remained lower than its even higher saving rate, giving rise to large current 
account surpluses in the mid-2000s—the so-called ‘external imbalance’. 
Documented high investment returns sit uneasily with claims of widespread 
over-investment. Anecdotal examples of wasteful investments include see-
through apartments, traffic-free highways, idle stadiums and unused capacity 
in some industries. Yet most studies find high, typically double-digit, returns 
to capital in the past two decades (Bai et al. 2006; Knight and Ding 2010). 
High returns to investment are sometimes ascribed to low interest rates, yet 
subsidised corporate borrowers who invest more should earn lower returns. 
In any case, while administered interest rates held below equilibrium levels 
can boost investment, they should also lead to inefficiency, affording inefficient 
state firms preferred access to cheap credit. As a result, returns on capital could 
rise if the prevailing benchmark interest rates converge towards some higher 
equilibrium levels, thanks to improved allocative efficiency. 
In our view, there are at least four proximate determinants of the sustained 
high Chinese investment rate over the past two decades. First is the high 
expected return to capital, as discussed below. Second is the reduced risk to 
investment (higher risk-adjusted returns), arising from more pro-business 
policy and increasing official recognition of private property. Third, managers 
even at state firms have increasingly faced financial rewards based on profit. 
Fourth, local government officials have faced promotion incentives to undertake 
investment projects, amid weak constraints on local government competition 
with the private sector in the marketplace (Ma and Wang 2010; Xu 2011). 
Some of the factors contributing to high investment returns have already 
been identified as underpinning the high Chinese saving rate, though 
increased global integration has weakened the domestic saving and investment 
correlation. The initially large pool of surplus rural labour as well as the surge 
in the working-age share of the population restrained wage growth and lifted 
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profits. Large-scale resource reallocation, both from the farm to manufacturing 
through labour migration and from state to non-state firms through tough 
corporate restructuring, improved allocative efficiency. High growth, high 
saving and high investment tended to reinforce each other, particularly from 
an initially low capital–labour ratio (Knight and Ding 2010). China’s WTO 
accession in 2001 helped accommodate these structural transformations, 
allowing an expanding export sector to absorb surplus labour and to increase 
savings out of foreign sales to finance increased investment. Finally, private 
home ownership and more household credit led to rising real estate investment, 
accounting for as much as half of the rise in China’s investment rate in the 
2000s (Figure 4.4, bottom panel).
Structural Factors Influencing the Prospective 
Investment Rate
Going forward, these same forces could influence the prospects for the 
Chinese investment rate. On the one hand, three factors could lead to a somewhat 
slower pace of investment relative to that of the past two decades. First, one-off 
windfalls from both the Chinese corporate restructuring and WTO entry could 
fade, and the per capita capital stock has been rising—both pointing to falling 
returns to capital. Stimulus from international trade could fade if the global 
financial crisis has weakened medium-term global growth. Second, an expected 
decline in the Chinese saving rate could push up the costs of capital. But, as 
discussed earlier, higher interest rates can also enhance efficiency and returns to 
investment. Third, the recent property price booms could cool off considerably, 
resulting in a collapse in real estate investment. This possible headwind could be 
overstated if real estate’s contribution to gross capital formation is exaggerated 
or if stimulus from public housing construction is overlooked.
On the other hand, high risk-adjusted expected returns to capital could 
continue. First, China’s capital–labour stock ratio, though rising, is still only 
a small fraction of the OECD average (Qu 2012). Second, such infrastructure as 
railways, subways and highways all could have ample room to expand relative 
to China’s population. Continued urbanisation and large-scale environmental 
projects could provide attractive investment opportunities for years to come, 
despite recent problems of bank lending to local government bodies. Third, 
ongoing technological progress, industrial upgrading and slower labour force 
growth could stimulate investment in labour-saving technology. Fourth, much-
needed progress in the rule of law and contract enforcement could further 
reduce investment risks, while strengthened institutions might dampen cyclical 
volatility and enhance regulatory efficacy. 
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In sum, China’s government and firms might continue investing strongly in 
infrastructure and manufacturing capacity for some years to come, to build up 
the physical capital stock (and corresponding pension assets) as the population 
ages, to invest in labour-saving processes in manufacturing, to expand cities 
and to meet environmental challenges. Thus, the Chinese investment rate 
seems unlikely to decline sharply anytime soon. In other words, any expected 
domestic rebalancing between investment and consumption should be modest 
and gradual over the next decade.
Outlook for China’s Current Account
So far, we have discussed, separately, the determinants and prospects for 
China’s saving and investment. We have suggested that they both could trend 
lower in the coming decade. To assess their impacts on the saving–investment 
(or current account) balance, however, we need to ascertain their interaction 
within a general equilibrium framework, which is beyond the scope of this 
chapter. Small variations in these two bigger variables can produce material 
changes in their balance. 
How might China’s domestic and external rebalancing play out in the coming 
decade? International experience offers mixed guidance. As emphasised by 
Kindleberger (1967) and seconded by Garnaut (2010), the Lewis turning point 
itself is likely to lead to a reduction of the current account surplus, as the rise 
in the wage share lowers savings. In China’s case, Kuijs (2006) tabled a set of 
policy measures and reforms that could potentially lower both Chinese saving 
and investment as a share of GDP by 18 percentage points and 11.5 percentage 
points, respectively. These estimates imply a fall in the current account surplus 
of 6.5 per cent of GDP. Nevertheless, the Japanese experience in the 1980s 
cautions that domestic rebalancing does not necessarily bring about external 
rebalancing. In fact, the Japanese domestic rebalancing was accompanied by 
growing external imbalances—Japan’s current account surpluses widened 
considerably during this transition phase (Fukumoto and Muto 2011).
As a baseline case, we envisage a more gradual scenario in which changing 
structural forces and sensible policy initiatives rebalance the Chinese economy. 
While growth remains respectable, the saving rate could fall more than the 
investment rate, further narrowing the current account surplus. The Chinese 
saving and investment rates could fall by 8 per cent and 4 per cent from the 
2010 rates, respectively, to about 45 per cent and 44 per cent of GDP. The current 
account surplus could then narrow from 3 per cent of GDP in 2011 towards about 
1 per cent over the coming decade. While this would require both private and 
public consumption spending to do more to drive economic growth, investment 
could remain a leading growth engine. One important variable helping to shape 
such a scenario is the Chinese exchange rate. 
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The Renminbi Exchange Rate Management
Besides the controversy over the fair value of the renminbi (Cheung et 
al. 2011), most observers see China’s currency management since the unpegging 
from RMB8.28 per dollar in 2005 as stuck in the axis of renminbi per dollar 
(Figure 4.5, top panel). Their view is that the renminbi crawled upward against 
the dollar from mid-2005 to mid-2008 then held steady against it for two years, 
playing safe in the global financial crisis, and then resumed crawling upward 
against the dollar in June 2010 (Figure 4.5, bottom panel). 
Figure 4.5 Bilateral Dollar Exchange Rate of the Renminbi (RMB per US$, daily)
Since 1994
Since July 2005
1 Rate implied by the estimated linear trend of the RMB nominal effective exchange rate (NEER). The trend 
line is estimated over a two-year period of 1 June 2006 to 20 May 2008, regressing the RMB NEER against 
a constant and a trading-day trend.
Sources: BIS; authors’ own estimates.
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On this view, the years since mid-2005 have not well anticipated the 
renminbi playing a supporting role in the rebalancing of the Chinese economy. 
Such a supporting role would require that the renminbi gain value against 
the currencies of China’s trading partners as a whole. Only accidentally can 
a gradual upward crawl against the dollar have this result. 
We contend that this conventional view of the management of the renminbi 
is materially incomplete. Two developments in the renminbi’s management over 
the seven years since 2005 have prepared for an exchange-rate contribution to 
the rebalancing of the Chinese economy. First, exchange-rate movements have 
shown a multi-currency orientation and, second, they have allowed a substantial 
real effective appreciation (Ma and McCauley 2011a, 2011b). Both a transition 
away from the focus on the dollar and a real appreciation are conducive to 
a rebalancing of the Chinese economy away from investment and exports to 
domestic consumption.
An extraordinary set of essays by a People’s Bank of China deputy governor 
gives weight to both the nominal effective exchange rate (NEER) and the real 
effective exchange rate (REER). Hu (2010b) starts with the observation that ‘[t]
heoretically, the best indicator to measure the international relative price of 
tradeables is [the] real effective exchange rate’. A lower price of tradeables 
(an appreciation of the real effective exchange rate) signals greater profit in 
production of services (whether haircuts or karaoke), than in production of 
goods for export, and so contributes to rebalancing the economy. She points 
out, however, two practical advantages of the NEER for policymaking: first, 
there is no need to agree on an appropriate and comparable price index; and 
second, the ‘real time’ availability of the NEER. Hu (2010c, 2010d) also refers 
to the power of renminbi appreciation to dampen imported inflation, pointing 
to the NEER as an important point of reference. Thus, both the NEER and the 
REER emerge as points of reference for Chinese currency policy.
We turn first to the renminbi movement against the basket of currencies of 
China’s trading partners. Then we show how the real or price-adjusted renminbi 
has appreciated, considering a newly constructed index based on unit labour 
costs as well as the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) index based on 
consumer prices. By this new measure, the renminbi’s competitiveness has 
eroded very substantially in this century. 
Management of the Nominal Effective Exchange Rate 
After the abandonment of the peg against the dollar in July 2005, for about a 
year the renminbi did in fact do little more than crawl upward against the dollar. 
As a result, the renminbi NEER tracked the dollar NEER. 
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Starting in late spring of 2006, however, there was a subtle shift. Observers 
were looking for a widening in the renminbi’s daily moves against the US 
dollar but these remained very small by any standard. Despite continued 
tight management of daily fluctuations, however, over weeks and months, the 
renminbi NEER no longer shared the movements of the dollar NEER (Figure 4.6, 
top panel). 
Figure 4.6 Nominal Effective Exchange Rate of the Renminbi (2005 = 100)1
RMB NEER and US Dollar NEER
RMB NEER and its 2006–08 Trend2, 3
1 BIS effective exchange rate index based on 61 economies.
2 The trend line is estimated over the two-year period 1 June 2006 to 30 May 2008, regressing the RMB 
NEER against a trading-day trend. The adjusted R-squared is 0.48, while both the constant term and the 
trend coefficient are statistically significant at 1 per cent.
3 The thick dotted lines represent ±2 per cent of the trend line, while the thin dotted lines represent ±1 
per cent of the trend line.
Sources: BIS; authors’ own estimates.
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Instead, the NEER of the renminbi showed steady upward movements. 
In short, what appeared to remain an upward crawl against the dollar slowly 
and imperceptibly turned into an upward crawl against China’s trade-weighted 
currency basket as measured by the BIS NEER index (Figure 4.6, bottom panel). 
Daily movements suggested management against the dollar but weekly or 
monthly movements favoured a broader, multi-currency orientation.4 
In mid-2008, the global financial crisis worsened, sending the dollar soaring 
as non-US banks scrambled to obtain dollars. The renminbi quietly reverted 
to a familiar and easily understood dollar peg (Hu 2010d). Considering that 
the US dollar rose sharply in value, a continuation of NEER stability would 
have required a sharp depreciation of the renminbi against the dollar—even if 
neighbours’ currencies had not depreciated further in response to the renminbi 
movements (Figure 4.5, bottom panel). There is no telling how much more the 
offshore non-deliverable renminbi might have depreciated, and how much 
capital might have flowed out of China, had the renminbi not stabilised against 
the US dollar.
In June 2010, the renminbi resumed its movement against the dollar when 
the People’s Bank of China (PBC) announced an end to the ‘special measure’ of 
pegging to the dollar, appreciating by almost 8 per cent by the end of 2011. 
Some observers detected a quickening of its appreciation vis-a-vis the dollar 
in August 2011 after the downgrade by Standard & Poor’s of US Treasury 
obligations. 
Looking at Figure 4.6 (bottom panel), the renminbi exchange rate policy 
since June 2010 is not clear. From mid-2010 to mid-2011, the NEER traded in a 
fairly narrow range against the currencies of China’s trading partners, only to 
rise in late 2011. If the renminbi’s NEER in 2006–08 described a basket, band 
and crawl (the so-called BBC of Williamson 2001) then the currency did not 
revert to it in 2010–11 (Figure 4.6, bottom panel). 
Does this finding hold for the REER? After all, as noted, an appreciation 
of the REER provides incentives for production for domestic use rather than 
net exports. For China’s role in the global rebalancing, the renminbi’s REER, 
to which we now turn, is key.
4  Ma and McCauley (2011b) argue that the mid-2006 to mid-2008 data do not reject a hypothesis of a 
Singapore-style management with the NEER rising at 2 per cent per annum, mostly trading within 1 per 
cent of the centre and remaining within a ±2 per cent band (Figure 4.4, bottom panel, thin and thick 
dotted lines, respectively). 
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Management of the Real Effective Exchange Rate Based 
on Consumer Prices
A rising REER would complement a rebalancing of the Chinese economy 
to more domestic, consumption-led growth. The experience of gradual NEER 
appreciation described in the preceding section was at the same time an 
experience in slightly faster appreciation of the REER, as defined by consumer 
prices. The next section introduces our unit labour cost-based measure, which 
suggests a significantly faster appreciation. 
The REER appreciation of the renminbi in the period mid-2006 to mid-2008 
was more pronounced than its NEER appreciation (Figure 4.7, top panel). That 
is, higher inflation in those years in China than in her trading partners meant 
a steeper REER path than NEER path for the renminbi. In particular, using 
monthly data—inflation data are available only monthly in most economies—
the rate of appreciation was 0.44 per cent per month or about 5 per cent per 
annum (Figure 4.7, bottom panel).
From mid-2005 to December 2011, the renminbi’s REER appreciated by 
30 per cent, while the nominal effective rate had appreciated by only 21 per cent. 
From June 2010 when the renminbi resumed fluctuations against the dollar, 
through December 2011, the NEER appreciated by some 3 per cent, while the 
REER appreciated by 6 per cent. 
In contrast with the NEER, the REER in 2010–11 returned to the trend 
estimated in 2006–08. On this view, while the data for the earlier period could 
not distinguish between a NEER or a REER path for the renminbi, the data since 
mid-2010 weigh in for the REER path. 
Looking forward, some observers have concluded that the policy of 
allowing substantial wage increases and rises in distorted administered prices 
(for energy, water, and so on) implies that future appreciation of the REER will 
be accomplished more through rises in the price level in China than through the 
nominal appreciation of the renminbi.
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1 BIS effective exchange rate index based on 61 economies. The trend line is estimated over the two-year 
period of 1 June 2006 to 30 May 2008, regressing the effective exchange rate against a trend. The thick 
dotted lines represent ±2 per cent of the trend line, while the thin dotted lines represent ±1 per cent of 
the trend line.
Sources: BIS; authors’ own estimates.
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The Renminbi’s Real Exchange Rate Based on Unit 
Labour Costs
Reference to wage increases raises the question of how the renminbi’s 
exchange rate looks to a manufacturer. For a manufacturer, the inflation that 
matters is not that in consumer prices, which are more relevant to a tourist. 
Instead, manufacturers would want to compare the evolution of unit labour 
costs—that is, wage inflation in relation to productivity increases. If wage gains 
just match productivity increases then unit labour costs are steady; if they 
exceed them, unit labour costs are rising. 
Combined with an exchange rate, unit labour costs in two economies can 
answer how the cost of manufacturing goods in one economy is changing 
relative to the cost of manufacturing goods in another economy.5 Is the exchange 
rate simply offsetting changes in relative unit labour costs, or amplifying them? 
Combined with the exchange rates of major manufacturing countries, unit 
labour costs can better answer the question of how the cost of manufacturing 
in one economy is changing relative to the cost of manufacturing in a weighted 
average of trading partner economies. 
In any economy, measuring wages and productivity in manufacturing 
is challenging. It is all the more difficult in an economy like China’s where 
structural change is rapid. We estimate China’s unit labour cost by dividing 
total nominal wages paid in manufacturing by real GDP in manufacturing. For 
China’s trading partners, we rely on the OECD data for OECD members as well 
as a few other economies (such as Brazil and India) and national data for some 
important Chinese trading partners: Hong Kong SAR, Malaysia, Singapore, 
Thailand and Chinese Taipei. The resulting coverage is 43 economies—fewer 
than the 61 economies for which the BIS effective exchange rates are calculated.6 
5  A related question is how the internal exchange rate between traded and non-traded goods evolves. 
He et al. (2012b) find that prices in the non-tradable sectors have risen significantly faster than those 
in the tradable sectors, and China’s internal real exchange rate has appreciated at a faster pace than the 
renminbi real effective exchange rate.
6  China’s total wage bill series changed its coverage in 1998, so that the data before and after 1998 are not 
comparable (Lu 2007). We first bridged the 1998 break in the manufacturing wage series and then used 
percentage changes in the old series to pad the new series back to 1994 (see Figure 4.8 for more details). 
The 43 economies for which we have unit labour costs collectively account for 95 per cent of the 60 BIS 
trade weights for China. We increase each weight by about 5 per cent so that the 43 weights add up to 
100 per cent. Our estimates are closely in line with the World Bank (2010) estimates that were later cited 
by the Economist Magazine. 
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Figure 4.8 The Renminbi’s Real Exchange Rates Based on CPI and Unit Labour 
Costs (2005 = 100)
Effective Exchange Rates
Bilateral Dollar Exchange Rates
1 The ULC–based REER basket covers 43 trading partners’ currencies, with a combined trade weight of 
95 per cent of the broad BIS basket for the renminbi. The 43 BIS trade weights are re-normalised for our 
ULC-based REER basket. 
2 Unit labour cost of the industry sector for the euro area and of manufacturing sector for others; 
China’s unit labour cost is estimated using the ratio of the total nominal wage bill to the real GDP of the 
manufacturing sector. The coverage of the total wage bill was altered starting from 1998. The wage bill of 
1997 is estimated by assuming the 1997–98 growth rate is the simple average of the 1996–97 growth rate 
and 1998–99 growth rate. The wage bill of 1993–96 is then estimated backwards using the growth rate of 
the original series. 
3 The CPI-based REER and NEER of the broad BIS basket consisting of 61 trading partners’ currencies. 
4 Nominal bilateral rate adjusted for the relative unit labour cost or CPI.
Sources: BIS; CEIC; national data; OECD; authors’ own estimates.
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The resulting real effective exchange rate for the renminbi based on unit labour 
costs shows similarities in timing but differences in magnitude in comparison 
with its counterpart based on consumer prices (Figure 4.8, top panel). Both 
showed a local peak in 1998, when the Asian financial crisis resulted in sharp 
depreciation of the currencies of regional competitors like those of Korea and 
Thailand. Both subsequently showed the effect of deflation in China until the 
US dollar peaked in 2002. Both subsequently rose as wages and inflation rose 
faster in China than in its trading partners.
Quantitative differences are very striking. The earlier deflation of unit labour 
costs in China was much more severe than in consumer prices, as real output 
outran the wage bill from the late 1990s until 2002. The subsequent recovery of 
unit labour costs has likewise been much greater than that of consumer prices. 
As a result, the real renminbi based on unit labour costs showed much more 
pronounced movements than that based on consumer prices. With falling costs 
at home, China’s manufacturers gained cost advantage against their aggregate 
of trading partners from the late 1990s until 2003. This steady improvement 
in China’s competitiveness complements the shift from wages to profits in 
explaining the large subsequent widening of China’s current account surplus. 
By the same token, with the wage bill growing faster than real output in 
recent years, Chinese manufacturers have had to contend with an earlier and 
faster erosion of their cost advantage than is suggested by consumer prices. The 
real renminbi based on unit labour costs followed a steeper trajectory than that 
based on consumer prices. In particular, with the unpegging of the renminbi 
in 2005, the real renminbi strengthened during 2005–10 by 40 per cent or, on 
average, appreciated 7–8 per cent per annum—well above the 4–5 per cent of 
the rate of the measure based on consumer prices. It could have appreciated by 
as much as 50 per cent by the end of 2011. 
Although a multilateral perspective best represents broad trends in China’s 
manufacturing competitiveness, a glance at the real dollar/renminbi rate 
shows that the difference between a labour cost measure and a consumer price 
measure also holds in this narrower context. The bilateral real exchange rate 
against the US dollar based on unit labour costs has swung both ways even 
more sharply than that based on consumer prices (Figure 4.8, bottom panel). 
Not only has the renminbi appreciated more against the US dollar than against 
the currencies of China’s trading partners overall, but also the rise in Chinese 
unit labour costs contrasts particularly sharply with the trend decline in US 
unit labour costs. Thus, over the past decade, US manufacturers have regained 
competitiveness against manufacturers in China more than their counterparts 
in most of China’s trading partners. 
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How much real exchange rate appreciation would be required by the 
2 per cent decline in net savings that we discussed above? Obstfeld and Rogoff 
(2007) analyse the implications of a hypothesised jump in US savings for the real 
exchange rate, given the need to maintain employment in the non-traded goods 
sector. Working through their argument for China, the challenge would be to 
keep a sudden decline in savings from leading to excess demand for non-traded 
goods and services, given the short-run capacity to produce them. One would 
have to take into account that the structure of the Chinese economy is different 
from that of the US economy, with a larger traded goods sector and a smaller 
non-traded goods and services sector. 
As these authors acknowledge, however, if the adjustment takes place over 
the medium term, the problem changes. What price signals are sufficient to 
induce private investment in non-traded goods and services so that supply is 
sufficient given eventually lower savings and higher consumption? We do not 
have a rigorous answer to this question. Over five to 10 years, we conjecture 
that a continued real appreciation of something like 5 per cent per year might be 
sufficient. In any case, such a scale of the renminbi’s real effective appreciation 
is most likely contributing to narrowing China’s current account (Cline 2010).  
Summary
This chapter has argued that China’s current account surplus will likely 
trend lower from the 5–10 per cent of GDP seen in the mid-2000s towards 1 per 
cent in the coming decade, as saving declines more than investment and the 
renminbi continues its real appreciation. Factors that helped to account for the 
rise of Chinese savings over the past decade, such as one-off productivity gains 
and abundant supply of labour, point to their decline over the present decade. 
Investment is also likely to moderate but will remain robust on the back of 
large infrastructure projects and technical upgrading during China’s still early 
catch-up phase. Thus, China’s prospective saving–investment balance could 
well shrink on a trend basis. Policy might prove to cut in the same direction. 
The Government might deregulate services, strengthen the social safety net, 
bolster state-funded pensions and flush dividend income out of state-owned 
industry while shifting incentives for officials to deliver services rather than to 
pour concrete. 
The exchange rate can play a supporting role in shifting to a more balanced 
growth model. Ongoing appreciation of the renminbi’s real effective exchange 
rate provides signals of profit for investment in the non-traded goods sector. 
It has been under way in the past seven years, with a real effective appreciation 
of about 4–5 per cent per annum coming from a nominal effective appreciation 
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against the currencies of China’s trading partners of 2–3 per cent per annum, 
amplified by faster inflation in China than in its trading partners. Our new 
estimates based on unit labour costs rather than consumer prices suggest an 
even higher rate of 7–8 per cent per annum in real appreciation. There is no 
reason to believe that real appreciation cannot continue. Its balance between 
relative inflation of wages and prices, on the one hand, and nominal currency 
appreciation, on the other, remains to be seen. 
Looking forward, a narrowed current account surplus and appreciated 
currency can eventually impart a greater sense of two-way risk in the trading 
of the renminbi. This sense would form a more propitious backdrop to further 
financial liberalisation and greater monetary autonomy as China makes the 
transition towards a more balanced economy.
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5. Has the ‘Flying Geese’ 
Phenomenon in Industrial 
Transformation Occurred 
in China?
Yue Qu, Fang Cai and Xiaobo Zhang
Introduction
In the past three decades, the Chinese economy has experienced phenomenal 
growth in large part thanks to rapid expansion in the labour-intensive 
manufacturing sector, mostly concentrated in the coastal areas. In 2009, 
China’s per capita GDP reached $3774, qualifying it for status as a ‘middle-
income country’. Along with economic development, wages and other factor 
prices tend to increase over time. Consequently, labour-intensive industries will 
eventually lose their traditional comparative advantage, pushing enterprises 
to move to other regions or countries with lower costs. The existing literature 
focuses mainly on the patterns of industrial relocation across countries: as factor 
prices go up in a developed country, labour-intensive industries tend to move 
to other, less expensive places, while the developed country retains only those 
capital-intensive high–value-added industries. This pattern has been coined the 
‘flying geese model’ in the literature (Kojima 2000; Okita 1985).
As China opened up to the world beginning in the late 1970s, its coastal 
regions enjoyed a geographic advantage compared with their interior 
counterparts because of their proximity to international markets. Chasing the 
abundant supply of cheap labour, massive foreign investment flew to the coastal 
regions. Coupled with favourable policy support from the Central Government, 
the coastal areas have witnessed a three-decade-plus manufacturing boom. 
Most of the manufacturing industries are clustered in the coastal areas (Long 
and Zhang 2011; Lu and Tao 2006). China has become a ‘world factory’ in just 
a few decades and achieved the level of industrialisation that took European 
countries more than a century to realise. 
The booming manufacturing sector has generated ample employment 
opportunities, gradually exhausting the seemingly unlimited supply of labour. 
Since the early 2000s, there have been an increasing number of media reports 
of labour shortages, in particular in the coastal regions (Cai 2010; Zhang 
et  al.  2011). Since 2004, the average wage has escalated by a double-digit 
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percentage rate annually. Alongside the knowledge of demographic trends, 
there is consequently wide debate as to whether China has reached the Lewis 
turning point. Amidst rising labour costs, the spatial distribution of industrial 
activities has begun to change. 
For a long time, China was a typical dual economy with a large supply of 
surplus labour in rural areas. As the industrial sector draws millions of workers 
from farms to factory floors, the number of excess labourers in the rural areas 
dwindles. Consequently, workers start to find themselves with more leverage 
when negotiating wages with employers. At this stage, the wage rate is likely 
to climb at a much faster pace than before. This is the so-called ‘Lewis turning 
point’. After the turning point, the capital–labour ratio rises rapidly, imposing 
huge pressure on labour-intensive enterprises. In order to survive in the new 
paradigm of labour shortage, they have to make a choice: either introduce more 
capital-intensive technologies to replace labourers or relocate the business to a 
region with cheaper labour costs. 
In the long run, China will have to upgrade its industries by introducing more 
capital-intensive techniques and producing more high-quality goods. In the 
short run, however, because of large regional variations in factor prices, there is 
a possibility for enterprises to move their operations to interior regions to take 
advantage of the cheaper labour and land. Early empirical studies (Fan 2004; 
Luo and Cao 2005) have shown that the historical relocation of business was 
actually from the interior to the coastal areas, which have become increasingly 
‘clustered’; however, these findings are now quite dated, covering the periods 
up to the late 1990s or the early 2000s. By comparing the regional difference 
in labour costs from 2000 to 2007, Cai et al. (2009) demonstrate that it is 
economically viable to move labour-intensive industries to the interior regions. 
Using provincial-level data, Ruan and Zhang (2010) further confirm that, in 
the textile sector, the pattern of ‘flying geese’ has occurred. Their finding is, 
however, based on only one sector and aggregated data at the provincial level. 
In this chapter, we expand the analysis by Ruan and Zhang (2010) to the firm 
level, while encompassing all the manufacturing industries. Our results show 
that since the mid-2000s, the share of manufacturing-sector assets located in 
inland regions has steadily increased, especially in labour-intensive industries. 
Descriptive Statistics
Sample Representativeness
Our study is based on the above-scale manufacturing enterprise census data 
from 1998 to 2008, covering 31 provinces and 30 manufacturing industries 
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classified according to SITC (Standard International Trade Classification) two-
digit codes. All state-owned enterprises (regardless of size) and non-state 
enterprises with annual sales income exceeding RMB500 million are included in 
the sample. The number of businesses included in the sample ranges from about 
100 000 in 1998 to about 300 000 in 2008. The dataset has some unique features. 
First, it is a census survey for large-scale enterprises rather than a sample survey. 
Second, the sample period encompasses the proposed Lewis turning point about 
2004 as shown in Cai (2007) and Zhang et al. (2011). Of course, the dataset has 
a drawback in that it does not cover private enterprises with sales less than 
RMB500 million. To check for potential bias as a result of excluding these small 
firms, we compare the summary statistics drawn from our sample with those 
inferred from the China Economic Census in 2004 and 2008.
Table 5.1 presents the ratios of average assets, profit and employment 
calculated from our sample relative to those computed from the full economic 
census in 2004 and 2006 for major industries. Several features are apparent 
from the table. First, the difference is more salient for employment than for 
assets and profit. On average, our sample accounts for about two-thirds of total 
employment in 2004 compared with about 90 per cent of total assets and profit. 
Second, the gap in employment between the two data sources narrowed in 2008. 
The ratio of employment covered in our sample compared with the economic 
census increased to 73 per cent. Third, the difference in coverage varies greatly 
across industries. For example, the ratio is as low as 0.45 for the recycling 
industry in 2004, suggesting that the sector is dominated by small enterprises. 
In contrast, almost all the tobacco enterprises are in the above-scale category as 
shown by the greater ratios in assets, profit and employment, which are close to 
one. Overall, the sample has good coverage in terms of assets and profit, but has 
less thorough coverage of employment.
Table 5.1 Comparing the National Above-Scale Manufacturing Enterprise Survey 
with the Economic Census (2004, by industry)
Industry
Ratio
Assets Profit Employment Main
2004 2008 2004 2008 2004 2008 2004
Agriculture food products 0.8349 0.8608 0.7439 0.8380 0.6279 0.6964 0.8867
Food products 0.8433 0.8662 0.8779 0.8659 0.6523 0.7117 0.8836
Beverages 0.8664 0.8896 0.9042 0.8969 0.6577 0.6880 0.8957
Tobacco products 1.0046 0.9989 0.9897 0.9990 0.9846 0.9645 1.0062
Textiles 0.8717 0.8870 0.8577 0.8662 0.7441 0.8104 0.8921
Clothing 0.7913 0.8192 0.8932 0.8378 0.6586 0.7157 0.8558
Dressing and dyeing of furs 0.8268 0.8676 0.8481 0.8750 0.7332 0.8117 0.8854
Lumber 0.7118 0.7354 0.5469 0.6889 0.4559 0.5533 0.6926
Furniture 0.7194 0.7691 0.7092 0.6976 0.5637 0.6629 0.7738
Paper and paper products 0.8573 0.8961 0.8513 0.8610 0.6224 0.6959 0.8546




Assets Profit Employment Main
2004 2008 2004 2008 2004 2008 2004
Publishing, printing 0.7261 0.7490 0.7964 0.7356 0.4818 0.5348 0.6959
Entertainment products 0.7958 0.8329 0.8562 0.7820 0.6987 0.7923 0.8553
Refined petroleum products 0.9693 0.9611 0.9709 1.0138 0.8416 0.9299 0.9877
Chemicals and chemical 
products 1.1044 0.9243 0.9347 0.9323 0.7132 0.7713 0.9270
Medical products 0.8999 0.9251 1.0404 0.9909 0.8355 0.9005 0.9717
Fibre products 0.9463 0.9536 0.9733 0.9504 0.8888 0.9292 0.9803
Rubber products 0.8812 0.9034 0.8772 0.8644 0.7100 0.7618 0.8881
Plastics products 0.7810 0.8114 0.7988 0.7923 0.5798 0.6593 0.8057
Non-metallic mineral 
products 0.8144 0.8211 0.6781 0.7449 0.4770 0.5346 0.7527
Basic metals 0.9706 0.9875 0.9834 0.9804 0.8873 0.9509 0.9811
Non-ferrous metals 0.9523 0.9764 0.8399 0.9614
Fabricated metal products 0.7677 0.7926 0.8235 0.7965 0.5866 0.6554 0.8176
General machinery and 
equipment 0.8348 0.8564 0.8500 0.8582 0.6322 0.6877 0.8318
Special machinery and 
equipment 0.8513 0.7768 0.9034 0.8491 0.6855 0.6281 0.8743
Transport equipment 0.9355 0.8804 0.9648 0.9180 0.7695 0.7652 0.9503
Electrical machinery and 
apparatus 0.8958 0.9186 0.9641 0.9492 0.7588 0.8447 0.9355
Computing machinery 0.9471 0.9106 1.0169 0.9381 0.8275 0.9230 0.9868
Precision and optical 
instruments 0.8526 0.8793 0.9795 0.9472 0.7087 0.7799 0.9150
Crafts 0.7534 0.6291 0.7127 0.6748 0.5987 0.5921 0.7778
Recycling 0.6722 0.7799 0.6492 0.7071 0.4539 0.6069 0.7796
All manufacturing 0.8988 0.8477 0.9062 0.8411 0.6758 0.7275 0.9084
Sources: National above-scale manufacturing enterprise data from National Bureau of Statistics 
of China: The First Economic Census Bulletin available from <http://www.stats.gov.cn/zgjjpc/cgfb/
t20051206_402294807.htm>; The Second Economic Census Bulletin available from <http://www.stats.gov.
cn/was40/reldetail.jsp?docid=402610156>
The Spatial Distribution of Manufacturing and Labour-Intensive 
Industries
Using the above-scale manufacturing enterprise dataset, we examine the 
distribution of manufacturing industries in assets, profits and output values 
during the period 1998–2008 in inland and coastal regions. We pay particular 
attention to labour-intensive industries. By definition, labour-intensive 
industries use more labour relative to capital input during the production 
process; however, there is no clear-cut definition of labour-intensive industries. 
The capital–labour ratio might differ between developed and developing 
countries. In this chapter, we select a group of industries that displays low 
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capital–labour ratios in both China and the United States. Based on the above-
scale manufacturing dataset, we sort the 30 manufacturing industries according 
to the value of the capital–labour ratio. The right column in Table 5.2 presents 
the 15 most labour-intensive industries according to this measure, while the left 
column exhibits 16 industries with low capital intensity in the United States, 
obtained from Ciccone and Rapaioannou (2009). There are 12 overlapping 
industries between the two columns. We categorise these 12 industries as 
labour-intensive industries: textiles, garments and footwear (18); leather 
products (19); wood processing (20); furniture (21); sporting goods (24); plastic 
products (30); fabricated metal products (34); general-purpose equipment (35); 
special equipment (36); instrumentation (39); communications equipment and 
computers (40); and electrical machinery and equipment (41).
Table 5.2 The Criteria for Labour-Intensive Industries (International/National)
International criterion National criterion
Industry name CAPINT Industry name Capital–labour ratio  
 (RMB1000 per capita)
Footwear, except rubber 
or plastic
0.443 Dressing and dyeing of 
furs
31.28
Clothing, except footwear 0.481 Clothing 37.01
Professional and scientific 
equipment
0.654 Entertainment products 37.23
Leather products 0.663 Crafts 46.18
Tobacco 0.73 Furniture 61.16
Printing and publishing 0.785 Electrical machinery and 
apparatus
78.64
Furniture, except metal 0.789 Lumber 86.27




Machinery, electrical 0.924 Plastic products 94.33
Machinery, except 
electrical
1.017 Precision and optical 
instruments
94.36
Fabricated metal products 1.173 General machinery and 
equipment
110.24
Misc. petroleum and coal 
products
1.199 Recycling 110.51
Transport equipment 1.32 Special machinery and 
equipment
116.51
Food products 1.366 Computing machinery 116.56
Plastic products 1.416
Notes: For the international criterion, see Ciccone and Rapaioannou (2009); the national criterion is based 
on the calculations using the above-scale manufacturing enterprise data for 2008.
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Figure 5.1 plots the share of employment, assets and output values in the 
coastal regions spanning the period 1998–2008 for the manufacturing sector as a 
whole (the left panel) and for the labour-intensive industries only (right panel).1 
The figure reveals a few interesting features. First, the coastal region plays 
a dominant role in shaping China’s manufacturing sector. It employed more than 
55 per cent of workers, accumulated nearly two-thirds of assets and produced 
more than 70 per cent of output in 1998. By 2008, its shares of employment, asset 
and output values had all risen to more than 70 per cent. Second, despite the 
increasing importance of the coastal region in the manufacturing sector during 
the sample period, the speed of growth has slowed since 2004. In particular, 
the output share has decreased since then. Third, for the labour-intensive 
industries, the trend of firms flocking to the coast seems to have dwindled 
about the mid-2000s. Apart from output, the share of assets in the coastal region 
showed a declining trend from 2006 to 2008, suggesting a capital outflow from 
the coastal to interior regions. The share of employment has levelled off since 
2004. Because our sample encompasses only the large firms, it might fail to 
capture the movement in employment from the coastal to interior regions, for 
vast numbers of small labour-intensive enterprises tend to be more responsive 
to rising labour costs on the coast. 
Figure 5.1 The Share of Manufacturing and Labour-Intensive Industries 
in Coastal Areas
Source: Computed by authors based on the national above-scale manufacturing enterprises survey. 
1  The eastern (or coastal) region includes Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Liaoning, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, 
Fujian, Shandong, Guangdong and Hainan; the interior (central and western) region comprises Shanxi, 
Jilin, Heilongjiang, Anhui, Jiangxi, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Inner Mongolia, Guangxi, Chongqing, 
Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Tibet, Shaanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia and Xinjiang.
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Next, we further compare the return on assets (ROA) and per capita profit in 
the two regions over time. As shown in Figure 5.2, initially ROA in the coastal 
region exceeds that in the interior region. The gap is more evident for labour-
intensive industries; however, over time, the regional difference disappears. 
By  the end of the sample, the interior region even slightly outperforms the 
coastal region in ROA. Per capita profit shows a similar trend. Despite an 
initially unfavourable business environment, the interior region had become 
a more lucrative destination for business by 2008. Cai et al. (2009) also show 
that the total factor productivity in inland areas has increased faster than in 
coastal areas. The higher and rising returns to assets and profitability might be 
key factors behind the recent relocation of businesses to the interior regions. 
Figure 5.2 Return on Assets and Profit Per Capita (By region)
Note: ROA = return on assets.
Source: Computed by authors based on the national above-scale manufacturing enterprises survey.
Rising labour costs might be another driving force behind the migration. 
Figure 5.3 shows average labour costs in the two regions over the sample period. 
Overall, wages have steadily increased. The growth has accelerated since 2003. 
Moreover, labourers are more expensive in the coastal region than in the inland. 
In 2007, an average coastal worker earned RMB29 000, which was RMB5000 
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higher than his inland counterpart. In 1996, coastal workers in the labour-
intensive industries earned less than the average of the entire manufacturing 
sector; however, by 2007, the wage difference across industries had disappeared 
within the coastal region, while it still exists in the inland regions. This suggests 
that there is still some room for the labour-intensive industries to move inland 
to take advantage of the relatively cheaper labour costs. 
Figure 5.3 Labour Costs in Coastal and Inland Regions
Source: Computed by authors based on the national above-scale manufacturing enterprises survey.
As more enterprises move into interior regions, they will hire a greater 
number of local workers, hence pushing up local wages. As a consequence, the 
regional variation in wage rates is likely to drop as businesses fly from high-
wage coastal regions to low-wage inland regions. To check this, we compute 
a standard measure of inequality—the generalised entropy index (GE(0) index)—
using wages at the firm level from the above-scale manufacturing dataset. 
The index dropped from 0.34 to 0.25 between 2000 and 2007,2 suggesting 
wage convergence over time. To examine how much of the variation is due to 
coastal–inland difference, we further decomposed the overall GE(0) into two 
components: the mean difference between the coastal and inland regions and 
the intra-region variation.3 The share between coastal and inland differences in 
total wage variation has declined from 0.058 to 0.029, indicating a narrowing 
wage gap between the inland and coastal regions. The trend in wage inequality 
seems to support the story that ‘geese’ have flocked to the inland regions. 
2  The data for 1998, 1999 and 2008 do not include wage information. Consequently, the sample period 
used in the calculation of the inequality measure is 2000–07. 
3 See Zhang and Kanbur (2001) for the application of the decomposition methodology.
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Quantitative Analyses of Flying Geese
Having shown some descriptive evidence in support of the ‘flying geese’ 
pattern—industrial relocation to the inland regions since the mid-2000s—we 
next conduct a quantitative analysis to examine the relative importance of various 
factors behind the shifting spatial distribution of manufacturing activities. 
In the literature, the term ‘flying geese’ often refers to the movement of capital 
from a developed region to a less developed one. Following the convention, we 
present the results for assets only.4 When firms select a location for investment, 
they often make agglomeration their top priority. As stated by Krugman (1991) 
and Marshall (1920), agglomeration offers several key advantages: proximity to 
the market, the easy flow of information and technology and labour pooling. 
Holding everything else constant, a region with a higher degree of agglomeration 
is likely to attract more business investment. So, the first variable of interest 
is a measure of agglomeration. We use the proximity measure at the county 
level computed by Long and Zhang (2011) based on firm-level data from China’s 
Industrial Census of 1995 as a measure of agglomeration.
As more firms cluster in a place with high agglomeration, however, the space 
becomes congested and the demand for land rises. Because the conversion of 
land from agricultural to non-farm use is strictly controlled by the Government, 
the supply of land for industrial use can hardly keep pace with the rising 
demand. The combination of rising demand for and limited supply of land 
results in higher land prices. This makes it harder for many firms to expand 
their production in the increasingly congested coastal regions. If they want to 
expand their production base, they have to seek places endowed with cheaper 
land—mostly in inland regions. Unfortunately, land price information at the 
county level is not available. As a compromise, we use local population obtained 
from China’s Population Census of 2000 as a proxy for land price. 
The cost of living is generally higher in places with more expensive land. 
To  attract workers, the coastal regions have to offer better wages. Labour-
intensive industries are particularly sensitive to labour costs. As labour costs 
increase, these firms are more likely to move elsewhere to chase cheaper labourers 
(Duranton and Puga 2000; Puga and Venables 1996). Therefore, wage levels can 
be a major factor contributing to the relocation decisions of labour-intensive 
industries. 
Although China has a unified tax code on paper, the effective tax rate differs 
greatly across regions (Zhang 2006). This is largely due to China’s centralised 
political system and decentralised economic system. In China, the size of local 
government is largely proportional to the registered population; however, under 
4  The results for output and employment are similar and available upon request. 
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fiscal decentralisation, local governments have had to raise most of the revenue 
to cover their operational costs and provide local public goods and services. 
Naturally, regions with a larger tax base can afford to collect less tax revenue 
from individual enterprises than their less fortunate counterparts. In view of 
this, we also include the effective tax rate, the ratio of taxes collected to gross 
industrial output, computed from China Local Public Finance Yearbooks in the 
regression analyses.
To test the relative importance of the above four factors to the spatial 
asset distribution over time, we run the following regressions year by year 
(Equation 5.1). 
Equation 5.1
ln(Ki ) = b1*approxi + b2*ln(taxratei ) + b3*ln(wagei,–1 ) + b4*ln(popui ) + 
b5*dummyprovince + ei
In Equation 5.1, i represents county; K is total assets aggregated at the 
county level; approx is a measure of local agglomeration; taxrate represents the 
effective tax rate; and wagei,–1 refers to the average wage at the county level in 
the previous year. We use lagged wage data to primarily reduce the potential 
reserve causality. We also include a set of provincial fixed effects (dummyprovince) 
in the regressions. 
Because wage information is not available for 1998, 1999 and 2008, in the 
first set of regressions, we exclude the wage variable in the equation. Thus, the 
sample period ranges from 1998 to 2008. The upper part of Table 5.3 presents the 
estimations for the entire manufacturing sector, while the lower panel restricts 
the sample to labour-intensive industries. 
The coefficient for the agglomeration variable is consistently positive and 
significant throughout the years, suggesting that a county with a higher degree 
of agglomeration attracts more business investment; however, the importance 
of agglomeration in the whole manufacturing sector peaked at 10.34 in 2001 
and has declined since then (Figure 5.4, left-hand panel). Agglomeration 
commands a less important role in spurring asset accumulation for the labour-
intensive industries than for the manufacturing sector as a whole. Interestingly, 
the significance of clustering in influencing spatial distribution of capital in 
the labour-intensive industries has declined more rapidly than the overall 
manufacturing industries as shown by the coefficient falling from 6.21 in 1998 
to 3.32 in 2008. 


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Rebalancing and Sustaining Growth in China
104
The coefficient for the effective tax rate is generally insignificant for most of 
the years except for the last two (Figure 5.4, right-hand panel). The significant 
and negative coefficient in the last two years of the sample indicates that places 
with lower effective tax rates have become increasingly popular for business 
investment. 
In the next set of regressions, we include the wage variable. Due to missing 
values for wage data in 1998 and 1999, the sample period is reduced to 2001–08. 
The estimated results are similar to those in Table 5.3 and are not reported here. 
Figure 5.5 plots only the coefficient for the wage variable from this new set of 
regressions. It is apparent from the figure that the coefficient first increased up 
to 2005 and has steadily declined since then. Prior to the 2000s, capital flocked 
to the coastal regions to take advantage of the agglomeration despite a higher 
labour cost. The rising coefficient for the wage variable in the first half of the 
2000s suggests the positive agglomeration effect likely offset the rising labour 
cost; however, since 2005, counties’ wage levels have become less correlated 
with local asset accumulation, suggesting that some firms have moved away 
from places with a higher degree of clustering—where workers often command 
higher wages—to lower-wage regions. 
Figure 5.4 The Effect of Agglomeration and Tax Rate on Industrial Formation 
Note: The figure is depicted based on the estimated results included in Table 5.3.
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Figure 5.5 The Effect of Labour Costs on Asset Formation
Note: The figure is depicted based on the estimated results included in Table 5.3.
The above regressions run year by year offer some suggestive evidence 
that capital first flowed from inland to coastal regions up to the mid-2000s and 
subsequently reversed this trend. This approach entails a drawback in that it 
is not statistically efficient to estimate the regressions year by year. In addition, 
it does not directly test whether the share of assets possessed by the coastal 
region has first gone up before coming down after controlling for the major 
determinants. To overcome the problems, we run further regressions on the 
pooled sample as follows (Equation 5.2).
Equation 5.2
Ln(K)it = b1*D + b2*T*D + b3*T
2*D
 + b4*approxi + b4*T*approxi + b6*T
2*approxi
 + b7*ln(taxratei) + b8*T*taxratei + b9*T
2*taxratei
 + b10*wageit–1 + b11*T*wageit–1 + b12*T
2*wageit–1
 + year effect + eit
In Equation 5.2, i and t represent county and year, respectively; T is year-1998; 
D is a dummy variable for the coastal region; K is total assets aggregated at 
the county level; approx is a measure of local agglomeration; taxrate represents 
the effective tax rate; and wageit–1 refers to the average wage at the county 
level in the previous year. Year fixed effects are also included. We interact the 
above variables with T and T2 to capture the inverted-U shaped relationship 
between asset accumulation and several key determinant factors as identified in 
Figures 5.4 and 5.5. 
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Table 5.4 reports separate regression results for the entire sample, labour-
intensive industries and other industries. For each sample, we present three 
specifications. The first regression (R1), excluding the wage variable, is based on 
the complete sample from 1998 to 2008. The third regression (R3) includes the 
wage variable. Due to missing values for the wage variable, the sample period 
is restricted to 2000–08. To check if any difference in the results between R1 
and R3 is due to the additional wage variable or difference in the sample period, 
we repeat regression R1 on a smaller sample with reduced period 2000–08. 
The results for the coastal dummy variable and its interactions with T and 
T2 are robust across all the specifications no matter which sample is used. Its 
interaction with the time variable is significant and positive across all nine 
regressions, while its interaction with T2 is consistently statistically negative 
in all the specifications. This implies that after controlling for clustering, wage 
level and effective tax rate, the share of assets in the coastal region exhibits 
a clear trend: first rising and then declining. The results are consistent with the 
descriptive supporting evidence as shown in the previous section. 
The relationship between local wages and asset accumulation also follows 
an inverted-U shape. The coefficient for the interaction term of wages with 
T is statistically positive, while the interaction terms with the squared term 
are negative and significant. This implies that, as time goes by, higher wages 
in the coastal region will eventually push capital away. The results hold no 
matter whether we use the whole sample, the restricted sample composed of 
only labour-intensive industries or the sample excluding the labour-intensive 
industries. 
For the whole sample, the interaction term of the effective tax rate with the 
squared term of T is significantly negative. This suggests that, over time, effective 
tax rates become progressively more important in influencing asset accumulation 
in a location. When entrepreneurs select the destination of their investment, 
they have increasingly taken the ‘friendliness’ of the policy environment (lower 
taxes) into account; however, for labour-intensive industries, the results are not 
so robust. The coefficient for the interaction term of the effective tax rate with T2 
is significantly negative only in the first regression on the sample for the period 
1998–2008. It loses significance when the sample period is cut to 2000–08. 
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Conclusions
In the past several years, there have been more and more media reports on 
labour shortages, in particular in the coastal regions. Some have argued that 
China has passed the Lewis turning point (Cai 2008; Zhang et al. 2011). As labour 
costs keep rising, the labour-intensive manufacturing industries—most of which 
are located in coastal regions—will gradually lose their cost advantages in the 
international market. They have to either upgrade quality to move up the value 
chain or relocate their business to places with lower labour costs. 
Based on the census-type survey for above-scale manufacturing enterprises 
from 1998 to 2008, this chapter shows that a transfer of capital from the coastal 
to the inland region has occurred since the mid-2000s—exactly corresponding 
with the timing of the Lewis turning point. As investment flocked inward, wage 
rates in the interior regions caught up with those on the coast. Consequently, 
the regional difference in wages narrowed over time. As China is a large country 
with huge regional differences, it could take some years for wages to equalise 
across regions. The geese won’t stop flying inward until that date. After that, 
there are likely to be massive relocations of labour-intensive industries from 
China to other developing countries with cheaper labour, such as Bangladesh 
and Ethiopia; however, it is not clear when that day will come. 
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6. China’s Processing Trade: 
A firm-level analysis1
Miaojie Yu2 and Wei Tian3
Introduction
The processing trade, which has become hugely popular in China, involves 
domestic firms obtaining raw materials or intermediate inputs from abroad, 
processing them locally and exporting the value-added goods. Governments 
usually offer tariff reduction or tariff exemption to encourage the development 
of processing trade. The current chapter aims to provide a comprehensive 
review of various trends, characteristics and productivity levels of processing 
trade as opposed to ordinary trade in China. 
We begin with an overview of processing trade, focusing on its size and 
main types. Thereafter, we analyse why processing trade has developed rapidly 
in China in the past three decades. China’s open-door policy, particularly the 
establishment of special export zones, has played a significant role in the rapid 
growth of processing trade. We use transaction-level trade data (2000–06) from 
China to investigate various factors affecting processing trade. These include 
origin and destination countries, leading import and export commodities, 
transport modes, firm ownership, leading ports and their trade volume, and top 
cities and provinces where producers and consumers are located.
Our transaction-level trade dataset includes firm-level information. 
Each  trade transaction is attributable to a particular firm. We investigate 
the number of products (that is, scope) imported and exported by firms, as 
well as their number of trading destinations. More importantly, because 
firm productivity is key to understanding trade performance (Melitz 2003), 
we investigate the productivity growth of firms by matching transaction-level 
trade data with firm-level production data, and using the Olley and Pakes (1996) 
semi-parametric approach for estimating firm productivity. Furthermore, in 
carefully scrutinising processing trade in China, the present chapter contributes 
1  This chapter was prepared for the China Update (2012) conference organised by The Australian National 
University in Canberra in July 2012. We thank Dr Ligang Song for his invitation and helpful comments. 
Miaojie Yu thanks Yaqi Wang for her excellent research assistance. All errors are ours.
2  Corresponding author: China Center for Economic Research, National School of Development, 
Peking University, Beijing, 100871, China. Tel: (+86) 10-6275-3109; email: <mjyu@ccer.pku.edu.cn>
3  Department of Applied Economics, Guanghua School of Management, Peking University;  
email: <Wei.tian08@gmail.com>
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to the literature by providing a novel and orderly way of matching two powerful 
datasets—transaction-level trade data and firm-level production data—given 
the complexity involved and restrictions in data format. 
We find that processing firms mostly come from Korea, Hong Kong and 
Japan. The electrical machinery and transport equipment industry has the 
largest volume of processing imports. The majority of processing imports are 
shipped to China by sea and air. Shanghai, Shenzhen and Nanjing are the three 
busiest customs ports for processing imports, whereas Shenzhen, Pudong and 
Suzhou are the districts or areas with the highest volume of processing imports. 
The industry with the highest per-unit value of commodities is the aircraft 
and spacecraft industry. The top-five countries in terms of quality of goods 
shipped to China for processing are all in Europe: Norway, France, Finland, 
Germany and the Netherlands. With regard to importer ownership, foreign-
owned enterprises are the major importers of processing goods. Approximately 
20 per cent of all processing firms import a single variety, whereas approximately 
50 per cent import less than 10 varieties. The number of imported varieties 
has also declined over the years, suggesting heightened specialisation, greater 
domestic intermediate input, or both. Moreover, we find that processing firms 
are considered less productive than ordinary firms. 
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section two discusses the 
policy setting that supports processing trade in China. Section three explores 
various characteristics of China’s processing trade. Section four offers careful 
scrutiny of correlated data from firm-level production and transaction-level 
trade, followed by a precise measure of the total factor productivity of firms 
using a semi-parametric approach. Section five concludes.
Policy Setting to Promote Processing Trade
China’s foreign trade has grown rapidly in the past three decades, alongside 
overall economic activity. From a low level of openness (the ratio of exports 
and imports over GDP) in the early 1980s, China increased its openness ratio 
to about 70 per cent by 2006; the country’s exports accounted for 39 per cent 
of its GDP at this point, whereas imports accounted for 31 per cent of its gross 
domestic product (Figure 6.1). Although China’s exports declined by 16 per 
cent in 2009 due to the global financial crisis, it still surpassed Germany in that 
year to become the world’s largest exporter of goods. Today, China’s foreign 
trade volume (that is, the sum of exports and imports) accounts for more than 
10 per cent of the global trade volume.
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Processing trade now constitutes a very large proportion—usually one-half—
of China’s total trade. This trade began in China in the late 1970s. In the early 
1980s, processing imports accounted for only a small proportion of total imports; 
however, China’s processing imports dramatically increased in the early 1990s, 
and began to surpass ordinary imports in 1994 (Figure 6.2a). Processing trade 
peaked at 64 per cent of total trade in 1997 and then consolidated at about 
50 per cent for a decade. Processing trade declined to about 37 per cent during 
the most recent financial crisis. 
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China’s processing exports exhibit a similar evolution. After local assembly 
and processing, China exports the final value-added goods to the rest of the 
world. China’s processing exports surpassed ordinary exports in 1998, a year 
after processing imports peaked in volume (Figure 6.2b). This suggests that 
processing and assembly usually take a considerable amount of time in China—
on this evidence, more than one year but less than two. In the new century, 
China’s processing exports have steadily accounted for more than half of its 
total exports. Even with the financial crisis in 2008, the proportion of China’s 
processing exports remained higher than 50 per cent, whereas processing 
imports declined to about 35 per cent, indicating a gradual increase in value-
adding activities associated with processing trade.
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Classification by China’s customs bureau shows 19 types of trade regimes: 
ordinary trade (code: 10), aid or donation from government or from international 
organisations (11), donations from Chinese overseas or Chinese with foreign 
citizenship (12), compensation (13), processing with assembly (14), processing 
using imported inputs (15), goods on consignment (16), border trade (19), 
contracting projects (20), equipment imported for processing and assembly 
(22), goods on lease (23), equipment investment by foreign-invested enterprises 
(25), outward processing (27), barter trade (30), duty-free commodities (31), 
customs warehousing trade (33), entrepot trade by bonded area (34), imported 
equipment by export processing zone (35), and others (39). Table 6.1 shows the 
percentage of trade value for each customs regime in 2010.
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Table 6.1 Proportion of Customs Regime by Trade Value in 2010
Codes Trade type by customs regime Imports (%) Exports (%)
10 Ordinary trade 55.096 45.673
11 International aid 0.002 0.019
12 Donation by overseas Chinese 0.013 0.000
13 Compensation trade 0.000 0.000
14 Process with assembling 7.117 7.118
15 Process with imported materials 22.783 39.802
16 Goods on consignment 0.000 0.000
19 Border trade 0.690 1.040
20 Equipment for processing trade 0.087 0.000
22 Goods for foreign-contracted project 0.000 0.800
23 Goods on lease 0.404 0.009
25 Equipment/materials investment by foreign-invested 
enterprise
1.168 0.000
27 Outward processing 0.009 0.012
30 Barter trade 0.000 0.000
31 Duty-free commodity 0.001 0.000
33 Warehousing trade 4.377 2.242
34 Entrepot trade by bonded area 7.826 2.313
35 Equipment imported into export processing zone 0.286 0.000
39 Other trade 0.141 0.972
Source: NBS (2011b).
Table 6.1 shows that processing imports accounted for approximately 
45 per  cent of total imports, whereas processing exports accounted for 
approximately 55 per cent of total exports in 2010. Processing imports are 
supposedly transformed into processing exports after local assembly and 
processing; however, some firms consider their imported intermediate inputs 
as ‘processing imports’ on arrival in the ports but sell their final value-added 
products in the domestic market.4 Such behaviour reinforces the idea that the 
high share of processing exports is due to the addition of value involved in 
processing trade. Nevertheless, throughout this chapter, we rely on processing 
imports rather than on processing exports in measuring processing trade. 
Besides ordinary trade, of the 18 other types of trade regime, processing 
with assembly and processing with intermediate inputs are the most important 
in China. As shown in Table 6.1, processing imports (exports) with assembly 
account for roughly 7.12 per cent of China’s total imports (exports). In contrast, 
4  Such imported intermediate inputs are not eligible for customs duty rebates.
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processing imports with imported materials account for more than 22 per cent 
of total imports and 39.8 per cent of total exports. Processing with assembly was 
prevalent in the 1980s, and processing with imported inputs became popular 
after 1990. 
There are two key differences between processing with assembly and 
processing with intermediate inputs. First, processing with assembly does not 
require firms to pay for the raw materials. Chinese firms, in fact, import embodied 
raw materials for free and then send the value-added products to the same firm 
in the country of origin. Chinese firms do not need to pay for intermediate costs 
but earn payment for their service (that is, assembly). In contrast, firms engaged 
in processing with imported materials are required to pay for the imported 
intermediate inputs. Firms import raw materials or intermediate inputs from 
abroad and then sell their valued-added products to the rest of the world. 
Here, the source and destination countries can be different.
Second, processing assembly is 100 per cent duty free. Meanwhile, firms 
engaged in processing using imported inputs must pay import duties for these 
inputs first. After exporting their processed or final goods, they may obtain 
a full duty rebate, indicating that firms engaged in processing using imported 
inputs face more credit constraints than pure assembly operations because they 
need to have sufficient cash flow to cover import duties (Feenstra et al. 2011). 
Table 6.1 clearly shows that processing with imported inputs currently exceeds 
processing with assembly and other types of processing trade in terms of trade 
volume. It is worthwhile exploring the rapid growth in China’s processing trade 
over the past three decades.
The prevalence of processing trade in China can be directly attributed 
to the establishment of various free-trade zones—such as special economic 
zones (SEZs), economic and technological development zones (ETDZs), high-
technology industrial development zones (HTIDZs) and export-processing zones 
(EPZs)—which underwent three phases. In the first phase, shortly before SEZs 
were established, several cities were allowed to contract with Hong Kong-based 
firms for processing with assembly. Small-scale trade was initially established. 
In the spring of 1980, four coastal cities in Guangdong and Fujian 
provinces—namely, Shenzhen, Zhuhai and Shantou in Guangdong and Xiamen 
in Fujian—were selected as SEZs, mainly for their strong social connections 
with South-East Asia. People in Shantou and Xiamen, for instance, have enjoyed 
a long trading tradition and history with the region. Foreign firms found this 
social network favourable for investment in Mainland China. In SEZs, imports 
are completely duty free. Foreign investors likewise enjoy additional benefits, 
such as reduced income taxes. The Chinese Government grants foreign-invested 
enterprises (FIEs) located in the zones tax exemption in the first two years and 
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tax reduction in the subsequent three years. In addition, firms located in SEZs 
enjoy greater administrative flexibility and easier access to foreign markets. 
These policies have proven to be highly effective. Shenzhen, formerly a small 
and poor village, is now one of two regional financial centres in China, with its 
own stock exchange.
In 1984, China’s government allowed 14 eastern coastal cities to become 
‘open cities’ in the sense that they would have similar privileges as those 
enjoyed by the four special economic zones. This marked the second phase 
of trade liberalisation. Shortly thereafter, China established two more SEZs: 
Pudong SEZ and Hainan Island Special Economic Zone. Furthermore, China 
designated the Pearl River Delta and the Yangtze River Delta as economic 
development areas, and opened four northern ports to trade with Mongolia, 
Russia and North Korea in 1991 (Figure 6.3). 
Figure 6.3 China’s Free-Trade Zones
Source: Authors’ own compilation from China’s customs data (2010). 
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The third phase of China’s trade liberalisation occurred in early 1992. 
China  extended its open-door policy from the eastern coast to central and 
western China. Industrial cities in central and western China established various 
economic development zones and high-tech development zones. Table 6.2 shows 
that there were at least eight SEZs, 55 EPZs, 33 ETDZs, 49 HTIDZs and five bonded 
zones or export-oriented units (EOUs) by the end of 2010. Total  processing 
imports in these free-trade zones accounted for more than 22 per cent of China’s 
processing imports.
Table 6.2 Number of Special Economic Areas in China, up to 2010
Type of special economic area Number Proportion of 
processing imports
Special economic zones (SEZs) 8 3%
Export processing zones (EPZs) 55 11.2%
Economic and technological development zones (ETDZs) 33 12.8%
High-technology industrial development zones (HTIDZs) 49 4%
Bonded zones/export-oriented units (EOUs) 5 1%
Sources: Tian and Yu (forthcoming); and updated using China’s customs data (2010).
Perhaps the most direct and relevant policy in promoting processing trade 
is the establishment of EPZs beginning in the year 2000. Barely a year before 
China’s accession to the World Trade Organisation (WTO), China built EPZs in 
several eastern coastal cities. Only processing firms were allowed in the zones 
and were granted various privileges, such as freedom from duties and minimal 
administrative restrictions. By 2010, China had established 55 export processing 
zones. Table 6.3 ranks these EPZs and their proportion of imports over total 
country-wide processing imports. In 2010, all processing imports in the EPZs 
accounted for 11.5 per cent of China’s total processing trade. Jiangsu has the 
largest number of EPZs, with 12 of the 55 export processing zones. Kunshan EPZ 
in Jiangsu Province is the largest among all EPZs, contributing 2.62 per cent of 
China’s total processing imports. 
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Table 6.3 Ranking of Export Processing Zones by Processing Imports in 2010
Ranking Name Percentage Ranking Name Percentage
1 Kunshan, JS 2.6213 29 Jinan, SD 0.0165
2 Songjiang, SH 1.8914 30 Nantong, JS 0.0157
3 Yantai, SD 1.3422 31 Yubei, CQ 0.0146
4 Xuzhou, JS 1.0562 32 Nanchang, JX 0.0144
5 Chengdu, SC 1.0019 33 Jiading, SH 0.0128
6 Wuxi, JS 0.6701 34 Shenyang, LN 0.0113
7 Ningbo, ZJ 0.5542 35 Changshu, JS 0.0109
8 Minhang, SH 0.4190 36 Jiaxing, ZJ 0.0099
9 Xi’an, SX 0.2945 37 Fuzhou, FJ 0.0097
10 Shenzhen, GD 0.1725 38 Zhuhai, GD 0.0081
11 Hanzhou, ZJ 0.1618 39 Zhenjiang, JS 0.0073
12 Fengxian, SH 0.1127 40 Wuhan, HB 0.0065
13 Weihai, SD 0.0971 41 Guangzhou, GD 0.0064
14 Nanjing, JS 0.0834 42 Shijiazhuang, HB 0.0062
15 Changzhou, JS 0.0538 43 Hohhot, IM 0.0057
16 Dalian, JN 0.0531 44 Tanggu, TJ 0.0057
17 Shunli, BJ 0.0437 45 Cixi, ZJ 0.0054
18 Xiamen, FJ 0.0411 46 Binzhou, HN 0.0048
19 Yanzhou, JS 0.0395 47 Lianyungang, JS 0.0040
20 Qingpu, SH 0.0374 48 Kunming, YN 0.0034
21 Beihai, GD 0.0349 49 Hunchun, JL 0.0031
22 Qingdao, SD 0.0339 50 Quanzhou, FJ 0.0028
23 Haiyin, JS 0.0303 51 Weifang, SD 0.0022
24 Zhengzhou, HN 0.0285 52 Mianyan, SC 0.0021
25 Wujiang, JS 0.0227 53 Qinhuangdiao, HB 0.0011
26 Wuhu, AH 0.0198 54 Ganzhou, JX 0.0004
27 Pudong, SH 0.0187 55 Urumqi, XJ 0.0002
28 Jiujiang, JX 0.0169
Source: Authors’ own compilation from China’s customs data (2010). 
Figure 6.4 presents a geographic distribution of EPZs in China. Processing 
imports are concentrated in three areas: Suzhou in Jiangsu Province and 
Shanghai and Yantai in Shandong Province. The cities of Xuzhou in Jiangsu 
Province, Chengdu in Sichuan Province, Wuxi in Jiangsu Province and 
Ningbo in Zhejiang Province yield processing imports that make up more than 
1 per cent of country-wide processing imports. Most EPZs are located in eastern 
coastal cities, as expected. A notable and interesting finding is that all EPZs are 
located north of the Yangtze River. This suggests, to some degree, the Chinese 
Government’s intention to promote processing trade in northern China.
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Figure 6.4 Geographic Distribution and Proportion of Export Processing Zones 
in China, 2010
Note: Numbers shown in the figure represent the percentage of the export processing zone in total 
processing imports in China.
Source: Authors’ own compilation from China’s customs data (2010). 
Aside from EPZs, other free-trade zones have contributed to the surge 
of processing trade in China. Although China has only eight SEZs, processing 
imports in these zones make up more than 3 per cent of the country’s total 
processing trade, as illustrated in Table 6.4.
Table 6.4 Ranking of Special Economic Zones by Processing Imports in 2010
Ranking Name Percentage Ranking Name Percentage
1 Shenzhen, GD 1.7464 5 Shantou, GD 0.0777
2 Zhuhai, GD 0.6235 6 Yunfu, GD 0.0538
3 Xiamen, FJ 0.5908 7 Other, HN 0.0152
4 Haikou, HN 0.1334 8 Sanya, HN 0.0029
Source: Authors’ own compilation from China’s customs data (2010).
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Total processing imports from bonded areas are relatively small. There were 
five bonded areas in China in 2010: Tanggu, Pudong, Ningbo, Qingdao and 
Zhanjiagang. Only the bonded area of Tanggu, located in Tianjin Province, 
yielded a relatively large share of processing imports (0.81 per cent). 
Contributions from other bonded areas are relatively economically insignificant. 
By way of comparison, high-technology industrial development zones (HTIDZs) 
yield approximately 4 per cent of China’s total processing imports. As shown in 
Table 6.5, there are 49 HTIDZs in China today, the largest of which is Suzhou 
HTIDZ in Jiangsu Province, which accounts for 1.38 per cent of China’s total 
processing imports, as exhibited in Table 6.5. 
Table 6.5 Ranking of High-Technology Industrial Development Zones by Processing 
Imports in 2010
Ranking Name Percentage Ranking Name Percentage
1 Suzhou, JS 1.3834 26 Minhang, SH 0.0043
2 Wuxi, JS 1.0092 27 Fengtai, BJ 0.0037
3 Guangzhou, GD 1.0063 28 Xianyang, SX 0.003
4 Huizhou, GD 0.228 29 Mianyang, SC 0.0029
5 Wuhan, HB 0.2104 30 Changping, BJ  0.0028
6 Xuhui, SH 0.1231 31 Jilin, JL 0.0024
7 Shenzhen, GD 0.085 32 Anshan, LN 0.0015
8 Baoding, HB 0.0838 33 Zhongshan, GD 0.0015
9 Xiamen, FJ 0.0819 34 Guilin, GX 0.001
10 Weihai, SD 0.0551 35 Jiulongpo, CQ 0.001
11 Haidion, BJ 0.0534 36 Xiangfan, HB 0.001
12 Nankai, TJ 0.0495 37 Nanjing, JS 0.0009
13 Shenyang, LN 0.0344 38 Chaoyang, BJ 0.0008
14 Chengdu, SC 0.0321 39 Weifang, SD 0.0006
15 Nanchang, JX 0.0311 40 Changsha, HN 0.0003
16 Xi’an, SX 0.0301 41 Zhengzhou, HN 0.0002
17 Dalian, LN 0.021 42 Lanzhou, GS 0.0001
18 Kunming, YN 0.0207 43 Zhuzhou, HN 0.0000
19 Hefei, AH 0.0147 44 Urumqi, XJ 0.0000
20 Changzhou, JS 0.0138 45 Shijiazhuang, HB 0.0000
21 Nanjing, JS 0.012 46 Jinan, SD 0.0000
22 Hangzhou, ZJ 0.0109 47 Nanning, GX 0.0000
23 Zibo, SD 0.0052 48 Guiyang, GZ 0.0000
24 Zhuhai, GD 0.0052 49 Taiyuan, SX 0.0000
25 Changchun, JL 0.0045
Source: Authors’ own compilation from China’s customs data (2010).
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Economic and technological development zones (ETDZs) are the leading 
zones for processing imports. As shown in Table 6.6, Suzhou ETDZ in Jiangsu 
Province accounts for 4.83 per cent of China’s total processing imports, which 
is significantly higher than that accounted for by the largest EPZ, Kunshan EPZ 
in Jiangsu. Combined processing imports from the 33 ETDZs (12.8 per cent) 
are higher than those from the 55 EPZs (11.5 per cent). One possible reason 
is that EPZs were established much later than ETDZs. This implies that the 
absorption of processing imports takes time to materialise. Jiangsu Province has 
outperformed other provinces in welcoming processing imports.
Table 6.6 Ranking of Economic and Technological Development Zones by 
Processing Imports in 2010
Ranking Name Percentage Ranking Name Percentage
1 Suzhou, JS 4.8365 18 Shenyang, LN 0.034
2 Pudong, SH 2.1234 19 Taiyuan, SX 0.0277
3 Tanggu, TJ 1.4245 20 Hefei, AH 0.0277
4 Daxing, BJ 0.8821 21 Nanhui, SH 0.0258
5 Dalian, LN 0.8012 22 Lianyungang, JS 0.0252
6 Guangzhou, GD 0.7714 23 Wuhu, AH 0.0189
7 Yantai, SD 0.3768 24 Zhanjiang, GD 0.0117
8 Ningbo, ZJ 0.296 25 Changchun, JL 0.0047
9 Qingdao, SD 0.2247 26 Harbin, HLJ 0.0042
10 Other, HN 0.1621 27 Wenzhou, ZJ 0.0032
11 Fuzhou, FJ 0.1609 28 Nanan, CQ 0.001
12 Nantong, JS 0.1293 29 Chengdu, SC 0.0008
13 Hangzhou, ZJ 0.123 30 Xining, QH 0.0000
14 Wuhan, HB 0.0766 31 Yinchuan, NX 0.0000
15 Urumqi, XJ 0.0618 32 Shihezi, XJ 0.0000
16 Qinhuangdao, HB 0.0575 33 Changning, SH 0.0000
17 Minhang, SH 0.0469
Source: Authors’ own compilation from China’s customs data (2010).
In brief, the rapid growth of China’s processing trade is largely due to the 
establishment of various free-trade zones, such as SEZs, ETDZs, HTIDZs and 




The Characteristics of Processing Trade
In this section, we discuss various characteristics of processing trade: the 
top 10 countries from which China imports processing intermediate inputs, 
the top  10 industries of processing imports, the percentage distribution 
of processing imports by transport mode, the percentage distribution of share 
of imports by ownership of firms, the scope of processing firms, and the quality 
of processing imports. Processing imports, ordinary imports and total imports 
are compared. To realise these comparisons, we rely on transaction-level trade 
data provided by China’s customs bureau, which recorded about 3.3 million 
import transactions in 2010. The dataset includes information on the customs 
district, the location of the Chinese importer, customs regime, countries of 
departure/origin, location of Chinese consumers, transport modes, HS eight-
digit codes, quantity and monthly values (measured in US dollars). This dataset 
does not, however, include firm-level information. Considering that firm-level 
analysis is critical to understanding China’s processing trade from the micro-
perspective, we resort to using transaction-level trade data (2000–06) from an 
earlier period, which include firm-level information.
The Origin of Processing Imports
Our initial inquiry rests on the origin of processing imports. We compile 
customs data for the year 2010 to determine the top 10 countries in terms 
of total imports, processing imports and ordinary imports. As shown in the 
last two columns of Table 6.7, China primarily imports from Japan, Korea and 
Taiwan Province. China also imports much from its entrepots, Hong Kong and 
Macao. Although the United States ranks only fifth in terms of total imports, 
it ranks next to Japan in terms of ordinary imports. In terms of processing 
imports, Korea ranks first, followed by Hong Kong, Japan and Taiwan Province. 
This suggests in part that China imports core intermediate inputs from Korea 
and Japan and then exports final value-added products to the United States 
and Europe.
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Table 6.7 Ranking of Imports by Region by Customs Regime in 2010






1 Korea 14.97 Japan 11.77 Japan 12.80
2 China 14.43 United 
States
8.34 Korea 10.02
3 Japan 14.06 Germany 7.66 Taiwan 8.40
4 Taiwan 13.93 Australia 7.37 China 7.76
5 United 
States
6.17 Korea 5.95 United 
States
7.36
6 Malaysia 5.43 Brazil 4.58 Germany 5.40
7 Thailand 3.43 Taiwan 3.87 Australia 4.38
8 Germany 2.65 Saudi 
Arabia
3.41 Malaysia 3.66
9 Singapore 2.43 Angola 2.78 Brazil 2.77
10 Philippines 1.85 China 2.28 Thailand 2.41
Total 79.34 58.02 64.96
Notes: Here proportions denote the ratio of processing (ordinary or both) imports by country over China’s 
total processing (ordinary or both) imports in 2010. ‘China’ here refers to imports from Hong Kong and 
Macao special administrative regions. 
Source: Authors’ own compilation from China’s customs data (2010).
In terms of total import volume, the top 10 regions make up two-thirds of 
China’s total imports and 80 per cent of China’s processing imports. The remaining 
20 per cent of processing imports are produced by 200 trading partners in the 
rest of the world. The next section discusses the kinds of products that China 
imports as intermediate inputs.
Top Products of Processing Imports
As shown in Table 6.8, the electrical machinery and transport equipment 
industry yields the largest volume of processing imports, accounting for 
approximately 40 per cent of China’s total. Along with this industry, four other 
industries—machinery and mechanical appliances, optical and photographic 
instruments, mineral fuels and oils, and plastic—account for approximately 
70  per cent of China’s total processing imports. These five industries import 
a huge volume of intermediate inputs; however, it is still worthwhile investigating 
whether these industries adopt a large volume of domestic inputs.
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Table 6.8 Ranking of Imports by Industry in 2010
Ranking HS 2-Digit Proportion 
of imports
HS 2-Digit Proportion 
of imports
1 Electrical machinery 
and equipment
38.97 Electrical machinery and 
equipment
22.83
2 Machinery and 
mechanical 
appliances
13.99 Mineral fuels, mineral 
oils
13.71
3 Optical, photographic 
instruments
10.25 Machinery and 
mechanical appliances
12.51
4 Mineral fuels, mineral 
oils
5.98 Ores, slag and ash 7.90
5 Plastics and articles 
thereof
5.44 Optical, photographic 
instruments
6.54
6 Copper and articles 
thereof
3.10 Plastics and articles 
thereof
4.63
7 Organic chemicals 2.35 Vehicles other than 
railway
3.60
8 Iron and steel 1.74 Organic chemicals 3.50
9 Rubber and articles 
thereof
1.59 Copper and articles 
thereof
3.35
10 Aircraft, spacecraft 
and parts
1.10 Oil seeds, industrial 
plants
1.97
Notes: Here proportions denote the ratio of processing (or total) imports by HS two-digit industry over 
China’s total processing (total) imports in 2010.
Source: Authors’ own compilation from China’s customs data (2010).
We calculate the ratio of imported intermediate inputs against total 
intermediate inputs for several industries. Industrial intermediate inputs 
combine both imported and domestic intermediate inputs. We utilise data 
on intermediate inputs maintained by China’s customs bureau and China’s 
input–output data for 2005 to calculate the ratio of imported intermediate 
inputs. As shown in Figure 6.5, the five aforementioned industries use a large 
amount of imported intermediate inputs (for example, the ratio for machinery 
is 30 per cent, whereas the ratio for non-metal minerals is 17 per cent).
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Source: Cited in Yu (2011a).
Transportation Modes
There is ample evidence showing electrical machinery and transport 
equipment commodities are the most dominant among processing imports in 
China. How these products reach China’s ports is another interesting question. 
Do these imports arrive in China by sea, land or air? We classify these imports 
by transport mode used in 2010. Six types of transport mode are identified in 
this chapter: sea (or river if applicable), railway, truck, air, post and others. 
The last column of Table 6.9 shows that 62.52 per cent of processing imports 
(in terms of value) reached China by sea in 2010, suggesting sea shipment to be 
the prevailing mode of transportation. This observation is consistent with the 
fact that most of China’s free-trade zones are located along its eastern Pacific 
coast. The second most common transport mode is air (19.63 per cent) and then 
by truck (15.72 per cent).
Table 6.9 Proportion of Imports by Transport Mode in 2010
Transport mode Processing Ordinary Total
By sea 41.47 79.81 62.52
By railway 1.09 1.58 1.36
By truck 27.42 6.12 15.72
By air 29.56 11.47 19.63
By post 0.01 0.04 0.03
Other 0.45 0.99 0.75
Note: Here proportions denote the ratio of processing (ordinary or both) imports by transport mode over 
China’s total processing (ordinary or both) imports in 2010.
Source: Authors’ own compilation from China’s customs data (2010). 
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The leading transport modes for all processing imports are the same as above. 
Sea shipment accounts for 41 per cent, whereas air shipment and truck shipment 
account for 29.56 per cent and 27.42 per cent, respectively. It is surprising to 
note that the percentage of air shipment is higher than that of truck shipment 
because, intuitively, there should be more commodities shipped by truck. 
The value of imports was used as a measurement, however, not the quantity of 
goods. The average per-unit price of commodities sent by air shipment is usually 
higher than that for commodities sent by truck.
The Most Important Ports 
We switch our interest to customs ports in China with the largest volume 
of total imports, processing imports and ordinary imports. The top 10 ports in 
terms of the volume of processing imports in 2010 were Shanghai, Shenzhen, 
Nanjing, Qingdao, Huangpu in Guangzhou, Guangzhou, Tianjin, Gongbei in 
Shanghai, Dalian and Beijing (Table 6.10). Except for Beijing, these ports are 
seaports or river ports (for example, Nanjing) located on the eastern Pacific 
coast. The port of Shanghai is the largest port not only for processing imports 
but also for ordinary imports. Moreover, Shanghai’s port is the largest port 
for total imports, followed by Shenzhen—a special economic zone located 
in Guangdong Province.
Table 6.10 The Top 10 Ports with Largest Volume of Imports, 2010
Ranking Ports Processing Ports Ordinary Ports Total imports
1 Shanghai 22.57 Shanghai 15.99 Shanghai 18.97
2 Shenzhen 17.77 Qingdao 10.46 Shenzhen 12.64
3 Nanjing 15.23 Tianjin 8.57 Nanjing 11.38
4 Qingdao 9.19 Shenzhen 8.42 Qingdao 9.15
5 Huangpu 7.57 Nanjing 8.23 Huangpu 6.46
6 Guangzhou 3.40 Ningbo 6.10 Tianjin 6.14
7 Tianjin 3.19 Dalian 4.62 Ningbo 4.42
8 Gongbei 3.02 Huangpu 4.23 Dalian 3.80
9 Dalian 2.80 Hangzhou 4.05 Guangzhou 3.69
10 Beijing 2.78 Guangzhou 3.92 Beijing 3.38
Source: Authors’ own compilation from China’s customs data (2010). 
The top three ports with the largest share of processing imports are 
Shanghai, Shenzhen and Nanjing, comprising more than 55 per cent of China’s 
total processing imports. This confirms that most processing imports are located 
in Shanghai, Guangdong and Jiangsu. In contrast, the top three ports with the 
most ordinary imports—namely, Shanghai, Qingdao and Tianjin—account for 
only 35 per cent of China’s total ordinary imports. This suggests that China’s 
processing imports are more concentrated than its ordinary imports.
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The Most Strongly Demanded Locations
We next examine the destination of processing imports in China. 
Most processing goods are imported through Shanghai, Shenzhen and Nanjing, 
so a natural conjecture is that processing importers are concentrated in these 
areas. Processing firms would choose their closest port to reduce transport costs. 
To verify this conjecture, we determine the top 10 strongly demanded cities/
districts using China’s transaction-level trade data for 2010 (Table 6.11).
Table 6.11 The Top 10 Strongly Demanded Cities, 2010









2 Pudong, SH 6.11 Xicheng, BJ 5.71 Shenzhen, 
GD
3.58






















1.13 Haidian, BJ 1.71
8 Dongguan, 
GD
1.74 Pudong, SH 1.06 Chanyang, 
BJ
1.58
9 Kunshan, JS 1.24 Shenzhen, 
GD
0.95 Pudong, BJ 1.33
10 Dongguan, 
GD
1.09 Pudong, SH 0.93 Shenzhen, 
GD
1.08
Note: Sometimes a city is displaced more than once since it could contain firms in different zones such as 
an EPZ, ETDZ or and HTIDZ.
Source: Authors’ own compilation from China’s customs data (2010).
Shenzhen, Pudong and Suzhou prove to be the top three districts with 
the most processing imports; however, they account for only 18 per cent of 
total processing imports. The leading destinations for processing imports are 
different from the leading destinations for ordinary imports (that is, Chaoyang, 
Xicheng and Haidian, which are all in Beijing). One possible explanation is that 
ordinary imports include more final consumption goods, whereas processing 
imports include mostly intermediate goods. Combining processing imports and 
ordinary imports, Chaoyang in Beijing replaces Shenzhen and Pudong as the 
top import destination in 2010, receiving 6.41 per cent of total imports in China.
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Quality of Processing Imports
Another interesting issue is the quality of processing imports. China imports 
raw materials from many trading partners, so which countries ship products of 
the highest quality? Which goods have the highest quality? Answering these 
questions requires coming up with an appropriate measure of the quality of 
goods, which is a challenging task (Khandelwal 2010). A common gauge is the 
per-unit value of products (Hallak 2006), which is obtained by dividing a good’s 
value by its quantity.
Figure 6.6 shows the top 10 countries that ship goods with the highest 
quality to China. Interestingly, nine of these 10 countries (regimes) are located 
in Europe. The top five countries are: Norway, France, Finland, Germany 
and the Netherlands. The United States ranks sixth. Meanwhile, the top five 
countries (regimes) with the highest quality of ordinary imports are Cayman 
Islands, Finland, Germany, Panama and Austria. Cayman Islands is capable 
of exporting high-quality products due to its ‘tax-haven’ privileges. Certain 
countries can export their products to Cayman Islands, which serves as an 
entrepot, for eventual shipment to China.
Figure 6.6 The Top 10 Countries with Highest Quality of Processing Goods 
Shipped to China
Note: The coloured areas denote the top 10 countries (regimes) with the highest product quality for 
processing goods shipped to China in 2010: Norway, France, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, the 
United States, Austria, Switzerland, Italy and Denmark.
Source: Authors’ own compilation from China’s customs data (2010).
Table 6.12 lists industries that lead in terms of importing high-quality raw 
materials for processing. Imports for the aircraft and spacecraft industry have 
the largest per-unit value at approximately $2.39 million, followed by ships and 
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boats, and machinery and mechanical appliances. The table likewise shows very 
high differences in the per-unit value of products imported by the top three 
importing industries.
Table 6.12 Top 10 Industries with Highest Quality of Processing Imports, 2010
Code Descriptions of HS 2-digit codes Unit value
88 Aircraft, spacecraft, and parts thereof 2 398 441
89 Ships, boats and floating structures 482 843
84 Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery and mechanical appliances 42 994
90 Optical, photographic, medical or surgical instruments 17 576
87 Vehicles other than railway or tramway rolling stock 13 083
86 Railway or tramway locomotives, rolling stock and parts 3493
85 Electrical machinery and equipment and parts thereof 2890
30 Pharmaceutical products 1064
92 Musical instruments, parts and accessories 878
81 Other base metals, cement, articles thereof 727
Source: Authors’ own compilation from China’s customs data (2010).
Ownership of Processing Importing Firms
Thus far, we have gained some understanding of China’s processing imports 
from the industrial perspective, specifically the origin countries, main products, 
transport mode, entry ports, consumption destinations and even quality of 
commodities. Now, we take a step forward to understand the micro-mechanism. 
In particular, we explore what types of firms frequently engage in processing 
trade. In terms of ownership, what types of firms account for the largest 
proportion of China’s processing imports? We use China’s customs transaction-
level data for 2010 to answer this question. 
Table 6.13 Proportion of Imports by Ownership of Firms in 2010
Firm type Processing Ordinary Total
State-owned enterprise 12.24 41.23 28.16
Sino–foreign contractual joint venture 0.66 0.44 0.54
Sino–foreign equity joint venture 16.53 14.14 15.22
Foreign-invested enterprise 58.76 20.70 37.86
Collective enterprise 1.42 3.45 2.54
Private enterprise 10.17 20.00 15.57
Other, including foreign company’s office in China 0.01 0.01 0.01
Note: Here proportions denote the ratio of processing (ordinary or both) imports by ownership of firms 
of China’s total processing (ordinary or both) imports in 2010.
Source: Authors’ own compilation from China’s customs data (2010). 
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As shown in Table 6.13, more than half of processing imports are attributable 
to foreign-invested enterprises. Another 17 per cent of processing imports are 
attributable to Sino–foreign joint ventures (either contractual or equity joint 
ventures). State-owned and private enterprises account for only a relatively 
small proportion (12.2 per cent and 10.2 per cent, respectively). Meanwhile, 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are the most important type of firms involved in 
ordinary imports (third column of Table 6.13). Combining both processing and 
ordinary imports (last column of Table 6.10), foreign-invested enterprises are 
the most important type of importers (37.86 per cent), followed by state-owned 
enterprises (28.16 per cent).
The Scope of Activity Conducted by Import Processing Firms
How many varieties do processing firms import? Compared with ordinary 
importing firms, do processing firms import more varieties? Answering these 
questions requires a dataset containing firm-level information. China’s 2010 
customs dataset (the most recently released version) does not include such 
information. As a compromise, we have to rely on an older dataset. We therefore 
adopt China’s transaction-level trade data for 2000–06, which include firm-level 
information, such as firm name, address, zip code and telephone numbers.
Figure 6.7 Four Types of Firms in China
Note: Dotted lines represent firms’ processing imports (exports) whereas solid lines denote firms’ non-
processing (that is, ordinary) imports (exports).
Sources: Cited from Yu (2011a).
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Before investigating the importation scope of processing firms, we need to 
provide a formal definition of such firms. Yu (2011b) classified firms in China 
into four types, as shown in Figure 6.7: 1) non-importing firms that do not 
use any foreign intermediate inputs; 2) non-processing importing firms that use 
some foreign intermediate inputs but do not sell their final products abroad; 
3) hybrid (or regular) processing firms that engage in both processing and 
ordinary imports; and 4) pure processing firms that only engage in processing 
imports and exports, and do not sell their products in the domestic market. 
In the present chapter, we define both hybrid and pure processing firms as 
processing importers. In other words, a firm engaging in some processing 
imports is labelled as a processing firm.
Table 6.14a The Scope of Importing Firms by Year, 2000–06
Scope 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
1 19.04 18.9 19.76 20.32 21.65 22.66 23.6
2 10.27 10.14 10.55 10.77 11.43 11.97 12.19
3 6.67 7.15 7.23 7.34 7.66 7.93 8.1
4 5.26 5.39 5.42 5.76 5.64 5.78 5.96
5 4.38 4.41 4.5 4.62 4.63 4.65 4.62
6 3.61 3.87 3.9 3.79 3.8 3.69 3.76
7 3.29 3.26 3.34 3.34 3.2 3.17 3.2
8 2.98 2.89 2.89 2.81 2.79 2.7 2.73
9 2.44 2.66 2.54 2.53 2.49 2.38 2.34
10 2.33 2.35 2.36 2.26 2.12 2.13 2.11
11–50 31.21 30.68 28.23 28.24 26.71 25.74 24.51
51–100 5.05 4.23 4.9 4.97 4.78 4.43 4.34
101–1000 3.24 3.1 2.94 2.99 2.86 2.58 2.34
> 1000 0.23 0.97 1.34 0.26 0.24 0.19 0.2
Maximum 3497 3404 3321 3211 3070 3023 2839
Source: Authors’ own calculation from China’s customs data (2000–06).
Table 6.14a reports the scope of processing trade by year. In 2000–06, about 
20 per cent of firms imported only a single variety, and about 10 per cent imported 
two varieties. In 2000, about 45 per cent imported less than five varieties, whereas 
about 50 per cent imported less than 10 varieties. Another 31 per cent imported 
more than 10 but less than 50 varieties. The other 3.24 per cent imported more 
than 50 but less than 1000 varieties. Only 0.23 per cent of the firms imported 
more than 1000 varieties, with 3497 the highest number of varieties imported. 
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Table 6.14a also shows the dynamic pattern for each cohort. In the same 
period, the proportion of firms importing less than five varieties increased from 
45 per cent to 54 per cent. Similarly, the proportion of firms importing less than 
10 varieties increased from 60 per cent to 68 per cent. In contrast, the proportion 
of firms importing more than 10 varieties but less than 50 varieties declined 
from 31.2 per cent to 24.5 per cent. The highest number of varieties imported 
also declined, to 2839 in 2006.
Table 6.14b The Scope of Processing Importing Firms by Year, 2000–06
Scope 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
1 20.6 20.34 21.6 22.37 23.41 24.4 25.42
2 10.69 10.56 11.09 11.45 11.71 11.97 12.32
3 6.82 7.21 7.39 7.66 7.7 7.98 8.07
4 5.42 5.7 5.55 5.78 5.77 5.86 6.07
5 4.53 4.57 4.67 4.83 4.72 4.69 4.69
6 3.69 4.06 3.9 3.95 3.87 3.88 3.81
7 3.38 3.32 3.47 3.35 3.46 3.25 3.33
8 2.9 2.95 2.86 2.99 2.98 2.79 2.75
9 2.63 2.72 2.68 2.5 2.54 2.5 2.45
10 2.32 2.44 2.44 2.34 2.29 2.21 2.16
11–50 31.04 30.62 29.37 27.93 26.73 25.96 24.51
51–100 3.96 3.73 3.45 3.36 3.37 3.09 3.1
101–1000 1.83 1.58 1.34 1.3 1.3 1.27 1.18
> 1000 0.19 0.2 0.19 0.19 0.15 0.15 0.14
Maximum 3489 3397 3319 3199 3070 3023 2836
Source: Authors’ own calculation from China’s customs data (2000–06).
Processing and non-processing firms share a similar importation scope 
pattern; however, more processing firms import a single variety than non-
processing firms. In 2006, the proportion of single-variety processing importers 
(25.4 per cent) was higher than that of single-variety non-processing importers 
(23.6 per cent). In the same year, the proportion of processing firms (4.42 per cent) 
importing more than 50 varieties was lower than that of non-processing firms 
(6.88 per cent), as shown in Tables 6.14a and 6.14b.
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Source: Authors’ own compilation from China’s customs data (2000–06).
Figure 6.8 shows that the number of varieties that firms import has declined 
over time. Such a pattern is true for both processing and ordinary importers. 
For most years in the sample, processing firms have imported fewer varieties than 
ordinary firms. A lower variety of imports could reflect increased specialisation 
or it could reflect an increased sourcing of domestically produced intermediate 
goods, or both. 
Thus far, we have understood that processing firms mostly come from Korea, 
Hong Kong and Japan. The industry with the largest processing imports is 
electrical machinery and transport equipment. Most of the processing imports 
are shipped to China by sea and air. The top three busiest customs ports for 
processing imports are Shanghai, Shenzhen and Nanjing, whereas the three 
districts/areas that have the most processing imports are Shenzhen, Pudong and 
Suzhou. The industry with the highest per-unit value of commodities is the 
aircraft and spacecraft industry. The five countries with the highest quality 
of goods shipped to China for processing are all located in Europe: Norway, 
France, Finland, Germany and the Netherlands. In terms of types of importer 
ownership, foreign-invested enterprises are the top importers of processing 
goods. About 20 per cent of processing firms import only a single variety, and 
about 50 per cent import less than 10 varieties. Furthermore, the number of 
imported varieties declines over time. An important question, however, is still 
unanswered: do processing firms have higher (or lower) productivity than non-
processing firms? We now seek to answer this question.
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Matching Transaction-Level Trade Data and 
Firm-Level Production Data
To explore the productivity performance of processing firms, we need data 
on processing firms’ output level and labour input. If productivity is measured 
as total factor productivity, we also need data on capital and intermediate inputs. 
Transaction-level trade data offer rich information but do not contain information 
on production factors, such as output and input factors. Hence,  we  have to 
appeal to firm-level production data and use a merged dataset. Below, we begin 
by describing the two datasets, and we present a detailed technique for their 
merging. Thereafter, we discuss the performance of the matched dataset. Indeed, 
the two datasets are widely accepted in the study of China’s foreign trade and 
firm heterogeneity. Yet, as far as we know, beyond our own work there is not yet 
on offer a detailed and reliable means of matching these two datasets. Thus, our 
chapter aims to fill a research gap on the heterogeneity of Chinese firms.
Transaction-Level Trade Dataset 
Extremely disaggregated transaction-level monthly trade data for 2000–06 
are obtained from China’s General Administration of Customs. Each transaction 
is described at the HS eight-digit level. The number of monthly observations 
increased from about 78 000 in January 2000 to more than 230  000 in 
December 2006. As shown in column one of Table 6.15, the annual number of 
observations was more than 10 million in 2000 and 16 million in 2006, ending 
with a huge number of observations (118 333 831 in total) for seven years. 
Column two of Table 6.15 shows that 286 819 firms engaged in international 
trade during this period. 
For each transaction, the dataset compiles three types of information: 1) five 
variables on basic trade information, including value (measured in current 
US dollars), trade status (export or import), quantity, trade unit and value per 
unit (value divided by quantity); 2) six variables on trade mode and pattern, 
including country of destination for exports, country of origin for imports, 
routing (whether the product is shipped through an intermediate country/
regime), customs regime (processing trade or ordinary trade), trade mode (by sea, 
truck, air or post) and customs port (where the product departs or arrives); 
and 3) seven variables on firm information associated with each transaction, 
including firm name, identification number set by customs, Chinese city where 
the firm is located, telephone number, zip code, name of the manager/CEO and 
ownership type of firm (foreign affiliate, private or state-owned).
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Firm-Level Production Dataset
The sample used in this chapter comes from a rich firm-level panel 
dataset covering about 230 000 manufacturing firms per year for the period 
2000–06. The number of firms doubled from 162 885 in 2000 to 301 961 in 
2006. The  data, including full information on three accounting items—that 
is, balance, loss and benefit, and cash flow—are collected through an annual 
survey of manufacturing enterprises and maintained by China’s National Bureau 
of Statistics (NBS). On average, the annual entire value of industrial production 
covered by this dataset accounts for about 95 per cent of China’s total annual 
industrial production. Aggregated data on the industrial sector in the China 
Statistical Yearbook from the NBS are compiled from this dataset. The dataset 
includes more than 100 financial variables listed in the balance sheets of all 
firms covered. Briefly, two types of manufacturing firms are covered: all SOEs 
and all non-SOEs with annual sales more than RMB5 million. The number of 
firms increased from more than 160 000 in 2000 to 301 000 in 2006. As shown in 
column three of Table 6.15, the number of firms included in the dataset at any 
time in 2000–06 is 615 951 in total.
The raw production dataset is, however, still quite noisy given that many 
unqualified firms are included, largely due to misreporting by some firms. 
For example, information on some family-based firms, which usually have no 
formal accounting system in place, is based on a unit of RMB1, whereas the 
official requirement is a unit of RMB1000. Following Cai and Liu (2009) and 
Feenstra et al. (2011), we delete observations according to generally accepted 
accounting principles if any of the following are true: 1) liquid assets are higher 
than total assets; 2) total fixed assets are larger than total assets; 3) the net value 
of fixed assets is larger than total assets; 4) the firm’s identification number 
is missing; or 5) an invalid established time exists (for example, the opening 
month is later than December or earlier than January). Accordingly, the total 
number of firms covered in the dataset is reduced to 438 165, and about one-
third of firms are dropped from the sample after this filtering process. As shown 
in column four of Table 6.15, the filter ratio is even higher in the initial years: 
about one-half of firms in 2000 are dropped.
Matching Method
Although the two available datasets have rich information on production and 
trade, matching them is challenging. Both datasets contain firm identification 
numbers; however, the coding systems in these datasets are completely different. 
For example, the length of firm identifications in the transaction-level dataset 
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is 10 digits, whereas that in the firm-level dataset is only nine digits. China’s 
customs administration has a coding system that is completely different from 
that adopted by the National Bureau of Statistics. 
We go through two stages to match transaction-level trade data with firm-
level production data. In the first stage, we match the two datasets by firm 
name and year. If a firm has the exact same Chinese name in both datasets in a 
particular year, it should be the same firm. The year variable is necessary as an 
auxiliary identification variable because some firms could have different names 
across years and newcomers could possibly take their original names. Using the 
raw production dataset, we come up with 83 679 matching firms; this number 
is further reduced to 69 623 with the more accurate filtered production dataset.
In the second stage, we use another matching technique as a supplement. 
Here, we rely on two other common variables to identify firms: zip code and 
the last seven digits of a firm’s phone number. The rationale is that firms should 
have different and unique phone numbers within a postal district. Although 
this method seems straightforward, subtle technical and practical difficulties 
still exist. For example, the production-level trade dataset includes both area 
codes and a hyphen in phone numbers, whereas the firm-level production 
dataset does not. Therefore, we use the last seven digits of the phone number 
to serve as the proxy for firm identification for two reasons. First, in 2000–06, 
some large Chinese cities added one more digit at the start of their seven-digit 
phone numbers. Therefore, sticking to the last seven digits of the number will 
not confuse firm identification. Second, in the original dataset, phone numbers 
are defined as a string of characters with the phone zip code; however, it is 
inappropriate to de-string such characters to numerals because a hyphen is used 
to connect the zip code and phone number. Using the last seven-digit sub-string 
neatly solves this problem.
A firm might not include its name information in either the trade or the 
production dataset. Similarly, a firm could lose its phone and/or zip code 
information. To be sure that our matched dataset can cover as many common 
firms as possible, we then include observations in the matched dataset if a firm 
occurs in either the name-adopted matched dataset or the phone-and-post-
adopted matched dataset. The number of matched firms increases to 90 558 
when the raw production dataset is used, as shown in column seven of Table 
6.15. Our matching performance is comparable with (or even better than) that 
of other similar studies. For example, Ge et al. (2011) used the same datasets 
and similar matching techniques, but ended up with 86 336 matching firms. 
Meanwhile, if we match the more rigorously filtered production dataset with 
the firm-level dataset, we end up with 76 823 firms in total, as shown in the last 
column of Table 6.15.

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































How does our matched dataset perform? Table 6.16 compares several key 
firm-level variables between the matched dataset and the full-sample production 
dataset. The matched sample clearly has higher means for sales, exports, number 
of employees, log of capital–labour ratio and even the log of labour productivity 
compared with the full sample, suggesting that the merged sample is skewed 
towards large firms. By construction, the full-sample firm-level production 
dataset contains only large firms (that is, with annual sales larger than $770 000), 
and our matched dataset contains about 70 per cent of total exports. Thus, our 
matched dataset is sufficiently representative of large Chinese exporting firms.
Table 6.16 Comparison of the Merged Dataset and the Full-Sample 
Production Dataset
Mean Min. Max. Mean Min. Max.
Sales 156 348 5000 1.57e+08 85 065 5000 1.57e+08
Exports 51 751 0 1.52e+08 16 544 0 1.52e+08
Number of employees 479 10 157 213 274 10 165 878
Log of capital–labour ratio 3.62 –5.71 9.87 3.53 –6.22 11.14
Log of labour productivity 3.86 –7.75 10.78 3.84 –8.96 10.79
Note: Variables = matched dataset full-sample production dataset. 
Source: Cited from Qiu and Yu (2012).
Productivity for Processing Firms
With a matched trade and firm-level production dataset, we are now ready to 
explore the productivity of processing firms. Labour productivity is a simple and 
straightforward measure of productivity; however, labour productivity cannot 
measure the contribution of input factors other than labour. As such, total factor 
productivity (TFP) is a better measure because it captures contributions from all 
input factors. 
The TFP literature usually suggests using the Cobb-Douglass production 
function to introduce technology improvement (Equation 6.1).
Equation 6.1
In Equation 6.1  is firm i’s output, materials, capital and 
labour at year t, respectively. To measure a firm’s TFP,  one needs to estimate 
Equation 6.1 by taking a log function first (Equation 6.2).
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Equation 6.2
Traditionally, TFP is measured by the estimated Solow residual between the 
true data on output and its fitted value, . That is Equation 6.3.
Equation 6.3
This approach, however, suffers from two problems: simultaneity bias and 
selection bias. As first suggested by Marschak and Andrews (1944), at least 
some parts of TFP changes could be observed by firms early enough for them 
to change their input decisions and maximise profit. Thus, TFP could have 
reverse endogeneity in its input factors. The lack of such a consideration would 
make the maximised choice of firms biased. In addition, the dynamic behaviour 
of firms also introduces selection bias. With international competition, firms 
with low productivity would die and exit the market, whereas those with 
high productivity would remain (Melitz 2003). In a panel dataset, the firms 
observed are those that have already survived. Meanwhile, firms with low 
productivity, which collapsed and exited the market, are excluded from the 
dataset. This means that the firms included in the regression are not randomly 
selected, resulting in estimation bias.
Econometricians have strived to address the empirical challenge of measuring 
TFP but were unsuccessful until the pioneering work of Olley and Pakes (1996). 
In the beginning, researchers used two-way (firm-specific and year-specific) 
fixed-effects estimations to mitigate simultaneity bias. Although the fixed-effect 
approach controls for several unobserved productivity shocks, it does not offer 
much help in dealing with reverse endogeneity and thus remains unsatisfactory. 
Similarly, to mitigate selection bias, one might estimate a balanced panel by 
dropping observations that have disappeared during the investigation. 
The  problem is that a substantial part of the information contained in the 
dataset is wasted, and the dynamic behaviour of firms is completely unknown.
Fortunately, the Olley–Pakes methodology contributes significantly in 
addressing the challenge of TFP measurement. Assuming that the expectation 
of the future realisation of the unobserved productivity shock, uit, relies on 
its contemporaneous value, firm i’s investment is modelled as an increasing 
function of both unobserved productivity and log capital, . Following 
previous studies, such as van Biesebroeck (2005) and Amiti and Konings (2007), 
we revise the Olley–Pakes approach by adding the export decisions of firms as 
an extra argument in the investment function because most export decisions are 




In Equation 6.4, EFit(IFit) is a dummy variable measuring whether firm i 
exports (imports) at year t. Therefore, the inverse function of investment is 
Equation 6.5
. 
Unobserved productivity also depends on log capital and firm i’s export 
decisions.5 Accordingly, Equation 6.2 can now be written as Equation 6.6.
Equation 6.6
lnYit = b0 + bmlnMit + bllnLit + g(lnKit, Iit, EFit, IFit) + eit
In Equation 6.6, g(lnKit, Iit, EFit) is defined as . 
Following Olley and Pakes (1996) and Amiti and Konings (2007), fourth-order 
polynomials are used in log-capital, log-investment, export dummy and import 
dummy to approximate g(.).6 In addition, our firm dataset covers the period 
2000–06, so we include a WTO dummy (that is, one for a year after 2001 and 
zero for before) to characterise the function g(.) as follows (Equation 6.7).
Equation 6.7
After finding the estimated coefficients  and , we calculate the residual, 
Rit, which is defined as .
The next step is to obtain an unbiased estimated coefficient of bk. Amiti and 
Konings (2007) suggested estimating the probability of a survival indicator on a 
high-order polynomial in log-capital and log-investment to correct selection bias 
as mentioned above. We can then accurately estimate the following specification 
(Equation 6.8).
5  Olley and Pakes (1996) showed that the investment demand function is monotonically increasing in the 
productivity shock uik, by making some mild assumptions about the production technology of firms.
6  Using higher-order polynomials to approximate g(.)
 
does not change the estimation results.
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Equation 6.8
In Equation 6.8,  is the fitted value of the probability of firm i’s exit in 
the next year. The specific ‘true’ functional form of the inverse function  
is unknown, making it appropriate to use fourth-order polynomials in gi,t–1 
and lnKi,t–1 as approximation. In addition, Equation 6.8 requires the estimated 
coefficients of the log-capital in the first and second terms to be identical. 
Therefore, nonlinear least squares seem to be the most desirable econometric 
technique (Arnold 2005; Pavcnik 2002). Finally, the Olley–Pakes type of TFP for 
each firm i in industry j is obtained once the estimated coefficient  is obtained 
(Equation 6.9). 
Equation 6.9
As discussed above, the revised Olley–Pakes approach assumes that capital 
responds to an unobserved productivity shock with a Markov process, whereas 
other input factors do so without any dynamic effects; however, labour could be 
correlated with unobserved productivity shocks as well (Ackerberg et al. 2006). 
This consideration might fit with China’s case very closely, given that China is a 
country with abundant labour. When facing unobserved productivity shocks, 
firms might prefer adjusting their labour rather than their capital to reoptimise 
their production behaviour. We then use the Blundell and Bond (1998) system 
GMM approach to capture the dynamic effects of other input factors. Assuming 
that the unobserved productivity shock depends on firm i’s previous period 
realisations, the system GMM approach models TFP to be affected by all types 
of firm i’s inputs in both current and past realisations.7 In particular, this model 
has a dynamic representation as follows (Equation 6.10).
Equation 6.10
7  Note that the first-difference GMM introduced by Arellano and Bond (1991) also allows a firm’s output to 
depend on its past realisation. Such an approach would, however, lose instruments for the factor inputs 
because the lag of output and factor inputs is correlated with past error shocks and the autoregressive 
error term. In contrast, by assuming that the first difference of instrumented variables is uncorrelated 




In Equation 6.10,  is firm i’s fixed effect and  is the year-specific fixed 
effect. The idiosyncratic term  is serially uncorrelated if no measurement 
error exists.8 We can obtain consistent estimates of the coefficients in (12) using 
a system GMM approach. The idea is that labour and material inputs are not 
taken as exogenously given. Instead, they are allowed to change over time 
as capital grows. Although the system GMM approach still faces a technical 
challenge to control for selection bias when a firm exits, using this approach to 
estimate a firm’s TFP as a robustness check is still worthwhile.
Table 6.17 summarises the estimates of the Olley–Pakes input elasticity of 
Chinese firms at the HS two-digit level. We first cluster the 97 HS two-digit 
industries into 15 categories and calculate their estimated probability and input 
elasticity. The estimated survival probability of a firm in the next year varies 
from 0.977 to 0.996, with a mean of 0.994, suggesting that firm exits are less 
severe in the sample and in the given period.9
Table 6.17 presents differences in the estimated coefficients for labour, 
materials and capital using both the Olley–Pakes methodology and 
the system  GMM  approach. The last row of Table 6.17 suggests that, 
on  average, the  Olley–Pakes  approach yields a higher elasticity of capital 
( ), whereas the system GMM approach yields 
a  higher  elasticity of labour ( ). Summarising all the 
estimated elasticity, the implied scale elasticity is 0.989 using the Olley–
Pakes approach,10 which is close to the constant returns-to-scale elasticity.11 
Turning to the comparison between the OLS and the Olley–Pakes approaches, 
the estimates suggest that the usual OLS  approach has a downward bias 
( ) largely because of the lack of control for 
simultaneity bias and selection bias.
Finally, for a cross-country comparison of the Olley–Pakes estimates, the 
estimation results suggest that intermediate inputs are more important for 
Chinese firms than for American firms (Keller and Yeaple 2009) or for Indonesian 
firms (Amiti and Konings 2007). The elasticity of capital input is, however, less 
important for Chinese firms than for American or Indonesian firms. This implies 
that processing trade does play a significant role in China’s productivity growth.
8  As discussed by Blundell and Bond (1998), even if there is a transient measurement error in some of 
the series (that is, ~ ), the system GMM approach can still reach consistent estimates of the 
coefficients in Equation 6.6.
9  Note that here, firm exit means a firm either stops trading and exits the market or has an annual sales 
figure lower than the ‘large-scale’ amount (RMB5 million in sales per year) and dropped from the dataset. 
Owing to dataset restrictions, we cannot distinguish the difference between the two.
10  This is calculated as .052 + .820 + .117 = .989 using the Olley–Pakes approach.
11  Note that here we use the industrial deflator as a proxy of a firm’s price. Indeed, it is even possible that 
Chinese firms exhibit the increasing returns-to-scale property in the new century when the actual prices 
of firms are used to calculate ‘physical’ productivity. This is a possible future research topic provided 
that relevant data are available.
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Table 6.17 Estimates of Olley–Pakes Input Elasticity of Chinese Firms
HS 2-digit Labour Materials Capital




.056** .053 .888** .970** .048** –.022
(3.32) (.87) (55.36) (17.71) (1.80) (–.43)
Vegetable products 
(06–15)
.007 .031** .891** .571** .052** .019
(.49) (8.55) (68.05) (9.82) (5.49) (.46)
Foodstuffs (16–24) .036** -.020 .874** .595** .044 .027
(2.23) (-.25) (68.48) (10.73) (1.07) (.46)
Mineral products 
(25–27)
.035* .241** .872** .671** .099** .089
(1.70) (3.78) (51.00) (15.51) (2.69) (1.57)
Chemicals and allied 
industries (28–38)
 
.014** .127** .831** .488** .103** .071
(1.98) (1.95) (121.70) (10.99) (7.79) (1.48)
Plastics/rubber 
(39–40)
.064** .321** .796** .298** .103** –.003
(8.49) (6.98) (107.17) (4.54) (5.59) (–.08)
Raw hides, skins, 
leather and furs 
(41–43)
.102** .125* .810** .738** .090** .043




.039** .041 .855** .266** .012 .118**
(4.29) (.46) (97.11) (6.83) (.47) (2.99)
Textiles (50–63) .085** .157** .810** .653** .066** .043*
(19.50) (4.81) (192.59) (22.96) (10.38) (1.95)
Footwear/headgear 
(64–67)
.072** .138 .864** .703** .033** .108**
(5.93) (1.62) (73.17) (10.77) (5.43) (2.38)
Stone/glass (68–71) .104** .233** .785** .448** .103** .063
(9.14) (3.56) (67.02) (11.58) (8.19) (1.16)
Metals (72–83) .045** .191** .832** .400** .109** .084**
(6.30) (4.22) (131.73) (11.67) (16.23) (2.72)
Machinery/electrical 
(84–85)
.065** .056 .825** .548** .150** .175**
(13.36) (1.15) (206.22) (13.43) (10.83) (4.97)
Transportation 
(86–89)
.042** .147* .883** .426** .043** .068
(2.80) (1.70) (69.58) (8.81) (3.47) (1.08)
Miscellaneous (90–98) .083** .195** .796** .276** .098** .007
(10.32) (3.58) (110.01) (8.15) (10.70) (.22)
All industries .052** .240** .820** .486** .117** .001
(30.75) (17.05) (493.33) (44.54) (27.08) (.11)
* indicates significance at 5 per cent level 
** indicates significance at 1 per cent level
Note: Numbers in parentheses are robust t-values.
Source: Authors’ own estimation.  
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Our final interest is in comparing the productivity of processing firms and 
non-processing firms. As discussed in Figure 6.7, three types of firms that 
engage in both processing and non-processing activities are important: non-
processing firms (that is, ordinary firms), pure processing firms and hybrid 
firms. Figure 6.9 shows the dynamic evolution of the productivity of these three 
firm types. The productivity of all these firms has increased over time in the new 
century. Processing firms have the lowest productivity and ordinary firms have 
the highest productivity, with the productivity of hybrid firms in between. 
This strongly suggests that processing firms, compared with non-processing 
firms, have lower productivity. 


















Chinese Firms’ Log of TFP (2000-2006)
Ordinary Firms Hybrid  Firms Pure Processing Firms
Year
2000           2001         2002           2003          2004         2005              2006
Source: Authors’ calculation and estimates from China’s firm-level production data and transaction-level 
trade data.
Conclusions
This chapter aimed to provide an overview of China’s processing trade 
using highly disaggregated data (firm-level data and transaction-level data) 
from the new century. We started by highlighting that processing trade plays 
a fundamental role in China’s foreign trade, and then explored why processing 
trade has developed rapidly in the past three decades. China’s free-trade policy 
has dramatically fostered processing trade. Various free-trade zones, such as 
export processing zones and economic and technological development zones, 
have served as important instruments boosting processing trade.
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With such a background in hand, we then explored various characteristics 
of processing imports. We investigated China’s processing imports from the 
industrial perspective, including the origin countries, main products, transport 
mode, entry ports, consumption destinations and even the quality of the 
commodities. We provided very detailed firm-level evidence for the scope of 
processing trade. 
Similarly, to gain a rich understanding of processing trade, we carefully 
measured and calculated total factor productivity using the semi-parametric 
Olley–Pakes and GMM approaches. Our estimates show that the productivity 
of all firms has increased in the new century; however, processing firms usually 
have lower productivity levels than non-processing firms.
Last but not least, we also contribute to the literature by providing 
a  careful and very precise method of matching firm-level production data 
with transaction-level trade data. The match is not perfect due to data format 
restrictions, but the resulting matched dataset is still sufficiently representative 
of China’s trading firms. 
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7. Upgrading China’s Economy 




A key concern regarding China’s economy, among others, is the quality of 
growth. The surprisingly rapid economic growth over the past 30 years in China 
has resulted from reliance upon extensive growth, which has been at the expense 
of the environment and resources. The situation has worsened in the twenty-
first century. The industrial sector—the largest contributor to the country’s 
economic growth—has experienced an obvious heavy industrialisation process 
since the middle to late 1990s. Within the industrial sector, manufacturing is still 
at the low end of the international value chain since a majority of profits flow 
to foreign multinationals for their provision of technology, design and other 
services (Wang and Wang 2011).
On the other hand, beyond mainly investing foreign reserves in low-
yield foreign government bonds, China has taken the world by surprise by 
exporting large amounts of capital, which is increasingly in the form of outward 
foreign direct investment (ODI). The country’s ODI flows rose sharply from 
US$2.85  billion in 2003 to US$68.8 billion in 2010—a twentyfold increase 
within eight years!
This raises important questions. Could ODI be a contributing factor 
in  improving China’s growth quality or, more specifically, upgrading the 
country’s economy by moving it up the value chain? If the answer is yes, by 
what mechanism? Does the motivation for undertaking ODI have a bearing on 
growth? Are there any necessary preconditions to ensure a positive outcome? 
Do Chinese firms undertaking ODI meet those conditions? This chapter attempts 
to answer these questions by analysing statistics drawn from comprehensive 
firm-level investment information between 2003 and the first half of 2011. 
There are three main findings. First, the key reasons underpinning Chinese 
pursuit of ODI, especially for the country’s manufacturers, are the acquisition of 
resources (resource-seeking ODI) and the strategic purchase of assets (strategic 
1  This chapter is partly supported by the Key Research Base of Humanities and Social Sciences, the 
Ministry of Education of the People’s Republic of China (project number 11JJD790027).
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assets-seeking ODI), such as advanced technology, established brand names and 
developed distribution channels. Efficiency-seeking ODI—taking advantage 
of lower production costs in other less developed countries—is currently not 
a main attraction for Chinese investors. Second, we also find that firm capability 
is a significant determinant for Chinese strategic assets-seeking ODI, but not 
a crucial factor for resource-seeking ODI. For the latter, competition plays a key 
role, pushing Chinese manufacturers abroad. Finally, Chinese firms in industries 
with either overcapacity or backward capacity are more likely to pursue 
resource-seeking ODI and less likely to conduct strategic assets-seeking ODI. 
The implications for upgrading the country’s economy are profound. 
Resource-seeking ODI is likely to help Chinese firms become more efficient by 
overcoming resource bottlenecks. But without proper institutional reforms, 
such as a more liberalised market for production factors, this kind of investment 
could result in a heavier use of resources, greater externalities in the form of 
carbon emissions and other pollution and a deteriorating economic structure. 
In contrast, we argue that the outlook for upgrading the Chinese economy 
through strategic assets-seeking ODI is more favourable. For one thing, firms 
undertaking strategic assets-seeking ODI tend to possess a certain degree of 
technological capability, which facilitates their assimilation of the acquired 
strategic assets. For another, those firms are more likely to be in industries 
with lower competition and higher profit margins. As a result, they not only 
have capital available to purchase strategic assets, but also their profit margins 
are a good buffer against possible losses in the short term, which allows those 
strategic assets to play a role in the long run. But we also acknowledge that 
these two favourable conditions might not guarantee success. Weak corporate 
governance, a lack of transparency and experience, as well as differing cultures 
at the national and corporate levels, all present challenges ahead. There is still 
a long way for Chinese firms to go to become real international players and for 
China’s economy to upgrade and transform. 
The remainder of this chapter examines the key industrial characteristics of 
the Chinese economy, and the possible ODI mechanism that could upgrade the 
country’s domestic industries, with reference to the Japanese experience, and 
explores the current literature on reverse knowledge spillovers. Subsequently, 
the basic pattern of Chinese ODI is presented, followed by an identification of 
Chinese motivations for ODI, as well as an independent assessment and a probit 
regression test. After that, an empirical analysis of the impact of firm capability 
and industrial competition is conducted. Finally, we discuss the implications of 
using Chinese ODI to upgrade the country’s economy before some concluding 
remarks are drawn. 
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What Are China’s Industrial Characteristics? 
There has been an exceptionally large secondary industry in China. Its share 
of the country’s GDP averaged 46.5 per cent between 2000 and 2010. In 2008, 
secondary industry constituted 47.5 per cent of China’s GDP, compared with 
21.4 per cent in the United States, 28 per cent in Japan and the world average 
of 27 per cent. This large secondary industry underpins China as the world’s 
biggest manufacturer and largest exporter of global consumable products. 
In addition to a large secondary industry, there has been an obvious 
heavy industrialisation process occurring in China since the middle to late 
1990s. Heavy industry’s share in above-scale total industrial output value 
rose sharply from 57.1 per cent in 1998 to 71.4 per cent in 2010 (Figure 7.1). 
The  development of heavy industry is typical when a large economy enters 
later periods of industrialisation. Yet, unsustainably, China has approached this 
development with a focus on extensive growth, which in turn has increased 
resource constraints and environmental pressures. 
Figure 7.1 Different Components in Above-Scale Total Industrial Output Value, 
1998–2010 (per cent)
Source: NBS (various years).  
In terms of ownership structure, China’s domestic enterprises have produced 
an increasing share of the country’s total industrial output, while the production 
weight of domestic state-owned or controlled enterprises (SOEs) is shrinking 
(Figure 7.1). Domestic enterprises’ share in the country’s total industrial 
output, although decreasing from 75.3 per cent in 1998 to 68.6 per  cent in 
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2004, has  picked up since 2005 and reached 72.8 per cent in 2010. But the 
contribution of SOEs to industrial output dropped to 12.2 per cent in 2010 
from 49.6 per cent in 1998. Nevertheless, the privileged position held by SOEs 
allows them to devour an outsized share of the country’s resources, such as bank 
loans and direct financing, and enjoy the unreasonably high profits that the 
monopolised industries like tobacco, oil and natural gas provide. Alternatively, 
non-SOEs compete intensely for limited resources and are subject to increasingly 
unfavourable domestic macro-conditions such as rising costs of labour and raw 
materials, as well as a slowing of external demand. 
Structurally, extensive governmental economic intervention, in association 
with distorted factor markets, has led to serious structural problems, such as 
excessive investment, overcapacity, redundant construction and backward 
production capacity in segments of China’s industrial sector. Steel, cement and 
other traditional industries with overcapacity problems, subsidised by their 
parent governments, are still expanding. Some emerging industries such as wind-
power equipment and polycrystalline silicon, encouraged by the Government’s 
industry development policy, also fell into the hole of excess investment and 
repeated construction. Some 15–25 per cent of total capacity in 18 industries—
iron, steel, coke, iron alloy, calcium carbide, electrolysed aluminium, copper 
smelting, lead smelting, zinc smelting, cement, glass, papermaking, alcohol, 
monosodium glutamate (MSG) production, citric acid, hide processing, printing 
and dyeing, and chemical fibre manufacturing—is inefficient backward 
production capacity that is seriously detrimental to the environment.  
The structure of China’s industrial sector—the most important part of the 
Chinese economy—needs profound adjustment. Overcapacity needs to be 
absorbed, backward production needs to be eliminated and, above all, industrial 
upgrading must occur. Completing the marketisation of key energy and resource 
prices, the strict implementation of environmental supervision mechanisms and 
liberalising the country’s financial system are all important steps that need to 
occur. Another important method of achieving this goal could be through ODI. 
How Does ODI Affect Domestic Industrial 
Upgrading?
Mechanism
Industrial upgrading, from a value chain perspective, can be defined as the 
process by which economic actors—nations, firms and workers—move from 
low-value to relatively high-value activities in global production networks 
(Gereffi 2005). Industrial upgrading usually appears in four forms: 1) process 
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upgrading—the improvement of production quality by introducing more efficient 
production methods and advanced technologies; 2) product upgrading—moving 
to the production of more sophisticated and higher value-added products or 
services; 3) functional upgrading—undertaking new functions with higher 
incomes or abandoning old functions with lower incomes; and 4) inter-sectoral 
upgrading—moving horizontally into new sectors (Gereffi 1999).
In a market economy, industrial upgrading is a natural, albeit not guaranteed, 
process and is pushed forward by market competition, technological 
advancement and economic development. Globalisation has tremendously 
hastened this process, with freer information and capital flow, as well as better 
resource allocation on a global scale.  
Marginal industry expansion theory suggests that ODI could facilitate 
industrial upgrading in the home country (Kojima 1978). In this context, 
a marginal industry is one consisting of home manufacturers that are losing 
comparative advantage because of rising labour costs, appreciating local 
currencies and increasing environmental pressures. When ODI starts from 
marginal industries, resources are freed up for better usage. Some non–sector-
specific resources (for example, finance) are transferable to the expanding 
sectors and contribute to their development. Other sector-specific resources 
can be transferred to, and utilised in, other countries with favourable factor 
conditions, which would otherwise be wasted at home (Ozawa 1979). 
Marginal industry expansion theory mainly explains the industrial upgrade 
effect of efficiency-seeking ODI, which is usually located in developing host 
countries and secures access to cheaper input factors, especially labour. 
In addition to the desire for lower production costs in less developed countries, 
other incentives for pursuing ODI could positively affect industrial upgrading 
in a country, although the channel and magnitude can vary. 
Market-seeking ODI is often pursued to defensively maintain a market 
position or offensively strengthen market share. In theory, if an investing firm’s 
financial performance is elevated, they will have more resources to undertake 
research and development (R&D) and upgrade their production processes 
and products. 
Natural-resource-seeking ODI removes the resource bottleneck faced by 
enterprises in growth and development. Detrimentally, however, there is also 
less pressure to develop resource-conserving and environmentally friendly 
technologies, which in turn undermines any industrial upgrading in the home 
country.
In the case of strategic assets-seeking ODI, the acquisition of technology 
or brand names is conducive to enhancing the firm’s competitive edge 
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by  introducing more efficient production, transitioning the firm towards the 
production of higher value-added goods or services, and undertaking new 
functions with higher income. All of these are important aspects of industrial 
upgrading. In addition to technology and brand names, another crucial 
component of strategic assets-seeking ODI is improved access to distribution 
channels. The investing firms benefit from higher sales and, consequently, 
increased profits. On this front, as with market-seeking ODI, firms have greater 
financial resources to upgrade their production capacity and products. 
There are, however, necessary preconditions that must be met before 
strategic assets-seeking ODI confers benefits. Investing firms should be capable 
of managing and assimilating the additional strategic assets. Otherwise, the 
enormous upfront expenses required to purchase the assets will not be justified 
by the eventual return.  
Japanese Experience
Japan is an ardent practitioner of marginal industry expansion theory. 
In  early postwar Japan, labour-intensive light industries occupied the 
majority of Japan’s manufacturing sector, accounting for 74.7 per cent of the 
manufacturing output and 43.5 per cent of the country’s total exports in 1955. 
But in the 1960s, especially after 1963, with rising wage levels, those industries 
gradually lost their competitive advantages at home and, thus, Japanese firms 
moved to Singapore, Taiwan, South Korea and other Asian countries with lower 
labour costs. 
In the 1970s, following the demise of labour-intensive light industries, 
heavy industries led the second wave of Japanese ODI. The development of 
heavy industries, and the associated massive investment, intensive energy 
consumption and severe pollution, increasingly proved unsustainable in a 
country with limited land and resources like Japan. Japan’s economy was 
pressured into restructuring away from heavy industries towards a knowledge 
and technology-intensive structure. To survive, Japanese chemical, steel and 
other heavy industrial firms were forced to shift abroad.
Japanese ODI has helped Japanese firms maintain and grow foreign market 
shares and assisted with the restructuring of the country’s economy away from 
older industries (Blomström et al. 2000; Cantwell and Tolentino 1990; Hiley 
1999). Some newly industrialised countries, such as Hong Kong, Taiwan and 
Korea, have also successfully transformed from being exporters of raw materials 
to high-tech products through ODI activities and achieved industrial upgrading 
along the way (Lipsey 2002). 
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Reverse Knowledge Spillovers
ODI could channel international knowledge diffusion, not only from 
investing firms to host countries but also vice versa in certain circumstances. 
First, the investment destination matters. Generally, firms investing in a host 
country with a relatively high level of technology are more likely to receive 
technology spillovers and enjoy productivity gains. For example, Potterie and 
Lichtenberg (2001) found that ODI transferred technology only in one direction: 
the country’s productivity increased if it invested in R&D-intensive foreign 
countries but not if foreign R&D-intensive countries invested in it. They also 
found that this effect was higher for large countries than it was for small ones. 
Hijzen et al. (2006), using French firm-level data, argued that ODI in developed 
countries increased an investing firms’ productivity, while ODI in developing 
economies had no productivity effects. Similar findings were also found in Italian 
multinational enterprises (MNEs) (Falzoni and Grasseni 2005). 
There is also evidence of reverse knowledge spillover in emerging market 
(EM) ODI. For instance, Chen et al. (forthcoming), drawing on data from 
493 EM MNEs between 2000 and 2008 from 20 different EMs and 43 different 
industries, found evidence that EM MNEs that have subsidiaries in host-
developed markets exhibited stronger technological capabilities at home. 
Second, the investment motivation matters. Firms undertaking international 
knowledge-sourcing ODI are found to enjoy substantially, and significantly, 
higher productivity growth. For example, Pradhan and Singh (2008) found 
that technology-sourcing ODI by Indian automotive firms had a strong and 
positive effect on the firms’ R&D intensity, particularly if such investments 
were located in developed countries. While Branstetter (2006) found evidence 
that ODI increased the flow of knowledge spillovers both from and to Japanese 
firms investing in the United States, such knowledge spillovers received by 
the investing Japanese firms tended to be strongest via R&D and product 
development facilities.
Finally, the capabilities of the investing firm matter. The realisation of reverse 
knowledge transfer depends on the investing firm’s productivity, absorptive 
capacity2 and technology transfer skills. Only when these factors are present 
are investing firms capable enough to absorb and transfer spillovers, allowing 
the entire company, rather than just foreign subsidiaries, to benefit from the 
external knowledge (Smeets and Bosker 2011).
2  Defined as the firm’s ability to recognise the value of new, external information, to assimilate it and apply 
it to commercial ends (Cohen and Levinthal 1990).
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Where is Chinese ODI Going?
What are the main destinations of Chinese ODI? What are the key sectors 
attracting Chinese investors? These are critical questions for analysing the 
upgrading effects of ODI. But these questions are difficult to answer, especially 
if one relies only on figures from China’s official reports released annually by the 
Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China (MOFCOM). According 
to the official data, from 2003 to 2009, 78.26 per cent of the country’s ODI 
flow went to Hong Kong, the Cayman Islands and the British Virgin Islands. 
The largest category of investment during the same period, accounting for 
32.26 per cent, was commercial services. Interpretation of these figures could 
be misleading since MOFCOM’s data report only the first destination of ODI, 
which in many cases is a transit intermediary. For instance, some of the reported 
Chinese ODI in Hong Kong returns to the Mainland, or uses Hong Kong as 
a platform for making further investments in other countries such as Australia 
or Europe. As a result, reliance upon MOFCOM data does not greatly assist in 
the analysis of Chinese ODI.
To fill this gap, we construct datasets with detailed investment information 
at the project level. First, we use the approved ODI project information from 
the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC). Then, we scrutinise 
these data according to the following rules.
We retain the data where
1. the investment amount is reported or can be found
2. the investment content is reported or can be found 
3. Chinese investors control more than 10 per cent of the total share in 
the project. 
We discard the data if
1. the buyer and seller are both Chinese firms
2. round-tripping ODI—the final destination of ODI is the home country—
is apparent 
3. the investment is to set up a trade centre, industrial, scientific or technological 
parks, or an economic zone. 
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Table 7.1 Top Destinations of Chinese ODI Between 2003 and the First Half 
of 2010
Number of projects Investment amount (US$billion)
Australia 43 14.68% Australia 12.16 12.23%
Hong Kong 21 7.17% South Africa 7.63 7.68%
United States 21 7.17% Hong Kong 6.97 7.01%
Germany 20 6.83% Canada 6.00 6.03%
Canada 18 6.14% Russia 5.99 6.03%
Russia 13 4.44% Singapore 5.95 5.98%
Vietnam 10 3.41% Kazakhstan 5.83 5.86%
Laos 9 3.07% United States 5.67 5.70%
Singapore 8 2.73% Norway 4.50 4.53%
Cambodia 7 2.39% Afghanistan 4 4.02%
Indonesia 7 2.39% Laos 2.44 2.45%
Developed 176 60.07% Developed 52.44 52.75%
Developing 117 39.93% Developing 46.98 47.25%
Source: Author’s calculation based on the constructed datasets. 
After the application of the above parameters, 293 investment projects 
totalling US$99.43 billion were made by 216 Chinese firms from 2003 to the first 
half of 2011. Table 7.1 describes the top destinations and the distribution of 
Chinese ODI between developed and developing economies.
As shown, Australia is the biggest recipient of Chinese investment. 
Australia’s resources are its major attraction. More than 80 per cent of Chinese 
investment in Australia is in the mining sector, nearly half of this goes to iron 
ore and the rest goes to coal, zinc, aluminium, copper, uranium, and so on. Real 
estate, finance and manufacturing constitute 10 per cent of China’s investment 
portfolios, while agriculture and infrastructure have been gaining importance in 
recent years. Similarly, a large amount of Chinese ODI pours into Canada, Russia 
and South Africa for their resources—specifically, oil and oil-sands in Canada, 
oil and forest resources in Russia and gold and platinum in South Africa.
Hong Kong is the second-largest destination of Chinese ODI in terms of the 
number of projects and third-largest in value of total investment (Table 7.1). 
Unlike Chinese ODI in resource-rich economies, Chinese investments in Hong 
Kong centre on services, such as finance, shipping, telecommunications and 
electronic information. 
Other top destinations include the United States, Germany, Vietnam, Laos 
and Cambodia. The United States and Germany attract Chinese manufacturers 
for a variety of reasons: their advanced technology, prestigious brand names and 
large domestic markets. The Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
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members presumably offer mainly low production costs. Yet overall, developed 
economies have attracted more Chinese ODI and account for 60.07 per cent of 
the number of projects and 52.75 per cent in dollar terms. 
About 80 per cent of Chinese ODI is focused on industry, including mining, 
manufacturing and electricity, gas and water.3 Within the industrial sector, 
mining is the largest recipient of Chinese ODI in dollar terms while manufacturing 
is the largest recipient in terms of the number of investments (Table 7.2).
Of the 94 investments in the mining sector, seven are coal projects; 18 target 
oil and natural gas; 29 are in ferrous metals; and 39 are for nonferrous metals. 
The majority of sectors that attract Chinese manufacturing ODI are quite capital 
intensive. Automobiles, general-purpose and special-purpose equipment, 
electrical machinery, nonferrous metals and ferrous metal smelting and 
processing, communication equipment and chemical manufacturing account for 
86.2 per cent of Chinese ODI in manufacturing. 
Table 7.2 Sector Distribution of Chinese ODI
Number of projects Investment amount 
(US$billion)
Agriculture 12 4.10% 0.37 0.38%
Industry 231 78.84% 83.34 83.82%
Mining 94 32.08% 52.10 52.40%
Manufacturing 124 42.32% 23.07 23.20%
Automobile industry 16 9.37% 4.78 17.94%
General-purpose equipment manufacturing 15 8.78% 0.26 0.97%
Special-purpose equipment manufacturing 15 8.78% 2.65 9.96%
Electrical machinery manufacturing 11 6.44% 0.45 1.68%
Nonferrous metal smelting and processing 9 5.27% 1.11 4.17%
Communication equipment, computer, 
other electronic equipment
9 5.27% 3.10 11.64%
Chemicals manufacturing 8 4.68% 5.96 22.37%
Ferrous metal smelting and processing 
(steel and iron) 
7 4.10% 1.47 5.53%
Electricity, gas and water 13 4.44% 8.18 8.22%
Other 50 17.06% 15.71 15.80%
Total 293 100% 99.43 100%
Source: Author’s calculation based on the constructed datasets.
3  As defined using the National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBS) definitions.
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The distribution by sector of Chinese ODI is in line with the country’s own 
industrial features, as discussed earlier in this chapter. The heavy industrialisation 
process requires more resources and energy input. For the past decade, China 
has been relying on imports to meet its increased demands for commodities. But 
the commodities boom has increased prices beyond the point where Chinese 
producers can maintain their profit margins. The combination of the country’s 
stockpiles of foreign exchange reserves and an appreciating currency ensured 
the country’s enterprises looked outwards, taking major stakes in overseas 
mining projects and acting as both shareholders and customers. Meanwhile, 
rapid development of the heavy industries at home also pushed those capital-
intensive enterprises abroad. 
Chinese ODI Motivations
Firms engaging in ODI are generally driven by one, or a combination, of 
the following four motivations: market-seeking ODI, natural-resource-seeking 
(henceforth resource-seeking) ODI, technology and other strategic-asset-seeking 
ODI (henceforth strategic assets-seeking), and efficiency-seeking ODI (Buckley 
et al. 2007; Cross and Voss 2008; Dunning 1992, 1993). Our identification of the 
core causes of Chinese ODI occurs over three stages. First, the author and an 
outside researcher separately made an independent assessment of the primary 
and secondary reasons for each investment based on accessible project data and 
definitions outlined in the existing literature. Second, the two assessments are 
collated. Third, a probit model is used to empirically test the determinants of 
Chinese ODI by different motivations and support our assessment. 
Determinants 
Market-Seeking ODI 
Market-seeking ODI occurs when the investing firm expands horizontally 
into markets to secure or defend a market position established through 
arm’s-length relationships or to develop a new, previously unserved market 
(Buckley et al. 2007). Market-seeking ODI can be used defensively if a foreign 
country imposes or threatens to impose barriers to imports, or if a firm wishes 
to better serve its established customers and strengthen their loyalty by setting 
up a foreign affiliate close to its local customers. It can also be a positive strategy 
to explore new markets.  
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Market-seeking ODI responds to variables that measure market opportunities 
such as host-market size, income and growth momentum. To account for this, 
we incorporate three variables: the gross domestic product (GDP) of the host 
country, GDP; GDP per capita, GDPP; and GDP growth rate, GDPG. These three 
variables are from the World Bank’s database, World Development Indicators 
(WDI). GDP and GDPP are converted to logarithms for the estimation. 
Given other conditions, market-seeking ODI should positively respond to the 
host country’s GDP and GDPG. As for GDPP, the signs are unclear. A higher 
GDP per capita suggests a higher purchasing power. But there is also evidence 
that developing countries usually invest heavily in other developing countries 
(UNCTAD 2006). One of the reasons for this is that products made by developing 
firms are more likely to suit the tastes and needs of consumers in countries with 
a similar level of economic development.  
Resource-Seeking ODI
Resource-seeking ODI is directed to exploit local factor endowments such as 
oil, gas, minerals, timber and other natural resources. The abundance of natural 
resources in the host country is the key determinant of this type of ODI. We 
adopt two measures: orefuelsh—the share of ores and fuel in the host country’s 
total exports; and imrawsh—the host country’s share in China’s total imports 
of raw materials.4 These two variables are calculated based on the merchandise 
trade matrix from the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 
database. It can be expected that resource-seeking ODI should be positively 
related to orefuelsh and imrawsh. 
Strategic Assets-Seeking ODI 
Strategic assets-seeking ODI includes technology-seeking ODI and other 
strategic assets-seeking ODI. Technology-seeking ODI is directed to destinations 
that either already possess advanced technologies or are in the process of 
developing them (perhaps through technology clusters). Investing firms seeking 
this type of ODI tap the knowledge pool either directly, by cooperating with 
local companies, or indirectly, through spillover and demonstration effects. 
The remainder of the category—other strategic assets-seeking ODI—is normally 
aimed at acquiring brand names and obtaining improved access to distribution 
channels and tacit assets, with a view to helping the acquirer fulfil certain long-
term strategic objectives.
4  Raw materials are calculated as: China’s total imports of goods minus the total imports of manufactured 
goods. 
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We use the revealed comparative advantage (RCA) index in high-tech 
exports, RCA_hi, as a proxy for the abundance of strategic assets in the host 
economies. Balassa (1965) originally proposed the RCA index. He argued that 
the comparative advantage of a country’s industry could be revealed by the 
ratio of the share of an individual sector’s exports in total exports to that share 
for the world. An index value less than 1 implies relative disadvantage, whereas 
a value greater than 1 indicates relative advantage. 
We follow Balassa’s definition (Equation 7.1).
Equation 7.1
In Equation 7.1, EXc,i,t denotes the exports of industry i of country c in year 
t. RCAc,i,t denotes the revealed comparative advantage of industry i of country 
c in year t. 
In this study, we calculate RCA_hi using the trade matrix from the UNCTAD 
database. In addition to RCA_hi, to some extent, rich countries with high GDP 
per capita, GDPP, also possess more strategic assets, mainly technology and 
brand names. So, we expect a significantly positive response of strategic assets-
seeking ODI to both RCA_hi and GDPP.  
Efficiency-Seeking ODI
Efficiency-seeking ODI is undertaken to generate economies of scale and 
scope and/or to secure access to cheaper input factors, especially labour, by 
dispersing design and production facilities globally. In doing so, firms take 
advantage of  factor endowment differences between locations to improve 
efficiency levels.
Efficiency-seeking ODI is normally quite sensitive to cost factors. Thus, we 
introduce three variables: 1) GDP deflator, inflation, is an inflation indicator; 
2) the change of nominal exchange rate against the US dollar relative to the 
previous year, exchanf, measures the exchange rate fluctuation; and 3) GDPP 
represents the labour cost. The data source for inflation and GDPP is the World 
Bank’s World Development Indicators, and the calculation for exchanf is based on 
the UNCTAD database. It can be expected that efficiency-seeking ODI should be 
negatively related to inflation, exchanf and GDPP.     
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Results
Table 7.3 lists the distribution of the assessed primary motivation of Chinese 
ODI projects in the aggregate. As seen, overall, the largest attraction is to seek 
natural resources; 41 per cent of projects are in overseas resources and account 
for 51 per cent of total investments in dollar terms. Market-seeking ODI comes 
second while strategic assets-seeking ODI is the third-largest group. 
If we focus only on manufacturing firms, their primary motivation is slightly 
different. The key driver turns to strategic assets-seeking ODI, which represents 
35 per cent of projects and absorbs 46 per cent of all investments. This demonstrates 
that Chinese producers, who have been struggling in low value-added activities, 
are trying to seek strategic assets—advanced technology, established brand 
names and distribution channels—to increase their profit margins and climb the 
value chain. But still, natural resource-seeking ODI, or securing the supply of 
raw materials, is an important objective for Chinese manufacturers going abroad. 
This is especially true for Chinese steel companies, who rush into Australia and 
take equity in iron ore projects so as to secure the future supply of iron ore and 
hedge against the possibility of unfavourable price movements.
Table 7.3 Primary Motivation Distribution of Chinese ODI
By number By value




Market-seeking 87 30% 28.2 28%
Resource-seeking 121 41% 51.0 51%
Strategic assets-seeking 78 27% 20.0 20%
Efficiency seeking 7 2% 0.2 0%
Manufacturing
Market-seeking 49 27% 6.9 22%
Resource-seeking 61 34% 9.9 32%
Strategic assets-seeking 63 35% 14.2 46%
Efficiency seeking 7 4% 0.2 1%
Source: Author’s own compilation and calculation based on the constructed datasets. 
Notably, taking advantage of lower production costs in other less developed 
countries is not a main driver of Chinese ODI. Only seven projects out of the 
293 investments are primarily to increase efficiency. This is possibly because 
there are large inland areas in China. Despite rising labour costs in recent years, 
Chinese producers prefer moving their factories inward to less prosperous 
inland areas (see Chapter 5 of this volume) rather than operating across borders, 
which could entail huge uncertainties. The other possible reason involves 
data qualifications. Our sample covers mainly large investment projects based 
Upgrading China’s Economy through Outward Foreign Direct Investment 
163
on reported information. It is harder to track the numerous small investments 
that might be undertaken by efficiency-seeking investing enterprises.
Our assessment of Chinese ODI motivations is supported by the empirical 
tests (Table 7.4). Indeed, market-seeking ODI is significantly affected by market 
variables GDP, GDPP and GDPG. As expected, GDP and GDPG have a positive 
effect but GDPP is negatively linked to a destination’s market attraction. Also as 
predicted, strategic assets-seeking ODI has a significantly positive reaction to 
GDPP and RCA_hi, and resource-seeking ODI is also significantly positively 
related to orefuelsh and imrawsh; but the result for efficiency-seeking ODI 
is unsatisfactory. Although inflation has a significantly negative impact as 
predicted, the coefficient of exchanf, although still negative, is not significant. 
This is probably due to the limited size of observations for efficiency-seeking 
ODI (Table 7.3), which makes estimation difficult.















lnGDP 0.245*** 0.103 –0.383*** 0.169
–3.12 (–0.82) (–3.54) (–0.64)
lnGDPP –0.335*** 1*** 0.128 –0.251
(–3.05) –2.62 (–0.89) (–0.81)
GDPG 0.081** –0.049 –0.152*** 0.259*
–2.45 (–1.16) (–2.75) –1.84
RCA_hi –0.101 0.895** –0.424 –1.882
(–0.35) –2.04 (–1.1) (–1.35)
orefuelsh –0.425 –2.333** 1.451*** –0.603
(–0.91) (–2.29) –2.63 (–0.62)
imrawsh –7.851* –7.965 20.998*** –8.851
(–1.67) (–1.4) –3.74 (–0.23)
inflation 0 –0.109* 0.084*** –0.093*
(–0.02) (–1.73) –2.76 (–1.71)
exchanf 3.172** –0.179 –0.72 –1.468
–2.07 (–0.1) (–0.4) (–0.25)
Industry dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 289 289 289 289
Pseudo R-squared 0.3138 0.5196 0.6302 0.4901
*** indicates the coefficient is significant at the 1 per cent level 
** indicates the coefficient is significant at the 5 per cent level 
* indicates the coefficient is significant at the 10 per cent level
Note: Value of z statistics in parentheses.
Source: Author’s own estimation. 
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The Impact of Firm Capability and Industrial 
Competition 
The dominant explanation for the emergence of trans-border production by 
national firms asserts that firms going abroad must possess a bundle of intangible 
assets, which yield a rent to the firm capable of meeting the cost of ‘foreignness’ 
and offer an edge over local and third-country competitors in particular markets 
(Caves 1971; Hymer 1960; Kindleberger 1969). 
Firms engaged in asset-augmenting ODI are motivated to venture into 
international markets to acquire strategic assets such as brand names, 
technology, distribution networks, R&D facilities and managerial competencies. 
Nevertheless, these firms still have to possess some resources or capabilities to 
assimilate and manage the acquired strategic assets and apply them to commercial 
ends. 
Do Chinese firms possess the capabilities needed to invest overseas? Without 
doubt, they have ample funds and can leverage a huge domestic market. But these 
advantages are not firm specific or ownership specific. At the enterprise level, 
they are still painfully weak in areas of technology, management capability and 
brand names when compared with the global giants. 
Compared with the primary and service sectors, the manufacturing sector 
indeed has a comparative advantage in terms of performance in export markets 
and development in the domestic economy (Huang and Wang 2011). But  the 
advantages of Chinese manufacturers have focused on products such as simple 
bulk goods like steel, coal and cement, and the assembly of the various 
components of televisions, washing machines, refrigerators, airconditioners, 
microwaves and motorbikes that require minimal technological investment from 
the final assembler (Wang and Wang 2011).
Nevertheless, after 60 years of development, China has established a mature 
manufacturing system. It maintains high standards, if not necessarily while using 
up-to-date technology, in certain industries like mechanical manufacturing, 
metal smelting, household appliances and textiles (Li 2007). The mature 
technology in these industries is well matched to the requirements of China and 
other less developed economies.
In addition to firm capability, the degree of industrial competition is an 
important factor that determines a firm’s internationalisation strategies and 
performance (Boter and Holmquist 1996). Intense competition in a home market 
can drive subordinate firms to undertake ODI so as not to be squeezed by 
dominant domestic incumbents (Dawar and Frost 1999; Mascarenhas 1986). 
A  relatively low level of competition at home might not provide enough 
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incentives to venture abroad, especially to developed economies (Yamakawa 
et al. 2008); however, the impact of industrial competition can vary on different 
motivations of ODI. 
This section dissects the impact of firm capability and industrial competition 
on three reasons for Chinese ODI: market-seeking ODI, resource-seeking ODI 
and strategic assets-seeking ODI. 
Variables
Firm Capability 
Firm capability is difficult to measure since it is inherently unobservable. 
Here, we construct three dummy variables to measure whether a firm is provided 
with a labour-intensive capability, labourcapa; a capital-intensive capability, 
capitalcapa; and a technological-intensive capability, techcapa. To construct 
these variables, we first label the firm a ‘market leader’ if it is one of the top-500 
enterprises in China, in the Chinese Manufacturing Industry 500 or Chinese 
Service 500, ranked by the China Enterprise Confederation (CEC). Then, if a 
‘market leader’ invests in labour-intensive industries, it is said to possess a 
labour-intensive capability, and its labourcapa equals 1; if not, it equals zero. 
We use the same approach for capitalcapa and techcapa. 
Industrial Competition 
Industrial competition is proxied by profit margins at the sectoral level. 
The  higher the profit margins, the lower the industrial competitive pressure 
should be. We incorporate two profit margin measures at the sectoral level: the 
profit ratio of sales, profit_sale, and the profit ratio of costs, profit_cost. 
We also control five other sectoral variables: Growth, the year-on-year 
growth rate of total output value; Significance, the share of each sectoral total 
output value in total industrial output value; State power, the share of state 
capital in total paid-in capital; Exports share, the share of exports in total sales; 
and Intensity, total assets per worker. All of these sectoral-level variables are 
first-lagged to ease endogeneity issues and are calculated from various years of 
the China Industry Economy Statistical Yearbook. 
We are also interested in the behaviour of firms from industries with large 
overcapacity or backward technology. Thus, we include a dummy variable, 
overbackcapacity, which equals 1 if the investing firm is from an industry with 
excess or backward capacity, as specified by the Ministry of Industry and 
Information Technology of the People’s Republic of China. If not, it equals zero.
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Findings
From the results of the probit regression analysis reported in Table 7.5, there 
are four main findings.









labourcapa 0.266 0.233 –0.296 –0.248 –0.678 –1.034
(0.59) (0.51) (0.58) (0.47) (1.16) (1.61)
capitalcapa –0.076 –0.06 0.533* 0.49* –0.323 –0.303
(0.28) (0.23) (1.93) (1.75) (1.03) (0.95)
techcapa –1.074** –1.022* 1.307*** 1.174** –0.712 –0.584
(2.08) (1.96) (2.89) (2.55) (1.01) (0.81)
profit_sale 0.876 1.223 16.345*** 15.176*** –17.114** –14.623*
(0.26) (0.37) (3.20) (3.18) (2.20) (1.85)
State power 0.866 1.003 –3.913** –4.982** 1.5 1.486
(0.48) (0.55) (1.96) (2.29) (0.6) (0.59)
Exports share 5.081** 5.941** –3.854 –7.016** –55.309*** –53.403***





Growth 0.824 0.833 -0.502 –0.475 0.307 0.191
(1.03) (1.04) (0.53) (0.49) (0.29) (0.17)
Significance –5.201 –8.282 17.177** 28.785*** 20.805 12.853
(0.77) (1.02) (2.37) (2.97) (1.5) (0.9)
Intensity –0.002 –0.003 –0.031** –0.025 –0.01 –0.013
(0.19) (0.27) (2.01) (1.54) (0.61) (0.8)
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo 
R-squared
0.0584 0.0608 0.2539 0.2714 0.3541 0.3689
Observations 170 170 170 170 170 170
* indicates the coefficient is significant at the 10 per cent level
** indicates the coefficient is significant at the 5 per cent level
*** indicates the coefficient is significant at the 1 per cent level
Note: Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses.
Source: Author’s own estimation. 
First, firm capability is a significant determinant for Chinese strategic 
assets-seeking ODI, but not a crucial factor for market-seeking or resource-
5  The result using profit_cost is similar. So, for simplicity, we do not report it. 
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seeking ODI. The results indicate the coefficient for techcapa and capitalcapa 
is significantly positive for strategic assets-seeking ODI but insignificant 
(or significantly negative) for market-seeking and resource-seeking ODI. This 
means that the greater the investing firm’s technology-intensive capability 
or capital-intensive capability the more likely it is that the firm will conduct 
strategic assets-seeking ODI. 
Second, competition increases the likelihood of Chinese manufacturers 
seeking natural resources overseas, while it has no significant impact on 
manufacturers seeking a larger market overseas. In contrast, lower competition 
encourages Chinese firms to undertake strategic assets-seeking ODI. This is 
evidenced by the profit_sale coefficient, the proxy for industrial competition, 
which is significantly positively linked with the probability of strategic assets-
seeking ODI, negatively linked with resource-seeking ODI, while insignificant 
for market-seeking ODI. 
Third, although firms pursuing strategic assets-seeking ODI might face less 
competition currently, the potential for future competitive pressure cannot be 
ignored. The coefficient of State power is significantly negatively associated 
with the choice for strategic assets-seeking ODI; the lower the state power, 
the more likely a firm is to undertake strategic assets-seeking ODI. Usually, in 
sectors with lower state power, entry barriers, at least administratively, are also 
lower. Firms in these sectors, although presently enjoying relatively high profit 
margins, will likely face severe potential competition in the future. Thus, they 
have incentives to go overseas and acquire strategic assets to maintain their 
competitive edge at home.    
Finally, firms from industries with excess or backward capacity are more 
likely to enter into resource-seeking ODI, less likely to conduct strategic assets-
seeking ODI and are indifferent to market-seeking ODI. As shown in Table 7.5, 
the coefficient of the dummy variable overbackcapacity is significantly positive 
for resource-seeking ODI, significantly negative for strategic assets-seeking ODI 
and insignificant for market-seeking ODI. 
Implications for Upgrading China’s Economy
Japanese ODI has greatly facilitated the restructuring of the country’s economy 
by moving abroad labour-intensive, resource-consuming and environmentally 
detrimental activities between the 1960s and 1980s. What remain at home are 
operations with a greater technological content and higher added value. As a 
result, despite losing nearly two decades after the burst of the Japanese asset 
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price bubble, the Japanese economy is still competitive, its environmental 
situation has improved considerably, it is a very efficient consumer of resources 
and Japanese goods are still respected for their exceptionally high quality. 
Any upgrade of China’s economy through ODI, if possible, will, however, 
be quite different from Japan’s experience. The desire to seek lower production 
costs overseas is not a major motivation for Chinese firms. Also, rising labour 
costs, the appreciating renminbi and increasingly severe environmental policies 
do not—at least currently—push Chinese enterprises to shift labour and energy-
intensive, low value-added businesses abroad on a large scale. Instead, factories 
are moving within China to the western and central regions where production 
costs are lower than in the coastal areas. Other Chinese firms wish to grow their 
global footprint by pursuing overseas resources with the intention of locking 
in, or even lowering, the costs of raw materials.  
As confirmed by the above results, domestic competition has played a crucial 
role in forcing Chinese manufacturers to invest abroad to secure their resource 
supply. While it removes the resource bottleneck, increases a firm’s profit 
margin and thus equips them with greater resources to undertake innovation 
and move up the value chain, it also steers firms away from resource competition 
and potentially towards competition for ideas, management and technologies. 
But resource-seeking ODI is a double-edged sword. Investment in the resource 
sector is risky and requires a large amount of funds, while directing money 
elsewhere could have a more positive impact on upgrading a firm’s products and 
processes. 
Chinese firms are known for their ability to draw on a great deal of money. 
But, even for the country’s state-owned enterprises (SOEs), commercial pressures 
are mounting rapidly. After all, they still must pay millions of dollars in interest 
every year and undergo the economic performance evaluation required by the 
State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC). 
Notably, the 2011 dismissal of Sinosteel’s CEO by SASAC was partly because of 
the large losses of the company’s Australian investment, Midwest Mining Corp. 
Moreover, inadequate supporting infrastructure, extensive local bureaucracy 
(especially in relation to the environment and indigenous landowners) and 
high labour costs (especially for unskilled workers) all increase the risks for 
Chinese investment in overseas resources and these conditions are especially 
apparent in developed economies like Australia and Canada. Similarly, resource 
exploration in developing countries must contend with unstable social and 
political situations, as well as possible expropriation hazards that all add greater 
uncertainty to resource-seeking Chinese ODI.  
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Setting aside the risks mentioned above, resource-seeking ODI might 
discourage Chinese firms from developing resource-conserving and 
environmentally friendly technologies, while promoting heavier energy use and 
carbon production. 
The above is readily apparent for firms from industries with overcapacity or 
backward technology. Our probit regression analysis suggests that those firms 
are more likely to enter resource-seeking ODI, less likely to conduct strategic 
assets-seeking ODI and are indifferent to market-seeking ODI. This means that 
a significant number of firms from industries in this category neither digest 
excess production capacity through market-seeking ODI nor reduce backward 
production capacity or optimise incremental control structures through strategic 
assets-seeking ODI. Instead, they prefer resource-seeking ODI. This  could 
result in more blind investment and low-level expansion, intensifying China’s 
structural imbalances. Admittedly, factor market distortions, such as cheap 
capital and energy, could play a key role, but ODI only adds another dimension 
to this problem. 
The more promising method for upgrading China’s economy is through 
strategic assets-seeking ODI. It is apparent that strategic assets-seeking ODI 
has become the most important driver of Chinese overseas manufacturing 
investments (Table 7.3). Chinese firms have been heavily reliant on importing 
core components and technologies. Their Foreign Technology Dependence Ratio 
is more than 50 per cent, while developed economies do not exceed 30 per cent 
and the United States and Japan are about 5 per cent (Lu and Zhang 2007). 
Chinese firms also lack global brand names. According to the ‘100 World Best 
Brands in 2009’, eight of the top 10 were US companies, and no Chinese company 
made the list. 
Acquiring strategic assets through ODI helps elevate the competitiveness 
of Chinese firms by promoting their movement up the value chain, and in turn 
upgrading the Chinese economy. But such a favourable outcome is by no means 
preordained. At least two conditions have to be satisfied. The first requirement 
is that investing firms should possess a certain degree of capability—namely, 
an absorptive ability—the technology transfer skills to manage the acquired 
strategic assets, absorb spillovers and also transfer them back to the parent 
country. The second requirement is that investing firms should be patient 
enough or tolerant commercially to bear short-term losses while the advantages 
of the strategic assets come to fruition.
Our empirical results indicate that Chinese strategic assets-seeking ODI 
firms have partially met the above requirements. Their technological capabilities 
have facilitated their assimilation of acquired strategic assets. As shown in 
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Table  7.5, the higher the investing firm’s technology-intensive capability or 
capital-intensive capability, the more likely it will be to conduct strategic 
assets-seeking ODI. 
Chinese firms are also willing to absorb short-term losses and allow strategic 
assets to realise their value in the long run. Unlike resource-seeking ODI firms, 
which are significantly in industries with severe competition and low profit 
margins, strategic assets-seeking ODI firms are more likely to be from industries 
with lower current competition and higher profit margins—albeit in many 
instances where there is the potential for competitive pressure to increase. 
Under these circumstances, and in the current absence of competition, firms 
have the funds to buy strategic assets, but also could use their profits to buffer 
against near-term losses without concern for being squeezed out of the industry. 
Conclusions 
China, with its need to accelerate structural readjustment and improve 
the quality and efficiency of economic growth, is at a critical juncture. In the 
country’s Twelfth Five-Year Plan, covering 2011 to 2015, the key message 
was that the mode of economic development must be transformed. The core 
competitiveness of the manufacturing industries must be improved and 
resource conservation, as well as a concern for the environment, should be 
high on the agenda. 
In this chapter, we argued that ODI could play a role in upgrading the 
country’s economy. The statistical evidence suggests Chinese firms are motivated 
to invest overseas predominantly to acquire resources and strategic assets. It is 
also apparent that firms seeking resources overseas are often pushed abroad 
by domestic competition, while those investing in overseas strategic assets are 
already exhibiting a certain degree of technological capability. 
The impact of resource-seeking ODI on upgrading China’s economy is mixed. 
On the one hand, the resource bottleneck faced by enterprises in development 
might be eased, which allows investing firms to pay more attention to other 
aspects of competition such as product and process innovation. On the other 
hand, their incentive to develop resource-conserving and environmentally 
friendly technologies is also weakened. This could result in a wasteful use of 
resources and be detrimental to growth quality. 
The impact of strategic assets-seeking ODI on upgrading China’s economy 
is, however, more positive. Technology and brand acquisition are conducive 
to enhancing a firm’s competitive edge, while improved access to distribution 
channels is helpful to boost sales, increase profits and provide financial 
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resources for the upgrading of a firm’s production and products. One question 
remains, however: whether Chinese firms are able to best utilise strategic assets. 
Our analysis suggests that they are indeed equipped with certain technological 
capabilities that will assist with the assimilation of acquired assets. Also, firms 
pursuing strategic assets-seeking ODI are from industries with lower competition 
and higher profit margins. As a result, sufficient room (time, in the main) is 
available for the strategic assets to take effect.
Nevertheless, Chinese ODI faces other challenges ahead. Cultures at the 
national and corporate levels need to be reconciled and both must learn to engage 
with foreign regulators, unions and local communities, which remain unfamiliar 
territory. Firms also need to improve corporate governance and management 
skills to consolidate, absorb and operate foreign assets. While these challenges 
are also often present when conducting business abroad, that these challenges 
exist reflects the institutional background at home and, therefore, highlights 
problems with China’s economy as well. 
Chinese ODI is still small in size but its growing global importance is striking. 
It not only has the ability to upgrade China’s economy if properly managed but 
might also facilitate deeper reforms of SOEs, improve corporate governance, 
strengthen the notion of corporate social responsibility and, eventually, create 
a better and more orderly economic and business environment in China. 
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8. Intra-Provincial Inequality  
in China:
An analysis of county-level data
Tsun Se Cheong and Yanrui Wu
Introduction
Many studies have been carried out to investigate China’s regional inequality, 
which has increased considerably since the initiation of economic reforms. Most 
of the studies in the literature, however, are based on provincial-level data while 
intra-provincial inequality has not been examined thoroughly (Cheong 2012). 
In particular, the patterns and trends of inequality between the county-level 
units (CUs, including counties and county-level cities) within the provinces are 
virtually unknown. In order to get a full grasp of the pattern and dynamic 
trend of the inequality between the county-level units, the data have to be 
continuous and must have a long time span. Even though some researchers 
employ county-level data in their studies, many of these studies are still plagued 
by the problem of either limited coverage or a short time span. In-depth studies 
of intra-provincial regional inequalities are mainly confined to the provinces in 
China’s eastern zone with the rest of the country being ignored. The objective 
of this chapter is to estimate and decompose regional inequality using county-
level data from the provinces in both the inland and the coastal regions for 
an extended period. 
The county-level data used in this study can provide an opportunity 
to examine the pattern and evolution of regional inequality in greater detail. 
Specifically, this study decomposes overall inequality into the intra-provincial 
and inter-provincial components and hence makes it possible to identify the 
role of each province. Further decomposition of intra-provincial inequality can 
provide important insights into the effect on regional inequality of subregions 
within each province. The empirical exercise is carried out through a three-tier 
decomposition process so as to examine the contributions of the components 
in different spatial levels. The chapter begins with a literature review. Section 
three discusses the method of decomposition, while section four describes the 
data. Section five analyses the empirical findings and section six concludes and 
outlines some policy suggestions.
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Literature Review
One of the major analytical tools used in the analysis of regional inequality 
is the decomposition method. This study is based on the decomposition of 
inequality by subgroups, which are defined as different spatial groupings in 
the literature. The common spatial groupings used in the literature are the 
provinces, the economic zones (eastern, central, western and north-eastern) as 
well as the inland and coastal regions. The focus of this study is on regional 
inequality measured by gross regional product (GRP) per capita at the county 
level. Therefore, this literature review is mainly confined to the studies that use 
regional output in their calculations. The studies are grouped according to the 
different spatial levels used in the decomposition. 
Provincial-Level Decomposition
Tsui (1993) analysed inter-CU inequality using gross value of industrial 
and agricultural output (GVIAO) per capita in 1982. He decomposes overall 
inequality into two components: the inter-provincial and the intra-provincial 
components. Lee (2000) considered data for 1994 and compared his findings 
with those of Tsui. Lee found that the contribution of inter-provincial inequality 
to overall inequality increased between 1982 and 1994, while the contribution 
of intra-provincial inequality decreased. Herrmann-Pillath et al. (2002) also 
examined the contributions of inter-provincial and intra-provincial inequalities 
to overall inequality, but their study was based on GRP per capita amongst the 
prefectures. They found that the contribution of the inter-provincial inequality 
component to overall inter-prefectural inequality increased during 1993–98, 
whereas the contribution of the intra-provincial inequality component to 
overall inter-prefectural inequality decreased. Li and Xu (2008) also investigated 
regional inequality using prefectural-level GRP per capita and showed that the 
contribution of the intra-provincial component declined from 61.6 per cent in 
1997 to 59.4 per cent in 2005, while the contribution of the inter-provincial 
component increased from 38.4 per cent to 40.6 per cent during the period 
considered. Their results provide further empirical evidence supporting the 
findings of both Lee (2000) and Herrmann-Pillath et al. (2002). Although overall 
inequality measures in the aforementioned studies are calculated using data 
compiled at different spatial levels, the conclusions are very similar. These studies 
all show that the contribution of inter-provincial inequality to overall regional 
inequality increased while the share of intra-provincial inequality declined.
Zonal-Level Decomposition
The decomposition of inequality into inter-zonal and intra-zonal components 
is very common in the studies of inequality for China. Bhalla et al. (2003), Yao and 
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Zhang (2001) and Yao et al. (2005) all conducted research on the contributions 
of the inter-zonal inequality and intra-zonal inequality components to overall 
inequality using provincial-level GRP per capita data. They all come to the 
same conclusion that the contribution of the inter-zonal inequality component 
increased, while that of the intra-zonal inequality component decreased. 
Yao and Zhang (2001) found that the contribution of the inter-zonal component 
was about 80 per cent in 1997. Cai et al. (2002) studied inter-provincial 
inequality using GRP per capita during 1978–98 and they considered three 
economic zones. They showed that in 1978 the eastern zone’s contribution to 
overall inequality was more than 60 per cent; however, the contribution of the 
inter-zonal component increased significantly in the following 20 years and was 
about 60 per cent in 1998. The contribution of the eastern zone component 
declined dramatically over this period. Therefore, they argued that there was 
evidence of club convergence within the eastern zone. They also argued that 
the contributions of the central and western zone components remained very 
small during that period. Bhalla et al. (2003), who used provincial-level data 
in their study, showed that the eastern zone contributed the most to overall 
provincial inequality. Li and Xu (2008) decomposed inter-provincial inequality 
into contributions of four different zones using GRP per capita data during 
1978–2005. They observed that the eastern zone component contributed about 
20 per cent of overall inequality in 2005, while the sum of the contributions of the 
central, western and north-eastern zones was only 10 per cent. Moreover, they 
also showed that the contribution of the inter-zonal component rose from 
40 per cent in 1978 to about 70 per cent in 2005. Therefore, they concluded 
that inter-provincial inequality was mainly caused by the disparity between 
the four economic zones. Gries and Redlin (2009) decomposed inequality 
in provincial GRP per capita during 1978–2004. They showed that the eastern 
zone component contributed to most of the overall inter-provincial inequality 
back in 1978; however, the contribution of this component decreased sharply 
after 1978. In contrast, the contribution of the inter-zonal component increased 
dramatically and became the largest contributor to overall inequality in 2004. 
Villaverde et al. (2010) found that the contribution of the inter-zonal component 
increased considerably, from below 20 per cent in 1978 to about 50 per cent in 
2007, while the contribution of the intra-zonal component declined from 80 
per cent to about 50 per cent during the same period. Liu (2006) investigated 
rural regional inequality using the data for agricultural output (AO), rural non-
agricultural output (RNAO) and gross value of rural social product (GVRSP). 
Liu’s findings supported the existing consensus that the contributions of the 
inter-zonal components to overall inequality during the period 1980–2002 
increased while the contributions of the intra-zonal components decreased. 
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Inland and Coastal-Level Decomposition
It is well known that a large disparity exists between the inland and the 
coastal regions in China. Hao and Wei (2010), Jian et al. (1996), Tsui (2007) and 
Ying (1999) are representative works establishing this notion using provincial 
GRP per capita data. In these studies it is found that inequality between the 
inland and coastal regions increased while that within the inland and coastal 
regions decreased over time. Another study, by Fujita and Hu (2001), used 
regional GRP rather than GRP per capita in their calculation. They also reached 
the same conclusion: that there was an increase in inequality between the inland 
and coastal regions. Hao and Wei (2010) considered GRP per worker and showed 
that inequality between the inland and coastal regions increased sharply during 
1978–2004. They repeated their exercises by excluding the municipalities, and 
their findings remained the same.
Decomposition Based on Other Spatial Groupings
Some researchers presented their own definitions in constructing spatial 
subgroups for decomposition exercises. Herrmann-Pillath et al. (2002) 
divided the provinces in China into seven ‘macro-regions’. Similarly, Huang 
et al.  (2003) divided the provinces into seven ‘areas’. Herrmann-Pillath et al. 
(2002) examined inter-prefectural inequality using GRP per capita and found 
that the contribution of the inter-regional inequality component to overall 
inter-prefectural inequality decreased during 1993–98. Huang et al. (2003) 
explored inter-provincial inequality during 1991–2001 and found that the 
contribution of inter-area inequality to overall inter-provincial inequality 
increased, while the contribution of intra-area inequality to overall inequality 
decreased. Huang et al. (2003) thus concluded that inter-area inequality is 
the major driving force underlying the increase in overall inter-provincial 
inequality. On the surface, it appears that Herrmann-Pillath et al. (2002) and 
Huang et al. (2003) reached different conclusions; however, their results cannot 
be compared directly. First, the time span is not the same. Second, the results of 
Herrmann-Pillath et al. (2002) are based on prefectural-level data, whereas those 
of Huang  et  al.  (2003) are based on provincial-level data. Third, Herrmann-
Pillath et al. (2002) used GRP per capita data in their analysis, whereas Huang 
et al. (2003) used provincial GRP data unscaled by population. In addition, their 
methods of categorisation of the provinces into seven groups are not identical. 
The aforementioned studies show that progress in raising living standards 
across China has been very uneven amongst the regions. Moreover, it is now 
well established that spatial groupings play a major role in inequality and thus 
it is necessary to study inequality with due respect to spatial factors. 
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Methodology
Overall inequality can be decomposed into several components and the 
contribution of each component can be computed accordingly. This is an 
excellent tool for determining the relative importance of each component, 
which is valuable in determining the priority of government policies. 
The  most common approaches used in the literature are the decompositions 
by subgroups (Shorrocks 1980, 1984) and income sources (Yao 1997, 1999). 
Decomposition by subgroups can be applied to household survey or regional 
data (for  example, see  Cai et al. 2002; Cheng 1996b; Gries and Redlin 2009; 
Huang et al. 2003; Kanbur and Zhang 1999, 2005; Lee 2000; Li and Xu 2008; 
Lin et al. 2008; Liu 2010; Sicular et al. 2007; Tsui 1993; Wan 2007; Yang 1999; 
Yao and Liu 1998; Ying 1999), while decomposition by income sources is mostly 
used with household survey data to determine the significance of each income 
component (for instance, Cheng  1996a; Fang and Rizzo 2011; Gustafsson 
and Li 2001; Khan and Riskin 1998; Khan et al. 1993; Liu and Sicular 2009; 
Rozelle 1994; Zhou 2009). Theil-T and Theil-L indices are often employed in the 
decomposition by subgroups (Cowell 2000; Shorrocks 1980; Theil 1967, 1972), 
while the Gini coefficient is popularly used in the decomposition by income 
sources (for instance, Cheng 1996a; Yao 1997, 1999).
Decomposition of Inequality by Subgroups
The decomposition of inequality by subgroups is used to determine the 
contributions of the subgroups to overall inequality (Theil 1967, 1972). 
First, overall inequality is calculated using all the entities. Second, the entities 
are then divided into two or more subgroups. These subgroups can be defined 
by spatial relationship, quantifiable data or qualitative information. Overall 
inequality for all the entities is then decomposed into the weighted sum of the 
inequality within these subgroups (the intra-subgroup component) and the 
inequality between these subgroups (the inter-subgroup component).1 Theil-T 
and Theil-L indices are often used in the decomposition of inequality by 
subgroups because both indices can be decomposed completely into the inter-
subgroup and intra-subgroup components (Bourguignon 1979; Shorrocks 1980, 
1984). The Gini coefficient, however, does not have this property (Yao 1999); 
therefore, the Gini coefficient has seldom been used in this kind of exercise 
(Bourguignon 1979). 
The decomposition process can be carried out in successive tiers, so that the 
relationship between the various components can be investigated. There are 
five spatial levels in our decomposition: the county (level one), the provincial 
1  For a detailed discussion, refer to Bourguignon (1979) and Shorrocks (1980, 1984).
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(level two), the zonal (level three), the inland and coastal (level four), and the 
national (level five). Let  be the inequality index for the kth region at level j. 
The subscript i and superscript j represent different spatial levels, where j is 
always higher than i by one spatial level. The measurement of inequality is 
based on population and GRP data compiled at level I, which is represented 
by subscript i and represents inequality as measured amongst the level-i units. 
Superscript j represents the level of the spatial grouping that is used in the 
measurement of inequality. Every spatial grouping in level j is made up of the 
level-i units. Generally, there are several spatial groupings in each level (except 
level five, which is the national level, so it has only one entity), and the kth region 
is one of the many spatial groupings at spatial level j. For example, the inter-CU 
inequality within the ath province can be represented by . The subscript 1 
(county-level) shows that the inequality measurement is based on the county-
level units, while the superscript 2 (provincial level) shows that the county-level 
units are grouped into province, and the inequality measurement refers to the 
inequality amongst the county-level units within a province. The a behind the 
comma in the superscript refers to the ath province. Similarly, zonal level is level 
three and thus, the inter-provincial inequality within the bth economic zone 
can be represented by . It should be noted that the overall inequality of the 
whole nation based on county-level data is represented by . There is no region 
notation after the number 5 in the superscript, because superscript 5 represents 
the whole nation and it is the only spatial grouping at the national level.
The inequality of the inter-subgroup component measured at any level i can be 
decomposed into the sum of the intra-subgroup component and inter-subgroup 
component measured at a higher spatial level, j. Overall inter-CU inequality 
for China ( ) can be decomposed into the intra-provincial component and the 
inter-provincial component ( ). The intra-provincial component is equal to 
the weighted sum of the inter-CU inequalities within all the provinces in the 
dataset. The inter-CU inequality within the ath province is represented by  
(Equation 8.1).
Equation 8.1
In Equation 8.1, a = 1 to 22 since there are 22 provinces in this study and 
Wa is the weight for the a
th province. The weights for the Theil-L and Theil-T 
decompositions are population and income based, respectively (Gustafsson and 
Li 2002). Specifically, the weight for the ath province is na/N for the Theil-L 
decomposition and Ya/Y for the Theil-T decomposition where na and Ya represent 
the population and GRP in the ath province, while N and Y denote the total 
population and GRP of all the regions.
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Similarly, the inter-provincial inequality ( ) can then be decomposed into 
the sum of the intra-zonal component and the inter-zonal component ( ). 
The intra-zonal component is equal to the weighted sum of the inter-provincial 
inequalities within all the zones. The inter-provincial inequality within the bth 
zone is represented by  (Equation 8.2).
Equation 8.2
In Equation 8.2, b = 1 to 4 since there are four economic zones; Wb is the 
weight for the bth zone. 
In the third tier of decomposition, inter-zonal inequality ( ) can be further 
decomposed into the sum of the component of the inequalities within the inland 
and coastal regions, and the component of the inequality between the inland 
and coastal regions ( ). The component of the inequalities within the inland 
and coastal regions is equal to the weighted sum of the inter-zonal inequalities 
within the inland and coastal regions. The inter-zonal inequality within the cth 
region is represented by  (Equation 8.3).
Equation 8.3
In Equation 8.3, c = 1, 2, since there are two regions—namely, the inland 
and the coastal regions—and Wc is the weight for the c
th region. 
Substitute Equation 8.3 into Equation 8.2 to obtain Equation 8.4.
Equation 8.4
Thus, Equation 8.1 becomes Equation 8.5.
Equation 8.5
The contribution of the various spatial components to overall inequality 
in China can be derived from Equation 8.5. The percentage contribution of 
each component can then be found by dividing the value of each individual 
component by overall inequality. Overall inequality can be decomposed into 
the spatial components at four levels. This form of decomposition is the vertical 
decomposition, which can be applied across different administrative levels. 
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All components in Equation 8.5, except , are the weighted sums 
of inequality measured at a lower level. These intra-subgroup components can be 
further decomposed into their constituents within each level. The value of each 
constituent unit is the inequality of that entity times its weight. For example, 
the weighted sum of the inter-CU inequalities within all the provinces, which 
is made up of the contributions of 22 provinces, can be decomposed into the 
contribution of each province. This can identify major contributors to overall 
inequality for each spatial grouping. Similarly, the intra-provincial regional 
inequality (that is, the inter-CU inequality within each province) can be further 
decomposed into three components within each province: the components of 
the inter-county inequality, the intercity inequality and the inequality between 
city and county subgroups. The information can reveal the disparity between 
the cities and counties within each province. Accordingly, intra-provincial 
development policy can be formulated for each province.
Data
Regional inequality can be investigated using different indicators. Duncan 
and Tian (1999) noted that it is important to distinguish between studies 
using livelihood and output indicators, as they can lead to different results. 
Many inequality studies are based on expenditure, consumption, wages, total 
earnings and household income data. These indicators are good measures for 
the livelihood and economic wellbeing of people. On the other hand, output 
per capita is deemed to be a good measure of economic development for 
a region. Because the focus of this study is on regional inequality in economic 
development, regional output per capita is used in this study. Gross regional 
product (GRP) per capita is selected as the indicator of economic development 
in this research because it is the most frequently used indicator of output and is 
more comprehensive than other measures such as the gross value of industrial 
and agricultural output (GVIAO) and national income (NI).
The present study is based on a dataset of real GRP per capita for the counties 
and county-level cities in China. There are three kinds of county-level units: 
the counties, the county-level cities and the city districts (or simply ‘districts’) 
in the prefectural-level cities and municipalities. The data for the city districts, 
however, are unavailable for some provinces in the earlier years of the study 
period. Moreover, in some cases, only an aggregated value of the city districts, 
rather than the data for each individual district, is available. Therefore, this 
study is based on the data for the counties and county-level cities only. 
Many studies that examine inequality amongst the county-level units do not 
include city districts but are based on the data for the county-level cities and 
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counties only.2 In this study, the four municipalities—Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai 
and Chongqing—are not included because most of the administrative regions in 
the municipalities are districts.
The data are largely compiled from the Provincial Statistical Yearbook 
(NBS 1998–2008a) of each province; however, where the data are unavailable, the 
data from the China Statistical Yearbook for Regional Economy (NBS 2004–08) and 
the Provincial Yearbook (NBS 1998–2008b) for each province are used. Some cities 
and counties are dropped from the dataset because of incomplete information 
in the sources. All the county-level GRP data are adjusted for inflation and 
expressed in 1997 constant prices. Since the deflator for each individual county-
level unit is not available, the provincial deflator is used for all the counties and 
county-level cities within a province. To ensure consistency of data, the database 
has been thoroughly checked for changing administrative status/boundaries 
and so on.3 Aggregation has been used in some instances, following Fan (1995), 
where boundaries have changed over time. The shortcoming of aggregation is 
the possible underestimation of inequality in the aggregated county-level units, 
although according to the web site of administrative divisions in China, there 
were few changes in administrative divisions during the period covered.
The county-level units are divided into spatial groupings at four levels: 
national, inland and coastal, economic zonal, and provincial. In this study, the 
coastal region and the eastern zone are identical, whereas the inland region is 
defined to comprise all the provinces in the central, western and north-eastern 
zones. The definition of the inland and coastal regions used in this study 
is slightly different from the official definition. As the data for some provinces 
are not available in some years, the county-level units within these provinces 
cannot be included in the measurement of inequality conducted at the national, 
inland and coastal, and economic zonal levels. Eventually, only the county-level 
units in 22 provinces are included in these three levels of analyses, and these 
provinces are grouped as follows.
•	 Eastern zone: Hebei, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Guangdong and Hainan. 
The municipalities of Beijing, Tianjin and Shanghai are excluded from this 
study. The province of Shandong is not included because of unavailability 
of data.
•	 Central zone: Anhui, Jiangxi, Henan and Hunan. The provinces of Shanxi 
and Hubei are not included because of unavailability of data.
2  Examples include Brajer et al. (2010); Gustafsson and Li (2002); Lee (2000); Jones et al. (2003); Li and 
Xu (2008); Rozelle (1994); Song et al. (2000); Veeck and Pannell (1989); Wei and Kim (2002); Wu and 
Zhu (2011); Yu et al. (2007); Zhou and Zou (2010).
3  Detailed descriptions are available in Cheong and Wu (2012).
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•	 Western zone: Inner Mongolia, Guangxi, Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Gansu, 
Qinghai, Ningxia and Xinjiang. The municipality of Chongqing is excluded 
from this study. The provinces of Shaanxi and Tibet are not included because 
of unavailability of data.
•	 North-eastern zone: Liaoning, Jilin and Heilongjiang.
The categorisation of the zones is based on the 2006 China Statistical 
Yearbook (NBS 2006). The final dataset used in the study comprises 1485 counties 
and county-level cities covering the period 1997–2007. Population data are 
compiled from the Provincial Statistical Yearbook (NBS 1998–2008a), Provincial 
Yearbook (NBS 1998–2008b) and China Statistical Yearbook for Regional Economy 
(NBS 2004–2008). It is well known that the provincial population data in China 
are based on the household registration system (hukou) population, and the 
number of temporary migrants is not taken into consideration. This could 
distort the final results and cannot be resolved given the resources available.4 
Wan (2008) suggests that China’s regional inequality can be divided into two 
dimensions: the east–central–west divide and rural–urban inequality. The latter 
contributes to more than 70 per cent of overall inequality. The data for rural 
and urban areas within the county-level units are not available, therefore, it is 
impossible to study inequality between the rural and urban areas at the county 
level. Lee (2000) and Tsui (1993) treated the county-level cities as urban areas 
and the counties as rural areas in their analysis. They decompose overall inter-CU 
inequality into the contributions of the ‘intra-rural’, ‘intra-urban’ and ‘rural-
urban’ components. The same approach will be used in this chapter. To avoid 
confusion, the components are renamed as inter-county inequality, intercity 
inequality and inequality between city and county subgroups.
Results and Discussion
The dataset used in this research comprises data for the counties and county-
level cities. The terms ‘county-level city’ and ‘city’ are used interchangeably 
hereinafter. The term ‘inter-county-level-unit inequality’ or simply ‘inter-CU 
inequality’ refers to the inequality amongst all the counties and county-level 
cities within a region. The term ‘intra-provincial regional inequality’ or simply 
4  The data of the actual population in 2000 for each county-level unit are available in the County Data of 
2000 Census (2000 ren kou pu cha fen xian zi liao) (NBS 2003). As the census data for 2010 are not yet 
available, for the time being, it is impossible to adjust the population data by interpolation because 
the only data available are for 2000. Further adjustment can be made when the data become available. 
Another concern is the quality of output data in China. Researchers have raised doubts about the 
reliability and accuracy of China’s GDP statistics (Chow 1986; Holz 2006; Rawski 2001; Wu 1997). 
The official source is, however, still the only channel for statistics used in this type of exercise. 
Thus, caution should be exercised in interpreting the results here.
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‘intra-provincial inequality’ refers to the inequality amongst the county-level 
units within a province (that is, the inter-CU inequality within each province). 
This section has two parts: the results based on decomposition of overall 
inequality into different spatial components are presented first. Then,  intra-
provincial inequality is further decomposed into three components: inter-
county inequality, intercity inequality and inequality between city and county 
subgroups. 
Decomposition of Inequality into Spatial Components
Table 8.1 shows the three-tier decomposition of inequality. The first tier 
is the decomposition of overall inter-CU inequality into the intra-provincial 
component (that is, the weighted sum of the inter-CU inequalities within all 
the provinces) and the inter-provincial component as shown in Equation 8.1. 
The contribution of each component is expressed as a percentage of the overall 
inter-CU inequality. The second tier is the decomposition of inter-provincial 
inequality into the intra-zonal component (that is, the weighted sum of the inter-
provincial inequalities within all the zones) and the inter-zonal component as 
shown in Equation 8.2. The contribution at this level is expressed as a fraction of 
inter-provincial inequality. The third tier is the decomposition of the inter-zonal 
inequality into the component of inter-zonal inequality within the inland and 
coastal regions (that is, the weighted sum of the inter-zonal inequalities within 
the inland and coastal regions) and the component of the inequality between 
the inland and coastal regions as shown in Equation 8.3. The contributions of 
the components are expressed as a percentage of the inter-zonal inequality.
The first-tier decomposition in Table 8.1 shows that the contributions of 
inter-CU inequality within all the provinces and inter-provincial inequality to 
overall inter-CU inequality remain relatively constant during the period 1997–
2007. It is interesting to note that the contribution of inter-provincial inequality 
(Theil-T is used in this calculation) decreased slightly between 1997 and 2007, 
but it increased slightly when Theil-L is used. The difference is, however, very 
small. In contrast, the contribution of inter-provincial inequalities within all the 
zones to overall inter-provincial inequality increased substantially according to 
either Theil-T or Theil-L measure, as shown in the second-tier decomposition 
in Table 8.1. In 1997, the contributions were about 26 per cent and 28 per cent 
according to Theil-T and Theil-L measures, respectively. These contributions 
increased enormously to reach about 48 per cent in both cases in 2007, while the 
contribution of the inter-zonal inequality decreased significantly. Finally, the 
third-tier decomposition results illustrate that the changes in the contributions 
of the components are relatively small. The contribution of inter-zonal inequality 
within the inland and coastal regions dropped about 4 per cent, whereas the 
contribution of inequality between the inland and coastal regions increased 
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slightly during 1997–2007. The contribution of inequality between the inland 
and coastal regions to overall inter-zonal inequality reached about 90 per cent 
in 2007.
Table 8.2 shows the overall result of the decomposition into different 
spatial components using Equation 8.5. The contribution of each component is 
expressed as a percentage of overall inter-CU inequality. Although there are some 
minor differences in the percentage contribution derived from the two indices, 
the magnitude and trend are similar. The component of inter-CU inequality 
within all the provinces contributed the most to overall inter-CU inequality and 
was about 60 per cent in 2007. The contributions of inter-provincial inequality 
within all the zones and inequality between the inland and coastal regions 
were very close in 2007, being 19 per cent and 18 per cent according to the 
Theil-T measure. The component of inter-zonal inequalities within the inland 
and coastal regions contributed about 2 per cent of overall inequality in 2007.
Table 8.3 shows the changes in the contributions of the spatial components to 
overall inter-CU inequality. It can be observed that the contribution of inter-CU 
inequality within all the provinces to overall inter-CU inequality remained fairly 
constant over time. The contribution of inter-provincial inequality within all 
the zones increased, while the contributions of inequality between the inland 
and coastal regions and inter-zonal inequality within the inland and coastal 
regions were found to decrease. According to the Theil-T method, the percentage 
increase in the contribution of inter-provincial inequality within all the zones 
was about 8.6 per cent during 1997–2007 while inter-zonal inequality within 
the inland and coastal regions declined 2.2 per cent and inequality between 
the inland and coastal regions declined 7.7 per cent. This finding highlights 
the importance of monitoring the increase in inequality amongst the provinces 
within the economic zones.
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Table 8.3 Changes in the Contributions of the Spatial Components to Inter-CU 
Inequality (per cent)
1997 2007 Differences 
Theil-T
Inequality between the inland and coastal 
regions
25.70 18.05 –7.65
Inter-zonal inequality within the inland and 
coastal regions
4.21 2.01 –2.19
Inter-provincial inequality within all the zones 10.61 19.20 8.59
Inter-CU inequality within all the provinces 59.49 60.74 1.25
Theil-L
Inequality between the inland and coastal 
regions
25.38 19.70 –5.68
Inter-zonal inequality within the inland and 
coastal regions
5.32 2.83 –2.50
Inter-provincial inequality within all the zones 12.10 21.01 8.91
Inter-CU inequality within all the provinces 57.19 56.46 –0.73
Notes: The coastal region is treated the same as the eastern zone. The inland region includes the central, 
western and north-eastern zones.
Source: Authors’ own calculation.
Decomposition techniques can also be applied to analyse the changes in 
inequality itself. This extends the conventional decomposition of inequality. 
The decomposition of changes in inequality can provide detailed information 
about the contributions of the changes in different components to the change 
in overall inequality. The conventional approach shows the significance of the 
component to the absolute level of inequality. The results of the decomposition of 
the changes in overall inter-CU inequality over the period 1997–2007 are shown in 
Table 8.4. The increase in inter-CU inequality within all the provinces contributed 
substantially to the change in overall inequality during the period considered (63 
per cent and 55 per cent according to Theil-T and Theil-L measures respectively), 
followed by the increase in inter-provincial inequality within all the zones (35 
per cent and 43 per cent according to Theil-T and Theil-L). A comparison of 
Table 8.4 with Table 8.3 shows that inequality between the inland and coastal 
regions registered a decrease in its contribution to overall inequality in Table 
8.3, whereas Table 8.4 shows that 4 per cent (given Theil-T) of an increase in 
overall inequality can be explained by the increase in inequality between the 
inland and coastal regions. This information is quite revealing. It suggests that 
inequality between the inland and coastal regions increased in the study period, 
but the increase was not as dramatic as those of other components and hence led 
to a decline in its total contribution. Therefore, this component should not be 
overlooked just because it had a decline in total contribution. 
All the county-level units in a province can be further divided into city and 
county subgroups, and an additional tier of decomposition can be performed 
to investigate the contribution of the city and county subgroups to intra-
provincial regional inequality. The latter can be further decomposed into three 
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intra-provincial components: inter-county inequality, intercity inequality 
and inequality between the city and county subgroups in each province.5 
The results are shown in Table 8.5. It is observed that inter-county inequality 
within all the provinces has the largest contribution to overall inequality—
namely, 23 per cent and 31 per cent in 2007 according to the Theil-T and Theil-L 
measures respectively. The changes in the contributions of these components 
are shown in Table 8.6. It is shown that the changes of the three intra-provincial 
components were very small and remained fairly constant over the whole period.
Table 8.4 Decomposition of the Changes in Inter-CU Inequality, 1997–2007
Changes in
Contribution to inter-CU 
inequality change
Contribution to inter-CU 
inequality change (%)
Theil-T Theil-L Theil-T Theil-L
Inequality between the inland 
and coastal regions
0.005 0.004 4.072 5.447
Inter-zonal inequality within 
the inland and coastal regions
–0.002 –0.003 –1.999 –3.426
Inter-provincial inequality 
within all the zones
0.039 0.034 34.892 43.338
Inter-CU inequality within all 
the provinces
0.070 0.042 63.035 54.641
Notes: The coastal region is treated the same as the eastern zone. The inland region includes the central, 
western and north-eastern zones.
Source: Authors’ own calculation.
Table 8.7 shows the contributions of the changes in different spatial 
components (first three rows in the table) and the three intra-provincial 
components (last three rows in the table) to the change in overall inequality. 
It is shown that the contributions of the changes in the three intra-provincial 
components (inter-county, intercity and between city and county subgroups) 
were respectively 25 per cent, 26 per cent and 12 per cent according to the 
Theil-T technique (or 33 per cent, 13 per cent and 9 per cent if Theil-L indices 
are used). It is worth noting that in Table 8.6 the contribution of inequality 
between city and county subgroups within all the provinces exhibited 
a  declining trend while the increase in this component still contributed to 
12  per  cent (as measured by Theil-T) of the increase in overall inequality. 
Similarly, though in Table 8.6 the changes in the contributions of the other 
two intra-provincial inequality components remained constant, the increases 
in these two components contributed to more than 50 per cent (as measured 
by Theil-T) of the change in overall inequality during the period 1997–2007. 
Therefore, these inequality components should not be overlooked and efforts 
should also be made to mitigate these intra-provincial inequalities.
5  The decomposition of inequality into city and county subgroups cannot be conducted for Ningxia 
because there is only one county-level city in Ningxia, and there has also been a boundary change 
in this city that makes the data incomparable. This city is thus removed from the dataset.
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Table 8.6 Changes in the Contributions of Inequality Components (per cent)
1997 2007 Differences
Theil-T
Inequality between the inland and coastal 
regions
25.70 18.05 –7.65
Inter-zonal inequality within the inland and 
coastal regions
4.21 2.01 –2.19
Inter-provincial inequality within all the zones 10.61 19.20 8.59
Inter-county inequality within all the 
provinces
22.23 23.31 1.08
Intercity inequality within all the provinces 20.85 22.62 1.78
Inequality between city and county 
subgroups within all the provinces
16.41 14.81 –1.60
Theil-L
Inequality between the inland and coastal 
regions
25.38 19.70 –5.68
Inter-zonal inequality within the inland and 
coastal regions
5.32 2.83 –2.50
Inter-provincial inequality within all the zones 12.10 21.01 8.91
Inter-county inequality within all the 
provinces
29.66 30.57 0.92
Intercity inequality within all the provinces 12.61 12.72 0.11
Inequality between city and county 
subgroups within all the provinces
14.93 13.17 –1.75
Notes: The coastal region is treated the same as the eastern zone. The inland region includes the central, 
western and north-eastern zones.
Source: Authors’ own calculation.
Table 8.7 Decomposition of the Change in Inter-CU Inequality, 1997–2007 





Theil-T Theil-L Theil-T Theil-L
Inequality between the inland and coastal 
regions
0.005 0.004 4.072 5.447
Inter-zonal inequality within the inland and 
coastal regions
–0.002 –0.003 –1.999 –3.426
Inter-provincial inequality within all the zones 0.039 0.034 34.892 43.338
Inter-county inequality within all the provinces 0.028 0.025 25.277 32.876
Inter-city inequality within all the provinces 0.029 0.010 25.875 12.985
Inequality between city and county subgroups 
within all the provinces
0.013 0.007 11.882 8.780
Notes: The coastal region is treated the same as the eastern zone. The inland region includes the central, 
western and north-eastern zones.
Source: Authors’ own calculation.
Further Decomposition Analyses
Further analysis can be performed to gain more insights into inequality 
in each province. Decomposition can be conducted horizontally amongst 
the provinces so as to identify the contributions of individual provinces. 
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The results are shown in Tables 8.8 and 8.9 (corresponding to the Theil-T and 
Theil-L methods). As the two sets of results are similar, our discussions are 
based on the Theil-T results in Table 8.8. The values in column CU in Table 8.8 
represent percentage contributions of individual provinces to overall inequality 
and they sum to one hundred. Individual provinces’ contributions are then 
decomposed into three components reported in columns Co, Ci and Co-Ci in 
Table 8.8. According to this table, in 2007 Jiangsu made the largest contribution 
to overall inequality. This finding is in agreement with the results of Sakamoto 
and Fan (2010), who showed that Jiangsu contributed considerably to the 
income disparity within the Yangtze River Delta and that its contribution was 
growing. Other large contributors in 2007 were, in turn, Hebei, Henan, Inner 
Mongolia and Zhejiang. Together, these top-five contributors have a share of 
about 63 per cent. These provinces are situated close to each other. That could 
imply that spatial factors play major roles in inequality in China. Table 8.8 
also shows that inter-county inequality in Hebei, Henan and Inner Mongolia 
dominates each province’s contribution while intercity inequality in Jiangsu 
is the most important contributing factor. Intercity inequality within Fujian, 
Guangdong, Hebei, Zhejiang, Henan and Xinjiang also contributed greatly to 
overall inequality. Most of these provinces belong to the eastern zone. It shows 
that the great disparity amongst the cities in the eastern zone further reinforced 
overall inequality. The inequality between city and county subgroups in Fujian, 
Hebei, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Henan and Xinjiang contributed significantly to 
overall inequality. Four of these provinces also belong to the eastern zone.
Table 8.10 shows the changes in the contributions of the three intra-
provincial components of the provinces to overall inequality during 1997–2007. 
It is observed that inter-CU inequality in Jiangsu had the largest increase in its 
contribution (using the Theil-T technique), which is largely attributed to the 
increase in the intercity inequality component. The contribution of inter-county 
inequality did not, however, change significantly though that of inequality 
between city and county subgroups increased moderately. It is also observed 
that inter-CU inequality in Inner Mongolia had the second-largest increase 
in its contribution (according to Theil-T). This change was mainly caused by 
the increase in the contribution of the inter-county inequality component. 
The results using the Theil-L method, however, show that inter-CU inequality in 
Hebei had the largest increase in its contribution, which was mainly due to the 
increase in the contribution of the inter-county inequality component. Table 8.10 
also shows that inter-CU inequality in Guangdong had the largest decrease in 
its contribution (3.46 per cent according to Theil-T), which was mainly due to 
the decline in the contribution of the intercity inequality component (2.04 per 
cent) and a modest decline in the inter-county inequality component (0.96 per 
cent). According to the Theil-L method, inter-CU inequality in Sichuan had the 
largest decrease in its contribution (3.05 per cent).
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Table 8.11 presents the results of the decomposition of the change in overall 
inter-CU inequality into the changes in the three components of intra-provincial 
inequality for each province. According to the estimates using Theil-T, the 
increase in inter-CU inequality in Jiangsu contributed to 26.35 per cent of 
the change in overall inequality in China. The increase in intercity inequality 
accounted for 16.91 per cent, while the increase in inequality between the 
city and county subgroups accounted for 8.37 per cent. It implies that more 
than one-quarter of the increase in inter-CU inequality in China over the study 
period could be due to the increase in intra-provincial inequality in Jiangsu. 
Furthermore, it is observed that the increases in inter-CU inequalities in 
Hebei and Inner Mongolia also contributed significantly to overall inequality. 
These  three provinces combined contributed to about 47 per cent of the 
increase in overall inequality according to the Theil-T estimates. It means that 
if the levels of inter-CU inequality in these provinces had remained unchanged 
during the entire study period then the overall increase in inequality in China 
would have been reduced by nearly one-half. 
The relative importance of the three intra-provincial inequality components 
in every province can also be estimated. In Table 8.12 the contributions of inter-
county inequality, intercity inequality and inequality between city and county 
subgroups in every province are expressed as a percentage of the sum of these 
three components. For example, inter-county inequality in Hainan contributed 
to 34.58 per cent of the intra-provincial inequality of Hainan in 1997 while this 
figure increased to 43.88 per cent in 2007 according to the Theil-T estimates. 
The  contribution of intercity inequality increased from 18.61  per cent to 
35.63  per cent while that of inequality between city and county subgroups 
decreased from 46.81 per cent to 20.49 per cent during the same period. 
The  contribution of the intercity component increased substantially in this 
period. This could have important policy implications for local government as 
well as the Central Government.
Table 8.12 provides additional information about the characteristics of the 
provinces in each zone. According to the Theil-T measurement, inter-county 
inequality in 2007 contributed to more than 50 per cent of the intra-provincial 
regional inequality in Anhui, Hunan, Jiangxi, Gansu, Guangxi, Guizhou, 
Inner Mongolia, Sichuan and Yunnan. These provinces are all in the central 
and western zones. The intercity component contributed to more than 50 
per  cent of intra-provincial regional inequality in Guangdong, Jiangsu and 
Jilin. Both Guangdong and Jiangsu are in the eastern zone. Inequality between 
city and county subgroups contributed to about 67 per cent of intra-provincial 
regional inequality in Qinghai, which is in the western zone.
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Conclusions
Important information can be obtained from the decomposition of inequality 
based on county-level data. In this chapter, we found that intra-provincial 
regional inequality (that is, inequality amongst the county-level units within the 
provinces) contributed about 60 per cent of China’s overall inequality in 2007, 
whereas the increase in intra-provincial regional inequality contributed to about 
63 per cent of the overall increase in regional inequality during 1997–2007. 
Thus, intra-provincial regional inequality is the crux of the problem of regional 
inequality in China. It was also found that the contribution of inter-provincial 
inequality within all the zones increased significantly while the contributions of 
other components remained relatively constant or even tended to decline during 
the period considered. Therefore, more specific government policies should be 
implemented in order to reduce intra-provincial regional inequality.
The results of our decomposition analysis imply that inequality alleviation 
might need a local rather than a national approach in the first instance. 
For example, the results of the Theil-T decomposition of the changes in inequality 
show that immediate actions are needed at least in three provinces: Jiangsu, 
Inner Mongolia and Hebei. These three provinces together contributed to about 
47 per cent of the increase in overall inequality in China during 1997–2007.
It is shown that the evolution of regional inequality in each province has 
its own characteristics and patterns. Thus, it is necessary for the provincial 
governments to formulate province-specific policies for the county-level units. 
For instance, the provinces in the central and western zones should focus more 
on inter-county inequality, while the provinces in the eastern zone should 
concentrate on both inter-county and intercity inequalities. The provinces in 
the north-eastern zone should focus on intercity inequality. The provinces of 
Fujian, Jiangsu, Henan, Guizhou and Qinghai should pay special attention to 
inequality between city and county subgroups.
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9. Mapping Modes of Rural 
Labour Migration in China
Sylvie Démurger
Introduction
China’s rapid economic development and government policy changes towards 
higher inter-regional labour mobility have encouraged a massive rural–urban 
labour force exodus since the mid-1980s. The National Bureau of Statistics of 
China estimated the total number of rural migrants working in cities in 2011 
at about 158 million.1 Compared with developed countries, where similar 
population movements occurred in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, 
in China, the much larger scale and pace of population movements confront 
the Chinese authorities with extremely challenging policy issues that call for 
a better understanding of the motives of and constraints to labour mobility. 
Rural-to-urban migration has become a norm for rural households in China. 
In 2007, about one-half of rural households had at least one member working 
outside the home village. As part of their diversification strategy, rural households 
use migration as one of their main sources of income, with remittances accounting 
for about 21 per cent of total rural income and 43 per cent of migrant-sending 
households’ total income in 2007 (Démurger and Li 2012). Multiple sources of 
incentives can motivate households and individuals to migrate. The economic 
literature on the determinants of migration usually highlights two sets 
of  factors: the ‘pull’ and the ‘push’ factors (Barrett et al. 2001). Since Todaro 
(1969), the expected urban–rural income gap is considered the most important 
pull factor for the migration decision. On the other hand, push factors typically 
include ex-ante risk management, ex-post risk coping or response to a surplus of 
rural labour driven by land constraints and population pressure. 
From a theoretical perspective, the seminal works of Oded Stark (for example, 
Stark 1991) and the ‘new economics of labour migration’ (NELM) literature 
have revitalised interest in the motives for and the consequences of migration 
in developing countries. The general framework proposed by the NELM 
departs from the neoclassical approach to migration in two ways (Taylor 1999). 
First,  it  considers the household, rather than the individual, as  the most 
1  Source: <http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjfx/fxbg/t20120427_402801903.htm> This number refers to the rural 
labour force that has migrated for work out of their township of residential registration for at least six 
months in the year of investigation. 
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appropriate decision-making unit. By integrating migration decisions into 
a  household strategy, individual income maximisation is no longer the 
only motive for migration and income risk minimisation can be specifically 
considered. Second, it accounts for the imperfection of markets other than the 
labour market in explaining migration behaviour.
The existing empirical research on the motivations for labour migration in 
China has documented that both the rural labour surplus and the rural–urban 
income gap are major driving forces of migration decisions (Zhao 1999, 2005; 
Zhu 2002). Using a village survey conducted in 1996, Rozelle et al. (1999) also 
showed that the poorest households were often not capable of participating in 
migrant labour markets. In addition, both land size and land-tenure insecurity 
reduce migration (Mullan et al. 2011). At the individual level, age, gender 
and marital status have been consistently found to play a significant role in 
migration decisions (Hare 1999; Zhao 1999), whereas evidence for the role of 
education is mixed. Finally, drawing on a sample of 824 households surveyed 
in six provinces in 1999, Zhao (2003) pointed out the role of migrant networks 
in labour migration, in particular through practical assistance provided in the 
process of migration. Chen et al. (2010) confirmed the role of social interactions 
in job-related migration based on data from the 2006 China agricultural census. 
They found evidence of the effect being mostly driven by co-villagers helping 
each other to reduce moving costs and find job opportunities at the destination. 
Using household-level data from the Rural Household Survey of the 
National Bureau of Statistics of China for 2007, this chapter updates the existing 
empirical literature on the determinants of migration by differentiating various 
modes of migration and by extending the analysis of the role of family and 
community networks. Following the NELM, we use the household as the unit 
of analysis. Our focus is on understanding several aspects of the migration 
decision and migration size by analysing the determinants of migration, 
migration destination and migration duration. In particular, we aim to map out 
different types of migration across space (namely, short-distance versus long-
distance migration) and time (short-term versus long-term migration). Drawing 
on various estimations, we argue that the various types of migration are driven 
by different factors. Moreover, in addition to household characteristics, assets 
and geographic attributes, we account for the specific impact of family and 
community networks. 
The following research questions are successively examined: 
1) what determines the participation of Chinese rural households in migration; 
2) what determines their destination choice and the time spent in migration; 
3) what determines the size of migration? We explore these issues by estimating 
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bi-variate probit and Poisson models that include a number of relevant 
characteristics of the family and community situation and background on 
household-level data for 2007.
The chapter is structured as follows. Section two presents the methodological 
framework used for the empirical analysis of the determinants of migration. 
The data are briefly discussed in section three and the econometric results are 
presented in the next two sections. Section four is devoted to a discussion of 
the determinants of household migration decision, by destination and duration. 
Section five extends the analysis to the size of migration, measured through the 
number of household members sent to migration and section six concludes. 
Methodological Framework
We examine the household-level migration decision using multi-variate 
analysis. We proceed in two steps and successively examine the decision to 
migrate (including the choice of destination and the duration of migration) and 
the size of migration. 
The framework for estimating the determinants of the migration decision 
is as follows. The household decision to engage in migration is postulated to 
reflect its underlying (unobserved) utility (Equation 9.1).
Equation 9.1
In Equation 9.1, εi is assumed to be independent of Zi and to have a standard 
normal distribution (probit model). The actual decision to send a migrant 
is given by the following (Equation 9.2).
Equation 9.2
In the model above, Z is a vector of household demographics and assets and of 
village attributes that are supposedly influencing migration decision, destination 
and duration. Drawing on the theoretical literature on the determinants of the 
migration decision, it includes the following variables. 
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First, household demographics and assets are captured by the household 
size, the share of male adults, the number of elderly dependants, the number of 
children below the age of sixteen, the age and education level of the household 
head2 and the household land size per capita. In the vein of the push and pull 
factors detailed above, most household-level variables refer to the coping capacity 
of households facing risks or to their risk exposure. Typically, household size 
and composition together with the household’s land assets account for potential 
diminishing labour returns in the presence of land constraints. 
Beyond specific household characteristics, migration networks can also be 
important drivers of the migration decision, as they can serve as cost-reducing 
devices. A body of theoretical and empirical literature has highlighted the role 
of information networks in lowering the cost of migration through information 
on employment opportunities at the destination, better access to employment 
at the destination and as a source of help to settle down at the destination 
(Görlich and Trebesch 2008; Haug 2008; Taylor 1986; Winters et al. 2001). 
In their study of the role of migrant networks in Mexico, Winters et al. (2001) 
further distinguish the differentiated role of family and community networks, 
the former being identified as ‘strong ties’ networks while the latter are defined 
as ‘weak ties’ networks. They find that both family and community networks 
lower the cost of migration and that they are substitutes—once migration is well 
established in a community, family networks become less important. Moreover, 
once migration networks are established, they are also more important than 
household characteristics in explaining migration patterns. To investigate the 
role of migration networks, we follow Winters et al. (2001) and define two 
different indicators: 1) a community-level network—the village population share 
of migrants in 2005; and 2) a family-level network—whether the household 
has more than one member with a migration experience. This second variable 
includes both ongoing migrants and returning migrants, and thus measures the 
accumulated experience of migration at the household level.
Finally, we account for location attributes by including dummies for 
villages located in a central or a western province. We also employ village-level 
information on access to an asphalt road to account for proximity to market.
Besides migration decision, we also explore the determinants of destination 
and duration probability. For that, we employ a recursive model to account 
for unobservable characteristics such as motivation or risk aversion that might 
simultaneously determine the migration decision and the destination/duration 
decision. If unobservable heterogeneity has a direct influence on both decisions 
(to migrate as well as how far or how long to migrate) then the migration 
2  As argued by Mullan et al. (2011), education can be used as a proxy for off-farm wages that should 
ideally be introduced as determinants of the migration decision, but are not available. 
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destination/duration variable will be correlated with the error term εi, which will 
make it effectively endogenous in the selected sample. As suggested by Greene 
(2008), this unobservable heterogeneity can be captured by using a recursive 
bi-variate probit model, which estimates the migration duration/destination 
choice together with migration decision. The system of equations is identified 
by nonlinearities even if the vectors of observables overlap completely. 
Finally, to examine the determinants of the level of migration, we use a Poisson 
model of the number of migrants in a household, classified by destination and 
duration. A model similar to the above migration decision model is estimated 
with key independent variables including household demographics and assets, 
migration networks and community characteristics. 
Data and Stylised Facts
We use data from the Rural Household Survey carried out by the National 
Bureau of Statistics (NBS) under the Rural–Urban Migration in China (RUMiC) 
project3 in 2008. The survey covers 8000 rural households in nine provinces: 
Hebei, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui, Henan, Hubei, Guangdong, Chongqing 
and Sichuan.
We identify migrants as household members who work outside their home 
village and have been living away for at least six months. This rather broad 
definition includes individuals who work off the farm in the neighbourhood 
of their home village (for example, county seat), which will allow us to 
differentiate migrants according to their distance from their home village. 
With this definition, 48 per cent of the 8000 surveyed households had at least 
one migrant member in 2007 and migrant-sending households had on average 
1.7 migrant members. The survey provides additional information on migration 
destination and duration that is also useful here. 
Concerning destination, the records include the location of employment 
for working household members, which allows us to categorise migrants 
through the distance of their working destination from their home village as 
follows: working in the local county seat/working in a city or another county 
within the province/working in a city or a county outside the province. In 
2007, 19 per cent of the sending households had at least one migrant member 
working in the local county seat, 30 per cent had at least one migrant member 
working outside the county within the province and 44 per cent had at least one 
migrant member working outside the province. As far as the level of migration 
3  For details about the whole project and the survey design and implementation, see Meng et al. (2010). 
See also <http://cbe.anu.edu.au/schools/eco/rumici/> for a map of the surveyed provinces and for 
survey questionnaires.
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is concerned, Table 9.1 shows that migrant-sending households have on average 
0.70 members working in the local county seat, 0.46 members working within 
the province and 0.26 members working in another province. By comparison 
with the shares of sending households by destination, these figures indicate 
that the number of migrants is inversely proportional to the share of sending 
households by distance. Hence, while sending households actively participate 
in ‘long-distance’ migration (with a share of 44 per cent), they send few members 
far away. In contrast, sending households marginally contribute to ‘short-
distance’ migration (with a share of 19 per cent), but households involved in 
‘local’ migration send more members locally. 
Concerning duration, we separate ‘short-run’ migrants, whose maximum 
migration duration in 2007 was less than seven years, and ‘long-run migrants’ 
otherwise.4 The overwhelming proportion of migrant-sending households 
(60  per cent) have at least one migrant member working outside the village 
for less than seven years, but summary statistics also indicate that 44 per cent 
have at least one migrant member outside the village for more than seven years. 
Numbers indicating the size of migration by duration confirm the higher 
incidence of short-run migration: migrant-sending households send on average 
0.89 members for less than seven years and 0.61 members for seven years 
or more.
To sum up, the above statistics highlight some key stylised facts about 
migration. They confirm the high incidence of rural migration in China as well 
as its temporary, or at least short-run, nature. Interestingly, they also point to 
migration patterns involving both long-distance and short-distance movements.
4  One should note that the design of the question does not allow us to distinguish different individual 
sojourns that could have been interrupted by a temporary return. As a consequence, the duration 
calculated here is a maximum for each individual. 
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Percentage of total number of households 100 51.9 48.1
Number of migrants per household 0.81 0 1.68
Percentage of migrant-sending households 
with at least one migrant member:
—working in the local county seat 18.9
—working within the province 29.6
—working outside the province 43.8
—for less than seven years 60.4
—for seven years or more 44.7
Number of migrants per household:
—working in the local county seat 0.34 0 0.70
—working within the province 0.22 0 0.46
—working outside the province 0.13 0 0.26
—for less than seven years 0.43 0 0.89
—for seven years or more 0.30 0 0.61
Household characteristics and assets
Household size 3.974 3.553 4.428 ***
Percentage of adult males 0.514 0.507 0.521 ***
Number of elderly dependants 0.176 0.198 0.154 ***
Number of children below 16 years 0.666 0.639 0.695 ***
Age of household head 50.33 50.32 50.33 NS
Years of education of household head 7.190 7.184 7.197 NS
Per capita household land 1.354 1.456 1.244 ***
Networks
Village share of migrants in 2005 0.167 0.142 0.194 ***
Family migration network 0.303 0.0855 0.537 ***
Locational characteristics
Asphalt road in the village 0.751 0.761 0.740 **
Central province 0.362 0.331 0.397 ***
Western province 0.200 0.171 0.231 ***
Sample size 8000 4152 3848
NS = not significant
* significant at 10 per cent
** significant at 5 per cent
*** significant at 1 per cent
Notes: Family network is a dummy variable for households with more than one member with a migration 
experience. Some averages/percentages are calculated over a smaller number of observations because of 
missing values. We only report the total number of observations for reference. The mean test column 
indicates the significance level of mean differences between migrant-sending households and non–
migrant-sending households. 
Source: RUMiC Rural Household Survey 2007.
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Table 9.1 also contains baseline characteristics of migrant sending and non-
sending households for the key variables used in the empirical analysis. There is 
a clear gap in household characteristics between the two groups, as indicated 
by mean tests significant for almost all variables. Sending households are 
significantly larger and have a higher share of adult males: the average migrant-
sending household size is 4.4 persons (against 3.5 for non-sending households), 
with 52 per cent of adult males. In terms of age composition, they have fewer 
elderly members (0.15 on average, against 0.2 for non-sending households), but 
more children below the age of sixteen (0.7 on average, against 0.64 for non-
sending households). With regard to household assets, an interesting feature is 
that the average land endowment per person is significantly lower for sending 
households, who have an average of 1.24 mu (or 0.08 hectares) per capita, 
compared with 1.46 mu (or 0.10 ha) per capita for non-sending households. 
This significant difference could reflect both land shortages and labour surplus 
in migrant-sending households—a dimension that will be further explored in 
section four. In contrast, summary statistics on household human capital show 
no significant difference between sending and non-sending households: the 
average age of the household head is slightly above fifty years and the education 
level of the household head is about 7.2 years of schooling. That is two years 
below the nine-year compulsory education system.
As for migration networks, the data show that 53.7 per cent of migrant-
sending households have a family migration experience, whereas the share is 
only 8.6 per cent for non-sending households. At the village level, sending 
households also have a significantly larger village network than non-sending 
households. Finally, geographic characteristics also exhibit significant differences 
between migrant sending and non-sending households. Not surprisingly, the 
incidence of migrant-sending households is significantly higher in both central 
and western provinces, which are emigration provinces compared with coastal 
provinces. Interestingly, access to an asphalt road is significantly higher for 
non-sending households than for sending households.
The Migration Decision
Table 9.2 presents marginal effects (at mean values) from the estimation 
of a simple probit model for whether households have any migrant member 
(column  one) and of recursive bi-variate probit models for the choice of 
destination and duration (columns two to six) that allow for selection on 
unobservable characteristics.5 
5  Because of space constraints, columns two to six report only the destination/duration equation of the 
recursive bi-variate probit model. The full model includes the migration decision equation. Since this 
equation is estimated separately as a first step (column one) and since the estimates are stable across 
specifications, we do not report the migration decision estimate for the recursive bi-variate probit models. 
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On the migration decision model (column one), we observe that the likelihood 
of sending a migrant increases with household size and male labour force, 
whereas it decreases with the number of elderly dependants and the number 
of children below the age of sixteen. This is consistent with the empirical 
literature showing that migration is associated with larger households and 
larger male labour force—both factors that reduce the opportunity cost for the 
family to send a migrant to cities.6 In contrast, a higher dependency ratio of 
the household (through both elderly and children) significantly reduces family 
labour availability for migration. Moreover, we find that older households have 
a lower probability of participating in migration: older household heads might 
be more reluctant to send family members to cities most probably because of 
a higher risk aversion with old age. Among other reasons, the lack of access to 
healthcare services outside the home province could also influence the reluctance 
of older household heads. As a measure of the demand for farm labour, the per 
capita size of land is, unsurprisingly, found to have a negative and significant 
impact on the probability of a household to send migrants. In the specific case of 
China, it could also reflect the need for households to keep farming their land if 
they want to protect their land-use rights7 (Mullan et al. 2011). Once the labour 
force size is controlled, only families with smaller landholdings can afford to 
send household members to migrate.
The importance of both family and village network effects in the household 
migration decision is also highlighted in column one. Having more than 
one member with migration experience strongly increases the household’s 
probability of sending a migrant—the probability is increased by 43.3 per cent 
compared with households with no migration experience. Likewise, a 1 per cent 
increase in the village share of migrants increases the household’s migration 
probability by 72 per cent. Hence, both family and community networks seem 
to facilitate migration and their marginal effect is important. In contrast, after 
controlling for location in emigration provinces, the ease of access to markets, 
as proxied by the asphalt-road dummy, is not found to significantly influence 
migration decisions. For households living in villages with easier access to the 
market, migration might not be the most attractive option since there could be 
other, local opportunities to diversify. 
Columns two to four show estimates for a specific destination: another 
province, any city in the same province or the local county seat. A comparison 
of the three estimations reveals interesting differences as well as similarities. 
Household size has a significant and positive effect on all migration destinations. 
6  See, for example, Dercon and Krishnan (1996) on Ethiopia and Tanzania; Winters et al. (2001) on Mexico; 
or Zhao (2003) on China. 
7  Mullan et al. (2011) show that migration is associated with an increased risk of land expropriation 
because land-tenure arrangements in rural China involve administrative redistribution of some 
household lands to maintain egalitarian landholdings. 
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Interestingly, the marginal effect is three times larger for long-distance migration 
compared with local migration. Likewise, the adult gender composition of the 
household significantly (and positively) influences the probability to send 
a migrant to a city in another county or another province, whereas the estimated 
impact is non-significant on local labour mobility. In contrast, the presence 
of old and young dependants significantly lowers the probability of sending 
migrants to any destination, and, again, the marginal impact seems stronger 
for long-distance migration (as opposed to the local county seat). Hence, family 
demographics are important in shaping general migration as well as migration 
destination, with seemingly larger impacts for long-distance migration. As long-
distance migration means that the migrant cannot easily return if needed, 
these results are fully consistent and stress the key importance of household 
demographics in shaping long-distance migration.
Interestingly, household human capital and assets play a differentiated 
role depending on the destination. First, available per capita land lowers the 
probability of short-distance migration, but we do not find any significant impact 
on long-distance migration decisions. Second, a higher educational level of the 
household head correlates positively with medium or short-distance migration, 
but correlates negatively with long-distance migration. This finding conforms 
to the ambiguous role of education in off-farm labour force participation in rural 
China found in the literature. In particular, there is evidence that better-educated 
individuals tend to choose local off-farm work over migration (Zhao 2003). 
Migration networks also play a prominent and differential role across long-
distance and short-distance migration. Both community and family networks 
are at play in long-distance migration, whereas only the family network is found 
to significantly influence short-distance migration. This result is consistent with 
the intuition that networks are a means to reduce migration costs. As long-
distance migration usually involves higher costs and higher risks, migration 
networks at both the village and the family levels are unsurprisingly important 
drivers for such migration decisions. 
Finally, we find interesting differences in the role played by locational 
characteristics of the sending community. Better access to markets lowers the 
probability of sending migrants to another province, while it increases the 
probability of sending migrants to the local county seat. In remote places, 
the only available means to diversify income-generating activities is to send 
migrants to cities, possibly far away, whereas in better-connected villages, 
sending migrants a short distance can be sufficient. Putting that another way, 
in better-connected villages, there are more local opportunities for off-farm 
jobs. This is confirmed by the significantly higher incidence of long-distance 
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migrants in central and western provinces and a significantly lower incidence of 
medium and short-distance migrants in central provinces (and to a lesser extent 
in western provinces). 
The last two columns of Table 9.2 show recursive bi-variate probit estimation 
results by migration duration (below or above seven years). Here again, the 
determinants of the duration of migration differ substantially between short-
term and long-term migration. As far as household characteristics and assets are 
concerned, we still find a positive and significant impact of household size and 
gender composition in facilitating migration decisions, for both short-term and 
long-term migration. Interestingly, the marginal effect of the household size is 
larger for short-term migration, whereas the marginal effect of the share of male 
adults is slightly larger for long-term migration. This could illustrate the fact 
that the male labour force is an important input for agricultural work. In this 
context, having enough male members to farm the land on a stable basis might 
be a prerequisite for sending migrants to cities for more than seven years. Long-
term migration decisions also depend more strongly on household landholdings: 
larger land size significantly reduces the probability of a household sending 
a migrant member for seven years or more, whereas it does not significantly 
influence the decision to send a migrant for a short period. Again, this finding 
can be interpreted in terms of land-tenure insecurity. As households might be 
concerned about potential administrative land reallocation, their incentive to 
send migrants for a long time could be lowered by the fear of losing their land.
Turning to the effect of migration networks, we find that both family 
migration experience and village migrant networks strongly increase the 
probability of a household sending a migrant for either a short or a long period. 
As an example, the probability of sending a migrant for less than seven years 
is increased by 30 per cent compared with households with no migration 
experience. Interestingly, the marginal effect of community networks is twice 
as strong for long-term migration. 
The Level of Migration
To complement the above analysis on migration decisions, Table 9.3 presents 
the determinants of the number of migrating household members—again by 
destination and duration. Generally speaking, the factors that affect the number 
of migrating household members are similar to those that affect the household 
decision to send a migrant. Household characteristics and assets are found to 
be important drivers of the size of migration in a similar way as for the decision 
to migrate, and all our results regarding destination and duration choices hold 
with the number of migrant members. 
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Besides expected similarities, one result deserves a specific comment. Indeed, 
we find an ambiguous effect of children on the size of migration: the number 
of children in the household is negatively correlated with the number of short-
term migrants, but it is positively (and significantly) correlated with the number 
of long-term migrants in the household. Though the marginal effect is rather 
small, the positive correlation with long-term migration probably reflects the 
trade-off that Chinese rural households face. The institutional constraints 
imposed on rural households make the migration of a whole family very difficult, 
if not impossible. Indeed, land-tenure arrangements induce rural households 
to keep some members in the countryside to protect their land-use rights 
(Mullan  et  al.  2011), and the household registration system (hukou) induces 
them to leave their children behind so that they can receive free primary and 
secondary education (Démurger and Xu 2011). Confronted with these strong 
institutional constraints, rural households with children might have higher 
incentives to send more family members to migrate for a longer period in order 
to cover the cost of the future education of their children. On the other hand, 
the presence of more children could lower the motivation to send household 
members in the short run because of the potentially high psychological costs of 
separation. 
Overall, the impact of migration networks is confirmed for the level of 
migration. The migration history of a household not only influences its 
propensity to send a migrant, it also increases the number of members sent 
to migrate. Likewise, if a village is sending a large share of migrants, families 
in this village are more likely to send more migrants than families living in 
villages with a smaller migration network. As for the migration decision, 
migration networks are found to be more important for long-distance rather 
than short-distance migration—the number of migrants sent to cities or to 
another province is positively related to both the family and the community 
networks. In contrast, it is the family rather than the community network that 
counts for determining the number of members sent to migrate locally, and the 
family network’s marginal effect is fairly small compared with the estimates for 
long-distance migration.
Finally, locational characteristics are found to influence the number of 
household members that migrate in a way similar to their impact on the 
likelihood to participate in migration. Rural households living in central or 
western provinces are more likely to send more migrants than households living 
in coastal provinces. As for destination and duration, they are also more likely 
to send more members farther from their home village, but for a shorter period 
compared with households in coastal provinces.
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Conclusion
This chapter aimed to unravel the main factors driving rural households in 
their decision to send family members to migrate. Migration was fairly widespread 
among households in rural China in 2007: about half of the sample households had 
at least one member working outside the village and, for the sending households, 
the average number of migrant members was close to 1.7. We examined both 
the decision and the level of migration and highlighted a number of differences 
across destination choices as well as duration choices. Our  key results can 
be summarised according to two main lines. First, differentiating migration 
decisions by distance and by duration emphasises different modes of rural labour 
migration in China. Interestingly, household demographics and composition 
are found to be particularly constraining for long-distance as well as long-term 
migration. On the other hand, short-distance migration is negatively correlated 
to per capita household land—an additional mu of land per capita reducing the 
probability of sending a member to the local county seat by 2 percentage points.8 
Household human capital, proxied by the number of years of education of the 
household head, reveals contrasting effects on migration that corroborate Zhao’s 
(1999) findings for the mid-1990s that educated farmers prefer local non-farm 
work to migration. In our household-level estimates, education reduces long-
distance migration whereas it increases short or medium-distance migration. 
Second, regarding migration networks, our results indicate that family and 
community networks do not play the same roles in facilitating migration, and 
in this sense they can be thought of as complementary means of reducing costs 
for migrant candidates. While family migration networks uniformly influence 
migration, migration duration, migration destination and migration size, 
community networks appear to be less important for short-distance migration, 
which is relatively low cost and low risk, but very important for long-distance 
migration, which carries high levels of risk.
From a regional development perspective, our findings on the various modes 
of labour migration have a number of interesting implications. In her study of 
rural migrants at the end of the 1990s, Zhao (2003:510) concluded that ‘with 
migrant networks, migration becomes a self-sustaining and self-enforcing 
process’. What our findings show is that this process has indeed been reinforcing 
over time and that it also shapes the extent of migration. With migrant networks, 
long-distance migration is facilitated, which contributes to the inter-provincial 
redistribution of the population. Moreover, in inter-provincial flows, the effect 
of migrant networks goes beyond the family circle and community networks 
are found to play an active role. In addition to the self-enforcing process of 
migration through networks, our finding that better access to local markets 
8  Since the observed probability of short-distance migration is 18.9 per cent (Table 9.1), this effect is rather 
large.
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reduces migration also highlights another potentially important spatial issue. 
China is now experiencing a rapid rural labour exodus—a phenomenon that 
occurred in developed countries in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries—
which could lead to the desertion of remote rural areas. Our finding that 
people living in remote areas are more likely to migrate further away from their 
home village than those living close to markets stresses the potential for such 
desertion. Hence, another key challenge for the Central Government in coming 
years might be to find an efficient means of keeping remote areas alive and 
preventing a further agglomeration of people in a limited number of urban 
metropolises. 
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10. Climbing the 
Intergenerational Ladder 
of Education in Urban, 
Migrant and Rural China
Jane Golley and Sherry Tao Kong
Introduction
During the six decades of the People’s Republic, China has made great 
achievements in raising national average standards of educational quality and 
attainment. These achievements have, however, been distributed unevenly 
across the country. According to one recent study, by the late 2000s, while more 
than 90 per cent of primary school students in rural China went on to junior high, 
less than 20 per cent made it through to high school, with a mere 1.3 per cent 
entering tertiary-level education. As a result, children born in Beijing, Shanghai 
or Tianjin were 35 times more likely to attend college than children born in rural 
areas.1 While labour market reforms have raised the returns to education across 
China,2 the incompleteness of these reforms—in particular, ongoing constraints 
to permanent rural-to-urban migration3 and segmentation in urban labour 
markets4—means that the incentives for pursuing higher educational outcomes 
in pursuit of higher wage returns are uneven across urban, rural and migrant 
populations. The combination of uneven development in education and urban-
biased labour market reforms has undoubtedly contributed to the gap between 
urban and rural incomes in China, which is not only large but rising over time 
(Sicular et al. 2005).
For a country that claims to be intent on reducing rural–urban income 
inequality, as a core element of its quest for a more harmonious and balanced 
society, understanding the link between each individual’s educational 
opportunities, achievements and returns is critical. This link in turn hinges on 
intergenerational dynamics, in which the educational achievements and earning 
1  See Barriers for the rural poor on the road to college: new evidence from REAP, REAP Brief No. 107, Stanford 
University, Stanford, Calif., <http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/22773/REAP_brief_107_EN_web.pdf>
2  See De Brauw and Giles (2006); Liu et al. (2010); Yang (2005); Zhang et al. (2002, 2004, 2005).
3  See Cai and Wang (2010); Golley and Meng (2011); Knight et al. (2010); Kong et al. (2010); Lee and Meng 
(2009); Zhao (1999).
4  See Appleton et al. (2004); Chen et al. (2007); Démurger et al. (2007, 2009); Meng and Zhang (2001).
Rebalancing and Sustaining Growth in China
226
capacities of one generation—themselves the result of a complex interaction of 
ability and opportunity—impact on those of the next generation in complex 
ways. 
Most of the literature relating to intergenerational patterns of educational 
attainment in China has been confined to one or other of the rural or urban 
populations, and much of it has focused on the impact of the Cultural Revolution 
(1966–76) on different members of society at the time, or on subsequent 
generations.5 For urban China, there is some debate over whether the policies 
of the Cultural Revolution even succeeded in making educational attainment 
more egalitarian with respect to social origins at the time, let alone in the future, 
with Meng and Gregory (2002) reaching the somewhat unexpected conclusion 
that the largest negative impacts of the Cultural Revolution were in fact on 
children with parents of lower educational achievement and lower occupational 
status. There is, however, little dispute over the claim that urban educational 
inequality has increased in China since 1978, favouring ‘the most advantaged 
groups in the population: the children of high-rank cadres and professionals, 
residents of large cities, and men more than women’ (Zhou et al. 1998:217). 
Sato and Li’s (2008) analysis of the impact of family origin on educational 
attainment in rural China essentially echoes those of Meng and Gregory (2002) 
and Zhou et al. (1998), by showing that class-based discrimination during the 
Cultural Revolution did not last long enough to have a permanent effect on 
educational attainment across generations; instead, those higher up the social 
strata have continued to ‘out-educate’ those below them. A recent string of 
papers indicates that shortcomings in China’s rural education system from 
early childhood onwards seriously impinge on the educational opportunities 
for rural and migrant children, which in turn impacts on their ultimate levels 
of educational attainment (Luo et al. 2011; Teng 2005; Wang et al. 2010). 
These papers emphasise the low incomes of poor rural households relative to 
rising educational costs and the poor quality of rural education as the major 
impediments to upward mobility of the poorest members of Chinese society. 
These findings combine to depict a possible future of rising intra-rural, 
rural–urban and intra-urban inequalities in educational opportunities and 
outcomes, in which a positive and possibly strengthening relationship between 
the educational achievements of parents and their children will be a prominent 
feature.
5  During the Cultural Revolution, the Chinese Government implemented a range of policies to promote the 
educational opportunities and outcomes of children from peasant and worker families at the expense of 
those from higher status backgrounds. Notable measures included the closure of most schools in urban 
China for six years beginning in 1966, with senior high schools reopening in 1972; the ‘sending down’ 
of urban youths to live and work in rural villages; and various forms of discrimination against landlords 
and rich peasants in rural areas, and intelligentsia and cadre families in urban areas. For details of these 
policies, see Deng and Treiman (1997); and Meng and Gregory (2002).
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This chapter investigates intergenerational patterns of educational attainment 
over time and space in China. Drawing on the Rural–Urban Migration in China 
and Indonesia (RUMiCI) Survey for 2008, which provides unique access to data 
on the educational attainments of up to three generations of people within the 
same household across China’s rural, urban and migrant populations, we find 
that intergenerational ‘mobility’, as reflected by low regression and correlation 
coefficients between a child’s and parents’ education levels, is higher in rural 
and migrant populations than in urban ones. A closer look at the sources of this 
correlation reveals, however, that the low values observed in rural and migrant 
China stem from the fact that the majority of these children complete only 
junior high, with some children in the youngest cohorts actually moving down 
the educational ladder relative to their parents. In contrast, for urban children, 
the only way is up. This combination of results has clear and undesirable 
implications for China’s rural–urban divide.
Should College-Educated Parents Have 
College-Educated Children?
There are many reasons to expect a positive relationship between the education 
levels of parents and those of their children, as measured by the regression 
coefficient in a bi-variate regression of a child’s years of schooling on parents’ 
years of schooling, or by the simple correlation coefficient between these two 
variables.6 The strength of this correlation—often referred to as ‘persistence’—
depends not only on the degree of inheritability, but will also be greater if, 
for example, more educated parents invest more time (in a productive way) 
in supporting their children’s educational achievements (Black and Devereux 
2010). Credit constraints and the higher average income of parents with higher 
levels of education provide two other reasons for the positive relationship 
between parent and child education, although these income advantages could 
be offset by government investment in education that is progressive to parental 
income (Solon 2004). 
The fundamental question of interest is whether the persistence in educational 
achievements across generations reflects genuine differences in genetic ability, 
or if they are instead the result of uneven opportunities for the pursuit of higher 
educational outcomes, or uneven returns to pursuing those higher outcomes. 
This question is critical as it determines the extent to which educational policies 
might be able to reduce part of the intergenerational transmission of inequality. 
Measures of intergenerational persistence—or its converse, mobility—provide 
6  See the seminal work of Becker and Tomes (1979, 1986); and Solon (1999, 2004); and also Black and 
Devereux (2010) for an excellent survey.
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the first critical step in seeking to establish any kind of causal effect. It is this 
measurement, and how it has differed across China’s rural, migrant and urban 
populations during the People’s Republic of China (PRC) era, that is the focus 
of this chapter.
The positive relationship between the socioeconomic status of parents and 
their children is hardly unique to China, but has instead been observed almost 
universally across societies, and using a variety of measures of social status, 
of which education is just one. Hertz et al. (2007) provide estimates of 50-
year trends in the intergenerational persistence of educational attainment for 
42 nations, including (rural) China. Dividing a cross-sectional survey for each 
country into 10 age cohorts of people aged twenty to sixty-nine, they show 
that the regression coefficient of a child’s education on parents’ education has 
fallen substantially over time, while there is no such trend for the correlation 
coefficient, which fell in about as many countries as it rose. Checchi et al. (2008) 
show a reduction in the correlation coefficient between the levels of schooling 
of fathers and children over time in Italy. Despite this overall decline, however, 
their decomposition of the correlation coefficient (explained further below) 
reveals a rise in persistence at the upper end of the education tail, evidenced by 
the large and non-decreasing proportion of the correlation that is explained by 
college-educated children and fathers with either college or high school degrees. 
Following Hertz et al. (2007), we begin with a simple bi-variate regression 
(Equation 10.1).
Equation 10.1
In Equation 10.1, y is the number of years of schooling; j = c, s, d for child, 
son or daughter; k = p, f, m for parent, father or mother; and subscript i refers 
to the birth cohort of the child. The regression coefficient β is our first measure 
of the degree of intergenerational transmission of educational attainment, with 
low values suggesting low persistence, or high mobility. Another measure of 
interest is the intergenerational correlation coefficient, ρ, which is bounded 
between –1 and 1,7 and which is related to β as follows (Equation 10.2). 
7  While the expectation is that the intergenerational correlation coefficient will be positive (that is, lying 
between 0 and 1), it is theoretically possible for it to be negative—that is, the case in which policy 
measures were strong enough to eliminate any non-observable links between children and parents’ 
educational outcomes, although in practice this outcome is extremely unlikely.
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Equation 10.2
The main difference between β and ρ is that the former provides a relative 
measure, while the latter is absolute, abstracting away from possible changes in 
the dispersion of education within each cohort (Checci et al. 2008). That is, β could 
fall over time because the variance of education in the child’s generation is lower 
than that in the parents’ generation (for example, following the introduction 
of compulsory primary school education), or because the correlation itself has 
fallen (for example, because of policies to promote mobility). For both β and ρ, 
higher values indicate that a child’s level of schooling is more strongly related 
to his/her parents’ level. As Hertz et al. (2007) show, these two coefficients can 
move in opposite directions, and for this reason Black and Devereux (2010) 
recommend reporting both, which we do below. 
Our data come from the RUMiCI Survey for 2008, which covers three 
groups of Chinese households: 5000 urban migrant households who worked in 
15 designated cities (Urban Migrant Survey, UMS); 5000 urban local incumbent 
households in the same cities (Urban Household Survey, UHS); and 8000 rural 
households with and without migrant members from the nine provinces where 
the 15 cities are located (Rural Household Survey, RHS). The nine provinces 
or metropolitan areas are Shanghai, Guangdong, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui, 
Hubei, Sichuan, Chongqing and Henan. The first four of these are the largest 
migrant destinations; the remaining five are the largest migration sending 
areas. The RUMiCI survey of migrant workers in urban cities, to the best of our 
knowledge, is the only random sample of migrant workers for China so far.8
Each of the households in the UHS, UMS and RHS provides information at 
the individual level for up to three generations of members: the household head 
and his/her spouse (generation two), their parents (generation one) and their 
children (generation three). For generations two and three, we have years of 
schooling, while generation one provides only the completed level of education, 
which we convert into years of schooling. We use this set of information to 
construct a dataset that comprises 10 five-year birth cohorts of ‘children’, from 
1941–45 through to 1986–90, with total sample sizes of 11 831, 6247 and 25 126 
in the urban, migrant and rural surveys respectively. All of the tables and 
figures presented below are based on results calculated by the authors using 
these survey data, unless otherwise noted.
8  The detailed sampling procedure can be found at <http://rumici.anu.edu.au>
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Results: Take one
Table 10.1 presents some preliminary statistics for the urban, migrant and 
rural surveys, which include the percentage of people in each (child) cohort 
to obtain no education, primary school, junior high, high school and college 
education, along with the average years of schooling for each cohort and their 
parents.9 The table confirms the general trend of rising educational attainments 
across the country, with the percentage of people receiving only primary 
education or less plummeting from 15 per cent to 2 per cent, 50 per cent to 
4 per cent and 65 per cent to 8 per cent between the first and ninth cohorts in 
the urban, rural and migrant surveys respectively. These trends are reflected 
in the average number of years of schooling, which rises over time for each 
population subgroup with the exception of a slight drop between the 1941–45 
and 1946–50 (that is, first and second) cohorts in the urban and migrant surveys, 
which presumably relates to the disruption caused by the Cultural Revolution,10 
and a slight fall between the 1961–65 and 1966–70 (that is, the fifth and sixth) 
cohorts in the migrant survey, which is likely to be connected to the changing 
opportunities for migration from 1978 onwards.11 
As expected, education levels are highest in the urban survey, at 14.1 years 
on average for the ninth cohort, compared with 10.2 years for rural China and 
10.4 years for migrants. The significant drop to 12.4 years for the tenth urban 
cohort is driven by the fact that 22 per cent of this cohort had in fact not yet 
finished their tertiary education at the time of the survey, and so could not 
be counted as having completed college. This issue is less important for the 
migrant and rural surveys given their lower levels of education, with 7 per cent 
of the same cohort in the RHS and just 1.7 per cent of the migrant survey. 
For this reason, the results for this final urban cohort are excluded in what 
follows, while those for the other two surveys are presented as a reasonable 
approximation. 
9  In cases where only the father’s or the mother’s level is provided, we use this level alone in order to 
maximise the number of observations.
10  According to Meng and Gregory (2002), the Cultural Revolution (1966–77) had the greatest impact on 
educational attainment for those whose high school education was interrupted—that is, those in the 
latter half of the 1946–50 cohort and the first half of the 1951–55 cohort.
11  In particular, Zhao (1999) shows that between 1979 and 1988 there were strong incentives for rural 
residents to obtain high school education as the primary means of obtaining urban hukou, while de 
Brauw and Giles (2006) show that the increased ability to migrate and the consequent dramatic rise 
in migration volumes during the 1990s created disincentives for increases in educational attainment 
among rural youth. This combination of findings is consistent with a fall in educational attainment 
between these two cohorts, who fell into the prime migration age in the mid to late 1980s and early 
1990s respectively. In the UMS 2008, migration rates peak at age twenty-four for men and age twenty-
one for women, with rates of 60 and 64 per cent respectively. Rates decline with age, in part due to the 
institutional barriers to migration, as explained in Golley and Meng (2011).
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Table 10.1 Preliminary Statistics for the Urban, Migrant and Rural Surveys, 2008













Birth cohort Urban survey
No. Years
1 1941–45 2 13 32 31 22 10.8 3.5 454
2 1946–50 2 14 40 28 16 10.3 4.1 749
3 1951–55 1 9 43 32 15 10.6 4.7 1236
4 1956–60 1 4 24 53 17 11.5 5.5 1425
5 1961–65 0 2 23 45 30 12.3 6.6 1705
6 1966–70 1 4 24 34 37 12.3 8.0 1685
7 1971–75 1 2 16 33 48 31.1 8.7 1602
8 1976–80 0 1 9 30 60 13.8 9.1 1272
9 1981–85 1 1 5 26 67 14.1 10.3 1021
10 1986–90 2 0 11 54 32 12.4 10.4 231
Migrant survey
1 1941–45 0 50 50 0 0 7.5 3.0 2
2 1946–50 22 44 22 11 0 6.0 1.0 18
3 1951–55 13 35 39 13 0 7.2 1.8 46
4 1956–60 8 23 56 12 1 8.1 2.7 145
5 1961–65 5 19 53 22 2 8.8 2.8 352
6 1966–70 3 25 58 13 1 8.4 3.9 743
7 1971–75 2 20 59 16 3 8.9 4.3 889
8 1976–80 1 9 57 27 7 9.9 5.3 996
9 1981–85 0 4 56 30 10 10.4 6.9 1439
10 1986–90 0 3 53 39 5 10.4 7.5 1616
Rural survey
1 1941–45 16 49 30 5 0 6.3 2.4 764
2 1946–50 14 53 27 6 0 6.4 2.6 1589
3 1951–55 12 47 31 9 1 6.8 2.8 2464
4 1956–60 7 33 39 19 1 8.0 3.1 2140
5 1961–65 3 25 52 18 2 8.6 3.7 3125
6 1966–70 2 26 57 12 2 8.6 4.6 3462
7 1971–75 1 19 60 15 5 9.1 5.7 3018
8 1976–80 1 12 59 21 8 9.8 6.4 2676
9 1981–85 0 8 58 20 13 10.2 7.4 2923
10 1986–90 0 8 60 25 7 9.9 7.9 2584
Source: Authors’ calculations based on RUMiCI Survey 2008.
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The most striking differences are at the higher end of the education spectrum. 
In the ninth cohort, 93 per cent of urban children attained either high school 
or college degrees, compared with 40 per cent of migrants and 43 per cent of 
rural children. As expected, the greatest divergence is at the college level, with 
urban children in this cohort more than six and five times more likely to attend 
college than their migrant and rural counterparts. Another point worth noting 
is that a higher proportion of rural children in the three youngest cohorts attains 
college degrees than their migrant counterparts, and yet a higher proportion is 
also more likely to complete only primary education. Migrants, on the other 
hand, are more likely to have high school degrees—a point that is true across 
all cohorts apart from the fourth one. While there are clear differences in the 
educational attainments of China’s migrant and rural populations, these are 
dwarfed by the urban–non-urban divide. 
Table 10.2 turns to the results of the child–parent regression and correlation 
coefficients based on Equations 10.1 and 10.2 for i = 1, …, 10, j = c and k = p. 
There are five key points. 
The first point regards the standard deviations of years of education 
for children and parents, and the ratio of the two. While these differ across 
the three samples and over time, the ratio of the child’s to parents’ standard 
deviations, σc/σp, varies only slightly over the cohort range in each survey, and 
these variations are not enough to create any substantive differences in the 
trends for the regression or correlation coefficients; as seen in Figure 10.1, these 
are rising or falling simultaneously within each survey. It is also worth noting 
that for every cohort, the standard deviations of children and parents are both 
higher in the urban than the rural populations, but their ratio is lower. Thus, 
it is not the case that a high ratio of standard deviations is the driving force for 
the relatively high regression coefficients in the urban sample; something other 
than dispersion is going on.
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Table 10.2 Regression and Correlation Coefficients for Child–Parents
Birth cohort b r sc sp sc/sp
Urban
1 1941–45 0.20 0.22 3.5 3.9 0.89
2 1946–50 0.23 0.30 3.2 4.2 0.76
3 1951–55 0.16 0.23 2.8 4.2 0.67
4 1956–60 0.20 0.30 2.8 4.3 0.65
5 1961–65 0.17 0.26 2.7 4.2 0.64
6 1966–70 0.23 0.31 3.1 4.1 0.75
7 1971–75 0.23 0.30 3.0 3.9 0.75
8 1976–80 0.22 0.28 2.6 3.4 0.77
9 1981–85 0.30 0.31 2.5 2.6 0.97
10 1986–90 0.27 0.24 2.7 2.4 1.15
Migrant
1 1941–45 .. .. .. .. ..
2 1946–50 .. .. .. .. ..
3 1951–55 .. .. .. .. ..
4 1956–60 0.09 0.10 3.0 3.2 0.93
5 1961–65 0.12 0.24 2.8 3.2 0.09
6 1966–70 0.13 0.17 2.4 3.3 0.72
7 1971–75 0.17 0.23 2.5 3.3 0.76
8 1976–80 0.19 0.26 2.4 3.3 0.72
9 1981–85 0.17 0.23 2.3 3.1 0.73
10 1986–90 0.15 0.21 2.0 2.7 0.74
Rural
1 1941–45 0.20 0.18 3.2 3.0 1.10
2 1946–50 0.13 0.12 3.1 2.9 1.05
3 1951–55 0.13 0.12 3.2 3.0 1.07
4 1956–60 0.13 0.13 3.1 3.0 1.04
5 1961–65 0.17 0.19 2.7 3.0 0.87
6 1966–70 0.19 0.23 2.4 2.9 0.83
7 1971–75 0.21 0.23 2.4 2.6 0.91
8 1976–80 0.21 0.21 2.5 2.5 1.01
9 1981–85 0.24 0.23 2.7 2.5 1.07
10 1986–90 0.24 0.24 2.3 2.3 0.99
.. = not available
Source: Authors’ own calculation based on RUMiCI survey (2008). 
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Figure 10.1a Regression Coefficients by Cohort Across Surveys
Figure 10.1b Correlations by Cohort Across Surveys
Figure 10.1c Children’s Standard Deviations by Cohort Across Surveys
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The second point to make is that the regression coefficients and correlations 
are low in all three samples and lowest in the rural survey. The average regression 
coefficients and correlations across all cohorts are 0.21 and 0.28 for the urban 
survey, 0.16 and 0.20 for the migrant survey and 0.18 and 0.19 for the rural 
survey. In contrast, Hertz et al. (2007) find average regression coefficients and 
correlations taken across all cohorts for each of 42 countries ranging from 0.88 
and 0.66 in Peru to 0.20 in Kyrgyzstan and 0.10 in (rural) Ethiopia, with rural 
China having the second-lowest values of both at 0.34 and 0.20 respectively. 
Third, for all three surveys, both the regression coefficients and the 
correlations display a general trend of rising persistence over time, albeit with 
fluctuations. This contrasts with the key finding of Hertz et al. (2007) that the 
regression coefficient had fallen substantially for most countries over half a 
century, including for rural China. Our finding is not, however, inconsistent 
with Hertz et al.’s finding for rural China, as the period they cover is 1928–73, 
and much of the fall in their regression coefficient happens between 1928 and 
1943 (see Hertz et al. 2007:Appendix 1).
Fourth, the relationship between child and parent education is clearly 
different across the three populations—in both levels and trends. If it were 
simply the case that rural China was behind urban China in levels, but along the 
same path of educational development, we would expect these trends to be in 
the same direction over time. Instead, these results suggest that the determinants 
of the child–parent educational relationship differ across China’s rural, migrant 
and urban populations in more substantial ways than pure developmental 
differences would suggest.
The final point is that there are striking differences in the intergenerational 
patterns of different gender combinations of child–parent pairs, as illustrated 
in Figure 10.2 for the regression coefficients through to the ninth cohort in 
each survey. In particular, across all subgroups, the daughter–parent coefficient 
is the highest in virtually all age cohorts, driven mainly by the daughter–
father relationship, while the son–mother relationship is the weakest. In all 
comparisons, the educational attainments of daughters are more, and often 
much more, highly associated with the parent–father–mother than that of 
sons. In other words, the socioeconomic status of women as reflected in their 
educational achievements is more tightly bound to their family’s social status 
than that of men.12 
12  This is consistent with the findings of Gong et al. (2010), who find coefficients on years of schooling for 
urban China of 0.26 for father–son, 0.22 for mother–son, 0.37 for father–daughter and 0.38 for mother–
daughter, using the Urban Household Education and Employment Survey 2004 for people aged sixteen 
to seventy-four.
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Figure 10.2a Urban Regression Coefficients for Different Gender Pairs
Figure 10.2b Migrant Regression Coefficients for Different Gender Pairs
Figure 10.2c Rural Regression Coefficients for Different Gender Pairs
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‘Persistence’ and ‘Mobility’: A closer look at ρ
Given the rise in average educational levels nationwide, not only the levels 
but also the sources of persistence within the educational distribution are likely 
to change over time. To examine these changes, following Checci et al. (2008), 
we decompose the correlation coefficient as follows (Equation 10.3).
Equation 10.3
In Equation 10.3, μ denotes the mean and the set of possible values for 
education is set at {0, 6, 9, 12, 16}, corresponding with no education (NE), 
primary school (PS), junior high school (JH), high school (HS) and college (C), 
and σcf is the covariance between the child’s and father’s levels of educational 
attainment, yc and yf. This implies that the correlation coefficient depends on the 
combined deviations of the child’s and the father’s education from the mean, the 
conditional probability of a child achieving a certain education level given the 
father’s level of education and the probability of the father achieving that level 
of education.13
As long as both generations of a given child–father pair (for example, college-
educated children and college-educated father) achieve levels of education above 
(or below) the mean for their own cohort, this child–father pair will contribute 
positively to ρ, while if one is above (below) and the other below (above) the 
pair will make a negative contribution. Checci et al. (2008) use this approach in 
their Italian study to show that about one-third of the correlation coefficient in 
older cohorts results from the correlation between the most uneducated fathers 
and sons, with this contribution falling over time, while a large and growing 
proportion of the correlation coefficient is due to the top end of college-educated 
fathers and sons. 
Figures 10.3 to 10.5 present the results of a decomposition of the correlation 
coefficient by cohort in the urban, migrant and rural samples respectively. 
This decomposition aims to shed light on the source of the correlation within the 
educational spectrum. Based on Equation 10.3, each figure is divided into five 
stacks, each of which isolates the contribution made by fathers with education 
13  The focus here on levels of schooling rather than years is necessary to ensure there are enough 
observations in each level and for ease of exposition; otherwise, we would be looking at a decomposition 
of 20 by 20 years of education in which many components would be zero and which would be nearly 
impossible to depict. The reduction to levels also necessitates the focus on just one parent (to avoid the 
problem of averages lying in between the adopted levels); and following the bulk of the literature, we 
begin here with the father.
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levels beginning with no education (NE) through to college education (C). 
The vertical sum of all 25 components across the five stacks gives the correlation 
coefficient ρ for each child cohort.14 
Figure 10.3 Urban Correlation Decomposition Across Education Levels and Cohorts
14  These will not exactly match the figures in Table 10.2, because here they are calculated using five levels 
of education, rather than years.
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Figure 10.4 Migrant Correlation Decomposition Across Education Levels 
and Cohorts
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Figure 10.5 Rural Correlation Decomposition Across Education Levels and Cohorts
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Focusing first on the urban decomposition in Figure 10.3, and to see how 
the decomposition works, note the positive contributions of the components for 
fathers with high school and college qualifications whose children obtain college 
education (the black solid lines in the fourth and fifth stacks respectively); with 
both parents and children above their mean levels of education, this contributes 
positively to ρ, or to ‘persistence’. Contrast this with the negative contribution of 
fathers who completed junior high and children who completed college (beyond 
the sixth cohort, black solid line in the third stack); in this case, fathers below 
the mean for their cohort have children who achieve above the mean for their 
cohort, which increases ‘mobility’ (or reduces persistence). The most obvious 
point from the urban decomposition is that the correlations between high school 
and college-educated fathers and their college-educated children dominate the 
overall correlation for all cohorts, and more so in the younger cohorts than 
the older ones. By the ninth cohort, of 157 fathers with college education, 
90 per cent had children who also completed college with another 9 per cent 
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finishing high school. Of 327 fathers with high school qualifications, 69 per cent 
of their children went on to complete college and 29 per cent completed high 
school, leaving just seven children with sub–high school qualifications. And of 
the 350 fathers who finished junior high, 64 per cent of their children also made 
it to college and 26 per cent completed high school. In urban China, it seems the 
only way is up, and once you are up, you stay there. 
Turning to the migrant decomposition in Figure 10.4, the first point to note 
is that the number of migrants with college-educated fathers is small, at less 
than five for the fourth to eighth cohorts and just 13 and 12 for the ninth and 
tenth cohorts respectively. For the ninth cohort, six of those children made it 
to college as well and five completed high school, with both these sets of child–
father pairs making positive contributions to the overall correlation. Like their 
urban counterparts, no migrant children with college-educated fathers in the 
ninth or tenth cohorts achieved less than junior high qualifications. Given that 
these college-educated migrants will most likely go on to obtain urban hukou 
status, and that college-educated urban fathers are very likely have college-
educated children, these migrants ultimately become part of urban China’s 
intergenerational persistence story.
At the other end of the education spectrum, the declining positive 
contribution of fathers with no education and children with either no education 
or primary schooling (the dark blue and red lines in stack one) is a good sign—
that of decreasing ‘persistence’ at the low end. But note also the rising positive 
contribution of fathers with no education and children who finish junior high. 
That is, a jump of two education levels between generations, but with both 
parents and children below the mean levels of schooling for their own cohorts, 
contributes to what is interpreted as rising persistence. 
Note that the same issue arises for fathers with primary schooling and 
children with junior high education in stack two, for fathers with junior high 
and children with high school or college education in stack three, and for 
fathers with high school and college-educated children in stack four. While 
these intuitively signal upward mobility across generations in the sense that 
children out-educate their parents, their positive and rising contribution to 
ρ results in an interpretation of rising persistence. This is easy to understand 
mechanically: ρ is rising because children of parents with higher levels of 
education are increasingly likely to out-educate children of parents with lower 
levels of education—that is, rising averages with absolute divergence. It is still 
worth noting here, however, that some kinds of persistence (and mobility) are 
better than others.
Climbing the Intergenerational Ladder of Education in Urban, Migrant and Rural China
243
One final point of interest is that the majority of migrants have fathers with 
either junior high or high school qualifications, and the outcomes of these 
children are quite different from those of their urban counterparts. In the 
ninth cohort, for example, of the 508 migrant children with fathers educated to 
junior high level, 286 (56 per cent) also completed junior high, 257 (31 per cent) 
completed high school and 53 (10 per cent) completed college degrees. Compare 
these with the equivalent numbers for the urban survey above and the message 
is clear: upward mobility is harder for migrants than it is for urban residents. 
And yet in level terms, observing that the overall correlation in the migrant 
survey is below the urban one (as shown Figure 10.1b) leads to the suggestion 
that intergenerational mobility is greater for migrants than for urban residents. 
Again, this use of language can be somewhat misleading.
The results for the rural survey in Figure 10.5 echo many of the migrant 
survey results. The number of college-educated fathers is very small, ranging 
between 15 and 28 for the fifth to tenth cohorts. Despite these small numbers, 
the message from stack five is clear: college-educated rural fathers are highly 
likely to have high school or college-educated children, with 13 and six of the 
21 in the ninth cohort achieving these levels respectively. At the other end of 
the spectrum, major contributions to the positive correlation come from child–
father pairs with primary school only and from fathers with primary school 
and children with junior high education—a kind of persistence we would 
probably rather not observe. For fathers with junior high qualifications—
close to 60 per cent of the rural survey from the seventh to tenth cohorts—
the majority of their children also reached junior high. For example, of the 
1329 fathers with junior high qualifications in the ninth cohort, 61 per cent 
of children also obtained junior high qualifications, 18 per cent reached high 
school and 13 per cent completed college. Of the 586 rural fathers with high 
school qualifications, 45 per cent of their children obtained only junior high 
qualifications, while 29 per cent and 20 per cent reached high school and college 
respectively. These percentages are dramatically different from the equivalent 
urban results reported above. In particular, they indicate that intergenerational 
mobility in rural China can involve moves both up and down the education 
ladder.
To illustrate this key point further, Figure 10.6 presents a five-by-five 
‘mobility’ matrix of father–child pairs in the ninth cohort for each of the urban, 
migrant and rural samples. Each cell, aij, indicates the conditional probability 
of a child achieving level of education i given education level j of their father. 
Thus, for example, the urban matrix reveals that 90 per cent of children with 
college-educated fathers also made it to college (C-C, bottom right cell), with 
the remaining 10 per cent moving down the education ladder relative to their 
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fathers. As shown by the figures highlighted in grey, there was a miniscule 
movement in this direction in the urban survey, particularly in contrast with 
the migrant and rural surveys.
Figure 10.6 ‘Mobility’ Matrices for Child–Father Pairs in the Ninth Cohort
In sum, the higher overall correlation between the educational attainments 
of urban children and their fathers stems largely from the positive contribution 
of college and high school-educated fathers and their college-educated children, 
while the lower correlations for the migrant and rural children–father pairs 
stem from the fact that college-educated fathers hardly exist in the sample, and 
that the majority of children go on to complete junior high regardless of their 
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fathers’ educational achievements. Thus, what looks like greater ‘mobility’ of 
children in rural China might instead be a case of limited opportunities for the 
majority. 
Conclusions
Our interest in the issue of the transmission of educational attainment across 
generations in China commenced with the observation that urban Chinese 
appear to be investing vast amounts of time, resources and energy to ensure that 
their children obtain the highest possible educational qualifications—and in the 
majority of cases they seem to be succeeding: college entry rates among urban 
Chinese are high by any standards. In contrast, there is plenty of evidence to 
suggest that rural Chinese are struggling to move beyond junior high. Wang 
et al.’s (2009) paper on What is keeping the poor out of college shows that the 
college participation rates of the rural poor are low because of barriers to entry 
that exist throughout the rural education system—a point that is supported 
by the findings of Luo et al. (2011), whose aptly titled paper ‘Behind before 
they begin: the challenge of early childhood education in rural China’, shows 
that the disadvantages of China’s rural children begin at the early childhood 
education level and are likely to ‘hamper their learning experience throughout 
life’. The implications of this divide for the future trend of rural–urban income 
inequality in China are both clear and undesirable. 
The persistence or mobility of educational attainment across generations, and 
how this changes over time, is determined by a multitude of factors that interact 
with each other in complex ways. To the extent that persistence at the top end 
of the education spectrum reflects high ability, which is transmitted genetically 
from parents to their children, one might accept the consequential income 
disparities as being unavoidable, even desirable. The evidence demonstrating 
the ‘rebound’ of educational achievements of China’s urban and rural ‘elites’ 
following their persecution during the Cultural Revolution, and their children 
(Meng and Gregory 2002; Sato and Li 2008), provides some support for this 
view; even the policies of the Cultural Revolution could not undermine the 
educational successes of those who are somehow bound to achieve. To the 
extent that this persistence reflects anything else, however, there is cause for 
further thought. 
The results presented in this chapter add to a growing literature that suggests 
that there is more going on in China than the simple line that high-ability parents 
have high-ability children who achieve high educational outcomes. As Black 
and Devereux (2010) point out, given that the inheritability of education-
related endowments (that is, brains) is unlikely to differ significantly across 
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(or within) countries or over time,15 the hunt for explanations of cross-country 
differences tends to focus on differences in returns to education or in government 
investments, the latter being one of the key determinants of the equality of 
opportunity. For example, they suggest that the relatively low regression 
coefficients found in Nordic countries could be explained by compressed 
earnings distributions (low return to skills) or by social and educational policies 
that tend to equalise opportunities for children. Similarly, Ichino et al. (2009) 
find that countries with better public education systems tend to have higher 
intergenerational mobility, or lower regression coefficients, particularly when 
focused on primary education. 
Applying this logic to our findings here, the relatively low regression and 
correlation coefficients in rural China are likely to have something to do with 
relatively compressed earnings there, resulting from ongoing constraints 
to permanent rural-to-urban migration16 and segmentation in urban labour 
markets.17 Meanwhile, an apparent lack of investment in the rural education 
system constrains most rural children to a relatively uneducated life, giving 
the appearance of mobility or of equal opportunity because, regardless of their 
parents’ education, they are most likely to reach only junior high themselves. 
Only the very brightest rural and migrant students have the opportunity to 
make it through to college and to ultimately join the majority of urban children 
who will make up the subsequent generation of educated urban elite. Based on 
ability alone, and in a country of equal opportunity for all, surely the proportion 
of this elite originating in rural China would be higher. While our results do not 
prove any of these claims definitively, they pave the way for ongoing research 
to deepen our understanding of the factors constraining and facilitating rural 
and urban children respectively in their climbs up China’s educational ladder. 
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11. Demographic Transition 
in Rural China:
A field survey of five provinces
Funing Zhong and Jing Xiang
Introduction
Rural–urban migration and labour mobility are major drivers of China’s 
recent economic growth. Despite the importance of migration to China’s 
continuing economic success there have been few attempts to understand 
what is happening on the ground.1 This chapter will look at questions such as 
how and to what extent China still enjoys the benefits of large-scale internal 
migration after three decades, and the extent of rising wages in rural areas. 
Parallel with these questions, the negative impacts of long-term large-scale 
migration on agriculture and predictions for the future of the rural labor force 
will be discussed.
The futures of rural–urban migration and of the rural labour force are 
determined by the remaining rural population and labour force and the 
demographic structure—for example, the gender and age structures of the 
population and labour force. It is understandable that, with the same total 
population, one aged rural society might have a relatively smaller percentage 
of population of working age, and hence less workers working in agriculture 
and less labourers looking for off-farm jobs as migrants, compared with another 
but much younger society. But the demographic structure holds more relative 
importance. China’s population pyramid has been impacted significantly by 
the ‘One Child Policy’ since the 1980s and, to a lesser extent, the sustained 
famine in the early 1960s. The irregularities in China’s population pyramid 
make meaningful analysis of the rural population and labour force more 
difficult than they would otherwise be. Studies of the demographic dynamics 
of China’s rural population and labour force have been insufficient to date. 
The sampling procedures generally adopted have not been sufficient to describe 
the demographic change in rural areas and the official population census data 
are not released in a timely manner. To fill the gap in the current research, this 
study has used surveys of whole villages to obtain comprehensive pictures of 
rural demographic dynamics. The aim of this study is to improve on previous 
1  More detailed discussions on the impacts of rural–urban migration can be found in a number 
of publications, such as Chen et al. (2011); Huang (1999); Rozelle et al. (1999).
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explanations of rural–urban migration and the projection of future trends. 
At the same time, we aim to improve understanding of China’s rural labour force 
engaged in agriculture, in terms of total quantity and gender and age.
As a corollary, this study provides insight into China’s ‘left-at-home’ 
children. China’s rural–urban migration has long been characterised by seasonal 
migration and/or leaving some family members at home. Such migration raises 
serious issues with children left at home and the impacts on their physical, 
mental and emotional wellbeing and their education, health and human capital 
developments. Our study aims to provide a systematic description of the current 
status of ‘left-at-home’ children and plausible explanations with regard to the 
job opportunities their parents face.
Field Survey: Procedures, coverage and 
reliability
As stated above, the purpose of this survey was to obtain a comprehensive 
picture of demographic dynamics in rural China that could reveal the impact of 
rural–urban migration, both permanent and seasonal. The traditional sample 
procedure does not serve this purpose due to exclusion of those who have 
already migrated to urban areas; the only way to obtain an accurate picture of 
rural demographic dynamics is to conduct a village-wide survey, covering all 
households, including permanent and seasonal migrants.
The survey relied on the cooperation of villagers to provide necessary 
information regarding absent household members. 
The lowest rural community unit (cunmin xiaozu) typically consists of 20–30 
households, and members are generally close, with a large portion being relatives. 
In such a social structure, a local student collecting the survey data could obtain 
necessary demographic information of all households of the village, including 
those absent, with the help of parents, relatives and village leaders.
Although this approach is considered to provide the fullest picture of rural 
demographic dynamics, it could (as with all surveys) have some shortcomings 
regarding the quality and reliability of the survey data especially in regard to 
information provided on behalf of absent villagers. In order to decrease the 
potential survey error, we expanded the sample size and reduced the information 
requirements.
The pilot survey targeted five provinces with high rates of outward 
migration: Anhui, Hunan, Henan, Sichuan and Jiangsu. Twenty counties in 
each of the provinces were selected based on per capita income levels. Balanced 
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between the availability of students who could collect the survey data and other 
considerations, two villages were selected in each of the counties. In the selection 
procedure, villages close to county centres and/or major towns were avoided 
to reduce the possible bias of including in the sample an over-proportion of 
villages/labourers with better migration opportunities. 
To ensure reliable information was collected, especially for absent villagers, 
the survey was restricted to demographic information that was non-sensitive 
and easily accessible. The demographic information of each individual was 
recorded—for example, age, education, marital status, occupation, months 
staying at home in a year, the starting year working outside the village either 
permanently or seasonally, and residential status outside the village.
The survey covered five provinces, 121 counties, 203 villages, 7317 households 
and 28 021 people. On average, there are 36 households in a village and 
3.83 people in a household.
All students who collected the survey data were trained by the author and 
conducted the survey during the winter of 2010–11 in their home villages 
when the number of villagers staying at home was at its peak. After checking 
completeness and consistency of the information collected, the basic statistics 
of the effective survey data are summarised in Table 11.1. 
Table 11.1 Sample Statistics
Province Jiangsu Anhui Hunan Henan Sichuan Total
County 24 20 21 36 20 121
Villages 51 42 40 39 31 203
Households 2246 1276 929 1305 1561 7317
Persons 8950 4833 3506 5230 5502 28 021
Source: Calculated from field survey data.
The reliability of the survey data was crosschecked with data contained in 
the China Statistical Yearbook and China Population and Employment Statistical 
Yearbook to ensure its accuracy. For example, the average size of the rural 
household reflected in the survey was 3.83 persons per household at the end of 
2010–beginning of 2011; the corresponding figure is 3.98 nationwide, according 
to the National Rural Household Survey conducted by the National Bureau of 
Statistics at the end of 2009 (NBS 2010). 
A more direct test was undertaken by checking the gender and age structure 
of our survey data with that for the nation as a whole. Two population pyramids 
are shown in Figure 11.1—one from our survey (at right) and another from 
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national population and employment statistics (at left) (Department of Population 
and Employment Statistics of NBS 2010). The two population pyramids are 
generally consistent.
Figure 11.1 Comparison of Rural Households’ Demographic Structures
Source: Department of Population and Employment Statistics of NBS (2010); field survey.
Considering the time difference in survey conducting, the similarity might 
increase if the pyramid generated from the survey moves down one or two years; 
however, there are two features requiring further explanation: the first gap 
is rather smaller in our survey compared with the national population and 
employment statistics data. A plausible explanation is that all five provinces 
have been major grain producing and exporting areas for a long time and the 
rural population might have relatively better access to food compared with 
those living in food-deficit regions, which could lead to relatively higher birth 
rates as a result, even during times of famine. The second point of inconsistency 
is that the population reproduction cycle seems to extend based on our survey. 
The second gap centres on the group of those aged thirty-five, but the third gap 
does not show a clear sign of ending or bouncing back. One of the plausible 
explanations for this could be that rural young people have delayed their 
marriage and reproduction due to uncertainty associated with migration.
Basic Features of Rural Demographic Dynamics
As mentioned above, to ensure the quality of the data, the questionnaires 
were short and straightforward, focusing primarily on demographic information. 
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After preliminary work cleaning the data, some useful information was organised 
to show three aspects of the rural demographic dynamics: the residential and 
employment status, the demographic structure of the rural labour force and the 
custody status of the ‘left-at-home’ children. 
Residential and Employment Status
In our study, all persons with local residence registration status are classified 
into five groups based on their length of stay at home in a calendar year: none—
that is, already migrated; less than three months; more than three months 
but less than six months; more than six months but less than 10 months; and 
more than 10 months. The official statistical criterion for permanent residence 
is living in a place for more than six months in a calendar year. We specify 
two much longer periods—that is, between six and 10 months and more than 
10 months—in an effort to separate farmers more precisely according to their 
major employment by working place. 
The survey was conducted in the winter of 2010–11, and preliminary 
findings are presented in this chapter.
Among the 28 021 respondents, 13 169 people live more than 10 months at 
home per year; however, a significant portion of this population has already found 
off-farm employment to supplement their income. The number of villagers who 
had already migrated was 8020 (28.6 per cent); if these respondents are added 
to those who are at home less than three months per year (18.5 per cent), those 
who might be considered not staying at home account for another 47 per cent 
of the total rural population. The number of persons who move between home 
and work more frequently—that is, stay home between three and 10 months 
a year—is relatively smaller, at less than 6 per cent of the total (see Table 11.2).
Table 11.2 Residency Status of Total Population Surveyed
Time staying at home Persons Percentage of total
Already migrated 8020 28.62 
Less than 3 months 5174 18.46 
Between 3 and 6 months 899 3.21 
Between 6 and 10 months 759 2.71 
More than 10 months 13 169 47.00 
Total 28 021 100.00 
Source: Calculated from field survey data.
In Jiangsu Province, more than 47 per cent of the rural population has 
migrated to urban areas, and 11 per cent of the population returns home less 
than three months each year; the number of rural residents who are considered 
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to have migrated to an urban area has reached more than 58 per cent and more 
than 37 per cent of the population stays at home for more than 10 months 
per year. The number of persons leaving home between three and 10 months 
a year is small—just more than 4 per cent of the total. There is a rather similar 
distribution of residence status in Sichuan, where the number of population 
left home is roughly short by 9 percentage points, while the number staying at 
home is about 6 percentage points more than that in Jiangsu. In comparison, the 
proportions of those who have migrated are relatively smaller in Anhui, Hunan 
and Henan, at about one-quarter, one-third and one-fifth of the level in Jiangsu 
respectively, with the proportions of population staying at home greater by 
13–19 percentage points (Table 11.3).
Table 11.3 Residency Status by Province (per cent)
Time staying at home Jiangsu Anhui Hunan Henan Sichuan Total
Already migrated 47.31 12.48 16.69 9.16 38.51 28.62 
Less than 3 months 11.04 24.73 26.30 24.24 14.56 18.46 
Between 3 and 6 months 1.9 3.06 3.85 6.44 1.98 3.21 
Between 6 and 10 
months 2.37 2.79 2.88 4.13 1.73 2.71 
More than 10 months 37.39 56.94 50.29 56.02 43.22 47.00 
Total 100 100 100.00 100 100 100.00 
Source: Calculated from field survey data.
From comparison of the residence status among the five provinces, the 
rate of rural–urban migration is dependent on economic development due to 
associated opportunity costs, including the financial costs directly incurred 
during the migration process, and the human and social capital required for 
looking for appropriate employment.
The actual speed of migration at any time is partly determined by the gender 
and age structure of the remaining population. Given total rural population, 
ageing indicates fewer people seeking migration opportunities hence less 
mobility of the population. In order to understand past demographic dynamics 
in relation to rural–urban migration and, more importantly, to understand the 
future trend, it is necessary to know the demographic structure of the rural 
population (Figure 11.2). 
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Figure 11.2 Rural Demographic Structures by Residence Status
Source: Calculated from field survey data.
The data show that most of the ‘permanent’ rural population who live in 
home villages more than 10 months a year are either elderly or youngsters with 
a dependency ratio close to 0.42; the proportions of the ‘left-home’ population 
are quite high among those aged sixteen to fifty, peaking about the group of 
those aged twenty, and declining afterwards; and the ratio of women staying at 
home is relatively higher, and increasing with age.
If migrants are excluded from the data, the relationship between age and 
working place is higher. Seasonal migration is common in China from the age of 
sixteen and increases with age. By age twenty-five, only about one-quarter of the 
rural population still lives in home villages more than 10 months a year, while 
the proportion staying home less than three months is as high as 60 per cent. 
The ratio of seasonal migration declines after age thirty, but even for those aged 
over fifty, more than 30 per cent of the rural population is still temporarily 
moving between rural and urban areas.
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Demographic Structure of the Rural 
Labour Force
For agricultural production, the demographic structure of the remaining 
rural labour force, especially those primarily engaged in agriculture, is more 
important than that of the total population with formal rural registration status. 
There are two steps in presenting a clear picture of the status of the remaining 
rural labour force and its employment distribution. The first step is to clarify 
who is considered as a remaining, or permanent, rural worker, and to draw 
the demographic structure of such a rural labour force. Following international 
standards,2 age groups between sixteen and sixty-five are taken as criteria 
to clarify the labour force. Further, only those who stay home for more than 
10 months a year are considered ‘remaining’ or ‘permanent’ rural workers. The 
data from our survey are summarised in Table 11.4.















16–25 610 602 1212 6.57 6.49 13.06 101.33 
26–35 575 667 1242 6.20 7.19 13.39 86.21 
36–45 1094 1434 2528 11.79 15.45 27.24 76.29 
46–55 1130 1295 2425 12.18 13.96 26.13 87.26 
55–65 972 900 1872 10.48 9.70 20.17 108.00 
Total 4381 4898 9279 47.21 52.79 100.00 89.44 
Source: Calculated from field survey data.
It is shown that, if staying home more than 10 months and being aged 
between sixteen and sixty-five are taken as the criteria for the sub-sample, aged 
and female participation become more important parts of the permanent rural 
labour force. The absolute number of the permanent rural labour force in either 
the sixteen–twenty-five or the twenty-six–thirty-five age groups is about half 
that for older age groups and the gender ratio is significantly biased towards 
females.
A further step is to discompose employment structure among the permanent 
rural labour force, and a preliminary picture is shown in Table 11.5. 
2  There are slight differences in defining working age, or the economically active age, among countries and 
organisations. For example, the International Labor Organisation statistics for the economically active 
population (ILO 2011) cover age groups from fifteen–sixty-five and over, which are similar to the same 
standards used in many countries. China has a formal retirement age based on gender and occupation in 
urban sectors, but this is not applied to farmers, and the legal age to start work is set at sixteen, so the 
working age is taken as being between sixteen and sixty-five in this chapter.
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Table 11.5 Employment Structure of Permanent Labour Force
Age Farm Non-farm Both No-work Total
No. % No. % No. % No. % No. %
16–25 154 1.66 240 2.59 458 0.49 360 3.88 1212 13.06
26–35 286 3.08 268 2.89 633 0.68 55 0.59 1242 13.39
36–45 881 9.49 260 2.80 1322 1.42 65 0.70 2528 27.24
46–55 967 10.42 164 1.77 1202 1.30 92 0.99 2425 26.13
55–65 908 9.79 67 0.72 725 0.78 172 1.85 1872 20.17
Total 3196 34.44 999 10.77 4340 4.68 744 8.02 9279 100.00
Source: Calculated from field survey data.
By comparing Table 11.4 and Table 11.5, it is clear that ageing is an even 
more serious problem in agricultural production than in the rural economy as 
a whole. Among the 3196 permanent rural workers primarily engaged in farm 
work, only 154 persons were aged sixteen–twenty-five and 286 persons were 
aged twenty-six–thirty-five—about one-sixth or one-third of that for older 
age groups, respectively. The situation is a little better in terms of the numbers 
working in both the farm and the non-farm sectors, but the figures for younger 
generations are still significantly lower than those for older generations. 
If such a structure is maintained, even without further out-migration of young 
farmers, the total number of those in the rural labour force primarily engaged in 
agriculture will sharply decline in 20–30 years when those currently aged over 
thirty-five retire or die. 
Custody Status of ‘Left-at-Home’ Children
According to our survey, about 28 per cent of rural residents have left 
home with all members of their families; there were no so-called ‘left-at-home’ 
children for those families. For those who have not left with their whole family, 
about 20 per cent of children under the age of fifteen are staying home less than 
10 months a year, possibly going out with their parents (or one of the parents) 
seasonally. Education and other welfare issues exist for these children too but 
they are not classified as left-at-home children.
In the sample covered by our survey, there are 3169 rural children under 
the age of fifteen staying at home for more than 10 months a year. About half 
the total, 1595 children, are living with both parents at home. The remaining 
1574 children are categorised as ‘left at home’: 685 with mothers alone, 54 with 
fathers alone, 815 with one or more grandparents, and 20 in the custody of 
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other persons. Detailed custody information of those children staying at home 
for more than 10 months a year, including regional variations, is listed in 
Table 11.6.
Table 11.6 Custody Status of Rural Children by Province (per cent)
Custodians Jiangsu Anhui Hunan Henan Sichuan Total
Parents 40.63 47.98 50.00 53.43 64.36 50.33
Mother 25.19 22.94 16.15 28.52 7.13 21.62
Father 2.78 2.10 1.55 0.96 0.84 1.70
Grandparents 29.87 26.17 32.08 16.85 27.67 25.72
Others 1.52 0.81 0.22 0.24 0.00 0.63
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Source: Calculated from field survey data.
Table 11.6 indicates that the percentage of children in the custody of both 
parents reaches its lowest level of 41 per cent in Jiangsu, and then increases to 
48 per cent in Anhui, 50 per cent in Hunan, 53 per cent in Henan and 64 per cent 
in Sichuan. This regional difference might suggest a relationship between the 
decision to work outside and that of child care. As the destinations of outgoing 
migrant workers are concentrated in the south-east coastal regions, the distance 
between the working place and home is much further for farmers from Sichuan 
compared with those from the other four provinces. The travel costs will be much 
higher for Sichuan farmers, not only because of the distance but also because of 
geographic conditions, so seasonal migrants might come back only once a year. 
As more and more young couples are not willing to suffer long-term separation, 
they tend to migrate together or stay at home together. The high proportion of 
single-mother custody in Jiangsu, Anhui and Henan could be explained by the 
same reason: with better job opportunities in nearby locations, the husbands 
might commute between working places and home more frequently, hence the 
suffering of separation is largely reduced.
Summary and Policy Implications
The above is an analysis of demographic structure in rural China based on 
a survey conducted in the winter of 2010–11 covering five provinces with a 
large rural population and a large proportion of rural–urban migration. While 
in-depth study is yet to be formulated and carried out, some preliminary results 
can be summarised.
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Rural–Urban Migration Will Continue, but the Speed Will 
Reduce
The rural population pyramid (Figure 11.1) indicates that the gap in the 
pyramid is getting larger with an extended cycle, and the number of children 
under the age of fifteen is about 30 per cent less than that for those in the 
twenty-five–forty age group. As a result, even as the One Child Policy is phased 
out in the near future, the number of annual births might not exceed the current 
level, so the rural population will shrink purely due to lower birth rates.
The current rural demographic structure (Figure 11.2) further indicates 
that most young people have at least seasonally migrated (80 per cent about 
the age of twenty). As young urban migrants are eager to settle down with 
their whole families, more children will move out before reaching working age. 
As the number of children under age fifteen is smaller than the number of those 
in the older generation, a further reduction of this number could lead to lower 
migration levels by those of working age.
Due to demographic dynamics, rural–urban migration will continue in the 
near future, while the speed might reduce significantly; however, if measured 
by official statistics, the index of urbanisation might significantly increase 
in the next 20–30 years, even without large-scale rural–urban migration. 
The reason is simple: ageing in rural China. As the population ages due to the 
out-migration of young generations—pine-shaped, and possibly mushroom or 
umbrella-shaped—the rural population will dramatically shrink when all those 
elderly pass away. Urbanisation will appear to progress as the number of rural 
residents reduces by more than half in 20–30 years, but it will be mainly due to 
demographic changes and not an increase in migration.
The Number of Agricultural Workers Ageing Will Continue 
to Increase Rapidly and then Decline Sharply
Table 11.5 indicates that, among those engaged mainly in agricultural 
production, the number in the twenty-six–thirty-five age group is only about 
one-third that for the thirty-six–forty-five, forty-six–fifty-five and fifty-six–
sixty-five age groups. The same number is even smaller for the sixteen–twenty-
five age cohort: only about one-sixth. There is no reason to expect that children 
under the age of fifteen will participate in agriculture in greater numbers than 
the older generation when grown up. On the contrary, the number of children 
permanently staying at home is already below that for the older generation 
currently, and is likely to reduce further as more parents settle in urban areas.
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In general, looking at the permanent rural labour force engaged mainly in 
agriculture, the age structure looks like a spindle with a tail at the bottom. 
As the elderly leave employment and youngsters move out, the ‘spindle’ will 
become thinner and thinner, with the top shrinking much faster. As a result, 
the ageing of the agricultural labour force could speed up, followed by a sharp 
decline in the total number of those aged twenty–thirty years. 
Decisions Regarding Migration Interact with Those 
Regarding Child Care
Table 11.6 suggests that the issue of left-at-home children is interrelated 
with off-farm job opportunities. If off-farm jobs are easily accessible in nearby 
regions, more children will be left at home with a single parent. Otherwise, 
more children will be taken with both parents or both parents will stay at 
home. The figures in Table 11.6 are, however, in percentage terms, and provide 
only a comparison of custody status for children staying at home for more than 
10 months a year among the five provinces covered by the study. One cannot 
directly infer the percentage of children left-at-home and its relationship with 
out-migration decisions.
Nevertheless, the relationship between child care and out-migration 
suggested by such a comparison is still important as it raises some interesting 
yet inconclusive issues looking into the future. If the local economy in Sichuan 
and other inland provinces is to be boosted by the Western Development 
Strategy,3 will more children in western regions be left at home as off-farm 
jobs are increasingly available nearby? Or, will more children move out with 
their parents instead? In either case, the movement of children will have some 
important implications for future development in social security and service 
systems.
Finally, the above analysis opens up a lot of issues for further study. 
For  example, one could apply the collected data containing gender and age 
information of the rural population to more rigorous demographic models, 
systematically simulating and projecting future trends of rural population along 
with its changing structure. The same data could also be applied to study the 
timing of each migrant moving out for the first time, re-establishing models 
of rural–urban migration and systematically simulating and projecting future 
trends of the migration; to establish a model to explain the relationship between 
3  The Western Development Strategy was first formally raised in the Tenth Five-Year Plan (People’s 
Congress of China 2001), aiming to speed up economic development in the vast western regions 
with greater allocations of the state budget, along with induced funds from other sectors directed 
to infrastructure and other investment. More detailed investment plans submitted by the State 
Development and Reform Commission were approved by the State Council in 2007 and 2012.
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the general welfare status of left-at-home children and the employment of their 
parents; and to explain the different trends of ageing among provinces, and 
identifying the potential economic and social factors impacting on the ageing 
status.
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12. Building Social Welfare 
in China: 




Rapid growth and structural reforms since 1978 have transformed the 
economic and social basis of China’s welfare system. A sedentary population 
serviced through the unit of employment has been replaced with a mobile 
labour force, a market economy and greater reliance on user-pays principles. 
Until the 1980s, China’s welfare provision was based on the planned economy 
model, whereby the employer was responsible for all aspects of the employee’s 
welfare, including old-age retirement income. In urban areas this revolved 
around the work unit—be it enterprise or government organisation—and in the 
countryside the people’s communes provided for their members (Dixon 1981). 
Once the market reforms were introduced, such a system could no longer be 
sustained. Labour became mobile, enterprises became profit oriented, the people’s 
communes disappeared and the sources of poverty and disadvantage changed. 
China thus faced the need to rebuild its welfare system by creating services that 
are more standardised across society as a whole, are accessible to all citizens, 
are linked to the government’s budget and are operated through specialised 
service providers. In effect, the work unit could no longer supply employees 
and retirees with the full range of housing, medical, welfare and retirement 
benefits that had been the norm. China had to build a social welfare system 
with the familiar range of services found in market economies: unemployment 
benefits, health insurance, work injury cover, maternity support and old-age 
retirement incomes.
Alongside its role in maintaining social justice, equity and stability, the 
provision of social welfare can be seen both as a basic safety net to provide ex-post 
support to citizens in need and as developmental to provide ex-ante preparation 
for the challenges created by structural economic change (Cook et  al. 2003). 
In other words, by providing citizens with the resources to withstand shocks 
and build resilience, it can help cushion the adjustments that rapid growth and 
structural economic change bring and sustain the human resources needed for 
new growth. In China’s case, the development of an equitable and reliable social 
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welfare system can also be seen as a small but important part of the effort to 
rebalance the economy away from its high investment and high savings rates 
towards greater consumption and greater income equity. 
This brief study will first review a number of reasons why the development 
of a new social security system is a critical part of rebalancing and sustaining 
growth in China over the next phase of economic development. It then focuses 
on the issue of old-age retirement incomes and discusses the choice of model, 
the evolution of policy and the current operation of the system. It will conclude 
with a few comments on the lessons to be drawn and the challenges for further 
development.
The Underlying Challenges
In market economies, social security is a form of risk sharing and of managing 
market failures. It creates social equity and stability by ensuring basic incomes 
and services for citizens in need. It redistributes income across sectors and 
generations. In China’s case, the planned economy model sought to achieve that 
within the unit of employment, with the result that the levels of service obtained 
by individuals depended on the resources available to their unit. A commune in 
a poor area had little to offer its farmers; one in a rich area could ensure a better 
quality of life. A well-endowed state enterprise could provide quality housing 
and retirement incomes. An inefficient and low-income factory had much less 
to offer. The shift to a market system with a large private sector inevitably 
required China to make the transition from a unit-based system to a socialised 
and government-managed system. Since the mid-1980s, therefore, China’s social 
security system has gradually evolved towards local pooling of social security 
funds at county and urban levels and then towards higher levels of regional 
and national integration (Saunders and Shang 2001; Wang 2001:3–12). In that 
process, a number of key issues have emerged as drivers of the need to build an 
integrated national system.
First, there is the contradiction between labour market integration and the 
operation of a social security system based on place of employment and locality. 
The latter was originally designed for a sedentary population, with resources 
allocated through the bureaucratic distribution system. Economic reforms 
liberated the labour force and required labour flexibility and mobility in order 
to respond to changing market and production conditions. The most obvious 
sign of this has been the emergence since the 1980s of the huge flow of rural-to-
urban migration. Though their mobility makes it difficult to produce accurate 
and reliable statistics, it was reported that in 2011 there were about 252 million 
such ‘farmer-workers’ in China, consisting of 94 million who were working 
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in off-farm enterprises in their locality and 158 million who had migrated 
elsewhere (SSB 2012). Their contribution to economic growth and structural 
change has been huge, but because of their rural household registration they 
are excluded from the urban social security system (Watson 2009). The fact that 
they can slip between the two categories adds to the complexity of designing 
social security systems for them. This problem of mobility, however, is not 
exclusive to migrants. The creation of urban social security pools helped share 
obligations and create mobility at the local level, but residents seeking to move 
between cities and provinces still face the challenge of transferring their social 
security registration and entitlements between different pool areas. In effect, 
by forming an obstacle to the flexible movement of labour, the social security 
system has risked becoming a barrier to further structural change. 
A second issue requiring urgent change to the social security system is the 
ageing of the population. The need to provide retirement pensions, health care for 
the old and other support services for the ageing has long been a major challenge 
for public policy and social security systems in most developed economies. 
China’s rapid social and economic changes combined with its family planning 
policies have meant that it has entered the phase of demographic transition to an 
ageing society much more rapidly than most countries (Wang 2011). According 
to estimates by the United Nations (UN 2011a:103), the Chinese population aged 
over sixty was nearly 12.8 per cent in 2010 and will grow to 33.9 per cent in 2050, 
and remain at more than 34 per cent by 2100. The same study (UN 2011b:327) 
estimates a rising dependency ratio from 12.7 per cent in 2010 to 18.4 per cent 
in 2020 and 40.1 per cent in 2040. Whatever the reliability of such estimates—
and work by others has suggested that previous UN calculations might be 
underestimates (Zhao and Guo 2007)—even if population policies were to 
change today, the demographic momentum implies that the era of a plentiful, 
young workforce is coming to an end, the ratio of old to young will increase and 
the proportion of working-age people able to support the old will decline. This 
reality means that the design and implementation of an effective social security 
system and especially a set of policies to provide for old-age retirement incomes 
have become urgent priorities. Failure to prepare now would create a huge fiscal 
burden for the government in the future.
The issue of funding social security is thus another urgent challenge facing 
China’s social security reform. Furthermore, while many aspects of social 
security such as unemployment, work injury, maternity and health are needed 
for only specific periods for each individual and can be managed through forms 
of insurance, the provision of old-age retirement incomes is something that lasts 
over many years and requires both a period of accumulation before retirement 
in order to prepare for the post-retirement obligation and a period of payout 
until death. In an ageing society, where the declining numbers of young are no 
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longer able to pay for the growing numbers of the old while at the same time 
saving for their own ageing, the need to make financial preparations is obvious. 
If the government decides to rely on paying pensions from fiscal revenue, 
the fiscal burdens become substantial. Furthermore, if accumulation through 
contributory insurance or superannuation schemes is adopted, the design has to 
be reliable and transparent, and the accumulated contributions have to be able 
to preserve and grow value. What is more, the total amount of funds in such 
schemes for a large population will be very large. They can provide a significant 
growth of capital resources and can play an important role in capital markets. 
They also require strong regulatory mechanisms to ensure the safety of the 
accumulation.
Finally, a further important dimension for the development of social security 
systems in China is their role in helping economic rebalancing. The need to 
rebalance China’s economic growth model has long been recognised (Dollar 2007; 
Kuijs and Wang 2006; Pettis 2011). Growing income and regional inequalities, 
heavy reliance on investment in export manufacturing, a declining share of 
consumption and wages, high savings rates with low financial returns to savers 
and poor social security systems have all been identified as indicators of a need 
to change. A shift towards higher levels of wages and domestic consumption, 
increased growth of the service sector and small enterprises, and better social 
welfare are all seen as part of this process. Within that context, the introduction 
of a more equitable and accessible social security system would not only generate 
better social welfare outcomes, but would also reduce the need for individual 
saving, help increase the consumption of the disadvantaged and contribute to 
the redistribution of income.
Given these factors, it is not surprising that the development of social 
security has emerged as a key policy goal for the Chinese Government. Opinion 
surveys show that it has also become a major issue of concern for the average 
citizen (China Daily, 22 February 2011). While, as discussed below, the political 
economy is complex and implementation has faced many challenges, the issue 
has received a lot of attention in leaders’ speeches over the past 10 years, and 
was given considerable prominence in the Twelfth Five-Year Plan (Xinhua 2011). 
The Government Work Report delivered by Wen Jiabao at the National People’s 
Congress (NPC) on 5 March 2012 claimed that significant expansion of the 
system was taking place.
The administration of China’s social security is entrusted to the Social 
Insurance Administration (SIA), a public service unit under the Ministry of 
Human Resources and Social Security (MOHRSS). The SIA has a hierarchy 
of bureaus at central, provincial, urban and county levels, each of which 
manages their local social insurance pools. It is responsible for drafting and 
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implementing legislation and for the management and regulation of the system. 
In October 2010, the NPC approved the Social Insurance Law, which had 
been in preparation for a number of years, and it was implemented on 1 July 
2011 (NPC 2010). The overall model is based on contributory insurance and 
covers health, unemployment, work injury, maternity and old-age insurance. 
Against this overall background, this study now turns to examine the old-age 
insurance system, which because of its complexity provides clear insights into 
the challenges faced.
The Choice of Model for Old-Age Retirement 
Incomes
For many years, international economic institutions such as the World 
Bank, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) have devoted considerable resources to 
studying the policy choices facing governments in providing for the old (World 
Bank 1994; World Bank and OECD 2008). They have supported policy-related 
research in many countries. These studies suggest that the key policy choices 
for old-age retirement incomes are
•	 the extent to which the state should provide for the old
•	 the extent to which individuals should provide for themselves
•	 the target levels of retirement income to be achieved
•	 the merits of ‘pay-as-you-go’ schemes, in which pensions are paid from 
current income, compared with ‘fully funded’ schemes, in which funds are 
accumulated from current income to pay for retirement incomes in future
•	 the mechanisms used to accrue funds for pension payments
•	 the mechanisms for the distribution of benefits.
In most countries, models of ‘pay-as-you-go’ schemes that provide the 
old with a defined benefit from current revenue are giving way to defined 
contribution schemes, in which contributions from employers and individuals 
are accumulated during their working life in order to provide the retirement 
incomes. In other words, what a person will get in retirement will depend on 
what is saved and will not be a defined proportion of final salary paid from 
current revenue after retirement. This trend has driven retirement income 
reform in Australia and many European countries. 
Associated challenges include pressures to increase the retirement age so that 
people work longer and the number of retirement years is reduced, equalising 
retirement ages for men and women, and closing existing defined benefit 
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schemes whereby retirees are entitled to a defined benefit as a proportion of 
their final salary. These last schemes are common for public service workers 
and government employees and tend to be pay-as-you-go schemes funded from 
fiscal revenue.
Overall, the consensus in market economies focuses on building a three-
pillar model.
1. A state pension. This generally gives a low level of income paid from fiscal 
revenue. It provides a basic safety net for those who do not have enough 
accumulation or income from other sources.
2. A compulsory contributory scheme. Such schemes are funded by contributions 
from employers and/or employees. The contributions are paid into an 
accumulation account held in each member’s name and are eventually paid 
out after retirement in the form of annuity insurance or superannuation.
3. A voluntary contributory scheme. Individuals are encouraged to supplement 
the compulsory scheme by contributing more of their own funds to their 
retirement savings. Such schemes may also attract tax concessions or 
incentives from the state.
The aim of this model is to increase individual accumulation for old age 
and to reduce the burden on state revenue, especially in a context in which an 
ageing society means that there are declining numbers of people of working age 
paying taxes to support the old.
As discussed above, China’s planned economy model was essentially a defined 
benefit scheme that operated at the unit of employment level. People’s benefits 
thus varied by location and employment, with a major difference between the 
urban and the rural systems. During the reform period, the need for change was 
shaped by the key drivers listed above, and it has resulted in a move towards 
defined contribution schemes that embody the principles of the three-pillar 
model. This has been reflected in the transition from the unit-based system 
to local and regional pools and a gradual raising of the level of the pool from 
county and town to province, with the eventual goal of creating an integrated 
national scheme. 
As yet, there is no first pillar in the form of a state pension, and a basic social 
safety net is provided by the guaranteed minimum income scheme launched in 
1993 and operated through the Ministry of Civil Affairs. The extent of coverage 
is, however, patchy, especially in rural areas, there is considerable regional 
variation, and studies suggest it is not yet very effective (Chen et al. 2006; Tang 
2012). The second pillar is provided by a combination of the basic urban old-
age insurance for enterprise employees, the new rural pension plan that was 
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introduced in 2010 and is gradually spreading across the countryside, and the 
other emerging schemes for unemployed and self-employed urban residents. 
Public servants for the moment continue to receive defined benefit pensions 
paid from government revenue that are generous and indexed for wage increases 
(Chen 2008), but mooted reforms to public service units indicate that these might 
also eventually be changed into defined contribution schemes as well. The third 
pillar is left to the individual and to enterprise annuity schemes voluntarily 
established by employers.
The Evolution of Policy
As noted above, during the early phase of economic reform in the 1980s, 
China’s unit-based system of social security gave way to a social pooling system 
based on county or urban administrations that brought the obligations of the 
local state-owned enterprises within an administrative area together. By the mid-
1990s, as the urban reforms intensified, state-owned enterprises were reformed, 
merged or closed and the market and private economy grew, any remnants 
of  the old model became unsustainable. There was no accumulated provision 
to fund pension obligations, and the ratio of pensions to wages was increasing 
(Zhao et al. 2006). In loss-making state enterprises, it was no longer possible 
to guarantee a fixed percentage of an individual’s final wage as a pension, and 
the government had to look for alternative ways to smooth income over time 
in order to provide for peoples’ old age. Given the growing number of people 
dependent on pensions, the ageing of the population underlined the urgent need 
for change. After 1990, therefore, China began to develop a new set of policies. 
Between 1991 and 1998, the government progressively elaborated a system 
of basic old-age insurance for enterprise employees (Wang 2001, 2002:4–9; 
Zhao et al. 2006). Employers were required to pay the equivalent of a percentage 
of the wage into the old-age insurance fund and the individual worker also 
contributed a percentage. These two elements created the common social pool 
and the individual account. These developments were extended in August 1998 
in the decision to work towards raising social pooling to provincial level and 
to merge 11 existing industry-based pension funds into the social insurance 
pools (SC 1998). Subsequently, regulations and decisions sought to clarify the 
management of the system and its requirements and entitlements, to increase 
the level of contributions to 20 per cent from the employer and 8 per cent from 
the employee, and to enable self-employed people to join (SC 2005). Ultimately, 
the basic principles of the scheme were incorporated into the Social Insurance 
Law of the People’s Republic of China (NPC 2010) and further refinements 
were introduced to bring in migrant workers and to make transfers between 
pool areas by people with urban household registration easier (Watson 2009). 
Rebalancing and Sustaining Growth in China
272
An important aspect of this process, however, was that existing retirees or those 
close to retirement were brought in as members, even though they did not bring 
any accumulated contributions with them. The funds thus had to cover old 
members (with ‘empty accounts’ and no accumulation), middle members (with 
partial accumulation) and new members (those making full contributions from 
the time of joining) (Wang 2005). There was thus an unfunded obligation that 
threatened funds with deficits and created pressures on local governments to 
defend their pools.
Because this scheme was designed for enterprise employees, unemployed 
urban residents did not have access to it. The State Council recognised this in its 
2000 policy document on improving the urban welfare system, when it called for 
special provisions for such people (SC 2000). Given the difficulty that residents 
would have in paying both the pool levy and the individual payment, it was 
necessary to develop a different scheme for this category of people. Consequently, 
experiments began with establishing pensions through an insurance scheme 
based on individual contributions and government subsidies. These schemes 
paralleled the emerging new rural pension plan discussed below, and a number 
of cities introduced combined provisions for unemployed urban residents and 
for local landless farmers who had been displaced by urban expansion (Chen 
and Li 2012; State Council 2011; Yang 2012).
The rural system was much slower to replace the old collective structures. 
Until the recent innovations, rural social welfare continued to rely primarily 
on what the village or individual could provide. Initially there were a 
number of local experiments that attempted to provide insurance cover for 
farmers and, after central guidelines were issued in 1992, some provinces 
and localities introduced contributory old-age insurance schemes run by the 
Ministry of Civil Affairs (Luo and Lü 2006; Song 2008:436–8; Su 2009:53–61; 
Zhao et al. 2002:120–33). Collectively known as the ‘old rural pension plan’, 
these experiments suffered from reliance on individual contributions, low 
rates of return, poor administration and combined government and commercial 
operation with the associated high risks. It was estimated that by the end of 
1997 they covered only about 80 million farmers, and the schemes subsequently 
tended to languish.
Given the increasing urban–rural inequalities, the lack of welfare provisions 
for farmers and the decline of rural family support systems with the growth 
of rural-to-urban migration, the need to improve the scheme was becoming 
increasingly urgent. In 2007 the Central Government re-emphasised the need 
to develop a rural pension system (Institute of Economics, Chinese Academy 
of Social Sciences 2010:353). At its Seventeenth Congress in 2007, the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) called for ‘exploring the establishment of a rural 
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old-age insurance system’, and in October 2008 proposed building ‘a new rural 
pension system requiring a combination of individual contributions, collective 
subsidies and government subsidies’. This statement established the principle 
of direct government fiscal support for the rural scheme. The new national 
system was formally announced in August 2009, with trial implementation to 
begin in 10 per cent of counties in 2010 and national coverage to be achieved 
by 2020 (SC 2009). In practice, however, the scheme expanded rapidly and, by 
March 2012, Premier, Wen Jiabao, stated in the Government Work Report to 
the National People’s Congress that trials of the system operated in 60 per cent 
of counties and embraced some 358 million people, of whom nearly 99 million 
received pensions. While, as discussed below, the level of benefit is not high 
and there are many challenges of implementation, this new rural pension plan 
marks a substantial development in rural welfare policy.
The other major group that had to be addressed in the development of old-age 
insurance policy was the rural-to-urban migrant workers (for a full discussion 
of the issues below, see Watson 2009). Since the basic urban system was built 
around one’s place of household registration, migrant workers were excluded 
because of their rural registration; however, including those in township and 
village enterprises, there are now about 252 million of them, and they make 
up the major proportion of the total manufacturing workforce. They are 
characterised by relative youth (average age about twenty-nine), high mobility, 
low incomes and a high proportion of informal employment. Apart from the 
basic obstacle created by their household registration, there are a number of 
systemic and political economy challenges to bringing them within the basic 
urban system. Their mobility conflicts with the fragmented structure of the 
social pooling system and with regulations that require 15 years’ contributions 
with the final five years to be in the same location. There are many technical and 
administrative difficulties of managing interregional transfers of registration. 
There is resistance from employers who are unwilling to increase their labour 
costs by paying social insurance. And local governments are happy to use any 
social contributions made on the migrants’ behalf to bolster their pool funds 
and counteract implied deficits but reluctant to allow these contributions to be 
transferred out when the migrants move on. As a result, a major segment of the 
young workforce has been excluded from basic insurance at a time when they 
are most able to contribute.
Initially, some areas experimented with allowing migrants to join local 
schemes or established special programs of their own (Han 2009:480–2; Liu and 
Xu 2008:209–43). Eventually, however, the need to provide social security 
services for migrants and to combat discrimination against them was recognised 
at the national level. Document Five in 2006 called for a comprehensive review of 
migrant issues and for the establishment of an old-age insurance scheme to suit 
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their needs (SC 2006). Subsequently, the Ministry of Human Resources and 
Social Security issued a discussion draft of a separate scheme for migrants that 
allowed for lower levels of contribution and greater flexibility of transfers. Plans 
to develop this scheme, however, were rapidly overtaken by the introduction 
of the new rural pension plan. The proposed separate migrant worker scheme 
implied increased fragmentation of the social insurance system. It seemed that 
migrants might eventually have the choice of joining the basic urban scheme, 
the special migrants’ scheme or the rural pension plan. The administrative 
complexity of managing transfers between several schemes also loomed large. 
In the face of these challenges, the decision was made in late 2009 to require the 
migrants to join the basic urban scheme, to have the right to transfer back to the 
rural pension plan if they wished and to improve the mechanisms for the transfer 
of social security registration between pool areas. Subsequently, the policy 
focus shifted to developing mechanisms for managing the migrants’ transition 
to the integrated urban scheme, for making membership transfers between the 
rural and urban schemes and for the transfer of registration between pool areas.
This discussion of the process of policy development has illustrated the 
two interlinked features that have dominated the development of China’s 
social welfare. The first is that the reforms have been profoundly shaped 
by the inheritance of the plan period. The second is that the new system is 
fragmented by location and by category. The division between urban and rural 
welfare based on household registration has continued to have a profound 
influence, and the practice of different categories of people in different localities 
obtaining different types of access and benefits remains embedded within the 
operation of local pools. The overall framework thus maintains separate systems 
for enterprise employees, migrants, non-employed residents, farmers and 
government employees. It is perhaps inevitable that a transitional system has 
to build on pre-existing practices and expectations. As in many other aspects 
of the gradual reform process, therefore, the political economy of the existing 
set of vested interests, understandings and obligations has made it difficult to 
sweep everything aside and start again. The result, however, is that the social 
security system remains fragmented by place and by employment status, and 
this is the core challenge facing its evolution.
The Operation of the System and its 
Challenges
Social insurance policies are implemented through the SIA. This has a 
hierarchy of offices from central to local levels at provincial, urban, county and 
district offices. As is common in the Chinese system, professional management 
comes through the ministerial hierarchy but local government handles the 
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administrative responsibilities. Each level has its Social Security Bureau, which 
manages the registration of members and the operation of the insurance. It has 
service centres that deal with both employers and members. Membership 
requires the employer to register the employee. After registration, the monthly 
contributions due from the employer and employee are calculated by the social 
security department and collected from the employer, who deducts the employee 
amount from the wage. The contributions are paid to the bureaus (in some 
localities the payments are made to the tax bureaus but the records are kept by 
the social security system). The funds are placed in a special account operated 
through the fiscal offices and subject to strict and conservative management rules 
in an effort to ensure their security. In this context, it is important to recognise 
that the definition of ‘local’ is complex. Enterprises register their employees at 
the level at which they operate. A provincial-level enterprise would register 
with the provincial bureau and an urban one at the urban level. The bureaus 
manage the collection of funds and the distribution of benefits.
During the 1990s, much of the record-keeping and administration was on 
paper, but the elaboration of the system required substantial improvement in 
management and information systems and in computerisation. This is an inevitable 
precondition for the introduction of an integrated national system. In  1999, 
the ministry began to introduce social security cards, and these now operate 
as smart cards in the more developed regions. In 2002, when the government 
announced a major drive to develop information systems for government, the 
Jinbao Project was launched to build up information technology (IT) for social 
security (State Council 2002). This project is operated by the MOHRSS. It aims 
to be a single, integrated platform with two sections: one for social security and 
one for employment. It operates at three levels: central, provincial and urban. 
The system includes the development of computerised systems for providing 
services, internal management, fund management and access for individuals to 
consult their own records through the Internet. Since computer systems are 
not yet nationally standardised and links between regional databases are still 
developing, there is some distance to go before a truly integrated system can 
be built. These technical challenges are also magnified by disparities in the 
capacity of local administrations; however, considerable investment is taking 
place and the infrastructure to enable an integrated national system is emerging.
The operation of the basic urban old-age insurance scheme is straightforward, 
though there can be much local variation in the details. Employers and 
employees contribute at a rate of 20 per cent and 8 per cent of the wage 
respectively. The employer contribution goes to the local social pool and the 
employee contribution goes to the individual account. Individuals are able to 
apply for a monthly pension after reaching the retirement age (currently fifty-
five for women and sixty for men). The pension has two parts: the social pool 
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payment and the individual account payment. The social pool payment is set at 
60 per cent of the local social average wage, provided there has been a minimum 
of 15 years’ contributions, with the last five being continuous in the pool area. 
This payment is therefore based on the local average and not on the actual wage 
of the individual. It is adjusted over time to take account of wage changes. 
The individual account payment depends on the amount of accumulation in the 
individual account. It is paid at a monthly rate of 1/139 of the total accumulation 
(that is, it assumes an actuarial life of 139 months after retirement). Overall, the 
scheme has a number of characteristics that add to its complexity and underline 
its fragmented structure at the current stage of development.
1. While national integration is the long-term goal, it is not yet operated 
as a unified system but as a set of parallel local pools. These are managed 
as separate funds and can have their own specific features, such as variations 
to the national standards, depending on local average wages, and extra 
subsidies depending on the strength of local finances. As a result, the levels 
of contributions and benefits will vary by location. Although a growing 
number of provinces are developing provincial-level pooling, in practice 
many pools remain at city or county level. Transfers of contributions and 
benefits between cities and regions thus present problems.
2. The coexistence of the common social pool and the individual account means 
that the two elements are managed separately. Local authorities see the social 
pool as a local resource and rely on it to ensure that they can meet their 
obligations to their members. They therefore have an incentive to retain as 
much of it as they can when an individual moves to employment in a different 
pool area. This pressure was recognised in the 2009 transfer regulations, 
which allow local pools to retain some 40 per cent of the employer’s 
contribution when an employee moves elsewhere, and only 60 per cent is 
transferred to the destination pool.
3. This strong sense of local interest is linked to the fact that when the system 
was introduced in 1996, no provision was made for existing retirees or for 
those approaching the end of their working life. The social pools thereby 
inherited unfunded liabilities from the pre-existing system. Areas with lots 
of failing state-owned enterprises faced large deficits, whereas new-economy 
areas with a smaller legacy and growing new industries had a much healthier 
financial position.
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4. The system differentiates among different categories of people. As discussed 
above, employees in government agencies, public welfare units and similar 
institutions still receive the old planned economy defined benefits pensions 
and do not participate in these schemes. Self-employed people may join, 
provided they contribute to both the pool and the individual account. 
Unemployed urban residents have access to a different scheme.
The above characteristics highlight the barriers the design of the scheme 
presents to migrant workers. The high individual costs relative to low incomes, 
the operation of local pools and barriers to portability, the lack of formal 
employment contracts for most migrants and the retention of enterprise 
contributions in the local pool all combine to mean that migrants lack incentives 
to join the urban scheme. Their mobility, their frequent changes of job and 
their employment in the informal sector add to the obstacles. Migrants cannot 
guarantee that they will be able to make 15 years’ worth of contributions to 
the fund (including the required five consecutive years of contributions in 
the final years of employment), and it is therefore difficult for them to qualify 
for a retirement benefit in a particular pool area. Until 2009, these barriers to 
transfers between pool areas were a major challenge. As a result, when migrants 
were allowed to join, they could withdraw their contributions to their individual 
account only when they moved elsewhere. The employer’s social contribution 
made on their behalf was retained in the local pool. In effect, these contributions 
helped maintain the fund balance and reduced any funding deficits for the 
payment of pensions to the local population. The migrants’ individual account 
contributions represented an enforced saving of a proportion of their wages 
until they changed jobs, when they were allowed to withdraw it. The 2009 
procedures for transfers are intended to resolve this problem by guaranteeing 
transfers of pool contributions, but many technical issues of implementation 
remain to be resolved. For employers, registering migrant workers means 
increasing their labour costs. For the social security system, constant movement 
adds to the complexity of maintaining records and managing funds. These issues 
are magnified for female migrants who have greater job mobility, higher levels 
of informal employment and more inconsistent employment records because of 
childrearing and family responsibilities. Not surprisingly, therefore, migrants 
lack incentives to join and have little faith in the system.
The 2009 regulations requiring migrants to join the urban scheme were 
intended to address some of these issues. The new policy required: 1) compulsory 
participation with no withdrawals; 2) reducing the entry threshold for migrants 
by allowing lower contributions; 3) maintaining sealed accounts in local pools 
when migrants moved; 4) establishing a national database for migrant records; 
5) developing a mechanism for pooling lifetime contributions at the place of 
final residence; and 6) designing procedures for linking the urban scheme 
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to the rural pension plan should the individual decide to retire back to the 
countryside. Designing mechanisms to implement these goals requires flexible, 
accurate and integrated information management systems, and good record-
keeping to ensure that fund contributions are preserved in the various pools, 
combined and transferred to the place of final residence when the individual 
retires.
The rural pension plan mandates a minimum monthly cash pension of RMB55 
to all rural residents, male and female, over the age of sixty. This payment is 
guaranteed by the government and funded by a combination of central, provincial 
and collective-level contributions. Individual farmers may join voluntarily while 
they are still working and make an annual payment into the scheme. If  they 
do so, when they reach the pensionable age they become eligible to receive 
both the government pension and an additional monthly amount calculated at 
the actuarial rate of 1/139 of the total funds in their individual contribution 
account (that is, the same actuarial assumption as the urban scheme). As the 
scheme matures, it would therefore have two components like the basic urban 
insurance: the pension and the individual account. The  difference is that in 
this case the basic pension is a guaranteed payment from government finances. 
All farmers aged sixteen and over who are not migrant workers and therefore do 
not belong to urban schemes are eligible to join in their home villages. 
The basic design of this scheme is simple, and the payment of the government 
subsidy from the budget marks an important innovation in old-age income 
payments. This innovation has also been extended to unemployed urban 
residents who have a similar subsidy. There is also gender equity, since both 
males and females get the same pension. While the total amount of RMB55 per 
month per person is not large, it is in cash, which can be important in poor rural 
areas. There are also expectations that the pension level will rise over time.
Trial implementation of the new scheme during 2010 allowed a number of 
local policy variations.1 The government subsidy was provided 100 per cent 
from the Central Government in the poor western provinces and 50 per cent 
from the centre and 50 per cent from provincial governments in the richer 
east. Further variations were then developed within provinces. For example, 
in Fujian, several ways of providing the 50 per cent local component of the 
subsidy were used. In poor counties, the province provided 30 per cent and 
required the counties to supply the remaining 20 per cent. In intermediate-
level counties, the ratio became 10 per cent provincial and 40 per cent county. 
Rich counties had to provide the full 50 per cent themselves. In addition, 
if they wished, rich counties could add an amount so that the monthly pension 
1  The following discussion draws on interviews with the Fujian Social Insurance Centre, 29 March 2010.
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might be RMB10 higher than the national guideline. A further variation was 
in the contributory individual account amount to be paid by working farmers. 
The  national guidelines proposed five levels from RMB100 to RMB500 per 
person per year. Recognising the capacity of its richer areas to accumulate more, 
Fujian introduced 12 levels ranging from RMB100 to RMB1200. Furthermore, 
to encourage farmers to join, it experimented with paying a RMB30 state 
subsidy to the individual account of farmers who started at the basic level. 
Administrative villages were also allowed to contribute an additional amount 
to the basic pension if they had the resources. It was therefore possible for the 
guaranteed pension in rich areas to be higher than the norm and for richer 
farmers to accumulate more in their account. 
The implementation of the trial program also highlighted some of the 
difficulties and teething problems. Issues included
•	 identifying all the people who were eligible (some old farmers do not have ID 
cards or reliable records of their age)
•	 maintaining up-to-date records so that new entrants and exits through death 
can be accurately recorded each month
•	 having staff available at the basic level to manage the scheme
•	 enabling old people to have bank accounts through which the pension can 
be paid, in a context in which many old people are barely literate and many 
villages do not have a local financial institution
•	 persuading young farmers to join and ensuring that families will also pay 
contributions for female members
•	 experiments with a system of ‘binding’ that requires young family members 
to join the scheme and make contributions before their old parents can qualify 
for a pension, thereby changing a voluntary scheme into a compulsory one. 
Practical issues of this kind can be expected as the new scheme is developed; 
however, it represents a major innovation for rural welfare and the rural elderly. 
Furthermore, the introduction of the new rural pension plan also created 
a challenge for migrant workers and for the operation of their old-age insurance 
schemes. They now face a range of choices. They may opt to join the local rural 
pension in their home village, to enrol in local insurance schemes for township 
and village employees, to enrol in any remaining special schemes for migrants 
in some cities or to join the basic urban scheme. They might also need to shift 
between these as their employment changes. The fragmentation of the schemes 
and the uncertainty about the differences in final outcomes for each of them 
makes a clear choice difficult. From the administrative point of view, maintaining 
reliable and accurate records of highly mobile migrants and calculating the 
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ratios for the transfer of entitlements and benefits between schemes that operate 
with different standards are both very difficult. These challenges for migrant 
workers underline the fact that, in the long term, the need is to move towards 
a standard, integrated national scheme for all citizens, regardless of where they 
live and work. 
A further key issue facing the old-age insurance system is the management of 
the accumulated funds. Contributory old-age insurance schemes have a lifetime 
of up to 60 or more years for each member in order to cover both the period 
of accumulation and the period of payment of benefits. Commitment to long-
term participation requires trust in the security of the fund and a belief that 
value will be preserved and will grow. If the system is not transparent and 
accountable or there is a fear of corruption and misuse then support for it is 
low. Members also need to have access to information on the performance of the 
fund and their individual accounts. Given that China’s transitional structure 
means that there are still many retirees with unfunded ‘empty accounts’, the 
security of the fund remains an issue. According to Zhao et al. (2006:55), in 
1999, 26 provinces operated with a deficit and in 2001 a number of provincial 
fund outgoings exceeded income by close to 30 per cent. One estimate put 
the national shortfall between accumulation and liabilities at RMB2.5 trillion 
(Wang 2005:8). Another recent estimate by expert commentator Zheng Bingwen 
(Dongfang Zaobao, 16 March 2012:A30) suggested a total of RMB1.7 trillion of 
such empty accounts. Some studies also suggest that these figures will blow out 
over the next 50 years. While the reliability of such claims can be questioned, 
the size indicates the scale of the challenge. It is not surprising therefore that 
Article 56 of the Social Insurance Law states that ‘the balance between income 
and expenditure of the social insurance funds will be realized through the 
budget’ and that governments at the county level and above will subsidise 
any deficits. Furthermore, the China Social Insurance web site takes pains 
to underline that the empty accounts may be managed through government 
subsidies (CNSS 2012). In effect, the system as a whole is not yet fully funded 
and in many ways operates as a pay-as-you-go fund.
The amount of capital involved is substantial. In 2010, the Renmin Ribao 
reported that the current size of the social security fund was about US$130 
billion and by 2015 it would grow to US$300 billion (Renmin Ribao, 11 April 
2010). The MOHRSS reported that in 2010, total income in the old-age insurance 
fund was some RMB1.35 trillion (including RMB1.95 billion of fiscal subsidies) 
(MOHRSS 2011). These funds represent a large and growing source of capital. At 
present, however, fund management is very conservative and is regulated to rely 
only on bank deposits and government bonds. There is no investment in stocks, 
property or other assets. Given the many risks of corruption and misuse, these 
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restrictions are understandable. This does, however, mean that the potential to 
preserve value against inflation and to grow value to match rising incomes and 
expectations is very limited. Not surprisingly, the ministry is now considering 
some experiments to improve investment performance, though the security of 
the funds remains a paramount concern (China Daily, 26 October 2011).
The above discussion has highlighted the many challenges facing the 
development of China’s old-age insurance system. These include 
•	 the legacies of the old system and its expectations
•	 the complexities of overcoming the fragmented structure
•	 the burdens of the transition to a fully funded scheme
•	 the significant improvements in the management and information systems 
that are needed 
•	 the political economy of the conflicts of interests involved—the local 
governments, the employers, the local residents, the migrants and the 
different levels of government all have competing stakes in the way the 
system operates. 
Nevertheless, the system as a whole continues to develop.  Table 12.1 lists 
some recent statistics on the growth in membership of old-age insurance schemes, 
drawn from a number of sources.  While the figures must, inevitably, be treated 
with caution, the reports indicate that the extent of coverage is growing and the 
system is becoming more elaborated.  They also show that many people in each 
category are yet to become members and also that migrant workers continue to 
be excluded.  Nevertheless, the issues are a major public concern.  A web search 
of Chinese sources with such questions as: ‘how do I claim my old-age benefits’, 
‘can I still get medical benefits when I am drawing unemployment insurance’, 
and so forth will yield a lot of discussion of the rules and their implementation.
While the distance between policy and implementation remains large and 
coverage still has many gaps, the significance of the issues facing an ageing 
society appears to have been recognised. As a result, the Twelfth Five-Year Plan 
adopted in March 2011 calls for 
•	 all-round implementation of the rural pension plan
•	 further improvement of the basic urban insurance and unemployed resident 
insurance schemes
•	 realisation of provincial-level pooling
•	 national integration of the age funds
•	 realisation of better transfer and portability mechanisms
•	 gradual extension of the linkages between urban and rural schemes 
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•	 reform of government and public welfare enterprise pension systems.
This agenda is extensive, but failure to realise it would have major implications 
for China’s sustainable development.
Table 12.1 Membership of Old-age Insurance Schemes (millions)
Item 2009 2010 2011
Total population 1334.7 1341 1347.4
Urban employment 311 347 359
Total number of migrant workers 230 242 253
Members of basic urban old-age insurance 235.5 257 284
Of which:    
pensioners 58 63 68.2
migrants 26.5 32.8  
Members of rural pension plan 86.9 102.8 326
Of which:    
pensioners 15.6 28.6 98.8
Members of non-employed urban residents 
scheme
  13.34
Of which:    
pensioners   6.4
Source: Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security 2009 and 2010 Statistical Reports, Wen Jiabao’s 
2011 Government Work Report, March 2012 State Statistical Bureau, Annual Communiques on Economic 
and Social Development 2009/2010/2011.
Lessons and Conclusions
This study has outlined the main features of the development of China’s 
social security system, and especially its old-age insurance schemes. It has 
emphasised the importance of these reforms for social justice and equity on 
the one hand and for sustaining growth and rebalancing the economy on the 
other. It suggests that there are a number of features that are now needed for 
successful and sustainable policy development in China. First, an integrated 
national system with equal access to all citizens is most likely to provide both 
social equity and efficiency of management. It would reduce barriers to labour 
mobility and simplify the complexities of service provision. Second, it will be 
important for the state to continue to provide system guarantees and to sustain 
a social safety net to cover retirement incomes for those who are disadvantaged 
or fall outside the system. Third, portability and flexibility of design and 
operation are essential. The system needs to be able to respond to the many 
adjustments that will take place in an individual’s circumstances as structural 
economic change continues and the economic and demographic changes in an 
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ageing society. This challenge is thrown into stark relief by the needs of migrant 
workers. They represent the bulk of China’s young labour force and preparations 
for their retirement are urgently required while they are still working. Fourth, it 
is necessary to design ways in which accumulated funds can preserve and grow 
value, while at the same time reducing or offsetting the risks created by exposure 
to market changes. Fifth, given the different life expectations and experiences of 
women and men, a gender perspective is needed when policy is being designed. 
Otherwise, there is the prospect of a growing cohort of old but poor women. 
Finally, the most successful public policy development and management require 
open, transparent and consultative processes. Citizens need to understand and 
trust the system. The ways competing interests are balanced against each other 
need to be debated and articulated. In this way, public confidence can be built 
and policy can be broadly supported and implemented.
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13. An Empirical Study of 
China’s High-Tech Industry 
Innovation Capability in 
Transition
Zhiyun Zhao and Chaofeng Yang
Introduction
Since the reform and opening up, the growth mode of China’s economy 
has essentially featured a heavy reliance on investment and exports and 
intense input of low-cost resources and factors. Such a mode was reasonable 
to some extent when China lagged behind in economic development and its 
economic aggregate accounted for a relatively small proportion of the world 
economy. With China’s continuous economic growth, however, the costs of this 
growth mode have become increasingly large, including resource depletion, 
environmental damage, a gradually widening wealth gap, significantly increased 
social conflicts and more frequent international trade friction. The international 
financial crisis and the severe recession that it triggered spelt an end to the 
rapid economic growth experienced since the 1980s, and especially since the 
turn of the new century, which caused a profound adjustment of the global 
economy. Consequently the external environment for China’s development has 
changed deeply and extensively. Urgent demands are thus generated for China 
to transform its economy as soon as possible from the traditional economic 
growth mode based on resources, capital and labour to the new mode based 
primarily on innovation.
The high-tech industry, with characteristics of high growth, large driving 
forces and high value added, is a strategically leading industry in the 
national economy, playing an important role in industrial restructuring and 
transformation of the economic development pattern. In 2010, the total output 
value of China’s high-tech industry reached RMB7.47 trillion, accounting 
for 10.56 per cent of the total output value of the large and medium-sized 
enterprises in that year. China has become the world’s major manufacturing 
base for high-tech products, with an important role in the international high-
tech production chain. During the development process, however, there have 
been several problems in China’s high-tech industry, including weak innovation 
capacity, low technology intensity and poor economic efficiency. A top agenda 
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item for China’s government, high-tech industry and academia is to improve the 
innovation capability of China’s high-tech industry and make it play a greater 
role in China’s ongoing economic transformation.
In recent years, some scholars have carried out empirical research on 
innovation performance in China from the regional and industrial points of 
view. The major studies from a regional perspective of innovation efficiency 
in China are summarised as follows. Shi and Zhao (2009) calculate the regional 
innovation efficiency in China and analyse its spatial discrepancy using the 
stochastic frontier approach. Li (2007) conducted an empirical analysis of the 
efficiency factors influencing the regional innovation capability differences in 
China, taking the number of invention patent applications granted as indicators 
of innovation output. Guo et al. (2007) analysed the ability of technology 
innovation and its influencing factors for the six provinces of central China 
by establishing a knowledge production function model with fixed effects and 
variable intercept. Yang (2008) studied the technological innovation capacity 
of large and medium-sized enterprises in different regions and conducted 
a comprehensive evaluation using the factor analysis method. The major 
literature on Chinese innovation efficiency from an industrial perspective is 
summarised as follows. Zhang and Feng (2007), through their panel data analysis 
of 28 sectors in China’s high-tech industry, discussed the relationship between 
market structure, research and development (R&D) investment and economic 
performance under different industrial characteristics. Zhi (2009) used the 
stochastic frontier method to analyse the technological innovation performance 
of China’s electronic information industry. Han (2010) also applied the stochastic 
frontier method to conduct an empirical analysis of the innovation efficiency of 
China’s high-tech industry. These studies have contributed a lot to this research 
field and provide a number of policy ideas to promote China’s innovation 
capacity; however, there are also some shortcomings in previous studies, which 
can be viewed from the following three aspects. First, the majority of scholars 
selected sales revenues of new products and the number of patent applications 
as the output indicators of innovation. Though it is generally believed that the 
number of patents—information for which is relatively easy to obtain and use in 
statistical analyses—is a good indicator of innovation output, there are still some 
limitations. On the one hand, not all innovation will be registered as patents. 
On the other hand, the tendency to apply for patents varies with enterprises’ 
size. Large enterprises often rely on a monopoly of market and technology to 
protect innovation while small companies are more willing to apply for patents 
in order to protect their innovation from infringements by other companies with 
more resources (Comanor and Scherer 1969). These are issues that should be 
addressed in future research. Second, when choosing indicators of innovation, 
most scholars do not take the knowledge stock into account. The generation 
of new knowledge depends not only on investment in R&D and personnel, 
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but also on the existing knowledge stock. Third, when choosing the factors 
affecting innovation efficiency, most scholars consider market structure and 
government support for innovation activities. These factors are very important 
when examining the innovation efficiency of different countries, but they are 
not necessarily differentiating across industries in the one country. For China, 
as an economy in transition, factors that affect innovation efficiency should 
be determined by taking into consideration the characteristics of regional or 
industrial development during the transition period.
This chapter strives to achieve a breakthrough in the above aspects. 
An analytical model is established to evaluate the innovation capability of high-
tech industries in China, and the influencing factors of innovation capability 
are discussed. The chapter is organised as follows: the first section is the 
introduction; the second section briefly analyses the characteristics of China’s 
high-tech industries during the transition period; the third section introduces 
the model and accounts for the variable selection; the fourth section details the 
empirical analysis; and the final section contains the conclusions and policy 
recommendations. 
Characteristics of China’s High-Tech Industry 
During the Transition Period
Since its entry into the World Trade Organisation (WTO), China has witnessed 
rapid growth in its high-tech industry and has leapt into the front ranks of the 
world in terms of scale through taking an active part in economic globalisation. 
But, unlike developed countries, China’s economic system is in a transitional 
period. In such a special period, the development of China’s high-tech industry 
is significantly distinct from that of developed countries.
Significantly Increased R&D Activities
In recent years, investments in R&D activities and personnel for China’s 
high-tech industry have increased dramatically. R&D expenditures expanded 
rapidly from RMB36.25 billion in 2005 to RMB96.78 billion in 2010, increasing 
170 per cent in six years. R&D personnel rose from 173 000 people (full-time 
equivalent) in 2005 to 399 000 people in 2010—an increase of 130 per cent in 
six years (Figure 13.1).
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Figure 13.1 R&D Investments of China’s High-Tech Industry, 2005–10
Source: Authors’ own calculation using the data from China Statistical Yearbook on Science and Technology.
Driven by these investments, the R&D output of the high-tech industry 
in China has grown rapidly. There were less than 10 000 invention patent 
applications in China’s high-tech industries in 2005, but there were 35 000 
applications in 2010, increasing at an average annual growth rate of 29.7 per cent. 
Such a growth rate is rare even in developed countries. At the same time, the 
number of invention patents in force owned by China’s high-tech industries had 
soared to more than 50 000 in 2010 (Figure 13.2).
Figure 13.2 Number of Invention Patents in China’s High-Tech Industry, 2005–10
Source: Authors’ own calculation using the data from China Statistical Yearbook on Science and Technology.
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Low R&D Intensity and Productivity
Technology intensity is a basic international standard for high-tech industry. 
Only those industries with technology intensity significantly higher or several 
times higher than the average intensity of all manufacturing industries can be 
defined as high-tech industries. R&D expenditure intensity is an important 
indicator of technology intensity. In the United States, Germany, France, Britain 
and other developed countries, the R&D intensity of the high-tech industries is 
three or four times higher than the average level of manufacturing industries. 
In contrast, the R&D intensity of China’s high-tech industry (1.3 per cent) 
was only about two times that of the manufacturing industry (0.62 per cent) 
in 2010—far lower than the level of the abovementioned countries (Figure 13.3). 
This  indicates that the technology intensity of China’s high-tech industries 
is still low and the innovation capacity of enterprises is relatively poor.
Figure 13.3 R&D Intensity of China’s High-Tech Industry, 2006–10
Source: Authors’ own calculation using the data from China Statistical Yearbook on Science and Technology.
Paradoxically, ‘low-tech’ is a more appropriate description of China’s ‘high-
tech’ enterprises. Although the products they produce are called ‘high-tech 
products’, they assemble such products rather than design and build them 
completely. The rapid expansion of China’s high-tech industry in the past 
six years was based on scale expansion more than on industrial upgrading. 
The overall labour productivity of China’s manufacturing industry was RMB726 
400 per capita in 2010—an increase of 100 per cent compared with that of 2005; 
meanwhile, the overall labour productivity in high-tech industry increased by 
only 32 per cent. The labour productivity of China’s high-tech industry in 2010 
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was even lower than the overall level of the manufacturing industry, reflecting 
the slow improvement of production efficiency in China’s high-tech industry 
(Figure 13.4).
Figure 13.4 Labor Productivity of China’s High-Tech Industry and Manufacturing 
Industry, 2005–10
Source: Authors’ own calculation using the data from China Statistical Yearbooks and China Statistical 
Yearbook on Science and Technology.
Acquiring Technologies Mostly from Domestic Providers
The external channels of technology acquisition for China’s high-tech 
industry mainly include acquisition of foreign technologies and the purchase of 
domestic technologies. During the period 2005–10, China’s high-tech industry 
experienced an increase and then a decrease in its expenditures for acquisition 
of foreign technologies, with the peak—RMB13 billion—in 2007. Since then, it 
has decreased continuously, to RMB6.88 billion in 2010—almost half of that in 
2007 and RMB1.6 billion less than in 2005 (Figure 13.5). At the same time, the 
funds for purchasing domestic technologies of high-tech industries in China 
increased steadily, from RMB950 million in 2005 to RMB2.13 billion in 2010. 
This indicates the gradual change in the technology sources of China’s high-tech 
industries from foreign channels towards domestic providers.
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Figure 13.5 Expenditure for Acquisition of Foreign Technology and Purchase 
of Domestic Technology of China’s High-Tech Industry, 2005–10
Source: Authors’ own calculation using the data from China Statistical Yearbooks and China Statistical 
Yearbook on Science and Technology.
Research Methods and Data
As innovation is a process of knowledge production and commercialisation, 
we can explore the industry’s innovation capability through the knowledge 
production function. The knowledge production function was initially proposed 
by Griliches (1979) when he estimated the contribution of R&D to economic 
growth using the production function. Improved by Jaffe (1989), the Griliches–
Jaffe knowledge production function model was developed. The knowledge 
production function connects the inputs and outputs of innovation, thus, we can 
get a better understanding of the driving forces, nature and influencing factors 
of knowledge production through the study of it, and furthermore promote 
knowledge production and innovation. A large body of empirical research has 
found that a knowledge production function does exist in the real world and 
that it is a good statistical model for the study of knowledge and innovation. 
It has been proven by most empirical studies at the national or industry level 
(Anselin et al. 1997; Blind and Grupp 1999; Bode 2004). The  Griliches–Jaffe 
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In Equation 13.1, K denotes the innovation output; RD denotes R&D 
investment; Z is the series of factors that affects innovation output (such as 
knowledge stock); e is random disturbances; and i are decision-making units in 
high-tech industries.
Given the shortcomings we have identified regarding the use of the 
number of patents to measure innovation output, we use the number of new 
product development projects and sales revenue of new products to measure 
the innovation output in this study. According to the definition in the China 
Statistical Yearbook on Science and Technology (NBS 2009), the new product 
time series captures ‘new products developed and produced by adopting new 
technological principles and new design concepts, or products with performance 
obviously enhanced or functions expanded through significant improvement in 
structure, material or techniques of the original products’. The new products 
include both those that have applied for patents and those that have not yet 
applied. Using the number of new product development projects can overcome 
the estimation bias caused by the differences of tendency to apply for patents 
across industries. In addition, in order to make up for the weakness of the number 
of new product development projects in measuring the direct contribution of 
innovation to economic growth, we also use the sales revenue of new products 
to measure the innovation output. It should be noted that it is also inappropriate 
to measure the innovation output with the sales revenue of new products only, 
because the industry’s innovation capability is not necessarily strong when the 
sales revenue of new products is high considering the market size of different 
industries. Thus, it is better to use both indicators.
Compared with the measurement of innovative output, the measurement 
of innovation is relatively easy. Considering the characteristics of knowledge 
production, in addition to the R&D expenditure and R&D personnel, we regard 
the knowledge stock as an important input factor of knowledge production, for 
the knowledge stock could reflect the knowledge production status quo and 
development potential of technological innovation of an industry or a region. 
It is also a key measure of industrial or regional innovation capability. There have 
been no uniform standards for the estimation of knowledge stock. Following the 
approach used by Acs et al. (2002), the number of effective invention patents is 
used to measure the knowledge stock here. 
For the factors affecting innovation output, combined with the characteristics 
of the transitional economy, we consider three factors: the expenditure for 
acquisition of foreign technology, the purchase of domestic technology and 
enterprise size. In developed countries, innovation is mainly performed through 
R&D activities; but in an economy in transition, innovation is based more on 
technological learning, mainly through the absorption of external technologies 
instead of independent R&D efforts (Gil et al. 2003). In addition, with regard to 
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the impact of enterprise size on innovation output, it is commonly agreed that 
such an impact exists, though views differ on whether the innovation efficiency 
is higher in small enterprises or in large enterprises. In this chapter, the average 
output value per enterprise in the industry is adopted to measure the size of the 
enterprise in the high-tech industry.
A defect in using traditional regression analysis to estimate a knowledge 
function is the assumption that production is carried out on the production 
possibility frontier. But in fact, most producers often deviate from the 
optimal production plan, resulting in inefficiency to some extent. There are 
usually two types of methods to identify inefficient items: parametric and 
non-parametric methods. Data envelope analysis is the main non-parametric 
method. It establishes the production frontier through linear programming and 
uses the distance function to calculate the efficiency of the production unit. 
The advantage of this method is that there is no need to assume a particular form 
of production function or make an assumption of the distribution of inefficiency 
in the sample(s). Its flaw is its assumption that there are no random errors 
affecting the output. Stochastic frontier analysis is the main parametric method. 
It is based on the idea of dividing the deviation of the actual production unit 
from the frontier into random error and inefficiency, estimating the frontier 
production function using the metric method. Compared with data envelope 
analysis, stochastic frontier analysis has a more solid theoretical foundation 
and can separate the potential impact caused by random errors and provide 
a variety of statistical tests to judge the quality of model fit. So, we choose the 
stochastic frontier model for our estimation.
The stochastic frontier model was first put forward by Aigner et al. (1977) 
and Meeusen and van den Broeck (1977), then expanded and developed by 
Jondrow, Battese and Coelli and other researchers with the flexibility and 
applicability improved. According to the definition of the stochastic frontier 
production function by Battese and Coelli (1995), we set up the stochastic 
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Equation 13.5
RDK denotes R&D expenditure; RDL denotes R&D personnel; KS is the 
knowledge stock measured by the number of invention patents in force; vit is 
the random observation error normally distributed and independent of uit, the 
inefficient error, which is a random variable from a truncated normal distribution 
with its mean as mit and variance as ; mit is expressed as a linear combination 
of a set of influencing factors; TIF is the expenditure for acquisition of foreign 
technologies; TID is the expenditure for purchase of domestic technologies; and 
ES is the enterprise size.
Compared with more traditional estimation methods, the advantages 
of stochastic frontier analysis lie in its consideration of the inefficiency item. 
How  then to determine the effectiveness of the stochastic frontier function? 
If there is no inefficient item in the model or the inefficient item is not obvious, 
it would be more appropriate to use the traditional method. According to 
Battese and Corra (1977), the coefficient of variation can be used to determine 
the effectiveness of the frontier function model. The coefficient of variation 
is defined as follows (Equation 13.6).
Equation 13.6
When Y is close to one, indicating that the inefficient item accounts for 
the main part of the deviation of the production units from the frontier, it is 
appropriate to use the frontier function model; if Y is close to zero, indicating 
that the random error is the main component, it is better to use traditional 
estimation methods.
After the effectiveness of the model is tested, the estimated value of 
innovation efficiency can be calculated by the following formula (Kumbhakar 
and Lovell 2000) (Equation 13.7).
Equation 13.7
The data in this chapter come from the China Statistical Yearbook and China 
Statistical Yearbook on Science and Technology. According to the related statistical 
indicators of the National Bureau of Statistics, China’s high-tech industry is 
divided into five major categories (namely, medicine manufacturing industry, 
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aircraft and spacecraft manufacturing industry, electronic and communication 
equipment manufacturing industry, computers and office equipment 
manufacturing industry, and medical equipment and meters manufacturing 
industry), which are further divided into 17 classes. Each class of industries is 
treated as a decision-making unit. The sample period is 2005–10. The descriptive 
statistics for all variables are shown in Table 13.1.
Table 13.1 Descriptive Statistics of Variables
Maximum Minimum Mean Standard 
deviation
Sales revenue of new 
products (RMB10 000)
42 748 772.6 37 857.00 6 742 440.14 8 750 481.42
Number of new product 
development projects 
(10 000)
9316.00 57.00 2179.94 2162.41
R&D expenditure 
(RMB10 000)
3 047 068.40 14 160.00 382 918.57 491 888.58
R&D personnel (man-years) 98 637.00 341.00 16 845.96 19 518.94
Number of invention 
patents in force
23 979.00 2.00 1428.87 3040.46
Expenditure for acquisition 
of foreign technologies 
(RMB10 000)
335 532.00 0.00 50 658.77 76 498.78
Expenditure for purchase 
of domestic technologies 
(RMB10 000)
222 193.00 0.00 10 357.91 24 574.96
Enterprise size (0.1 billion/
enterprise)
64.48 0.44 4.06 9.72
Source: Authors’ own calculation based on data from China Statistical Yearbook on Science and Technology.
Empirical Results and Analysis
Estimation Results
The estimation software we used is FRONTIER4.1. In order to reduce the 
impact of outliers on the estimated results and make the estimated coefficient 
easier to explain (as a coefficient of elasticity), all variables were converted to 
natural logarithms. In addition, in terms of the input/output delay that must be 
dealt with in the model estimation, most researchers set it as long as one year 
when facing direct R&D output (such as the number of patent applications), 
and two years when facing indirect R&D output (such as the contribution of 
R&D investments to economic growth). According to the above tradition, the 
input/output delay is set to two years when the sales revenue of new products 
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is used as an innovation output indicator, and one year when the number of 
new product development projects is used as an innovation output indicator. 
Table 13.2 shows the estimation results under different conditions.
Table 13.2 Estimation Results
Variables Number of new product 
development projects
Sales revenue of new products
Coefficient Standard 
deviation
T value Coefficient Standard 
deviation
T value
Factors affecting the function frontier
Constant 0.57993 0.92501 0.62694 5.04503** 2.43261 2.07392
RDK 0.40839** 0.18123 2.25345 1.41651* 0.25939 5.46102
RDL 0.20830** 0.20996 1.99205 0.71739* 0.22210 3.22998
KS 0.11571** 0.06575 1.75985 0.02347 0.11030 0.21274
Factors affecting the efficiency
Constant 0.97835 0.62917 1.55498 4.28012* 1.49926 2.85482
TIF –0.03579 0.03065 –1.16755 –0.14040 0.13325 –1.05366
TID –0.12382* 0.03564 –3.47410 –0.21459 0.19943 –1.07600
ES 0.34534* 0.10922 3.16196 –0.78163*** 0.65169 –1.29939
Model test and other settings
Coefficient 
of variation





* statistically significant at the 1 per cent level
** statistically significant at the 5 per cent level
*** statistically significant at the 10 per cent level
Source: Authors’ own estimation.
It can be seen from the coefficient of variation estimated through the stochastic 
frontier model in the antepenultimate row of Table 13.2 that a considerable part 
of the variance can be attributed to the efficiency factor under both assumptions. 
It strongly supports our use of the stochastic frontier analysis model.
Known from Table 13.2, the number of new product development projects is 
significantly correlated with the R&D expenditure and R&D personnel, as well 
as the knowledge stock, while the sales revenue of new products is significantly 
correlated with the R&D expenditure and R&D personnel, but not with the 
knowledge stock. One possible reason for this difference is the lower quality 
of R&D outputs in China’s high-tech industry; many R&D outputs can be used 
for further R&D activities and produce patents, but only a relatively small 
proportion of them can be successfully commercialised. In terms of the size of the 
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coefficients, the estimation results show that, if the R&D expenditure increases 
by 1 per cent, the number of new product development projects will increase 
by 0.41 per cent and sales revenue will increase by 1.42 per cent, assuming 
that other variables are constant; if the number of R&D personnel increases 
by 1 per cent, the number of new product development projects will increase 
by 0.21 per cent and sales revenue will increase by 0.72 per cent. The direct 
R&D output/input coefficient is large while the final output/input coefficient is 
small, which, to some extent, confirms the view previously mentioned that the 
rapid expansion of China’s high-tech industries is more a scale expansion at low 
technical level without the quality of economic growth improving accordingly.
As to the factors affecting the innovation efficiency of China’s high-tech 
industry, the expenditure for acquisition of foreign technologies is statistically 
significant neither with the number of new product development projects nor 
with sales revenue of new products, indicating that the acquisition of foreign 
technologies had no important influence on the innovation capability of China’s 
high-tech industry during the sample period. One possible reason for this result 
is that, compared with other industries, developed countries impose more 
strict limits on high technology exports against developing countries due to 
intellectual property concerns so that China’s high-tech industries might benefit 
from the introduction of foreign technologies in a very limited way.
When using the number of new product development projects as the measure 
of innovation output, the estimated coefficient of expenditure for the purchase 
of domestic technologies is negative and statistically significant. It indicates that 
the mean of inefficiency level uit will decrease with the increase of expenditure 
for the purchase of domestic technologies and thereby the innovation efficiency 
will increase. This shows that the R&D achievements of China’s R&D institutions 
other than high-tech enterprises play a significant role in promoting the R&D 
activities in high-tech industry. When using the sales revenue of new products 
as a measure of innovation output, the estimated coefficient of expenditure for 
the purchase of domestic technologies is negative but statistically insignificant. 
It shows the introduction of domestic technologies by high-tech industry has 
no significant impact on its final innovation output. To some extent, this result 
suggests that high-tech enterprises in China focus more on the introduction of 
assembly lines than on the absorption and commercialisation of technology.
When using the number of new product development projects as the measure 
of innovation output, the estimated coefficient of enterprise size is positive and 
statistically significant. This means the enterprise size has a negative impact 
on the innovation output of China’s high-tech industry. When using the sales 
revenue of new products as the measure of innovation output, the coefficient 
of enterprise size is negative and statistically significant, indicating that the 
enterprise size has a positive impact on the innovation output of China’s high-
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tech industry. This apparently confusing result is not necessarily contradictory. 
It is a general problem that China’s large-scale enterprises pay little attention to 
R&D, but these enterprises can acquire more economic benefits (extract higher 
margins) from a small number of innovations through their market power.
Comparison of Innovation Efficiency
Using the model estimation results, we can calculate the estimated innovation 
efficiency of the 17 industries in each year (see Tables 13.3 and 13.4).
Table 13.3 Estimated Innovative Efficiency (with the number of new product 
development projects as the indicator of innovation output)
Industry 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Mean
Chemical medicines 0.732 0.661 0.807 0.791 0.622 0.723
Finished traditional Chinese 
medicines
0.706 0.617 0.750 0.714 0.447 0.647
Biological and biochemical 
products
0.426 0.475 0.702 0.664 0.274 0.508
Aeroplane making and repair 0.575 0.642 0.497 0.463 0.447 0.525
Spacecraft 0.222 0.391 0.172 0.077 0.046 0.181
Communications equipment 0.210 0.223 0.386 0.442 0.199 0.292
Radar and its fittings 0.592 0.541 0.503 0.398 0.484 0.504
Broadcasting and television 
equipment
0.711 0.270 0.570 0.487 0.185 0.445
Electronic appliances 0.534 0.707 0.746 0.706 0.392 0.617
Electronic components 0.898 0.724 0.827 0.763 0.594 0.761
Domestic televisions and radios 0.688 0.679 0.634 0.506 0.495 0.600
Other electronic equipment 0.374 0.321 0.808 0.474 0.272 0.450
Computers 0.250 0.136 0.142 0.110 0.555 0.239
Computer peripherals 0.235 0.247 0.324 0.279 0.372 0.291
Office equipment 0.152 0.310 0.293 0.307 0.180 0.248
Medical equipment and 
appliances
0.314 0.357 0.685 0.619 0.227 0.440
Measuring instruments 0.698 0.721 0.894 0.852 0.456 0.724
Mean 0.489 0.472 0.573 0.509 0.367 0.482
Source: Authors’ own estimation.
It can be seen from Table 13.3 that, when using the number of new product 
development projects as the indicator of innovation output, the electronic 
components industry, measuring instruments industry and chemical medicines 
industry were significantly better than others in innovation efficiency. 
This  could be closely associated with their greater experience in global 
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competition and deeper integration into the global value chain than other 
industries. The innovation efficiency of the manufacture of spacecraft was the 
lowest—only 0.181, which is greatly below that of the electronic components 
industry (0.761). The innovation efficiency of the computer industry was also 
relatively low. These two industries are related with a state’s security. Obviously, 
there is still a long way to go to improve the innovation capability of high-tech 
industry.
From the perspective of the dynamic trends, the innovation efficiency 
of  China’s high-tech industry remained low during 2006–10. It reached its 
peak in 2008 and then declined dramatically. Such a dividing line indicates 
that the international financial crisis changed the dynamics in many industries. 
Overall, the innovation efficiency of China’s high-tech industry increased slowly 
in the past five years, leaving much room for further improvement.
Table 13.4 Estimated Innovative Efficiency (with the sales revenue of new products 
as the indicator of innovation output)
Industry 2007 2008 2009 2010 Mean
Chemical medicines 0.591 0.695 0.743 0.730 0.690
Finished traditional Chinese medicines 0.387 0.444 0.507 0.563 0.475
Biological and biochemical products 0.381 0.627 0.573 0.312 0.473
Aeroplane making and repair 0.776 0.762 0.369 0.404 0.578
Spacecraft 0.038 0.104 0.067 0.064 0.068
Communications equipment 0.833 0.825 0.878 0.846 0.846
Radar and its fittings 0.551 0.231 0.149 0.375 0.326
Broadcasting and television equipment 0.531 0.400 0.481 0.305 0.429
Electronic appliances 0.721 0.767 0.800 0.729 0.754
Electronic components 0.726 0.619 0.738 0.770 0.713
Domestic televisions and radios 0.694 0.710 0.777 0.733 0.729
Other electronic equipment 0.590 0.869 0.781 0.520 0.690
Computers 0.905 0.884 0.809 0.874 0.868
Computer peripherals 0.865 0.866 0.670 0.894 0.824
Office equipment 0.804 0.480 0.385 0.681 0.587
Medical equipment and appliances 0.264 0.444 0.445 0.174 0.332
Measuring instruments 0.691 0.828 0.801 0.613 0.733
Mean 0.609 0.621 0.587 0.564 0.595
Source: Authors’ own estimation.
It can be seen from Table 13.4 that, when using the sales revenue of new 
products as the indicator of innovation output, computers, communications 
equipment and computer peripherals were significantly better than other 
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industries in innovation efficiency. This could be a result of the huge consumer 
market for these industries in China. The average innovation efficiency of the 
manufacture of spacecraft industry was the lowest—only 0.068—significantly 
lower than that of the computer industry, with the highest innovation efficiency 
(0.868). It is clear that there are enormous obstacles for the commercialisation of 
the R&D results in China’s spacecraft industry.
Though different indicators are used to measure innovation output, we can 
see the trend of the changes in the innovation efficiency of China’s high-tech 
industry is consistent—that is, an inverted U-shape.
Conclusions 
A country’s international competitiveness and its role in the world economy 
depend on its innovation capability in high-tech industry, which is also an 
important indicator for developing countries to graduate to developed status. 
In this chapter, the stochastic frontier knowledge production function model is 
applied to conduct an empirical analysis of innovation efficiency of China’s high-
tech industry in transition. The results show that, during the period 2005–10
1. the knowledge stock did not play a major role in China’s high-tech industry 
innovation
2. the effects of acquisition of foreign technology on innovation capability 
in China’s high-tech industry were not statistically obvious
3. the effects of the purchase of domestic technology on the R&D output 
of China’s high-tech industry were obvious, but the economic benefits due 
to the purchase of domestic technology were not statistically obvious
4. the scale of enterprises in China’s high-tech industry had a negative impact 
on their innovation capability.
The above conclusions have important implications for the development 
of China’s high-tech industry.
First, due to the technological ‘blockade’ imposed by developed countries, 
the role of acquisition of foreign technologies in promoting China’s high-
tech industry is far weaker than that in China’s non-high-tech manufacturing 
industries. With the continuous increase of the share of China’s economy in the 
world economy, we can expect an even stricter technological ‘blockade’ from 
the developed countries. Therefore, the main way to enhance the innovation 
capability of China’s high-tech industry is via local innovation, with the 
importation of foreign technologies as a complementary trend. More preferential 
policies and public funds should be invested in the high-tech industries, 
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especially in the enterprises that have already exhibited innovative ability in 
strategic high-tech industry. Through this channel, China’s high-tech industry 
can enhance its innovation capacity and international competitiveness more 
quickly and occupy the high end of the global industry chain.
Second, as to the poor quality of China’s high-tech industrial development, 
China should change the practice that evaluates regional economic restructuring 
mainly by the output of high-tech industry, and construct a scientific evaluation 
system to guide local governments to pay more attention to the quality of the 
high-tech industry’s development. It will greatly reduce the phenomenon in 
which high-tech industry is treated as the Government’s ‘achievement projects’ 
when promoting economic transformation. At present, many technological 
breakthroughs in China cannot be commercialised and receive returns from the 
market, which greatly reduces the enthusiasm of enterprises for technological 
innovation. Thus, it is necessary for the Government to regulate monopolies 
to create a favourable environment for innovation and enable the innovator 
to realise market value more easily. China must make great efforts to establish 
various types of intermediaries and create a complete business model that can 
commercialise the major technologies. Only in this way can China fundamentally 
address the problems of poor-quality industrial development in its high-tech 
industry.
Third, the empirical result that the effects of purchasing domestic technology 
on the R&D output of China’s high-tech industry was obvious, but the economic 
benefits due to the purchase of domestic technology were not statistically obvious 
shows that technology transfer and cooperation between China’s enterprises does 
help to promote the R&D activities of high-tech industry. Without technological 
barriers, enterprises can make their cooperative R&D on key technologies more 
efficient through the technology transfer between them. It also confirms the 
effectiveness of industrial technology innovation alliances among enterprises. 
It is a good way to accelerate the integration of enterprises’ technologies and 
overcome the key and common technological challenges constraining the 
development of the industry under the guidance of the Government. But, on the 
other hand, the lack of obvious measurable economic benefits reveals that there 
is room for further improvement in the back-end operations of the technology 
innovation alliance among enterprises. In addition to improving the business 
model, it is also very important to coordinate different types of enterprises to 
take on appropriate responsibilities and work together to develop technological 
applications with greater commercial value after achieving breakthroughs in 
key and common technologies. This will ensure that the enterprises in the same 
alliance can position themselves correctly in cooperative R&D according to 
the location of their products in the industrial chain, and carry out strategic 
arrangements to occupy the corresponding market. In this process, the market 
Rebalancing and Sustaining Growth in China
306
mechanism is the principal determinant, while the Government plays only 
a guiding role. Intermediary organisations such as industrial associations and 
professional investors could exert a greater influence; this is the third force to 
promote innovation that China needs to cultivate and develop in the future.
Fourth, according to the empirical result that the size of enterprises in 
China’s high-tech industry had a negative impact on their innovation capability, 
we would make two points. On one hand, it shows once again that being state-
owned is an institutional barrier that has been an important factor hindering 
the functioning of enterprises’ innovation capability, as most of the large 
high-tech enterprises in China are state-owned. It has been a prominent issue 
during China’s current economic restructuring and institutional reform that 
the state-owned enterprises have insufficient motives for innovation. How can 
an effective incentive mechanism be established to stimulate the innovation of 
state-owned enterprises? It is a problem highlighted in the current pattern of 
reform and changing economic development that requires great attention from 
relevant departments and is critical to the success of transition to some extent. 
On the other hand, the empirical result further argues for the important role 
of small and medium-sized high-tech enterprises in the process of economic 
restructuring and changing development mode. It is a crucial issue for the 
successful transformation of China’s economic development mode in the future: 
how to enhance the innovative enthusiasm and capability of small and medium-
sized high-tech enterprises? For the large number of small and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs) in China, due to their small size, the transformation 
is relatively easy for them and the opportunity cost of transformation is also 
relatively low. This reinforces the point that it is appropriate to set as key policy 
priorities the solution of SMEs’ financing difficulties and improving SMEs’ 
innovation capacity. This policy should absolutely be maintained.
Fifth, through the above analysis, in our opinion, over a long period, 
China should insist on its development strategy of innovation and building an 
innovation-oriented nation, further increase R&D investments in enterprises, 
boost their innovation capability to occupy the high-end of the global value 
chain in the favourable period of global industrial adjustment, and drive the 
economic restructuring and change of economic development mode through 
improvement of high-tech industry’s innovation capability. Meanwhile, China 
should further promote the cooperation of industry, colleges and institutes 
through policy guidance to catalyse the commercialisation of new technologies 
and to promote their ability to realise the market value of new technologies. 
China should also carry out various initiatives to speed up technology 
incubation, create new business models to enhance the value added of high-tech 
industry’s products, combine technological innovation, financial innovation, 
industrial innovation and business model innovation to form a strong power 
An Empirical Study of China’s High-Tech Industry Innovation Capability in Transition
307
to improve the overall innovation capability of China’s high-tech industry, 
provide support and play a leading role in accelerating China’s transformation 
of economic development modes.
Finally, it should be noted that there are still shortcomings in this study. 
For example, when determining the factors affecting innovation efficiency, 
due to the availability of data, only the expenditure for acquisition of foreign 
technology and purchase of domestic technology and enterprise size are taken 
into consideration, with industrial market structure, profitability and other 
factors being ignored. In this sense, the conclusions in this chapter are limited. 
These issues should be overcome and improved in our future research. 
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14. The Impact of China’s 
Economic Growth on its 
Water Resources:
A regional and sectoral assessment
Hong Yang, Zhuoying Zhang and Minjun Shi
Introduction
With the astonishing speed of its economic growth during the past four 
decades, China has made unprecedented progress in national development and 
improvements in the living standard of its people. Alongside this achievement, 
however, there has been a continued intensification of water shortages and 
deterioration of water quality. Between 1980 and 2010, total water use increased 
by 35.8. per cent, from 443.7 billion cubic metres to 602.2 billion cu m (Liu and 
Chen 2001; MWR 1997–2010). Total industry and household wastewater 
discharge doubled during the same period. 
China’s water endowments are, overall, unfavourable. Average water 
resources per capita are a mere one-quarter of the world average. The uneven 
spatial and temporal distribution of water resources exacerbates the quantity 
problem. The bulk of water resources are concentrated in the southern part of 
the country, whereas the northern part has a much smaller share of the total 
water resources compared with its proportion of land. China is dominated by 
the East Asian monsoon climate, and a majority of its annual precipitation is 
concentrated in the summer months, leaving the rest of the year with little 
rainfall. Since the late 1980s, water shortages have emerged in many areas in 
China, particularly in the north. The problem has been worsening over the 
years in terms of intensity and coverage. It is reported that in some northern 
cities, the current water supply can barely meet 70 per cent of demand during 
the dry season. Out of 600 medium to large-sized cities, more than half of them 
have insufficient water supplies, and more than 100 of them are experiencing 
severe water shortage (Jiang 2009). Lacking water has caused hardships to 
people’s livelihoods and losses of economic activity. In many northern cities, 
water scarcity has become a bottleneck to the continuation of economic growth. 
Competition for limited water resources has led to a reallocation of agricultural 
water to urban sectors, putting irrigation under great pressure in many areas 
in the north. Food production—a sector heavily dependent on irrigation—is 
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facing the challenge of producing more food with less water. The water that 
is needed for maintaining healthy environmental and ecosystem functions has 
been held back to give priority to meeting the demands of the economic sector.
Along with the intensification of water shortages, water pollution and 
environmental degradation have been serious across the country. Currently, 
many rivers and lakes in the eastern part of the country have water quality 
below Grade V, meaning that the water is too polluted to be suitable for any 
use. Degraded water quality further aggravates the problem of water shortages. 
In the North China Plain, most rivers are now dry either completely or seasonally. 
The ones with water are all heavily polluted and often cannot be used.
Water scarcity and pollution problems have drawn increasing attention in 
China since the late 1990s. Many measures aimed at increasing water supply and 
curbing demand have been put forward; yet the problems remain severe, and 
in many places are worsening. The serious water situation in China has raised 
questions about water and environmental sustainability. How China will deal 
with its water shortage and pollution problems will have significant implications 
for its long-term economic development. 
China’s water problems are also of global concern given the increasing 
connection of China with the rest of the world through the international trade 
of goods and services. International trade between countries entails flows of 
virtual water—that is, the water used for the production of traded products 
(Allan 1997; Yang and Zehnder 2007). An inflow of virtual water through 
trade reduces the pressure on household water resources, whereas an outflow 
of virtual water adds to the pressure. As the ‘world’s manufacturing factory’, 
China uses a large portion of water for the production of its exports. Currently, 
China as a whole is a net ‘virtual water exporter’—that is, the amount of water 
used for the production of exported products is greater than the amount saved 
on imported products. The intensification of water scarcity in China could 
impact on its international trade, which has been an important pillar of its rapid 
economic development since the late 1970s. 
As China struggles to develop effective approaches to alleviate water shortages 
and pollution, a clear understanding of the water situation and its implications 
for economic development is important. The related questions include: how 
much water is available and in what quality across regions? How much water is 
used and for what purposes? Which economic activities are the major polluters 
of water? To what extent has China’s international trade influenced its water 
uses? This chapter addresses these issues. 
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The Status of China’s Water Resources with 
Respect to Quantity and Quality 
Water Resources and their Spatial Distribution
The annual average volume of renewable water resources in China 
is approximately 2812 billion cu m per year, including surface and groundwater 
(MWR 1997–2011). Dividing this volume by the total population of 1.33 billion 
in 2010, average water availability stands at approximately 2100 cu m per capita. 
This figure is roughly one-quarter of the world average and one-sixth of the 
figure for the United States. Thus, China as a whole can be said to be a water-
poor country by world standards. 
China’s water resources are geographically divided into nine major watersheds/
river basins: the Yangtze, Yellow (Huang), Hai-Luan, Huai, Song-Liao, Pearl, 
South-East, South-West and North-West (Table 14.1). The spatial distribution 
of water resources is highly uneven. The Yellow (Huang) River Basin, Hai-Luan 
River Basin and Huai River Basin (hereinafter, the HHH region) have average 
water resources of between 300 cu m/year and 700 cu m/year—substantially 
below the water-scarcity threshold of 1700 cu m/year defined by Falkenmark 
(1995). The Inland region is dominated by arid and semi-arid climates where 
water is extremely scarce. The relatively large volume of per capita water 
resources in the region is mainly because of the sparse population relative to 
the vast territory. The South-West watershed is endowed with abundant water 
resources. Several international rivers originate here, including the Mekong, 
Thanlwin and Brahmaputra; however, most of the water in the south-west is not 
accessible to the rest of the country due to geographical barriers and, to a lesser 
extent, international political sensitivities over shared waters. 
The ratio of water withdrawal to water availability is an indicator of the 
intensity of water use and the pressure on the ecosystem. Forty per cent (or 0.4) 
is a rule-of-thumb ratio commonly used as a benchmark for water criticality 
(Alcamo et al. 1999). The higher the ratio, the greater is the pressure of water 
withdrawal on the available water resources and dependent ecosystems. Table 
14.1 shows the ratio of water withdrawal to water resource availability in the 
major river basins in China. 
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cu m/capita billion cu m billion cu m %
Song-Liao 1704 172.07 64.38 37.42
Hai 358 29.75* 37.00 124.37
Huang 749 61.06 46.67** 76.43
Huai 505 89.06* 63.97 71.83
Yangtze 2388 839.60 197.04 23.47
Pearl 3327 453.62 87.68 19.33
South-East 
watershed
2962 173.52 34.36 19.80
Inland 
watershed
5270 132.34 64.13 48.46
South-West 
watershed
31 914 594.44 11.18 1.88
Nation 2100 2475.52 596.52 24.10
* including water transfer into the Hai River Basin and the Huai River Basin
** including water transfer out of the Yellow River Basin
Sources: MWR (1997–2011).
Currently, the ratios of water withdrawal to water resources availability 
in the Hai, Yellow and Huai Rivers are excessively high compared with the 
internationally recommended sustainable ratio of 40 per cent, indicating severe 
water stress in these basins. The Hai River Basin has a ratio of 124 per cent, 
meaning that the basin is using more water than it has. This is possibly mainly 
due to the exploitation of non-renewable deep aquifers in the North China 
Plain, supplemented with a small amount of desalinated seawater. The result 
has been a drop of the groundwater table at an alarming rate and a depletion of 
water resources in the region. It is estimated that the accumulated overdraft of 
groundwater during the past two decades in the North China Plain has exceeded 
90 billion cu m (Yang and Zehnder 2005). The depletion of groundwater has 
serious consequences, including land subsidence, seawater intrusion and loss of 
ecosystem functions. With the excessively high level of water withdrawal, many 
rivers and their tributaries in the north have had extremely poor ecological 
status. The Yellow River has become a seasonal river, and sent little or no water 
to the sea for most of the late 1990s (MWR 1997–2011). 
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State of Water Quality
The rapid economic growth in China during the past four decades has been 
accompanied by a continuous deterioration of its water quality. In China, water 
quality is divided into five categories that can be described as ‘good’ (grades I, 
II and III) or ‘poor’ (grades IV and V or V+). As shown in Figure 14.1, China’s 
water quality is characterised by extended sections of water of poor quality. 
At the national level, more than 40 per cent of river sections currently have 
poor water quality. In northern China, water-quality degradation is severe in 
all major rivers with the percentage of monitored water sections ranked poor 
exceeding 60 per cent. In the Yangtze and Pearl River Basins in the south, more 
than 30 per cent of the monitored water sections have poor water quality. Water-
quality status presents a serious situation in China, where water shortages and 
degraded quality interact and reinforce the negative effects of each other.
It should be mentioned that the water-quality issue has drawn much 
attention in China and huge investment has been poured into the construction of 
wastewater treatment facilities since the late 1990s; however, little improvement 
has been made so far. In many areas, water quality has been deteriorating. This 
situation is of particular concern for the southern rivers. During the past two 
decades, there has been a clear trend of water-quality degradation in the Yangtze 
and Pearl River Basins (MWR 1997–2011).
Figure 14.1 Water Quality in the Monitored Sections of the Major Rivers 
in China, 2010
Source: MWR (1997–2011).
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While the water quality in rivers is bad, the situation in lakes is generally 
worse because of the slow circulation of water and the high concentration of 
pollution sources in surrounding areas. Among 44 major lakes in China, 56 per 
cent have water quality of grades IV, V and V+. The water quality for the entirety 
of Tai Lake is below Grade III. In the Dianchi and Chao Lakes, water quality is 
below Grade V. The huge investment in the past decade in the improvement of 
water quality in the Tai, Dianchi and Chao Lakes has so far achieved hardly any 
result (MWR 1997–2011).
Changes in Water-Use Quantity and Value 
in Different Sectors 
Trends in Water Use in Different Sectors
Rapid economic development together with continuous population growth 
have generated an increased demand for water. Figure 14.2 shows the changes 
in water use in different sectors between 1980 and 2010.
Figure 14.2 Trends in Water Use by Industry, Domestic (Households) and 
Agriculture, 1980–2010
Sources: Liu and Chen (2001); MWR (1997–2011).
Between 1980 and 2009, total water use in China increased by 34 per cent. 
The increase, however, is solely from the industrial and household sectors. The 
quantity of water use in the industrial sector increased from 45.7 billion cu m 
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to 139.1 billion cu m, or threefold. The household sector had a much faster 
increase, from 6.8 billion cu m to 74.8 billion cu m, or elevenfold. In contrast, 
agricultural water use has experienced a decrease of 5 per cent, from 391.2 billion 
cu m to 372.3 billion cu m. About 19 billion cu m of the agricultural water was 
reallocated to the industrial and household sectors during this period. 
Despite the decrease in agricultural water use, the total irrigated area in China 
expanded by 34 per cent between 1980 and 2010, from 44.89 million hectares to 
60.35 million ha (SSB various years). This has been achieved with improvements 
in water-use efficiency in irrigation. On average, water use per hectare of irrigated 
land decreased from 8240 cu m/ha (549 cu m/mu)1 to 6280 cu m/ha (417 cu m/
mu). The North China Plain has been leading the trend, with current irrigation 
water use of between 3000 cu m/ha and 4000 cu m/ha. In Beijing, irrigation 
water use efficiency is reported to be as high as 0.8 (China Daily, 2011). In most 
other regions, however, irrigation water-use efficiency remains low. In the upper 
and middle reaches of the Yellow River and the north-west inland areas, it is 
below 0.5. Hence, the potential for improving irrigation water-use efficiency is 
considered to be high.
The need to allocate (or reserve) water for environmental uses has received 
attention in recent years. There is some confusion/disagreement about the 
appropriate amount of water required for maintaining healthy ecosystem 
status and functions. This is partly because of the complexity of measuring 
the ecosystem’s water use and partly because of the close relations between 
the ecosystem water requirement and the society’s demand for the quality of 
the aquatic environment. The latter evolves with economic development, as 
described by the Environmental Kuznets Curve (Jia et al. 2006). Despite the 
difficulty of determining the appropriate amount of water for the environment, 
it is clear that with competition for water from the economic sectors, little water 
has been left in the rivers of the northern regions. As the environment cannot 
represent itself in the competition for water, it is ultimately the responsibility 
of the government to ensure the allocation of water for maintaining ecosystem 
health at a level that is acceptable to (and demanded by) the society. 
Changes in Water-Use Values
The quantity of water use per RMB10 000 gross domestic product (GDP) 
value is an indicator used in China to measure the water-use value of the 
economic sectors. Hereinafter, this metric will be referred to as ‘water intensity’. 
Figure 14.3 shows the changes in this metric from 1993 to 2010. Water intensity 
decreased from 771 cu m in 1993 to 382 cu m in 2010. In the industrial sector, 
1  ‘Mu’ is a measure of land area in China. 1 mu is equivalent to 1/15 ha.
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the figures are 363 cu m and 230 cu m, respectively (note that the GDP figure 
comes from a constant price series based on the year 2000). The decrease in 
water intensity is rather slow. This concurs with the generally low efficiency of 
resource use in China. 
Figure 14.3 Sectoral Water Use Per RMB10 000 GDP Values, 1993–2010
Sources: The data for 1993 are from Liu and Chen (2001). The rest of the data are from SSB (various years).
Quantifying water intensity for individual economic sectors is complex 
because of the interconnection of water uses between sectors through the 
input–output relations. For example, the water used for a product in the textile 
industry might come partially from the agricultural sector through the raw 
materials it provided. Hence, the water-use value in the individual sectors 
can be accounted for by the direct water-use coefficient (DWUC) and the total 
water-use coefficient (TWUC), both of which are measured in the same fashion 
as aggregate water intensity. DWUC reflects the direct water intensity at the last 
stage of the production chain (the operational stage for a business or a factory), 
whereas TWUC reflects the water use throughout the whole production chain—
for example, from cotton production to the final production of, say, a pair of 
jeans. Hence, it is also called the ‘life cycle water-use coefficient’. DWUC is the 
conventional measure for the sectoral water intensity; however, it does not reflect 
the total water embodied in final outputs because a large amount of water used 
is in the upstream supply chain. To this end, TWUC provides a more complete 
picture of water use. Based on China’s provincial input–output tables for 2002 
and 2007 and the water-use quotas in individual economic sectors, DWUC and 
TWUC can be estimated. For simplicity, the full industrial classification has 
been compressed into 20 sectors. Table 14.2 shows DWUC and TWUC estimates 
for the individual sectors in 2002 and 2007. 
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Table 14.2 Water-Use Coefficient for 2002 and 2007 (cu m/RMB104)
Sectors
2002 2007
DWUC TWUC DWUC TWUC
1 Agriculture 1582 2068 924 1181
2 Coalmining and processing 38 268 22 140
3 Food and tobacco processing 39 991 23 523
4 Textile goods 37 652 21 520
5 Clothing 7 543 4 306
6 Sawmills and furniture 3 543 2 279
7 Paper and products 109 506 64 320
8 Petroleum processing 30 257 18 144
9 Chemicals 58 417 34 239
10 Non-metal mineral products 27 351 16 184
11 Metal smelting and products 49 386 29 217
12 Machinery and equipment 6 270 3 152
13 Transport equipment 7 291 4 147
14 Electrical equipment, 
telecommunications equipment 4 246 2 140
15 Other manufacturing 6 288 3 165
16 Electricity, gas and water 
production and supply 985 1251 575 840
17 Construction 5 271 3 159
18 Wholesale and retail trade and 
passenger transport 48 226 28 124
19 Restaurants and hotels 206 785 120 441
20 Other services 28 196 16 114
Sources: Zhang et al. (2011, 2012).
The difference between DWUC and TWUC is small in some sectors and large 
in others, reflecting different characteristics of water use in the production 
chain of each sector. In general, ‘Agriculture’ and ‘Electricity, Gas and Water 
Production and Supply’ (hereinafter, utilities) are direct water-use–dominated 
sectors, reflected by the high proportions of DWUCs in TWUCs. In contrast, 
most manufacturing sectors have large indirect water uses. In the sectors 
of ‘Food and Tobacco Processing’, ‘Clothing’, ‘Sawmills and Furniture’, 
‘Machinery and Equipment’, ‘Transport Equipment’, ‘Electrical Equipment’ 
and ‘Telecommunications Equipment’, more than 95 per cent of the water use 
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takes place in an indirect way—that is, in the processing stages prior to the 
final stage. For example, clothing had a DWUC of 7 and a TWUC of 543 in 
2002. This means that about 99 per cent of water use took place in the upstream 
supply chain of the industry. 
For both 2002 and 2007, agriculture had the highest water intensity, with 
a TWUC of 2068 cu m per RMB104 in 2002 and 1181 cu m/RMB104 in 2007. 
This was followed by utilities, which had a TWUC of 1250 in 2002 and 840 in 
2007. The other sectors with relatively high TWUCs are ‘Food and Tobacco’, 
‘Textiles’ and ‘Restaurants and Hotels’, which are indirect water-use dominated. 
Their main water uses were incurred in the upstream supply chain, typically 
through raw materials from the agricultural sector. 
Compared with 2002, in 2007, all the sectors showed notable reductions 
in both DWUC and TWUC. The scale of the reduction is mostly between 
20 per cent and 50 per cent, indicating that considerably less water was used 
in the production of one unit of output in 2007 compared with that in 2002. 
The sectors with the largest reductions in TWUC are ‘Sawmills and Furniture’, 
‘Transport Equipment’, ‘Coalmining and Processing’ and ‘Non-Metal Mineral 
Products’, where the reductions amounted to 49 per cent, 49 per cent, 48 per cent 
and 48 per cent respectively. The pace of the reduction in DWUC and TWUC, 
however, was not fast enough to offset the incremental water use due to the 
expansion of production. Total water use at the national level increased from 
549.7 billion cu m in 2002 to 581.8 billion cu m in 2007. 
Major Sources of Water Pollution 
Sources of water pollution are mainly wastewater discharge from industrial and 
household sectors and non-point source pollutants from agriculture (for example, 
from fertiliser, pesticide, processing residuals, and so on). The official statistics 
on wastewater discharge include only industrial and household wastewater. 
In the industrial sector, statistics for wastewater discharge account for only 
the enterprises at and above county level. Enterprises at the township level 
and below are not included. No information on agricultural water pollution 
is reported partly because of the difficulty of measuring the non-point source 
pollution from agriculture. Figure 14.4 shows the trend in wastewater discharge 
from the industrial and the household sectors during 1981 and 2010. 
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Figure 14.4 Trends in Industry (Enterprises at or Above the County Level) 
and Domestic (Household) Wastewater Discharge, 1981–2010 
Source: SSB (various years).
The quantity of industrial wastewater discharge has not changed significantly 
over the years, while household wastewater discharge has increased rapidly. 
In the 1980s, industrial wastewater dominated the total wastewater discharge. 
The household wastewater discharge surpassed the level from industry in the 
1990s to become the major source of wastewater discharge. Part of the discharged 
wastewater from industry and households is after treatment and meets the state 
discharge quality requirement. According to the official Chinese statistics, 
the proportion of the wastewater discharge meeting the effluent standard has 
increased steadily in the industrial sector. Currently, about 92 per cent of 
industrial wastewater discharge meets the requirement (SSB various years); 
however, as the wastewater discharge and the treatment rates are reported by 
local government agencies, there is a high possibility of underreporting in the 
official statistics. This is because of a strong incentive for reporting smaller 
wastewater discharges, especially of the amount below the effluent standard. 
In reality, the treatment rates for both industrial and household wastewater are 
probably much lower.
Adding to the problems of measurement is pollution from rural enterprises 
that is not accounted for in the official statistics. It must be pointed out that 
the exclusion of wastewater discharge from these enterprises substantially 
understates the intensity of industrial water pollution. Small scale and low 
technology are the common features of rural enterprises. They are notorious for 
releasing heavily polluted wastewater without any treatment. 
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Unlike industrial wastewater discharge, which in general requires treatment 
within the system before release into waterways, household wastewater is 
collected and treated on site or transferred to centralised wastewater treatment 
plants. In reality, due to the lack of collection networks and treatment facilities/
capacities, as well as the generally poor economic returns of the wastewater 
treatment business, a high proportion of household wastewater is released 
to water bodies without treatment. In small cities, the untreated component 
of household wastewater can be as high as 90 per cent (SEPA 2010). 









104 tonnes RMB108 cu m/RMB104
Mining and washing of coal 80 235.5 16 404.27 48.91
Mining and processing of non-
ferrous metal ores 37 307.31 2814.67 132.55
Processing of food from 
agricultural products 143 837.66 27 961.03 51.44
Manufacture of foods 52 699.09 9219.24 57.16
Manufacture of textiles 239 115.6 22 971.38 104.09
Manufacture of leather, fur, 
feather and related products 24 964.32 6425.57 38.85
Manufacture of paper and paper 
products 392 604.14 8264.36 475.06
Manufacture of raw chemical 
materials and chemical products 297 061.66 36 908.63 80.49
Manufacture of medicines 52 718.39 9443.3 55.83
Manufacture of chemical fibres 43 854.81 3828.32 114.55
Smelting and pressing of ferrous 
metals 125 978.31 42 636.15 29.55
The sum of the above sectors 1 490 376.79 186 876.92
Average 79.75
Percentage of national total 71 34
Source: SSB (various years).
The wastewater discharge intensity varies among industrial sectors. 
Table  14.3 shows the large contributors to industrial wastewater discharge. 
At  the national level, the sectors encompassed in Table 14.3 account for 
34 per  cent of the total gross industrial output value, whereas they produce 
71 per cent of the total industrial wastewater discharge. The sectors with very 
high wastewater discharge intensity are Mining, Textiles, Paper and Chemical-
related industries. Bearing in mind that small rural enterprises are highly 
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concentrated in these sectors, the untreated wastewater discharge from these 
enterprises has a significant impact on water quality. This perhaps partially 
explains the situation that the observed water quality is often worse than that 
reported in the official statistics. 
The Impact of China’s International Trade 
on its Water Resources 
International trade between countries entails flows of virtual water—that is, 
the water used for the production of traded products. With world markets filled 
with ‘made in China’ products on the one hand and the increasingly severe water 
stress and pollution endured in most parts of China on the other, the impact of 
China’s international trade of goods and services on its water resources warrants 
scrutiny. The input–output tables for the 30 provinces (excluding Tibet) in 2002 
and 2007 are used for the investigation.
Sectoral Assessment
The virtual water trade by sector is quantified for the whole production 
chain, instead of just the final stage of the process—that is, these are comparable 
in breadth with the TWUCs estimated above. In so doing, the total water use 
for the final products in individual sectors can be better reflected. The virtual 
water associated with the trade of the products in individual sectors includes 
the water used for the production of the input materials that are from other 
sectors—typically from the primary sectors. Table 14.4 shows the estimated 
virtual water flows associated with China’s international trade. 
China as a whole is a net virtual water exporter. The annual net virtual water 
export was estimated at 39.04 billion cu m in 2002 and 68.18 billion cu m in 
2007. This represents an increase of 74 per cent over five years. The situation 
coincides with the trend seen in the national total water use mentioned earlier. 
The improvement in water-use efficiency in individual sectors has not been 
able to offset the additional virtual water exported due to the expansion 
of international trade during this period. 
Of the 20 sectors in the study, only Agriculture, Petroleum Processing, 
Machinery and Equipment and Utilities are net importers of virtual water. 
The remaining sectors are net exporters. Textiles, Clothing, Electrical Equipment, 
Telecommunications Equipment, Wholesale and Retail Trade, Passenger 
Transport and Metal Smelting and Products are the five major net virtual water 
exporters. Their net virtual water export accounts for more than 85 per cent of 
the national total. These sectors are also mainstay industries in China, greatly 
contributing to China’s role as the ‘world’s factory’.
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It is worth noting that Food and Tobacco Processing and Textiles and Clothing 
are typical downstream industries of agriculture—that is, using raw materials 
from agriculture as inputs. Although the agricultural sector is a net importer of 
virtual water, its downstream industries are not. The situation implies that part 
of the imported virtual water in agriculture is re-exported through the exports 
of products in its downstream sectors.
Net virtual water exports are highly concentrated in Textiles, Clothing and 
Electrical Goods and Communication Equipment. These sectors are typically 
labour intensive, employing a large number of rural migrant workers. In terms 
of water use, Textiles and Clothing are rather water-intensive sectors with high 
TWUCs. The share of these sectors is often high in water-scarce regions, such 
as Tianjin, Hebei and Shandong. The impact of international trade on water 
resources in the water-scarce provinces is therefore more significant.
In addition to the impact on the quantity of water resources, China’s 
international trade also impacts on its water quality. The wastewater discharge 
from Food and Tobacco Processing, Textiles, Clothing, Paper and Products, 
and Metal Smelting and Products accounts for a large percentage of the total 
industrial wastewater discharge (Table 14.3). Small-scale and low-technology 
rural enterprises are mostly concentrated in these sectors. Hence, China is 
exporting a large amount of virtual water to other countries while keeping 
heavy water pollution to itself. 
Regional Assessment
With total water resources of 2812 billion cu m per year in China, the net 
virtual water export of 68.2 billion cu m/year (in 2007) is about 3.1 per cent 
of its total water resources. As a large portion of the country’s water resources 
are not accessible to the water-poor regions due to geographical barriers, the 
impact of China’s international trade on water resources is, however, much more 
significant when viewed at the regional level. In the extremely water-scarce 
Huang–Huai–Hai (HHH) region, 5.1 per cent of the region’s water resources are 
forgone due to virtual water exports.
Total water use in China was approximately 526 billion cu m in 2007 
(SSB 2008). The net virtual water export accounted for 11.5 per cent of total 
water use (Table 14.5). In the water-scarce HHH region, roughly 7 per cent of 
the total water use was for export. The share in Tianjin—an extremely water-
scarce city in this region—was 63 per cent. In Beijing and Shandong, the shares 
were 17.9 per cent and 20 per cent, respectively. The results suggest that China’s 
economic gains from being the ‘world’s manufacturing powerhouse’ (McKay 
and Song 2010) have been attained at a high cost to its water resources and 
environment, particularly in the northern regions.
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Table 14.5 Water Resources (WR), Water Use (WU) and Net Virtual Water Export 
(NVWE) in Different Regions, 2007
Regions Provinces
NVWE NVWE/WR NVWE/WU
106 cu m % %
North China 
Plain
Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Shanxi, 
Shandong and Henan
5240 5.1 6.9
North-East Liaoning, Jilin and Heilongjiang 378 0.3 0.7
East and 
Middle
Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, 
Anhui, Jiangxi, Hubei and Hunan
21 662 3.5 10.8
South Fujian, Guangdong, Guangxi and 
Hainan
26 044 5.2 25.7
South-West Chongqing, Sichuan, Guizhou 
and Yunnan 
423 0.1 0.8
North-West Inner Mongolia, Shaanxi, Gansu, 
Qinghai, Ningxia and Xinjiang
14 429 5.6 14.2
Nation 68 177 3.1 11.5
Sources: Data for WR and WU are from SSB (2008); data for NVWE are from Zhang et al. (2012).
Balancing Water Needs Between Society 
and Nature 
China’s water problems are characterised by insufficient quantity and 
poor quality. Rapid economic development and urbanisation combined with 
population growth continue to intensify the conflict between water supply 
and demand; and adverse future climate change is expected to increase China’s 
vulnerability to water scarcity. 
Poor management is one of the important factors responsible for the water 
problems in China. Hence, improving water resource management is crucial 
for alleviating China’s water vulnerability. Addressing China’s water problems 
requires a holistic, integrated and scientific approach with long-term and 
coordinated efforts. In recent years, some efforts have been made to improve 
water resource management to support long-term economic growth and restore 
aquatic ecosystem functions. 
China is making efforts to improve institutional systems that regulate 
water withdrawal and uses. River basin conservation commissions, under the 
Ministry of Water Resources, have been entrusted with more power over the 
administration and management of the water defined by basin boundaries 
and consistent with the hydrological cycle of water resources. Issuing water 
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withdrawal permits has been gradually implemented in some river basins. 
In this respect, the Yellow River Conservancy Commission (YRCC) has been at 
the forefront. The current Yellow River water allocation plan is enforced with 
both total quantity control and cross-provincial border discharge monitoring. 
In recent years, a so-called ‘investment for water saving and water rights transfer 
measure’ has been put forward in the Yellow River Basin. It mainly concerns 
water reallocation from agriculture to industry. As obtaining additional water 
in the water-scarce basins has been difficult, the increase in industrial water 
demand has to be met with the transfer of water from the agricultural sector. 
Given the widespread low efficiency in irrigation, the potential for water saving 
is considered high (Yang and Jia 2008). Industries, especially large enterprises, 
are encouraged to invest in water-saving projects in the existing irrigation 
schemes in exchange for the rights for the use of part of the saved water. 
The measure is regarded as a ‘win-win’ solution for low water-use efficiency and 
water shortages in water-scarce regions. So far, however, all the water rights 
transfers have been conducted within individual provinces. Cross-provincial 
water rights transfers have not taken place. In general, provinces are not willing 
to give up their entitled shares of water. This is partly because of the increased 
administrative complexity in water rights transfer across provincial boundaries. 
More importantly, recognising that water scarcity is a long-term trend in many 
parts of China, individual provinces all want to hold their shares of water for 
their own economic development. Water rights transfer is still in its infancy. 
Its scale and overall effect on improving water use efficiency remain to be seen.
Since the late 1990s, economic incentive-based approaches—typically 
water pricing and wastewater charges—have been given much emphasis in the 
effort to build a ‘water-saving’ society. With the exhaustion of suitable sites 
for water projects on the major rivers, as well as the very high withdrawal 
ratios from the northern rivers, augmentation of water supply becomes more 
and more difficult and costly. The economic incentive-based approaches are 
implemented to allow the market to adjust water demand and supply. Increasing 
water prices have been a general trend seen in all economic sectors; however, 
the pricing mechanism alone has not been effective in capping total water use 
within a sustainable amount. In many places, total water use has been rising 
continuously while water pollution has been worsening. The situation suggests 
that integrated approaches, including economic and non-economic measures, 
are necessary to tackle the water shortage and pollution problems, which are 
often interconnected.
Environmental water use and ecosystem water requirements have received 
increasing attention since the late 1990s. The criteria used for estimating 
ecosystem water demand are often subjective. Thirty per cent of the average 
river flow is commonly used as a rule-of-thumb percentage for the amount 
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of water required to maintain healthy aquatic ecosystems. As mentioned earlier, 
the ratios of water withdrawal to water resources in the major northern rivers 
all exceeded 70 per cent, meaning that less than 30 per cent of water is left 
for ecological maintenance. In the Hai River Basin, where the ratio exceeded 
100 per cent, the environment is left with essentially no water. It is interesting 
to note that the argument for the need to meet the ecosystem’s water demand in 
the rivers of the North China Plain has been an important factor in the decision 
on the construction of the South–North Water Transfer Project (Yang and 
Zehnder 2005). 
Facing the enormous challenges of water shortages and pollution, the Chinese 
Government has been implementing more stringent controls over water uses 
and wastewater discharges. In January 2012, the State Council released a ‘Red 
Head’ document (No. 3), in which several ambitious controlling Red Lines 
are set. For the year 2030, total water use will be capped at 700 billion cu m, 
compared with approximately 600 billion cu m in 2010. Water intensity will be 
reduced to 40 cu m (GDP being measured at 2000 prices). Agricultural irrigation 
water-use efficiency will be lifted to above 0.6, compared with the current 
0.5. Water quality will be ‘good’ in 95 per cent of water bodies (SC 2012). There 
are many challenges to surmount before these targets can be reached. It requires 
the establishment of accountable water resource management and evaluation 
systems, sound monitoring systems, investment mechanisms, regulations and 
laws, enforcement agencies and social scrutiny. How successful China will be in 
achieving these goals remains an open question. 
Conclusion 
China’s water endowments are unfavourable in terms of both the quantity 
(relative to its population) and spatial distribution. Water pollution due to 
the rapid pace of industrialisation and urbanisation has also aggravated the 
physical scarcity by reducing the availability of useable water. In many regions, 
water shortage has become a bottleneck to economic development, while 
water pollution has posed an increasingly high risk to human health as well as 
threatening environmental sustainability. As the major exporter of low value-
added and high water-use intensity manufactured products, China has been 
exporting a large amount of virtual water, while keeping heavily polluted water 
to itself. 
The low efficiency of water use in China concurs with the generally low 
efficiency of resource use and the dependence of economic growth on the 
expansion of resource supply. This calls for an integrated approach, including 
economic (such as water pricing) and non-economic measures. An integrated 
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approach is necessary to tackle the water shortage and pollution problems 
simultaneously. Decoupling economic growth from increasing water use 
and pollution is important for long-term economic development. A regional 
economic structural adjustment taking into consideration water resource 
endowments would be conducive to reducing pressure on the limited water 
resources in the water-scarce regions. Also important is the establishment of 
enabling institutions that can ensure the effective enforcement of the required 
measures for improving water resources management. 
Water shortages and water pollution are serious problems. How China deals 
with these challenges will be vital for its long-term economic development and 
environmental sustainability. Given its central position in the world economy, 
China’s degree of success in overcoming these challenges will have material 
implications for the rest of the world.
Bibliography
Alcamo, J., Henrichs, T. and Rosch, T., 1999, World water in 2025. Global 
modeling and scenario analysis for the World Commission on Water for the 21st 
century, Kassel World Water Series Report 2, University of Kassel, Germany.
Allan, J. A., 1997, ‘Virtual water’: a long term solution for water short Middle 
Eastern economies?, Occasional paper, Water Issues Group, School of Oriental 
and African Studies, London.
China Daily, 2011, Boost in capital’s water efficiency, <http://www.chinadaily.
com.cn/cndy/2011-04/28/content_12409302.htm>
Falkenmark, M., 1995, ‘Land–water linkages—a synopsis. Land and water 
integration and river basin management’, FAO Land and Water Bulletin, no. 
1, pp. 15–16.
Jia, S. F., Yang, H., Zhang, S. F., Wang, L. and Xia, J., 2006, ‘Industrial water use 
Kuznets Curve: evidence from industrialized countries and implications for 
developing countries’, Journal of Water Resources Planning and Management, 
vol. 132, no. 3, pp. 183–91.
Jiang, Y., 2009, ‘China’s water scarcity’, Journal of Environmental Management, 
vol. 90, pp. 3185–96.
Liu, C. M. and Chen, Z. K., 2001, China Water Resources Status Assessment and 
Supply and Demand Trend Analysis, China Hydro-Engineering Publishing 
House, Beijing.
Rebalancing and Sustaining Growth in China
328
McKay, H. and Song, L., 2010, ‘China as a global manufacturing powerhouse: 
strategic considerations and structural adjustment’, China and World 
Economy, vol. 18, no. 1 (February), pp. 1–32.
Ministry of Water Resources (MWR), 1997–2011, Water Resources Bulletin, 
Ministry of Water Resources, Beijing, <http://www.chinawater.net.cn>
Shen, D. J., 2010, ‘Climate change and water resources: evidence and estimates 
in China’, Climate Change and Water Resources, vol. 98, no. 8, pp. 1063–128.
State Council of China (SC), 2012, State Council Proposal for Implementing 
the Most Strict Water Resources Management Systems, State Council of 
China, Beijing, viewed 15 February 2012, <http://www.mwr.gov.cn/slzx/
slyw/201201/t20120119_312981.html>
State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA), 1994, China 
Environmental Statistical Data Compilation. 1981–1990, China Environmental 
Science Publishing House, Beijing.
State Statistical Bureau (SSB), various years, China Statistical Yearbook, China 
Statistics Press, Beijing.
State Statistical Bureau (SSB), 2008, Regional Input–Output Table of China, 2002, 
China Statistics Press, Beijing.
State Statistical Bureau, 2009, Input–Output Table of China, 2007, China Statistics 
Press, Beijing.
Yang, H. and Jia, S. F., 2008, ‘Meeting the basin closure of the Yellow River in 
China’, International Journal of Water Resources Development, vol. 24, no. 2, 
pp. 265–74.
Yang, H. and Zehnder, A., 2007, ‘“Virtual water”: an unfolding concept in 
integrated water resources management’, Water Resources Research, vol. 43, 
<doi:10.1029/2007WR006048>
Yang, H. and Zehnder, A. J. B., 2005, ‘The South–North Water Transfer Project in 
China: an analysis of water demand uncertainty and environmental objectives 
in decision making’, Water International, vol. 30, no. 3, pp. 339–49.
Zhang, Z. Y., Shi, M. J., Yang, H. and Chapagain, A., 2012, ‘An input–output 
analysis of trends in virtual water trade and the impact on water resource 
and uses in China’, Economic Systems Research, vol. 23, no. 4, pp. 431–46.
Zhang, Z. Y., Yang, H. and Shi, M. J., 2011, ‘Analyses of water footprint of Beijing 
in an interregional input–output framework’, Ecological Economics, vol. 70, 
pp. 2494–502.
329
15. Why Are the Stakes So High?:
Misconceptions and misunderstandings in China’s 
global quest for energy security
ZhongXiang Zhang 
Introduction
China was the world’s second-largest carbon emitter behind the United States 
for years. On the trends of the 1980s and 1990s, the US Energy Information 
Administration (USEIA 2004) estimated that China’s carbon dioxide emissions 
would not catch up with those of the United States until 2030. China’s energy use 
has surged, however, since the turn of this century, almost doubling between 
2000 and 2007. Despite similar rates of real economic growth, the rate of growth 
in China’s energy use during this period was more than twice that of the last 
two decades of the twentieth century (NBS 2009). As a result, China became the 
world’s largest carbon emitter in 2007, instead of being number two ‘until 2030’ 
as estimated as late as 2004.
Confronted with rampant environmental pollution problems and health 
risks, and rising greenhouse gas emissions and the resulting climate change, 
the mounting challenge for China is how to keep its energy consumption and 
carbon dioxide emissions under control while sustaining its rapid economic 
growth (Zhang 2010a, 2011c). Another enormous challenge that China needs 
to deal with is a huge increase in its oil imports, which is accompanying its 
rapid economic growth, and the resulting carbon emissions. This has raised 
great concern about China’s energy security because its rapidly increasing oil 
imports come mainly from politically unstable regions and are shipped through 
lengthy sealanes over which China has little influence. Given that global oil 
markets are very volatile and China’s incremental oil demand dwarfs that of any 
other single country, China’s responses to growing energy security concerns 
have been brought into the spotlight. In this context, China’s global quest for 
resources—in particular, oil and natural gas—has received unprecedented 
worldwide attention and scrutiny. This is partly because of China’s own high-
profile, active state diplomacy and its national oil companies’ acquisitions in 
the key exporting regions of oil and natural gas. But, in my view, the stakes are 
raised unnecessarily high mainly because of the growing politicisation of Chinese 
energy security as a result of misconceptions and misunderstandings of China’s 
quest for energy security both inside and outside China. Inside China, these 
relate to the perceived US-led oil blockade against China and China’s illusion 
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that its investments in oil fields overseas are able to help strengthen its energy 
security. Western political rhetoric characterises China’s efforts to secure energy 
supplies overseas as a major threat. That rhetoric further intensifies China’s 
mistrust of global oil markets, sparking fears that the energy establishment 
will seek to deny China’s access to the oil it needs for development. Outside 
China, there are wide misconceptions and misunderstandings of how Chinese 
policy banks operate and their oil and natural gas-based loans. China’s loans are 
often misrepresented as asking borrowers to sell a fixed quantity of oil to China 
during the contract period at a predetermined price so that China can capture 
windfall gains as oil prices rise.
This chapter aims to depoliticise the debate on China’s global quest for 
energy resources and to put discussions on that issue into perspective. To that 
end, the chapter first categorises the main features of China’s energy mix and 
discusses why energy security in China equates to a large extent to oil security. 
The chapter then pays special attention to misconceptions and misunderstandings 
regarding the hypothesised US-led ‘oil blockade’ against China; the Chinese 
policy banks and their oil and natural gas-based loans; and the role of Chinese 
investments in oil and gas fields overseas in discussions on China’s global quest 
for energy resources. The chapter ends with some concluding remarks on a more 
constructive way forward.
Energy Security in the Chinese Context
China’s energy security issues cannot be well understood without a better 
understanding of its energy mix. This section will categorise the main features 
of  China’s energy mix and discuss why energy security in China equates 
to a large extent to oil security.
Main Reliance on Domestic Energy Resources
China is self-sufficient in energy. Even in the 1950s when almost all oil 
was imported, 97 per cent of energy supply was still from domestic sources 
(Zhang  1998). China’s energy balance was also unaffected by the first rise in 
world oil prices. China is indeed a large energy consumer. With rapid economic 
growth fuelled by increasing energy consumption, China is now the world’s 
largest energy consumer, with an increasing dependence on imported oil. At the 
same time, however, China is also the world’s largest energy producer. With total 
domestic primary energy production of 2960 million tonnes of coal equivalent 
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(mtce)1 and total domestic energy consumption of 3250 mtce in 2010 (Hua 2011), 
domestic supply provides about 91 per cent of the total energy consumption in 
China, meaning that overall energy dependence (namely, the ratio of the energy 
that a country imports to the total it consumes) is about 9 per cent. With a 
variety of policies and investments in place that will further expand domestic 
supply capacity, China will continue to rely mainly on domestic supply to meet 
its growing energy demand in the future. 
Heavy Reliance on Coal as a Major Source of Energy
A country’s choice of fuels and technologies depends to a large extent on 
its resource endowments and their relative prices. China is abundant in coal 
resources (BP 2011). This abundant supply of coal and its relatively lower price 
compared with its more environmentally friendly substitutes make China 
far more reliant on coal for its primary energy needs than any other major 
economy. As the world’s largest coal producer and consumer, China produces 
and consumes about twice as much coal as the United States, the world number 
two, and China was responsible for almost half of global coal consumption in 
2010 (USEIA 2011a). Coal has accounted for more than two-thirds of China’s 
primary energy consumption for several decades. For a considerable period 
to come, China’s energy mix will remain dominated by coal (IEA 2010, 2011; 
Zhang 1990).
China displaced Japan as the world’s top coal importer in 2011—a position 
Japan had held since at least 1975. This raised concerns about whether China 
can meet its own coal demand. In my view, this is an over-interpretation. China 
imported 182.4 million tonnes of coal in 2011. That is a very small amount when 
compared with China’s total coal consumption. The move into the position 
of number-one importer can be attributed to some special factors. On  the 
Japanese side, the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant accident in Japan on 
11 March 2011 led to a power shortage. This, combined with strong Japanese 
currency appreciation, led to slack demand for coking coal as steelmakers 
curbed production. Moreover, as the magnitude 9.0 earthquake damaged coal-
fired power plants along the country’s north-east coast, this led to a reduction in 
Japan’s imports of thermal coal used for power generation. On the Chinese side, 
with robust demand for coal for power generation and cement production and 
rising costs of domestic coal production, foreign coal was particularly attractive 
to those regions far from domestic coal production bases (Tsukimori 2012).
1  China still uses mtce as its benchmark, whereas the international standard has moved towards oil 
equivalents (mtoe). Multiplying mtce by 1.43 will convert to mtoe. 
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Imports of Natural Gas Set to Rise, but Much Less 
Concerning than the Oil Situation
Since 2006 China has been an importer of natural gas. China’s imports of 
natural gas are set to increase as its overall energy consumption rises. China 
hopes to expand its domestic natural gas output to 150–180 billion cubic metres 
(bcm) a year by 2020, while imports would amount to 120–150 bcm per annum 
(Oxford Analytica 2012). Even by then, its gas dependency rate is much less than 
that of oil. Moreover, the majority of natural gas is used for chemical feedstock 
and power generation in China. There are a number of alternatives to natural 
gas for those uses. Furthermore, China’s unconventional gas reserves suggest 
that gas use can expand faster than expected without creating huge new import 
dependency. According to the US EIA (2011b), China is believed to have the 
world’s third-largest coal-seam gas reserves, and 36 trillion cu m of recoverable 
shale-gas reserves—the largest in the world.2 China has significantly increased 
its expectations for unconventional gas production, announcing in February 
2012 a plan to invest RMB116.6 billion to raise coal-seam gas production to 
30 bcm per annum by 2015—up from 15 bcm per annum in 2010. Expectations 
regarding shale-gas output range from 15–30 bcm per annum to 60–100 bcm per 
annum by 2020 (NDRC et al. 2012; Oxford Analytica 2012). If unconventional gas 
production meets even the lower bound of expectations, this will significantly 
cut China’s imports of natural gas and its future dependency rate. 
China’s attempts to achieve a commercial scale of shale-gas production have, 
however, so far been hindered by the lack of expertise and difficult geology. 
China’s shale-gas is situated in deeper and more difficult terrain than North 
American formations. Moreover, Chinese companies have struggled to master 
the hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling techniques used to exploit these 
resources. To that end, Chinese national oil companies (NOCs) establish strategic 
partnerships with other NOCs and international oil companies (IOCs) to gain 
technical know-how in areas where Chinese NOCs lack technical expertise. 
PetroChina, a Hong Kong-listed unit of China National Petroleum Corporation 
(CNPC), bought in February 2012 a 20 per cent stake in Shell’s Groundbirch 
natural gas development in north-eastern British Columbia, hoping to gain 
shale-gas experience from Shell (Welsch and Lee 2012). In January 2012, Sinopec 
signed a deal with Devon Corporation to invest US$2.2 billion for a one-third 
stake in five US shale and oil-and-gas fields controlled by Devon (Xinhua 2012). 
China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) is working with TOTAL in 
Nigeria’s Akpo and Egina deepwater fields (Jiang and Sinton 2011). PetroChina 
partnered with Shell in March 2010 to acquire a 100 per cent stake of Australian 
coal-bed methane producer Arrow Energy. The recent flurry of Chinese NOCs’ 
2  China’s own estimate puts its recoverable shale-gas reserves at 25 trillion cu m (NDRC et al. 2012).
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deal-making is more about gaining access to technology than the commodity 
itself so that Chinese NOCs will be better positioned to explore and develop 
similar resources (deepwater reserves, coal-bed methane and shale-gas) within 
China. 
Moreover, to achieve the aforementioned ambitious target for shale-gas, from 
virtually zero in 2012, China allows foreign partners in this sector. In March 
2012, Royal Dutch Shell PLC and CNPC signed the first production-sharing 
contract to explore, develop and produce shale-gas in China. This deal marks 
a milestone in the development of China’s shale-gas reserves and fits in with 
China’s overall strategy to bring technical and operational know-how to the 
development of its untapped reserves of shale-gas. Under the agreement, Shell 
will apply its advanced technology, operational expertise and global experience 
to jointly develop shale-gas with CNPC over a 3500 sq km area in the Fushun-
Yongchuan block in the Sichuan Basin (W. Ma 2012). This pact will serve as 
a template showing how production-sharing contracts between foreign and 
domestic companies might work to help China tap this unconventional fuel.
Increasing Dependence on Imported Oil and China’s 
Concerns about the Strait of Malacca
China’s appetite for oil has been soaring over the past two decades. Its oil 
demand grew from 2.3 million barrels per day (mbpd) in 1990 to 4.4 mbpd in 
2000 (IEA 2000). By 2010, China’s demand had jumped to 8.9 mbpd (IEA 2011). 
The IEA (2011) estimates that by 2035, China’s oil demand will reach 14.9 mbpd, 
overtaking the United States (14.5 mbpd) as the largest oil consumer in the 
world.
China was self-sufficient in oil for most of the 60 year history of the People’s 
Republic, but since 1993 it has been a net oil importer. China’s economic boom 
and its stagnating domestic production of oil have produced a growing hunger 
for imports. As of 2003, China emerged as second only to the United States in 
terms of oil imports. In 2009, China imported 4.3 mbpd, or 51.3 per cent of its 
demand (IEA 2010). This was the first instance in which China imported more 
than half of its oil needs. According to China’s National Energy Administration, 
China’s oil dependency rate increased further, to 56.5 per cent, in 2011 (Zhong 
2012). According to China’s General Administration of Customs, China’s oil 
imports cost the country US$196.7 billion in 2011, accounting for 11.3 per cent 
of its total import expenditures (J. Ma 2012; Zhong 2012). 
China is projected to maintain oil production close to the current level 
of 4.1 mbpd to 2025, followed by a steady decline as resource depletion sets 
in (IEA 2011). As a result its oil imports will continue to soar in the decades 
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ahead. The IEA (2011) estimates that by 2035, China will be importing nearly 
12.6 mbpd—more than the United States imports today—in order to meet its 
expected oil demand of 14.9 mbpd. This puts China’s oil dependency rate at 
84.6 per cent in 2035 (IEA 2011). China will thus become far more exposed to 
the risk of international supply disruptions than it is today. Energy security 
has risen to the height of importance in its foreign policy, and is becoming 
what has been called a ‘transforming’ factor in relations between China and the 
Middle East, Russia and energy-rich Central Asian, African and Latin American 
countries (Yi 2005). 
Indeed, China’s oil dependency rate is already high and increasing; however, 
this need not be viewed in a solely negative way. As a country’s overall trade 
intensity (defined as a ratio of the sum of imports plus exports to GDP) suggests, 
the higher ratio means that country is more integrated with the global economy. 
It does not necessarily suggest increased economic insecurity in that country. 
Moreover, many large economies have even higher oil dependency rates than 
China, although China naturally stands out in terms of the sheer quantity of 
its requirements. Furthermore, China itself experienced complete dependence 
on foreign oil prior to discoveries of its own reserves in the 1950s. In the 
post–civil war period China was geopolitically isolated, and it had to import 
essentially all of its oil. Taking these points together, the oil dependency rate 
alone is insufficient to determine the true level of energy security/insecurity of 
a country. To evaluate the energy security of a country properly, this factor has 
to be combined with other factors, including sources and routes of oil supply. 
Specifically, we need to look at
•	 whether oil imports are concentrated on a few source countries—more 
diversified sources of supply are obviously preferred
•	 whether the main oil-exporting countries are politically stable
•	 whether the transport routes for oil imports are considered vulnerable to 
physical disruption and how much influence the importer has on these 
transport lanes. 
As shown in Figure 15.1, in 1995, China relied mainly on the Middle East and 
South-East Asia (mainly Indonesia, which alone accounted for nearly one-third 
of China’s total imports) for 82 per cent of its crude-oil imports. The Middle 
East was—and is—clearly vital. Thus, China will continue to consolidate its 
base there. In recent years though, China has also turned its attention to the 
emerging oil and gas fields of Africa. Top Chinese leaders have paid frequent 
visits to oil-producing countries in the region. This high-profile, goodwill-
based energy diplomacy has helped China make remarkable inroads in striking 
energy deals with oil-rich African countries (Zhang 2007, 2010b). By 2005, this 
strategy enabled China to significantly diversify its import mix. As shown in 
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Figure 15.1, Africa accounted for 30 per cent of China’s oil imports in 2005—up 
from 7 per cent in 1995—while Russia supplied 10 per cent of total imports, up 
from less than 1 per cent 10 years earlier (Downs 2006). 
China became slightly more reliant on the Middle East in 2005 than it had 
been 10 years ago, with 47 per cent of its imports coming from the Persian Gulf. 
In addition, because China is now heavily reliant on Africa as well as the Middle 
East, it now depends more on a single chokepoint—the Strait of Malacca—than 
it had before, with nearly 77 per cent of its oil imports flowing through the 
strait. This situation remained unchanged in the following five years: China 
still imported 78 per cent of its crude from the Middle East and Africa in 2010 
(BP 2011; Kennedy 2011).
Figure 15.1 China’s Crude-Oil Imports by Region in 1995 (left) and 2005 (right)
Source: From Chen (2010) and Zhang (2011b).
Foreign trade has become one of the pillars underpinning China’s phenomenal 
economic growth over the past three decades, and oil is intimately related to it. 
Given that most crude-oil imports from the Middle East and Africa have to pass 
through the Strait of Malacca, the strait is of immense strategic and economic 
importance to China’s economic and energy security. As a chokepoint, this strait 
directly affects China’s sealane of communications, but China has little direct 
influence over it. Therefore, China has every reason to be concerned about 
the safe and smooth passage of its shipments. Beijing feels susceptible to this 
strategic weakness. Any adverse event in the strait would disrupt its trade flows 
and particularly oil imports, which could deal a further blow to China’s economic 
development, social stability and military capability (Chen 2010; Zhao 2007).
Clearly, oil poses a unique challenge for China, not only because its oil 
dependency rate is already high and continues to rise, but also, more importantly, 
because oil imports come from less politically stable regions and have to be 
Rebalancing and Sustaining Growth in China
336
shipped to China via routes that are considered vulnerable to physical disruption 
but which China has little physical sway over. Viewed in this context, energy 
security in China to a large extent equates to oil security.
Putting China’s Global Search for Energy 
Security into Perspective
Over the past few years top Chinese leaders have come to view the Strait 
of Malacca as a strategic vulnerability (Blumenthal 2008; Holmes 2007). 
In November 2003, President, Hu Jintao, declared that ‘certain major powers’ 
were bent on controlling the strait and called for the adoption of new strategies 
to mitigate the perceived vulnerability. Thereafter, the Chinese press devoted 
considerable attention to the country’s ‘Malacca dilemma’ (Lanteigne 2008; 
Storey 2006). The China Youth Daily, a leading Chinese newspaper, declared: ‘It 
is no exaggeration to say that whoever controls the Strait of Malacca will also 
have a stranglehold on the energy route of China’ (Shi 2004). 
Given the strategic importance of the Strait of Malacca and China’s lack of 
influence on the waterway, China has made great efforts on both the demand and 
the supply sides to cope with the perceived ‘Malacca dilemma’ and to enhance 
its energy security. 
On the demand side, China has taken considerable efforts to control the 
growth of its demand for energy and oil and thus its demand for oil imports. 
For the first time, China has incorporated an input indicator as a constraint in 
its five-year economic plan, requiring that energy use per unit of GDP be cut 
by 20 per cent during the Eleventh Five-Year Plan period, running from 2006 to 
2010. This formal acknowledgment is widely considered to be an important step 
towards building a ‘harmonious society’ through ‘scientific development’. Just 
prior to the Copenhagen climate change summit, China further pledged to cut its 
carbon intensity by 40–45 per cent by 2020 relative to its 2005 levels in order to 
help reach an international climate change agreement at Copenhagen or beyond 
(for further discussion, see Zhang 2010a, 2011a, 2011c). Meeting these energy 
and carbon intensity targets will not only help to limit the growth of China’s 
carbon emissions, but also will reduce China’s growing hunger for foreign oil, 
leave more oil on the market and thus help to stabilise world oil prices.
On the supply side, China has instituted a variety of policies to address its 
growing dependence on imported oil. The country has made considerable efforts 
to maintain domestic production close to the current level. In the meantime, 
China has been making significant efforts to support the expansion of its own 
NOCs (the so-called ‘going-out policy’); to diversify both sources of and routes 
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for its oil supply, including setting up a string of refineries in China through 
joint ventures with partners from energy-rich countries that often come with 
supply agreements; to develop its own strategic petroleum reserves; and to 
strengthen its naval capabilities to protect supply lines (Chen 2010; Jiang and 
Sinton 2011; Kennedy 2011; Wang and Wu 2011; Zhang 2007, 2010b, 2011b). 
Clearly, China has resorted to these unilateral and bilateral measures to enhance 
its energy security and cope with the Malacca dilemma.
In this context, China’s global quest for resources—in particular, oil and 
natural gas—has received unprecedented worldwide attention and scrutiny. 
This is partly because of China’s high-profile energy diplomacy and some 
debatable issues about the management and operation of Chinese NOCs. In my 
view, this is mainly because of misconceptions and misunderstandings of 
China’s quest for energy security both inside and outside China. Inside China, 
these relate to the hypothesised US-led oil blockade against China and the role 
of Chinese investments in oil fields overseas. Outside China, misconceptions and 
misunderstandings mainly relate to how Chinese policy banks operate and their 
oil and natural gas-based loans. The following section seeks to clarify each of 
these points. 
An American-Led Oil Blockade Against China?
The strategic importance of the Strait of Malacca to China on the one hand 
and its lack of influence on the waterway on the other have raised concerns 
about the threat of a US-led oil blockade against China.
As mentioned in the preceding section, China has made great efforts in both 
the demand and the supply sides to cope with the perceived Malacca dilemma 
and to enhance its energy security. One of the significant efforts on the supply 
side is to support the expansion of its own NOCs abroad through the so-called 
‘going-out policies’ and thus to increase the NOCs’ overseas oil production. 
If Chinese NOCs’ overseas oil production is to help to improve China’s energy 
security then oil so produced needs to be shipped back to China. But, if the 
threat of a US-led blockade is a concern then attempts to send Chinese NOCs’ 
equity oil shares back home will face the same blockade problem.
As the sole superpower, the United States is certainly reluctant to accept 
the rise of China and is wary of any prospective challenge to its hegemony. 
Geopolitically, the United States has attempted to contain China’s increasing 
global influence. As the United States withdraws from its two long wars in Iraq 
and Afghanistan and refocuses on the Asia-Pacific region, its ‘strategic pivot’ 
to Asia has so far mainly manifested itself in a shoring up of its ‘encircling 
alliances’ with the countries on China’s periphery (The Economist 2012a). 
Auctioning a policy that would inhibit the Chinese economy is, however, 
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highly unlikely, because the world’s two largest economies are too integrated 
and interdependent for one to fail. It would be a policy of self-immolation. The 
United States’ attempt to influence, but not intervene in, the recent Taiwanese 
presidential election to avoid instability in the Taiwan Strait clearly supports 
this view. In the last week or so running up to the election in January 2012, the 
opposition party’s presidential candidate was running neck and neck with the 
ruling party’s nominee. The opposition party was against the 1992 consensus 
that aims for a peaceful unification of Mainland China and Taiwan and if its 
candidate had been elected to the presidency, the United States believed the 
outcome could lead to instability. So, at the last moment, current and former 
top US officials were in Taiwan, disregarding the opposition party’s demand to 
keep political neutrality, which had been the stance the United States took in 
previous Taiwanese elections. Instead, these US officials explicitly persuaded 
the voters to treasure the current stability in cross-strait relations, which was 
clearly viewed as being to the ruling party’s advantage. 
Some might take the US-led Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) free-trade 
agreement—essentially a free-trade pact currently under negotiation between 
the United States, Australia, Brunei, Chile, Malaysia, New Zealand, Peru, 
Singapore and Vietnam—as a counterargument. But I do not share the view that 
the United States is using the TPP to isolate China economically. Rather, I think 
the United States wants to use the TPP to press China to observe the rules of 
the road on trade and intellectual property. The United States also wants to 
use the TPP to achieve its major goal of levelling the playing field in which 
private and state-owned enterprises (SOEs) compete.3 This goal reflects serious 
US frustration with what it sees as the unfair advantages Chinese SOEs have in 
world trade (Bussey 2012; Davis 2011).
Even if the United States were to attempt a blockade, it would probably 
not be very successful (Collins and Murray 2008), and would be extremely 
difficult to operate in practice. If the blockade operations were undertaken 
close to China, blockading vessels would be vulnerable to attacks from China. 
In contrast, if the blockade were implemented far from China’s shores, it would 
be extremely difficult to differentiate oil that was bound for China from oil that 
was bound for other countries, not only because oil carried in a given tanker can 
be destined for several countries, but also because ownership of the oil within 
that tanker can easily change during the course of its journey (Kennedy 2011).
3  There is a challenge for the United States to come up with a position on state-owned firms because the US 
proposal could be used against the US Postal Service, Tennessee Valley Authority and other state-owned 
or state-controlled entities. The United States also bought a controlling interest in General Motors during 
the financial crisis. While Democrats on the House Ways and Means Committee in a letter to the White 
House in June 2011 said that other free-trade agreements had exceptions for ‘prudential measures taken 
to ensure the integrity and stability of the financial system’, US trading partners could see an exception 
of that sort as justifying a variety of aid to their state-owned firms (Davis 2011).
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Taking these points together, it is safe to say that the threat of a US-led 
oil blockade against China is largely a chimera. If this blockade is unlikely to 
happen—and even if attempted has a low chance of success—then it seems 
strange that China’s energy security policy should take it as such a serious 
potential threat.
It is undeniable that Western powers have gained control over the best oil 
fields available and, as a late entrant to the international oil game, China has 
little choice but to strike deals with so-called rogue states and to take risks 
to make acquisitions in oil-rich but politically unstable countries or regions 
(Zhang 2007, 2010b). That explains why Chinese NOCs are actively bidding for 
assets in West Africa and Latin America. In my view, however, in their course of 
action and in the expansion of their overseas business, Chinese NOCs exacerbate 
the extent of potential disruption to oil supply. And in the name of energy 
security, Chinese NOCs are complicating China’s foreign relations in sensitive 
regions of the world. This could potentially hijack the Chinese Government’s 
going-out policies, as the NOCs prioritise their own profits but at the potential 
expense of China’s overall national interests. 
The Operations of Chinese Policy Banks
During the 1994 reforms of the financial sector, the Chinese Government 
created the China Development Bank (CDB) and the Export–Import Bank of 
China as ‘policy banks’ (Bräutigam 2009). Their loans would explicitly support 
the Government’s policy objectives. The creation of designated policy banks 
would theoretically free commercial banks from policy lending and hold them 
accountable for rational, market-based lending.
The two policy banks provide lines of credit to Chinese NOCs and foreign 
entities—mainly NOC counterparts—to support international expansion and 
secure oil or natural gas deals. As shown in Table 15.1, since 2009, CDB has 
extended lines of credit totalling almost US$85 billion to national energy 
companies and government entities in Brazil, Ecuador, Russia, Turkmenistan 
and Venezuela (Downs 2011a).
There is a widespread perception that the CDB provided these loans exclusively 
to advance Chinese Government policy objectives without commercial concerns. 
Contrary to this popular view, the CDB is not a mere puppet of the Chinese 
Government. It is wholly state owned, but it is not state run.
To be sure, the CDB has a mission to advance the Chinese Government’s policy 
objectives at home and abroad, including securing oil and natural gas supplies, 
but that mission does not prevent it from pursuing its own agenda to expand its 
business at home and abroad and pursue profits. In fact, the CDB is successful 
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at balancing commercial and policy priorities so that it has high profits and a 
balance sheet that is even healthier than all the other major Chinese commercial 
banks.4 Its non-performing loans ratio has stood at less than 1 per cent since 
2005—lower than that of all other major Chinese commercial banks. It lends 
at market-based interest rates. The interest rates on the lines of credit totalling 
US$45.6 billion extended to Petrobras, Rosneft and Transneft in 2009 and to 
Venezuela’s Bank of Economic and Social Development in 2010 are all based on 
the benchmark London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR), although the spread 
over LIBOR in Table 15.1 might be thinner than what a Western bank would 
require (Downs 2011a).
The CDB has been vocal in mobilising China’s massive foreign reserves to 
support cross-border energy and natural resource deals. Chen Yuan, its Governor, 
was quoted as saying that investing in energy and minerals was a good way to 
hedge against a declining dollar and rising commodity prices, and thus served as 
a medium for shifting China’s foreign exchange reserves away from low-yielding 
financial instruments (Downs 2011b). So the CDB made huge loans to Russia and 
resource-rich countries in Central Asia, West Africa and Latin America. China’s 
loan commitments of US$37 billion in 2010 to Latin America were more than 
those from the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank and the US 
Export–Import Bank combined for that year.
Associated with these loans are the common claims that Chinese loans to 
Latin America have more favourable terms, impose no policy conditions and 
have less stringent environmental guidelines than the loans of international 
financial institutions and Western governments. But Gallagher et al. (2012) find 
that this is often not the case. They find that the CDB loans carry more stringent 
terms than World Bank loans. In 2010, the CDB offered Argentina a US$10 
billion loan at 600 basis points above LIBOR. In the same year, the World Bank 
Group’s International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) granted 
4  There are at least two factors for its success. Under the leadership of its Governor, Chen Yuan, the CDB 
brought the lender’s risk-management system up to global standards, even rejecting loans to projects 
approved by the powerful National Development and Reform Commission (Downs 2011b). Jacob Frenkel, 
Chairman of JP Morgan Chase International and a former governor of the Bank of Israel, was quoted 
as saying that ‘[e]ven though it is a government arm, it is really treated by the marketplace as a well-
managed and well-run modern financial institution’ (Forsythe and Sanderson 2011). Second, unlike debt 
issued by other state-owned banks in China, the special financing bonds issued by the CDB are classified 
at the same level as sovereign debt by the Government. This is considered one of its biggest competitive 
advantages. Banks that buy the bonds can count them at a zero-risk weighting on their balance sheets. 
The Chinese Prime Minister, Wen Jiabao, plans to reclassify the CDB as a commercial bank instead of 
a policy lender so that the CDB has to compete on an equal footing with other state-owned banks that 
now have commercial bank status. That means the CDB would have to pay more to borrow money. With 
strong resistance from the CDB, the Chinese Government extended its special financial status through the 
end of 2012 (Forsythe and Sanderson 2011). 
Why Are the Stakes So High?
341
Argentina a US$30 million loan with a spread of 85 basis points. In 2009, the 
CDB gave Brazil a US$10 billion loan at 280 basis points. The IBRD gave Brazil a 
US$43.4 million loan in 2000 at a variable spread of 30–55 basis points. 





Interest rate Oil/gas deliveries 
to secure loan**







4 3 n.a. 100 kp/d
2009 Rosneft, Russia 15 20 LIBOR+5.69% 180 kp/d
2009 Transneft, Russia 10 20 LIBOR+5.69% 120 kp/d
2009 Petrobras, Brazil 10 10 LIBOR+2.8% 150–200 kp/d
2009 BANDES, 
Venezuela
4 3 n.a. 107–153 kp/d
2009 Turkmengaz, 
Turkmenistan
4 n.a. n.a. n.a.
2010 BANDES, 
Venezuela
20.6 10 LIBOR+0.5–2.85% 200–300 kp/d
2010 Ministry of 
Finance, Ecuador
1 4 6.0% 36 kp/d
2011 Turkmengaz, 
Turkmenistan
4.1 n.a. n.a. 10 bcm
2011 BANDES, 
Venezuela
4 n.a. n.a. n.a.
2011 Ministry of 
Finance, Ecuador
2 8 6.90% 67.58 kp/d
n.a. = not applicable
* includes funds from Export–Import Bank of China
** kb/d = thousand barrels per day 
Source: Downs (2011a).
China’s Export–Import Bank, in contrast, generally offers lower interest 
rates than the US Export–Import Bank. This is mainly because Chinese banks 
package commercial financing and development aid differently than their 
foreign counterparts. Instead of giving development aid through the CDB, 
China channels it through China’s Export–Import Bank. The IBRD and other 
development banks offer concessionary interest rates as an official form of 
development aid, while the CDB does not. Despite the CDB’s ‘development bank’ 
label, the Chinese bank generally charges borrowers the full cost of finance. 
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For this reason, Bräutigam (2009) labels the CDB ‘the development bank that 
doesn’t give aid’. It is not surprising, therefore, that the CDB’s interest rates are 
higher (Gallagher et al. 2012).
Given that the CDB offers loans at market-based interest rates on the one 
hand and that it imposes no policy conditions on the other, to mitigate loan 
risks, Chinese banks do require equipment purchases and sometimes oil sale 
agreements with borrowers as a sort of collateral in kind. This method allows 
China to loan to less creditworthy borrowers. As the CDB founder, Chen Yuan, 
states, backing loans with oil shipments ‘effectively keeps risks to a minimum 
level’ (Forsythe and Sanderson 2011). The risk mitigation of loans-for-oil seems 
to explain why the CDB was able to offer the US$20 billion loan to Venezuela at a 
floating rate of 50–285 basis points over LIBOR—only a fraction of its 935 basis 
point cost in sovereign debt markets (Gallagher et al. 2012). To date, this kind 
of lending seems to work well for borrowing countries in which they need less 
costly Chinese inputs and equipment to develop their own energy, mining, 
infrastructure, transportation and housing sectors. We will discuss this issue 
further in the next section.
Loans for Oil and Gas Deals
Using loan-for-oil and loan-for-gas deals to secure long-term supplies is not 
a Chinese invention. Japan gave China loans for its oil as early as the 1970s. 
This type of deal is not new for China and has been used by Chinese NOCs for 
some time. In 2004, CNPC loaned the Russian oil producer Rosneft US$6 billion 
for 180 000 barrels per day of oil supplies through 2010 (Downs 2011a). But such 
deals are dwarfed by the deal with Russia in 2009. China and Russia had been 
discussing a cross-border pipeline for crude oil since the early 1990s, but were 
not able to finalise a deal. Leveraging its relative financial strength at a time when 
most other big economies were in recession, China eventually struck its long-
awaited mega loan-for-oil deal with Russia on 17 February 2009. Under this long-
term deal, the CDB lends US$25 billion to Rosneft, Russia’s biggest oil producer, 
and Transneft, its oil pipeline operator. In exchange, Russia will provide China 
with an additional 15 million tonnes of crude oil a year between 2011 and 2030, 
which represents about 300 000 barrels per day for 20 years, or nearly 7 per cent 
of China’s volume of oil imports in 2009, through a new pipeline, which began 
making commercial deliveries on 1 January 2011. The deal not only provides 
the two Russian oil companies with much needed credit, it also helps Russia to 
secure customers and reduce its dependence on Western European customers. 
Another notable deal is a US$10 billion loan agreement with the Brazilian state-
owned oil giant Petroleo Brasileiro SA, known as Petrobras—the biggest deal 
in Central and South America. This loan is to help Petrobras develop newly 
discovered offshore oil reserves, which promise to convert Brazil into a major 
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world oil exporter. Under the terms of the 10-year loan from CDB, Petrobras was 
to supply China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation, known as Sinopec, with 
150 000 barrels per day in 2009, rising to 200 000 barrels per day for another 
nine years, from 2010 to 2019 (Ma 2009; The Economist 2010).
It should be pointed out that loan-for-oil and loan-for-gas deals are not 
without risk. Contracts could be voided with a change of government. Resource-
rich countries might fail to supply the promised quantities. Moreover, because 
the oil is not collateral for the loan, if the borrowers threaten to cut off the 
supply of oil, lenders cannot seize extra oil or oil revenue to compensate for 
potential losses (Jacob 2010; Jiang and Sinton 2011). Therefore, loan-for-oil and 
loan-for-gas deals are not the preferred method of the NOCs to gain foreign 
supplies. Good-quality assets are, however, rarely for sale these days, and even 
if they were, Chinese NOCs might not be able to fairly win the bids, as foreign 
governments have blocked many Chinese NOCs’ attempts to buy oil fields. 
Given these constraints, loan-for-oil and loan-for-gas deals serve as a second-
best strategy for China to diversify its oil supply (Arnson and Davidow 2011; 
Jiang and Sinton 2011; The Economist 2010).
In the midst of the global financial crisis, China further diversified its energy 
import mix via loan-for-oil and loan-for-gas deals. Chinese state-owned banks 
made loans worth US$77 billion to nine different oil and gas-producing countries 
in 2009 and 2010, all of which are located outside the Middle East (Jiang and 
Sinton 2011). Many outside observers explicitly or implicitly assume that these 
deals grant Chinese NOCs a discount. Under this assumption, borrowers simply 
send oil to China at a preset price to pay back the loan, and thus might lose out 
as oil prices rise. This is a misunderstanding of how this kind of deal works,5 
and is a misreading of the evidence. Chinese NOCs have no bargaining on 
prices, and all the deals are linked to market prices, not quantities of oil. Russia, 
Brazil and Venezuela all sell their oil to China at market prices (Downs 2011a; 
Gallagher et al. 2012; Jiang and Sinton 2011). These market-based arrangements 
will ensure deliveries of oil, as the temptation to default on supply contracts if 
the market price were to rise above a negotiated price would be very strong. 
The difficulties seen in other commodity markets—such as for iron ore—where 
long-term contracts sit beside spot markets, illustrate this reality.
Chinese NOCs, however, with support from the Chinese Government and 
backed with Chinese policy banks, did take advantage of stricken foreign 
companies in the global financial crisis to enable them to reach otherwise 
5  In a typical deal involving the CDB, one Chinese NOC and a foreign borrower (say, a foreign oil 
company), the CDB provides the loan to the foreign borrower and opens an account to the borrower. 
Then the Chinese NOC buys the oil from the borrower at market prices and deposits its payments into 
the borrower’s designated account at the CDB. In this way, the foreign borrower is obliged to sell oil to 
the Chinese NOC, and the CDB is guaranteed to receive payments to repay itself for the loan.
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unlikely deals and receive long-term oil and gas supplies. Moreover, these deals, 
backed with the CDB’s loans, required the borrowers to buy and hire from China 
to mitigate loan risks,6 despite no policy conditions being imposed (Gallagher 
et al. 2012). The agreement with Petrobras stipulates that US$3 billion of the 
US$10 billion loan must be used to purchase oil equipment from China. China’s 
US$10 billion loan to Argentina in 2010 is to buy Chinese trains. Thus, this loan 
is actually a credit line for Chinese railway companies to invest in 10 separate 
rail projects in Argentina, with the money effectively staying in China. Half of 
the US$20.6 billion loan the CDB granted to Venezuela’s Bank of Economic and 
Social Development is denominated in Chinese renminbi, which locks Venezuela 
into buying Chinese equipment and hiring Chinese firms (De  Córdoba 2011; 
Downs 2011b; Hall 2010). Clearly, in addition to securing oil supplies, these 
deals also serve the Government’s goal of creating new export markets for 
Chinese companies and at the same time reduce their exposure to default risks 
and the borrowers’ potential for misuse and corruption (Bräutigam 2009). 
These borrowers find purchase requirements attached to Chinese loans less 
objectionable because they seek to build up their energy, mining, infrastructure, 
transportation and housing sectors inexpensively using Chinese inputs and 
equipment.7
Chinese NOCs’ Equity Oil Shares 
In the early 2000s, the Chinese Government adopted its so-called going-out 
policies to help state-owned companies, including Chinese NOCs, to achieve 
their ambition to grow and build global businesses. Arguably the Government 
also sees supporting Chinese NOCs to make oil and natural gas mergers and 
acquisitions (M&A) overseas as a way to diversify its foreign exchange reserves 
to higher-yielding assets away from low-yielding financial instruments such as 
US Treasury Bonds (Downs 2011b). As a result of the going-out policy supported 
by Chinese policy banks, these NOCs now have equity stakes in production in 
20 countries. By the first quarter of 2010, NOCs’ overseas equity shares had 
reached 1.36 mbpd—nearly one-third of China’s net imports in 2009 (Jiang and 
Sinton 2011).
6  Western development loans tend to attach transparency and seniority clauses and reform requirements in 
an effort to reduce loan risks. 
7  This depends on the requirements of the borrowers. Mexico, Colombia and Peru—the traditional 
borrowers of the World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank—are undertaking projects outside 
the energy, mining, infrastructure, transportation and housing sectors for which Chinese purchase 
requirements would be a burden. They find the transparency and reform requirements of Western 
loans less costly than Chinese equipment. Brazil and Argentina accept Western loans where they find it 
acceptable to comply with Western standards. At the same time, they take on Chinese oil, mining and 
railway loans because they are willing to use Chinese inputs and have little objection to the purchase 
requirements (Gallagher et al. 2012).
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With oil an internationally traded commodity, China’s endeavours to expand 
its global search and production of oil are constantly confronted with the 
issue of whether this strategy is superior to simply buying oil in open markets 
because of concerns about Chinese NOCs’ overbidding and making investment 
losses abroad.
The Chinese oil companies have a history of overpaying for equity 
positions (Balfour 2002).8 Because China has viewed paying a higher price than 
competitors to secure energy resources as more of a national security issue than 
a pure business decision (Bradsher 2005), such bidding wars between Chinese 
companies and their rivals have further intensified the tendency of Chinese oil 
companies to pay far above what competitors offer. Prior to the credit crisis, 
China had grabbed these deals by overbidding by at least 10 per cent more than 
its competitor from India did. In January 2006, the CNOOC bought a 45 per cent 
stake in the Akpo offshore oil and gas field in Nigeria for US$2.27 billion by 
outbidding the competitor, India’s state-owned Oil and Natural Gas Corp 
(ONGC), which submitted a bid of US$2 billion but withdrew after India’s 
cabinet raised concerns about the risks involved (Aiyar 2006; Masaki 2006). 
In August 2005, the CNPC paid US$4.18 billion to acquire Canadian oil company 
PetroKazakhstan, making it China’s largest foreign acquisition ever at that time 
(Bradsher 2005). Originally, the CNPC offered US$3.6 billion. With an Indian 
consortium (ONGC-Mittal) bid of US$3.8 billion, the CNPC hiked its offer to 
US$4.18 billion to secure the deal (Basu 2005). 
The financial and credit crises and the decline in global oil demand have turned 
the oil industry into a buyers’ market, however temporarily. Should Chinese oil 
majors be able to make better M&A deals than those prior to the credit crisis? 
On 24 June 2009, Sinopec made a C$8.27 billion (US$7.22 billion) takeover bid 
for the international oil and gas exploration company Addax Petroleum, making 
it the largest overseas takeover by a Chinese company. The takeover would 
have given Sinopec access to Addax’s stakes in oil fields off the coast of West 
Africa, as well as in Iraq (Zhang 2010b). The Korea National Oil Corporation 
also bid for Addax, offering USS$6.9 billion (The Chosun IIbo 2009). Sinopec 
offered US$7.2 billion to win the deal. So, Sinopec overbid its competitor by 
only 4.6 per cent—far less than the overbidding of at least 10 per cent it had 
made in those aforementioned deals prior to the credit crisis. Measured in 
other ways, however, the story differs. Sinopec’s offer is equivalent to US$34 
8  Overpaying for acquisitions does not apply to China alone. Areva, a French state-owned nuclear energy 
group, is reported to have overpaid in its US$2.7 billion purchase in 2007 of UraMin, a Canadian start-up 
firm with mining assets in Namibia, resulting in a huge operating loss for 2011. In the rush to snap up 
uranium deposits at a time when expectations of a nuclear renaissance caused uranium prices to soar, 
Areva failed to do enough metallurgical due diligence on UraMin’s mines. The reserves in Namibia 
turned out to be smaller and less easily extractable than expected. This was compounded by a plunging 
uranium price after the Fukushima nuclear accident, thus further reducing the deposits’ value  
(The Economist 2012b).
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a barrel of proved reserves and US$14 a barrel of proved and probable reserves. 
The African transaction average in 2007—when the average crude price was 
similar to the prices in 2009 at the time this deal was made—was US$14.40 
a barrel for proved reserves and US$9.90 for proved and probable reserves, 
respectively. On a proven basis, the 2007 average suggests US$3.1 billion total 
value for the deal. Therefore, US$7.2 billion implies a 135 per cent premium 
(Xu 2009). In December 2008, Sinopec paid C$2.1 billion to acquire Tanganyika 
Oil, a Canadian company that owned oil fields in Syria. The 95 per cent takeover 
marked the first time a Chinese company had almost complete ownership of a 
formerly North American oil and gas firm. The C$2.1 billion deal was initiated 
when the price of oil was at US$90 a barrel. When the price fell to US$40 a barrel by 
December of that year, the offer was generally seen as overpriced. The company 
still went ahead with the purchase (Vaidyanathan 2012). On 8 October 2011, 
Sinopec bought Daylight Energy, a Canadian oil and natural gas producer, for 
about C$2.2 billion in cash. Under the terms of the deal, Sinopec offered C$10.08 
a share. That is more than double Daylight’s closing price of C$4.59 on the last 
trading day and 43.9 per cent above the 60-day weighted average trading price. 
China’s largest refiner paid a very high premium over its share price to fully 
acquire Daylight Energy (De La Merced 2011). 
It is important to note, however, that the higher bid does not always win in 
a politically charged industry such as energy. CNOOC in 2005 failed to acquire 
Unocal for US$18.5 billion, although it topped Chevron’s bid of US$16.4 billion. 
In the end, Chevron won the deal based on other factors. This overpaying could 
partly reflect a need to overcome the kinds of political difficulties that hampered 
Chinese state-owned companies’ overseas takeover attempts in recent years. 
Nevertheless, the Chinese NOCs are more reluctant than in the past to overpay for 
assets for at least two reasons. First, the Chinese NOCs have moved up technology 
and project management learning curves that the IOCs have dominated and have 
become increasingly sophisticated and capable internationally. Second, they 
have been tightening their premiums by examining the financial returns of their 
bids. CNOOC has started using a financial metric system that allows it to price its 
bids more accurately. Now even the larger national oil companies like PetroChina 
and Sinopec have started to follow the CNOOC’s path (Vaidyanathan 2012). 
A  recent study by the International Energy Agency uncovered no evidence 
of systematic or intentional overpayment associated with recent acquisitions 
(Jiang and Sinton 2011); however, this is still an issue open to debate, and there 
is still disagreement. Some American analysts, like Herberg (2012), believe that 
Chinese NOCs continue to pay significant premiums to acquire overseas assets. 
Derek Scissors of the conservative Heritage Foundation was also quoted as 
saying that Chinese companies usually pay 20 to 30 per cent more than other 
companies to secure assets (Vaidyanathan 2012). The premiums were generally 
seen as necessary to keep shareholders happy and quell any political concerns 
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given anti-China sentiment in certain circles. Eventually, whether assets are 
worth the premium price in the long run depends on whether and how far the 
value of oil and gas properties will rise.
Another issue is related to wide concerns about huge losses incurred when 
investing abroad. A study by China University of Petroleum suggests that China’s 
‘big-three’ oil corporations (CNPC, Sinopec and CNOOC) had invested in some 
144 overseas projects totalling US$70 billion by the end of 2010, but two-thirds 
of such overseas investments suffered losses (Fu and Lin 2012; Oxford Analytica 
2011). Given that these SOEs may cover overseas losses through their access 
to capital at home, this has created a perception of these SOEs as irresponsible 
users of state funds.
It can be argued that economic rationales take the back seat if the NOCs’ 
oil production outside China can help to improve China’s energy security. 
The question is then: are the Chinese NOCs’ equity oil shares improving China’s 
energy security?
First, as mentioned above, sending Chinese NOCs’ equity oil shares home 
would mean they faced the same US-led oil blockade problem if it were to 
emerge—even though this author is sceptical about the effectiveness of any 
blockade, as argued above.
Second, China’s oil imports rapidly outpace the equity oil production of the 
Chinese NOCs and their ability to acquire oil assets and accumulate investments 
in equity production abroad, so the equity oil strategy is hopelessly inadequate 
as a critical energy security strategy (Herberg 2012).
Third, it is widely understood that Chinese NOCs’ willingness to overpay is 
to a large extent because these state-owned oil majors are obliged to guarantee 
China’s energy security. There is little evidence, however, to suggest that the 
Chinese NOCs necessarily send their equity oil production back to China. 
Instead, the NOCs apparently prefer to let market conditions decide whether 
it is shipped back to China or whether it is sold to regional or international 
markets at the best price, as other IOCs do (Jiang and Sinton 2011; Kennedy 
2011). Prior to completion of the Kazakhstan–China oil pipeline in 2009, the 
Chinese equity oil from the Aktobe field in Kazakhstan was transported via 
the pipeline to Atyrau to be sold on the international market. Even with the 
new pipeline in operation, some of CNPC’s equity oil from Kazakhstan is still 
not shipped home. CNPC International, the exploration and production arm 
for CNPC’s overseas production, determines whether it is profitable to sell 
the oil that it produces to China National United Oil Corporation. This CNPC 
trading company also evaluates whether buying crude oil locally close to the 
pipeline starting point (Atasu, prior to 2009) is more economical than buying 
Rebalancing and Sustaining Growth in China
348
crude produced at Aktobe by CNPC’s exploration and production subsidiary 
and transporting it to Atasu (Jiang and Sinton 2011). China’s equity production 
in Venezuela has also not been shipped back to China. This is mainly because 
it is too costly to do that given the long distance involved, and partly because 
Venezuelan heavy crude was not compatible with the existing Chinese refining 
capabilities before PetroChina teamed up with the Venezuelan state-owned oil 
company, PDVSA, to build a refinery to process this type of crude oil in Jieyang, 
Guangdong (Jiang and Sinton 2011).
Fourth, the available evidence does not suggest that oil produced from the 
Chinese NOCs would be either cheaper or more available to Chinese consumers 
in a supply crisis. Indeed, these NOCs have shown little inclination to grant 
Chinese customers a discount when prices are high (Kennedy 2011). In fact, the 
NOCs responded to rising crude oil prices prior to 2008 by reducing supplies 
of refined products to the Chinese market, resulting in widespread shortages at 
the pump, since the Government’s controls over the prices of oil products did 
not allow them to pass their rising crude costs on to customers (Downs 2010).
In the meantime, Chinese investments in oil fields overseas do help to pump 
more oil out of the fields and enlarge the overall availability of oil on the world 
market. But this is seen as beneficial not only for Chinese consumers but also 
for other global consumers (Zhang 2007, 2010b). Taking these points together, 
Chinese NOCs’ efforts to secure overseas oil and gas supplies are not a threat 
to US or Western energy security because Chinese investments in oil fields 
overseas enlarge the overall availability of oil on the world market. But they do 
not unambiguously improve China’s energy security either because the NOCs do 
not necessarily send their equity oil production back to China (Herberg 2012; 
Jiang and Sinton 2011; Kennedy 2011).
Concluding Remarks
China is the world’s largest energy consumer and the world’s largest energy 
producer. China has relied and will continue to rely heavily on domestic energy 
resources to fuel its economic development. This makes China different from 
many other large economies. China is a key player on both the demand and the 
supply sides. Those who hold the ‘China energy threat’ view and blame Chinese 
oil demand and imports for high oil prices often tend to neglect this basic fact. 
This is not to deny the fact that China is increasingly dependent on imported 
oil. Indeed, this, combined with its heavy reliance on the Strait of Malacca to 
ship imported oil to China, poses distinct security challenges for China. Given 
the strategic importance of the Strait of Malacca and China’s limited influence 
on the waterway, China has taken great efforts on both the demand and the 
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supply sides to cope with its perceived Malacca dilemma and to enhance its 
energy security. China’s responses on the demand side are well formulated and 
justified, but the same cannot be said on the supply side. Some measures—for 
example, developing its own strategic petroleum reserves—are well taken, but 
others, such as going-out policies and exacerbation of disruption of supply, are 
open to debate. They might be considered misguided and not well founded. 
Needless to say, NOC expansion is a positive development for the companies 
themselves. If NOCs’ deals improve China’s energy security then it is reasonable 
to allow profitability to be sought as a second priority. If, however, that first 
condition is not met then the entire strategy is questionable because many 
NOCs’ deals are not justified on economic grounds alone. 
China’s aggressive global expansion to acquire resources is often perceived 
as a threat. This is a misreading of the evidence because Chinese NOCs’ efforts 
to secure overseas oil and gas supplies do not threaten US or Western energy 
security. Most oil produced by Chinese NOCs abroad was sold on international 
markets, benefiting not only Chinese consumers but also other global consumers. 
This perceived threat could, however, lead the Chinese NOCs to overpay in 
deals, and drive up the world prices of resources compared with what would 
otherwise have been the case. Being aggressive and keeping higher profiles 
than is strictly necessary, in the name of energy security, the Chinese NOCs are 
complicating China’s foreign relations in sensitive regions of the world and they 
could hijack the Chinese Government’s going-out policies to increase their own 
profits but at the expense of China’s overall national interests. 
In the context of discussions of China’s energy security, there is a tendency 
to overestimate potential disruptions to oil supply or take a pessimistic view of 
the stability of energy trade. This largely reflects mistrust of global oil markets; 
but evidence suggests that market-based energy contracts are long lasting, 
prevailing over ideological differences, wars or politically motivated action. 
Evidence suggests that under commercial contracts the former Soviet Union 
exported natural gas to Western Europe virtually unimpeded even during the 
Cold War era; however, brothers can be brought into conflicts if one does not 
follow market rules. This was clearly reflected by natural gas disputes between 
Russia and the Ukraine in 2005, despite the fact that the latter was a former 
Soviet republic and they remain close to each other. Russia attempted to halt the 
supply of natural gas to the Ukraine because of a disagreement over a payment 
for its natural gas sold to the Ukraine. Russia supplied the natural gas to the 
Ukraine at a price of US$50 per 1000 cu m at that time while its gas exported 
to Western Europe was at a price nearly five times that (Mao 2006). Clearly, the 
root cause of this dispute was politics because this supply of natural gas was not 
based on a commercial contract but rather on a political deal. Thus, it should 
not come as a surprise that one side was not going to stick to the deal when it 
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saw changing political conditions on the other side. In this case, Russia viewed 
the Ukraine’s notable trend towards autonomy and political independence away 
from Russia. 
Moreover, the oil embargos led by the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC) are most unlikely to be repeated—first, for the sake of OPEC 
itself. Even if undertaken, they would not be as damaging as in the 1970s because 
the major energy-consuming economies are much less energy intensive and have 
diversified their primary energy supply and have built up their emergency oil 
stockpiles to deal with any physical disruptions to supply. Furthermore, using 
resources as a political weapon is condemned internationally. Russia has been 
heavily criticised for its continued differential treatment of the former Soviet 
republics in terms of the price of its supplied natural gas. It supplies natural 
gas at a low price to those republics politically close to Russia but at a high 
price to those politically close to the West. While China denied the embargo 
threat, it received heavy criticism of its alleged embargo of rare-earth exports to 
Japan after Japan’s arrest of a Chinese trawler captain in the Diaoyu Islands in 
September 2010.
It thus follows that both China and Western countries need to depoliticise 
China’s global quest for energy security. Western politicians need to recognise 
that their rhetoric in relation to China’s efforts to secure energy supplies 
overseas—which paints it as a major threat—has done nothing but intensify 
China’s fear that they might seek to deny China’s access to the oil it needs for 
development. China needs to reconsider its stance of distrusting global oil 
markets and to recognise that reliance on aggressive acquisitions of overseas 
oil fields and equity oil production has been of little help in strengthening its 
energy security. Just like other oil importers, China’s energy security depends 
increasingly and deeply on the stability of global oil markets and reliable and 
growing oil supplies to the market. Thus, China and other major oil-importing 
countries share profound common interests in maintaining and strengthening the 
stability of global oil markets and reducing the chance of potential disruptions 
to oil supply and the resulting damaging oil-price shocks. 
Acknowledgments
I would like to dedicate this chapter to my mother, Guo Xié, who passed away 
on 3 April 2012. The main ideas of the chapter were presented at the Conference 
on China Energy Issues in the Twelfth Five Year Plan and Beyond, Singapore, 
23–24 February 2012. The chapter has benefited from work in this area from 
The Australian National University, Brookings Institution, Global Development 
and Environment Institute and the International Energy Agency. That said, the 
Why Are the Stakes So High?
351
views expressed here are those of the author, and do not reflect the positions 
of those institutions. The author bears sole responsibility for any errors and 
omissions that remain.
References
Aiyar, P., 2006, ‘No “great game” between India and China’, Asia Times, 
13 January, <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China_Business/HA13Cb01.html>
Arnson, C. and Davidow, J., 2011, China, Latin America, and the United States: 
The new triangle, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 
Washington, DC.
Balfour, F., 2002, ‘A global shopping spree for the Chinese: Mainland companies 
are snapping up more overseas assets’, Business Week, 18 November, 
<http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/02_46/b3808162.htm>
Basu, I., 2005, ‘India discreet, China bold in oil hunt’, Asia Times, 29 September, 
<http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/GI29Df01.html>
Blumenthal, D., 2008, ‘Concerns with respect to China’s energy policy’, in 
G. B. Collins, L. Goldstein, A. S. Erickson and W. S. Murray (eds), China’s 
Energy Strategy: The impact of Beijing’s maritime policies, Naval Institute 
Press, Annapolis, Md, pp. 418–36.
Bradsher, K., 2005, ‘Chinese company to buy Kazakh oil interests for $4 billion’, 
The New York Times, 22 August.
Bräutigam, D., 2009, The Dragon’s Gift: The real story of China in Africa, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford.
British Petroleum (BP), 2011, BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2011, British 
Petroleum, London.
Bussey, J., 2012, ‘US attacks China Inc.’, Wall Street Journal, 3 February.
Chen, S., 2010, ‘China’s self-extrication from the “Malacca dilemma” and 
implications’, International Journal of Chinese Studies, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 1–24.
Collins, G. and Murray, W., 2008, ‘No oil for the lamps of China?’, in 
G. Collins, L. J. Goldstein and A. S. Erickson (eds), China’s Energy Strategy: 
The impact of Beijing’s maritime policies, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 
Md, pp. 387–407.
Davis, B., 2011, ‘US targets state firms, eyeing China’, Wall Street Journal, 
25 October.
Rebalancing and Sustaining Growth in China
352
De Córdoba, J., 2011, ‘China—oil deal gives Chávez a leg up’, Wall Street Journal, 
9 November, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240529702037335045
77026073413045462.html>
De La Merced, M. J., 2011, ‘Sinopec to buy Daylight Energy for $2.1 billion’, 
The New York Times, 9 October, <http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/10/09/
sinopec-to-buy-daylight-energy-for-2-1-billion/>
Downs, E., 2006, China, Foreign Policy Studies Energy Security Series, Brookings 
Institution, Washington, DC.
Downs, E., 2010, ‘China’s energy rise’, in B. Womack (ed.), China’s Rise in 
Historical Perspective, Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham, Md.
Downs, E., 2011a, ‘China Development Bank’s oil loans: pursuing policy—and 
profit’, China Economic Quarterly, vol. 15, no. 4, pp. 43–7.
Downs, E., 2011b, Inside China Inc.: China Development Bank’s cross-border 
energy deals, John L. Thornton China Center Monograph Series No. 3, 
Brookings Institution, Washington, DC.
Forsythe, M. and Sanderson, H., 2011, ‘Financing China costs poised to rise 
with CDB losing sovereign-debt status’, Bloomberg, 2 May, <http://www.
bloomberg.com/news/2011-05-02/financing-china-costs-poised-to-rise-
with-decision-on-cdb-debt.html>
Fu, M. M. and Lin, X., 2012, ‘Overseas investment of Chinese enterprises 
suffers losses of nearly US$100 billion, 70% of the investment does not 
make money’, China Times, 11 February, <http://finance.sina.com.cn/china/
hgjj/20120211/081311358170.shtml>
Gallagher, K. P., Irwin, A. and Koleski, K., 2012, The New Banks in Town: Chinese 
finance in Latin America, Inter-American Dialogue, Washington, DC.
Hall, S., 2010, ‘China to invest in Argentine railways’, Wall Street Journal, 
13  July, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274870451890457536
4523811330964.html>
Herberg, M., 2012, China’s global quest for resources and implications for 
the United States, Testimony before the US–China Economic and Security 
Review Commission, Washington, DC, 26 January, <http://www.uscc.gov/
hearings/2012hearings/written_testimonies/12_01_26/12_1_26_herberg_
testimony.pdf>
Holmes, J., 2007, China’s energy consumption and opportunities for US–China 
cooperation to address the effects of China’s energy use, Testimony before 
Why Are the Stakes So High?
353
the US–China Economic and Security Review Commission, Washington, 
DC, 14 June, <http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2007hearings/transcripts/
june_14_15/holmes_prepared_remarks.pdf>
Hua, Y., 2011, ‘China leads the world in energy production during the 11th 
five-year period’, Sina Finance, 6 January, <http://finance.sina.com.
cn/g/20110106/10009212106.shtml>
International Energy Agency (IEA), 2000, World Energy Outlook 2000, 
International Energy Agency, Paris.
International Energy Agency (IEA), 2010, World Energy Outlook 2010, 
International Energy Agency, Paris.
International Energy Agency (IEA), 2011, World Energy Outlook 2011, 
International Energy Agency, Paris.
Jacob, J., 2010, ‘Ecuador, China sign $1 billion cash-for-crude loan deal’, 
International Business Times, 1 September, <http://www.ibtimes.com/
articles/48140/20100901/ecuador-china-energy-crude-latinamerica-
petrochina-petroecuador-opec-loan.htm>
Jiang, J. and Sinton, J., 2011, Overseas investments by Chinese national oil 
companies: assessing the drivers and impacts, February, Information Paper 
prepared for the Standing Group for Global Energy Dialogue of the 
International Energy Agency, Paris.
Kennedy, A., 2011, ‘China’s petroleum predicament: challenges and opportunities 
in Beijing’s search for energy security’, in J. Golley and L. Song (eds), 
Rising  China: Global challenges and opportunities, ANU E Press, Canberra, 
pp. 121–35.
Lanteigne, M., 2008, ‘China’s maritime security and the “Malacca dilemma”’, 
Asian Survey, vol. 4, no. 2, pp. 143–61.
Ma, J. T., 2012, The national economy maintained steady and rapid development 
in 2011, 17 January, National Bureau of Statistics, Beijing, <http://www.
stats.gov.cn/tjfx/jdfx/t20120117_402779443.htm>
Ma, W., 2012, ‘Shell reaches Chinese shale-gas deal’, Wall Street Journal, 
21 March.
Ma, Y. D., 2009, ‘China and Brazil signed US$10 billion loan-for-oil for a period 
of 10 years’, Oriental Morning Post, 20 May, <http://www.dfdaily.com/
node2/node23/node220/userobject1ai169877.shtml>
Mao, Y. S., 2006, ‘Politics vs market’, China Security, no. 3, pp. 106–15.
Rebalancing and Sustaining Growth in China
354
Masaki, H., 2006, ‘Japan takes on China in Africa’, Asia Times, 15 August, 
<http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Japan/HH15Dh01.html>
National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBS), 2009, China Statistical Yearbook 
2009, China Statistics Press, Beijing.
National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), Ministry of Finance, 
Ministry of Land and Resources and National Energy Administration, 2012, 
Development Plan for Shale Gas, 13 March, National Development and 
Reform Commission, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Land and Resources 
and National Energy Administration, Beijing, <http://zfxxgk.nea.gov.cn/
auto86/201203/P020120316383507834234.pdf>
Oxford Analytica, 2011, ‘China: state firms face scrutiny for overseas losses’, 
Oxford Analytica, 20 October.
Oxford Analytica, 2012, ‘China: gas consumption set to soar’, Oxford Analytica, 
7 February.
Shi, H. T., 2004, ‘China’s “Malacca dilemma”’, China Youth Daily, 15 June, 
<http://zqb.cyol.com/content/2004-06/15/content_888233.htm>
Storey, I., 2006, ‘China’s “Malacca dilemma”’, China Brief, vol. 6, no. 8 (12 April), 
<http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_
news%5D=31575>
The Chosun IIbo, 2009, ‘South Korea fought against China for natural resources 
despite repeated losses’, IFeng, 10 August, <http://finance.ifeng.com/news/
hqcj/20090811/1071120.shtml>
The Economist, 2010, ‘Brazil/China economy: deeper inroads—Latin America’, 
The Economist, 16 August, <http://latinamerica.economist.com/news/
brazilchina-economy-deeper-inroads/200>
The Economist, 2012a, ‘Lexington: buttering-up and scolding’, The Economist, 
18 February, p. 36.
The Economist, 2012b, ‘Nuclear energy in France: fallout’, The Economist, 
18 February, p. 67.
Tsukimori, O., 2012, ‘China overtakes Japan as world’s top coal importer’, 
Reuters, 26 January, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/26/us-coal-
china-japan-idUSTRE80P08R20120126>
United States Energy Information Administration (USEIA), 2004, International 
Energy Outlook 2004, Energy Information Administration, Washington, DC.
Why Are the Stakes So High?
355
United States Energy Information Administration (USEIA), 2011a, International 
Energy Outlook 2011, DOE/EIA-0484(2011), Energy Information 
Administration, Washington, DC, <http://205.254.135.24/forecasts/ieo/
pdf/0484(2011).pdf>
United States Energy Information Administration (USEIA), 2011b, World Shale 
Gas Resources: An initial assessment of 14 regions outside the United States, 
Energy Information Administration, Washington, DC, <http://www.eia.
gov/analysis/studies/worldshalegas/pdf/fullreport.pdf>
Vaidyanathan, G., 2012, ‘China: with energy investments rising, vice president 
heads to US’, Greenwire, 14 February. 
Wang, X. and Wu, P., 2011, ‘China’s strategic oil reserves in 2020 will increase 
to about 85 million tons’, China Economic Weekly, 18 January, <http://news.
sina.com.cn/c/sd/2011-01-18/001821830415.shtml>
Welsch, E. and Lee, Y., 2012, ‘China fuels its global energy supply’, Wall Street 
Journal, 3 February.
Xinhua, 2012, ‘Sinopec buys shale interest from Devon for US$2.2b’, 
Xinhua, 4 January, <http://www.china.org.cn/business/2012-01/04/
content_24316460.htm>
Xu, J., 2009, ‘Is China Inc. overpaying in its merger deals?’, Wall Street Journal, 
25 June, <http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2009/06/25/is-china-inc-overpaying-
in-its-merger-deals/>
Yi, X., 2005, ‘Chinese foreign policy in transition: understanding China’s 
“peaceful development”’, Journal of East Asian Affairs, vol. 19, no. 1, 
pp. 74–112.
Zhang, Z. X., 1990, Evolution of Future Energy Demands and CO2 Emissions up 
to the Year 2030 in China, ECN-I--91-038, The Energy Research Centre of the 
Netherlands, The Hague.
Zhang, Z. X., 1998, The Economics of Energy Policy in China: Implications for 
global climate change, New Horizons in Environmental Economics Series, 
Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK.
Zhang, Z. X., 2007, ‘China’s hunt for oil in Africa in perspective’, Energy and 
Environment, vol. 18, no. 1, pp. 87–92.
Zhang, Z. X., 2010a, ‘China in the transition to a low-carbon economy’, Energy 
Policy, vol. 38, pp. 6638–53.
Rebalancing and Sustaining Growth in China
356
Zhang, Z. X., 2010b, ‘Energy policy in China in the transition to a low-carbon 
economy’, in F. Fesharaki, N. Y. Kim and Y. H. Kim (eds), Fossil Fuels to Green 
Energy: Policy schemes in transition for the North Pacific, Korean Energy 
Economics Institute Press, Seoul, pp. 176–225.
Zhang, Z. X., 2011a, ‘Assessing China’s carbon intensity pledge for 2020: 
stringency and credibility issues and their implications’, Environmental 
Economics and Policy Studies, vol. 13, no. 3, pp. 219–35.
Zhang, Z. X., 2011b, ‘China’s energy security, the Malacca dilemma and 
responses’, Energy Policy, vol. 39, pp. 7612–15.
Zhang, Z. X., 2011c, Energy and Environmental Policy in China: Towards a low-
carbon economy, New Horizons in Environmental Economics Series, Edward 
Elgar, Cheltenham, UK.
Zhao, H., 2007, ‘Rethinking the Malacca dilemma and China’s energy security’, 
Contemporary International Relations, no. 6, pp. 36–42.
Zhong, J. J., 2012, ‘Crude oil imports rose by 6% year-on-year, dependence 




absorptive capacity 6, 11, 155, 169
Addax Petroleum 345
Afghanistan 157, 337
Africa 334, 335, 339, 340, 345, 346
ageing population 11, 15, 74, 256, 259, 
261, 262, 263, 267, 268, 270, 271, 
282, 283
agglomeration 13, 101, 102, 104, 105, 222
agricultural 
 census 208
 employment 25, 34, 37, 74, 251, 252, 
258, 259, 261–2
 inputs 218, 323
 investment 157
 land 101
 output (AO) 176, 177, 182
 productivity 33, 34, 35
 sector 55, 316, 318, 323
 transformation 1
 water use 309, 314, 315, 317, 318, 
321, 325, 326
 see also non-agricultural
agriculture 26, 31, 74, 95, 158, 251, 258, 
320, 323
 see also farming 
allocative efficiency 76, 77
Angola 124
Anhui 98n.1, 183, 196, 211, 229, 252, 
253, 256, 260, 324
appreciation 7, 13, 23, 26, 27, 36, 65, 66, 
74, 80, 82–3, 85n.5, 87–9, 153, 159, 
168, 331
 see also currency 
Argentina 340, 341, 344
Arrow Energy 332
Asia 22n.8, 70, 74, 154, 337
Asian Development Bank (ADB) 71, 269
Asian financial crisis 74, 87
Asia-Pacific 337
Association of South-East Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) 157




barriers to entry 10, 16, 48, 72, 74, 159, 
167, 245
Beijing 98n.1, 127, 128, 183, 225, 315, 
323, 324
bottlenecks 13, 150, 153, 168, 170, 309, 
326
Brahmaputra River 311
Brazil 85, 124, 339, 341, 342, 343, 344n.7
Britain 293
British Virgin Islands 156
Brunei 338
Cambodia 157
Canada 157, 168, 332, 345, 346
carbon dioxide emissions 1, 150, 169, 
329, 336
catch-up 3, 7n.4, 20, 38, 88, 329
Cayman Islands 129, 156
Central America 342
Central Asia 334, 340
Chao Lake 314
Chen Yuan 340, 342
Chengdu 119, 121, 122
Chevron 346
Chile 338
China Banking Regulatory Commission 
(CBRC) 53, 60
China Development Bank (CDB) 339, 340, 
341, 342, 343, 344
China Enterprise Confederation (CEC) 165
China National Offshore Oil Corporation 
(CNOOC) 332, 345, 346, 347
China National Petroleum Corporation 
(CNPC) 332, 333, 342, 345, 347, 348
China National United Oil Corporation 
347
China Petroleum and Chemical 
Corporation (Sinopec) 332, 343, 345, 
346, 347
China Securities Regulatory Commission 
(CSRC) 54, 60
China Social Insurance 280
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 272
Chinese Taipei 71, 85
Chongqing 98n.1, 183, 184, 211, 229, 324
climate change 324, 329, 336
Rebalancing and Sustaining Growth in China
358
coal 26, 31, 97, 157, 158, 164, 317, 318, 
320, 330, 331–3
 see also energy, mining




commercialisation 3n.1, 16, 60, 295, 300, 
301, 304, 305, 306
communes 72, 265, 266
comparative advantage 22, 93, 153, 161, 
163, 164
consumer price index (CPI) 30, 86
corruption 280, 344
 see also rent-seeking
Cultural Revolution 226, 230, 245
currency 7, 56, 59, 60, 79, 80, 82, 89
 see also appreciation, dollar peg, 
renminbi, US dollar




 change 22, 73, 283
 transition 72, 251–63, 267
 trends 94







dollar peg 66, 79, 80, 82, 87
 see also currency, renminbi, US dollar
East Asia 21, 22, 56, 309
economic and technological development 
zones (ETDZs) 116, 118, 122, 128, 
145
Ecuador 339, 341
employment 2, 7, 23, 27, 34, 72, 88, 95–6, 
98, 101n.4, 258–63, 265, 266, 270, 
275, 276, 278
 access to 12, 210
 formal contracts 277
 in ‘modern sector’ 26
 in manufacturing 93, 273
 in non-traded goods sector 88
 in production 26, 34
 in state-owned enterprises 72
 informal 273, 277
 location of 211
 non-agricultural 25
 off-farm 217, 251, 255, 262, 267
 opportunities 210
 statistics 254
 status 255–7, 274
 urban 21, 281
 see also labour, unemployment
energy 26, 30, 73, 169, 342
 consumption 169, 329–50
 demand 331, 336
 dependence 331
 diplomacy 334, 337
 input 159
 intensity 3, 5, 154, 168, 336, 350
 prices 83, 152
 production 330, 348
 security 16, 329–50
 supply 330, 331, 350
 see also coal, gas, nuclear, oil
environment 45n.1, 168, 315
 concern for 170





 costs 20, 149, 323
 damage 152, 167, 289, 310, 329
 health 310
 policy 168, 340
 pressures 151, 153
 problems 45
 projects 77
 protection 24, 152
 sustainability 310, 326, 327
 water 315, 325, 326
 see also technology—environmentally 
friendly 
Environmental Kuznets Curve 315
Ethiopia 108, 216n.6, 235
Index
359
Europe 11, 20n.6, 23, 38, 59, 93, 112, 





 rate 2, 7, 8, 11, 13, 21, 23, 25–8, 34, 
37, 38, 52, 56, 60, 65, 66, 78, 79–88, 
161
 reserves 60, 159, 340, 344
Export–Import Bank of China 339, 341
factor 
 analysis method 290
 conditions 153
 domestic factor income 35
 endowments 160, 161
 inputs 135, 139, 140, 142, 153, 161, 
289
 intensity 30, 31
 markets 10, 152, 169
 prices 11, 13, 29, 93, 94
 production factors 135, 150
 supplies 33
 see also total factor productivity 
farmers 74, 221, 255, 258n.2, 259, 260, 
266, 272, 274, 278, 279
farming 21, 72, 77, 94, 211, 216, 218, 259
 see also agriculture
financial 
 account surplus 2
 accounts 28
 capital 26
 development 47, 54, 57, 59, 60
 instability 11
 liberalisation 8, 46n.2, 47, 48, 51, 59, 
60, 61, 89, 152
 markets 7, 58, 59
 non-financial sector 12
 policy 45–8, 52, 54–6, 58, 59, 60, 61
 reform 7, 8, 9, 12, 45, 46, 48, 50, 51, 
52, 53, 59–60
 repression 12, 45–61
 sector 8, 20, 47, 48, 57, 339
 stability 47, 52
 system 6, 7, 8, 12, 47, 50, 51, 52, 54, 
61, 152




 Twelfth 8, 59, 170, 268, 282
‘flying geese’ 13, 93, 94, 100, 101, 108
food 95, 97, 144, 254, 309–10, 317, 318, 
320, 323
foreign direct investment (FDI) 10, 21, 22, 
28, 33, 34, 38, 39, 52
 see also outward foreign direct 
investment 
France 71, 112, 129, 134, 155, 293, 
345n.8
free-trade zones 116, 117, 118, 120, 122, 
126, 145, 338
Fujian 98n.1, 116, 183, 193, 200, 278, 
279, 324
Fukushima Daiichi 331, 345n.8
Gansu 98n.1, 184, 196, 324
gas 31, 152, 158, 160, 317, 329, 330, 332, 
333, 334, 337, 339, 341, 342–50
General Administration of Customs 
(China) 135, 333
Germany 71, 112, 124, 129, 134, 157, 293
global 
 economy 11, 22, 39, 73, 289, 334
 financial crisis 24, 49, 56, 60, 65, 66, 
68, 77, 79, 82, 112, 343
globalisation 153, 291
‘going-out policy’ 336, 337, 339, 344, 349
Gongbei 127
Guangdong 98n.1, 116, 127, 183, 193, 
196, 211, 229, 324, 348
Guangxi 98n.1, 184, 196, 324
Guangzhou 119, 121, 122, 127, 128
Guizhou 98n.1, 184, 196, 200, 324
Hai-Luan River 311
Hainan 98n.1, 117, 183, 196, 324
health 7, 8, 9, 252, 326, 329
 care 216, 267
 insurance 24, 265, 269
Hebei 98n.1, 183, 193, 196, 200, 211, 
323, 324
Heilongjiang 98n.1, 184, 324
Rebalancing and Sustaining Growth in China
360
Henan 98n.1, 183, 193, 200, 211, 229, 
252, 253, 256, 260, 324
high-tech 
 development zones 118
 enterprises 293, 301, 306
 exports 161
 industrial development zones 
(HTIDZs) 116, 118, 121, 122, 128
 industry 15, 289–307
 output 16
 products 154, 289, 293
 see also technology
Hong Kong 22, 54, 85, 112, 116, 123, 124, 
134, 154, 156, 157, 332
Hu Jintao 45n.1, 336
Huai River 311, 312
Huang–Huai–Hai (HHH) region 323
Huangpu 127
Hubei 98n.1, 183, 211, 229, 324
Hukou 184, 220, 230n.11, 242
Hunan 98n.1, 183, 196, 252, 253, 256, 
260, 324
India 21n.7, 52, 71, 85, 155, 345
Indonesia 14, 143, 157, 227, 334
industrialisation 1, 5, 6, 10, 20, 56, 72, 
93, 149, 151, 159, 326
inflation 27, 80, 83, 85, 87, 89, 161, 163, 
183, 281
infrastructure 1, 7, 10, 15, 21, 24, 66, 
70, 75, 77, 78, 88, 157, 168, 262n.3, 
275, 342, 344
Inner Mongolia 98n.1, 184, 193, 196, 
200, 324
innovation 2, 12, 24, 33, 168, 170, 278
 capacity 15, 16, 289–307
 domestic 20
 rate 47
Inter-American Development Bank 340, 
344n.7
International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development (IBRD) 340, 341
International Energy Agency 346, 350
International Monetary Fund (IMF) 50, 
53, 54
Iraq 337, 345
Italy 129, 155, 228, 237
Japan 3, 11, 14, 22, 23, 39, 40, 71, 78, 
112, 123, 124, 134, 150, 151, 154, 
155, 167–7, 169, 331, 342, 350
Jiangsu 98n.1, 118, 119, 121, 122, 127, 
183, 193, 196, 200, 211, 229, 252, 
253, 255, 256, 260, 324
Jiangxi 98n.1, 183, 196, 324
Jilin 98n.1, 121, 184, 196, 324
Jinbao Project 275
Kazakhstan 157, 347
Kazakhstan–China oil pipeline 347
knowledge 
 production 290, 295, 296, 297, 304
 reverse spillovers 150, 155
 spillovers 155
 stock/pool 160, 290, 291, 296, 298, 
300, 304
 structure 154
Korea 3, 22, 39, 70, 71, 74, 87, 112, 123, 
124, 134, 154
Korea National Oil Corporation 345
labour 2, 22, 72, 73, 74, 139, 142, 143, 
144, 266, 283, 289
 –capital ratio 77, 94, 96, 97, 139
 costs 7n.4, 22, 35, 66, 80, 83, 85–8, 
89, 93, 94, 98, 99, 100, 101, 104, 
105, 108, 152, 153, 154, 161, 162, 
168, 273, 277
 growth 66, 74, 77
 in production 31, 35
 inflexibility 11
 inputs 135, 143, 153, 161
 intensity 26
 -intensive exports 22, 39
 -intensive production 6, 93, 94, 96–
100, 101, 102, 106, 108, 154, 165–7, 
168, 323
 -intensive services 74
 low-skill 22
 market 6, 7, 15, 19, 56, 208, 266
 migration 15, 77, 207–22







productivity 21, 33, 34, 139, 293
 rural 251, 252, 255, 258–60
 -saving technology 77, 78
 shortage 93, 94, 108
 skilled 30, 31
 supply 3, 33, 34, 74, 88, 93, 142
 surplus 77, 214
 surplus rural 72, 76, 94, 207, 208
 tax 28
 transfer 72
 transformation 22, 39
 unskilled 30
 urban 15, 225, 246
 see also employment, reform—labour
Laos 157
Latin America 334, 339, 340
 see also Central America, South 
America
Lewis turning point 19, 22, 33, 34, 35, 
39, 74, 78, 94, 95, 108
Liaoning 98n.1, 184, 324
liberalisation 7, 8, 11, 52, 60, 73, 117, 
118, 150
 see also financial—liberalisation
loans-for-oil, see oil—loans-for-oil
London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) 
340, 341, 342
Macao 123, 124
‘Malacca dilemma’ 336, 337, 349
Malaysia 85, 124, 338
manufacturing 21, 38, 56, 77, 86n.2, 93, 
94–100, 102, 108, 126, 136, 149, 
152, 154, 157, 158, 162, 164, 165, 
166, 169, 170, 289, 293–4, 298–9, 
304, 310, 317, 323





 exports 3, 27, 268
 heavy 20, 21, 24, 27, 35, 36, 37, 38, 
39
 light 21, 22, 25–6, 34, 39
 ‘offshoring’ 19
 trade balance 5
 wages 85
 water intensity 16
 see also employment—in 
manufacturing
Mekong River 311
Mexico 210, 216n.6, 344n.7
Middle East 334, 335, 343
Midwest Mining Corp. 168
minerals 5, 30, 31, 96, 124, 125, 126, 144, 
160, 317, 318, 340
mining 31, 157, 158, 159, 317, 318, 320, 
342, 344, 345n.8
Ministry of Civil Affairs 270, 272
Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) 156
Ministry of Human Resources and Social 
Security (MOHRSS) 268, 274, 275, 
280, 281, 282
Ministry of Industry and Information 
Technology 165
Ministry of Water Resources (MWR) 324
Mongolia 117
Namibia 345n.8
Nanjing 112, 119, 121, 127, 128, 134
National Development and Reform 
Commission (NDRC) 156
National Energy Administration (China) 
333
National People’s Congress (NPC) 268, 
269, 272, 273
natural gas, see gas
Netherlands, the 112, 129, 134
New Zealand 338
Nigeria 332, 345
Ningbo 119, 121, 122, 127




 rural non-agricultural output (RNAO) 
177
North China Plain 310, 312, 315, 324, 326
North Korea 117
Norway 112, 129, 134, 157
nuclear 331, 345n.8
Rebalancing and Sustaining Growth in China
362
oil 16–17, 39, 65n.2, 124, 125, 152, 157, 
158, 160, 329–50
 blockade 16, 329, 330, 337–9, 347, 
350
 international oil companies (IOCs) 
332, 346, 347
 loans-for-oil 16, 330, 337, 342–4
 national oil companies (NOCs) 329, 
332, 333, 336, 337, 339, 342, 343, 
344–8, 349
 see also energy
Oil and Natural Gas Corp. (ONGC) 345
One Child Policy 22, 251, 261
open-door policy 111, 118
Organisation for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD) 70, 71, 73, 
75, 77, 85, 86, 269
Organisation of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC) 350
outward foreign direct investment (ODI) 
13–14, 149–50, 152–71
 see also foreign direct investment
Panama 129
Pearl River 117, 311, 312, 313
People’s Bank of China (PBC) 50, 51, 52, 
60, 80, 82
Peru 235, 338, 344n.7
PetroChina 332, 346, 348
PetroKazakhstan 345
Petroleo Brasileiro SA (Petrobras) 340, 
341, 342, 343, 344
Philippines 71, 124
Plaza Accord 23
pollution 3, 16, 150, 154, 310, 314, 318, 
319, 321, 323, 325, 326, 327, 329
 see also environment
poverty 20, 22, 23, 117, 208, 226, 245, 
265, 266, 278, 283
privatisation 10, 12, 21, 25, 33, 36, 37, 
38n.27
Pudong 112, 117, 119, 121, 122, 128, 134
Qingdao 119, 121, 122, 127
Qinghai 98n.1, 184, 196, 200, 324
raw materials 111, 116, 129, 152, 154, 
160, 162, 168, 316, 318, 320, 323
reform 6, 7, 8, 47, 50, 53, 55, 57, 61, 78, 
270, 274, 289, 344n.6, 344n.7
 economic 10, 46, 48, 52, 175, 266, 
271, 306
 economic policy 6, 11, 20
 government 6, 11, 282
 industrial 10, 20, 21, 24, 27, 33, 37, 
38, 39
 institutional 2, 6, 11, 20n.5, 150, 306
 labour 6, 11, 20, 225
 public service 271
 social security 15, 72, 267, 269, 282
 state-owned enterprise 10, 171
 structural 6, 265
 tax 10
 see also financial—reform
renminbi 11, 48, 53, 65–6, 79–88, 89, 344
 see also appreciation, currency, dollar 
peg
rent-seeking 2, 12, 20, 30
 see also corruption
research and development (R&D) 153, 
155, 164, 290, 291–4, 295, 296, 
298–302, 304, 305, 306
Ricardian equivalence 24, 27
Rosneft 340, 341, 342
Royal Dutch Shell PLC 333
Rural–Urban Migration in China (RUMiC) 
project 211, 213
Rural–Urban Migration in China and 
Indonesia (RUMiCI) Survey 14, 227, 
229, 231, 233
Russia 117, 157, 334, 335, 339, 340, 341, 
342, 343, 349, 350
Saudi Arabia 124
Shaanxi 98n.1, 184, 324
Shandong 98n.1, 119, 183, 323, 324
Shanghai 98n.1, 112, 119, 127, 128, 134, 
183, 225, 229, 324
Shantou 116, 120
Shanxi 98n.1, 183, 324
Shell 332, 333




Sichuan 98n.1, 119, 184, 193, 196, 211, 
229, 252, 253, 256, 260, 262, 324, 
333
Singapore 70, 74, 82n.4, 85, 124, 154, 
157, 338, 350
Sinopec, see China Petroleum and 
Chemical Corporation
Sinosteel 168
Social Insurance Administration (SIA) 
268, 274
Social Insurance Law 269, 271, 280
Social Security Bureau 275
Song-Liao River 311, 312
South Africa 157
South America 342
 see also Central America, Latin 
America
South-East Asia 116, 334
South–North Water Transfer Project 326
Soviet Union 349, 350
special economic zones (SEZs) 116, 117, 
118, 120, 122
spillover 12, 150, 155, 160, 169
Standard & Poor’s 82
State Council 262n.3, 272, 326
State-Owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission 
(SASAC) 168
Strait of Malacca 16, 333–6, 337, 348




Taiwan 3, 22, 36n.24, 39, 123, 124, 154, 
338
Tanganyika Oil 346
Tanggu 119, 121, 122
tax 10, 27, 52, 72, 101–2, 116–17, 129, 
270, 275
 company 34, 35, 36
 consumption 28, 30, 33, 34, 35





 incentives 54, 270




 rates 33, 101, 102, 104–6
 revenue 24, 102
 system 28
 see also labour—tax, reform—tax
technological
 barriers 305
 capability 150, 155, 165, 167, 169, 
170, 171
 challenges 305
 commercialisation 301, 305, 306




 progress 77, 153, 305
technology 101, 149, 150, 154, 155, 161, 
164, 168, 305, 306, 319, 323, 331, 
333, 346
 acquisition of 153, 170, 294–5, 296, 
298, 299, 301, 304, 307
 advanced 153, 157, 160, 162, 333
 backward 165, 169
 ‘blockade’ 16, 304
 capital-intensive 94
 clusters 160
 environmentally friendly 153, 169, 
170, 331
 exports 301
 imports 16, 169, 304
 improvement 139
 intensity 15, 165, 167, 170, 289, 293
 labour-saving 77
 production 29, 141n.5
 seeking 155, 159, 160, 162
 spillover 155
 transfer 155, 169, 305
 see also high-tech
Thailand 85, 87, 124
Thanlwin River 311
Tianjin 98n.1, 121, 127, 183, 225, 323, 
324
Tibet 23, 98n.1, 184, 321
Rebalancing and Sustaining Growth in China
364
TOTAL 332
total factor productivity (TFP) 33, 99, 
112, 135, 139, 145, 146
Transneft 340, 341, 342




 benefits 265, 267, 269
 insurance 9, 281
 see also employment, labour
United Nations 160, 267
United States 11, 19n.2, 23, 38, 52, 59, 
71, 82, 87, 88, 97, 123, 124, 129, 
143, 151, 155, 157, 169, 293, 311, 
329–34, 337–9, 344, 346, 347, 348, 
349
Unocal 346
US dollar 23, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 86, 87, 
123, 135, 161, 340
 see also currency, dollar peg
US Export–Import Bank 340, 341
Venezuela 339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 
348
Vietnam 157, 338
water 16, 83, 158, 309–27
Wen Jiabao 8n.6, 52, 268, 273, 282, 
340n.4
Western Development Strategy 262
World Bank 46n.2, 53, 54, 160, 161, 269, 
340, 344n.7
World Trade Organisation (WTO) 70, 72, 
74, 77, 118, 141, 291
Wuxi 119, 121
Xiamen 116, 119, 120, 121
Xinjiang 98n.1, 184, 193, 324
Xuzhou 119
Yangtze River 117, 119, 193, 311, 312, 
313
Yantai 119, 122
Yellow (Huang) River 311, 312, 315, 325
Yellow River Conservancy Commission 
(YRCC) 325
Yunnan 98n.1, 184, 196, 324
Zhanjiagang 121
Zhejiang 98n.1, 119, 183, 193, 211, 229, 
324
Zhuhai 116, 119, 120, 121
